THE 


HISTORY 


OF 


PROTECTIVE  TARIFF  LAWS 


BY 


R.     W.     THOMPSON, 


EX-SECRETARY  OF  THE  U.  S.  NAVY. 


THIRD     EDITION. 


CHICAGO: 
R.   S.   PEAIvE;    &    CO. 


MDCCCLXXXVIII. 


COPYRIGHT,   1888, 
BY 

R.  S.  PEALE  &  Co. 


"  Congress  have  repeatedly,  and  not  without  success,  directed  their  attention  to  the 
"encouragement  of  manufactures.  The  object  is  of  too  much  consequence  not  to 
"  insure  a  continuance  of  their  efforts  in  every  way  which  shall  appear  eligible.'1 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 


"  We  must  new  place  the  manufacturer  by  the  side  of  the  agriculturalist." 

THOMAS  JEFFERSON. 

"  There  is  no  subject  that  can  enter  with  greater  force  and  merit  into  the  delibera- 
"  tions  of  Congress  than  a  consideration  of  the  means  to  preserve  and  promote  the  manu- 
"  factures  which  have  sprung  into  existence,  and  attained  an  unparalleled  maturity  in 
1 '  the  United  States. "  J AMES  M  AD  i  SON. 

"  We  should  become  a  little  more  Americanized,  and,  instead  of  feeding  paupers 
4 '  and  laborers  of  Europe,  feed  our  own. "  ANDREW  JACKSON. 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

General  reflections — Necessity  of  material  development  to  a 
nation — England  hostile  to.  it  in  the  Colonies — Her  legislation  to  prevent 
it 17 

CHAPTER  II. 

Limited  extent  of  United  States — No  commerce — Tribute  paid 
to  English  manufacturers — Public  sentiment  united  in  the  demand  for 
American  manufactures.  ..........  28 

CHAPTER  III. 

Petitions  in  favor  of  protection — Washington  recommends  pro- 
tection— Necessary  to  independence.  .......  38 

CHAPTER  IV. 

First  Congress  adopts  protection — Action  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives— Madison  introduces' revenue  bill — Amended  by  making  it 
protective  —  Madison  supports  the  amendment  —  His  opinion  of  its 
constitutionality.  ......  ....  47 

CHAPTER  V. 

First  act  of  Congress  for  both  revenue  and  protection  —  Opposed 
by  those  opposed  to  the  Government — Protection  defended  by  ablest 
men  in  Congress  —  Its  constitutionality  undoubted  —  Tariff  of  1789 
passed  —  Approved  by  Washington  —  Universally  celebrated.  .  .  57 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Washington  approves  protection  of  manufactures  —  House  of 
Representatives  directs  report  from  Hamilton,  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury—  His  broad  field  of  inquiry.  .  .......  69 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Report  of  Secretary  of  Treasury  —  Overthrows  the  doctrine  of 
free  trade  —  Necessity  for  diversity  of  occupations — If  all  cultivated 
the  soil,  our  national  resources  could  not  be  developed  .  .  77 


VI  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Protection  supported  by  John  Adams  —  Also  by  Jefferson  —  Its 
effect  upon  revenue  —  Producing  surplus  —  Also  upon  trade  and  com- 
merce—  Jefferson  recommends  it,  notwithstanding  surplus — Proposes 
internal  improvements  by  amending  the  Constitution 84 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Relations  with  England  and  France  —  Embargo  law  —  Jefferson 
considered  protection  imperative  —  Duties  prohibitory  if  necessary  — 
Proceedings  of  Congress — Protection  referred  to  Committee  —  Favor- 
able report — Increased  duties  recommended  —  Question  referred  to 
Gallatin,  Secretary  of  Treasury  —  First  opposition  to  protection  —  Galla- 
tin's  report  —  Recommends  bounties  to  manufacturers 94 

CHAPTER  X. 

Madison  recommends  protection  as  necessary  to  independence  — 
Manufactures  made  necessary  by  the  war  with  England  —  Necessary 
to  increase  of  domestic  staples  —  Cannot  be  independent  without  them.  103 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Madison  recommends  protection  after  the  war  with  England  — 
Necessary  to  pay  debt  of  the  war  —  Also  to  encouragement  of  agricult- 
ure—  Tariff  act  of  1816  — Madison  on  constitutionality  of  protection  — 
Protection  direct,  not  incidental  —  Pertains  to  commerce,  not  revenue  .  no 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Congressional  proceedings  —  Tariff  of  1816  —  Protection  of  cot- 
ton and  wool  —  Madison  in  favor  of  protection — Leaders  of  House 
of  Representatives  —  Bill  reported  —  Opinion  of  committee  —  Opposed 
to  free  trade  and  favoring  protection  —  Threat  by  Lord  Brougham  — 
Congress  firm  for  protection, 118 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Proceedings  of  House  of  Representatives  on  Tariff  of  1816  — 
Opinions  of  Clay,  Lowndes  and  Ingham  —  Calhoun  in  charge  of  bill  — 
Defends  it  against  Randolph  of  Virginia — His  conclusive  argument- 
He  favors  protection -- Necessary  for  home  markets —  Bill  passed.  .  129 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Tariff  of  1816  produces  general  rejoicing — Jefferson's  letter  to 
Austin  defending  protection  —  His  letter  to  Simpson  to  same  effect  — 
The  act  of  1816  strongly  protective  —  No  sectional  issues  existing  —  Close 
of  Madison's  administration — His  popularity 137 


TABLE     OF    CONTENTS.  Vll 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Monroe  becomes  President  —  Approves  protection  —  Advocates 
home  markets  —  Protection  increases  prosperity  —  Necessary  to  inde- 
pendence —  Not  to  be  abandoned  even  if  demand  for  labor  reduced  — 
Free  trade  intended  by  England  to  destroy  our  manufactures  —  Monroe 
opposes  it  by  recommending  additional  protection  .....  144 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

Monroe  recommends  additional  duties  while  revenue  was  suffi- 
cient and  increasing  —  Tariff  of  1824  passed  for  that  purpose  —  Monroe's 
administration  favorable  to  patriotic  legislation  —  No  party  platforms  — 
England  proposes  free  trade  to  counteract  protection  —  Her  wealth  pro- 
duced by  protection  —  Her  object  in  protective  and  navigation  laws  — 
Her  claim  of  superiority  for  her  manufactures  .  .  .  .  .154 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Producers  of  cotton  influenced  by  England  to  advocate  free 
trade  —  They  prefer  English  to  American  manufactures  —  Their  interests 
promoted  by  protection  —  Cotton  manufacturers  in  the  United  States  — 
American  cotton  not  favored  at  first  by  England  —  That  from  her  Colo- 
nies preferred —  Cotton-gin  and  sea-island  cotton  produced  change  — 
Gave  United  States  advantage  —  Free  trade  intended  to  continue  Eng- 
lish monopoly —  English  relations  to  foreign  trade  ....  162 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

English  manufactures  injured  by  competition  with  those  of  the 
United  States  and  France — Movements  toward  free  trade  —  Huskisson, 
free  trade  leader — His  policy  to  produce  it  —  Cheap  labor  makes  cheap 
manufactures  —  Influence  of  English  arguments  in  United  States  —  They 
criticise  protection  —  Chief  objection  that  it  draws  labor  away  from  culti- 
vation of  land  —  We  must  cultivate  all  our  land  before  manufacturing  — 
People  here  too  independent  for  manufacturing  laborers  —  England 
should  continue  manufacturing  because  of  her  cheap  labor  .  .  .  171 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

Presidential  contest  of  1824  —  All  the. candidates  favor  protec- 
tion—  Jackson  voted  for  tariff  of  1824  —  Clay  for  that  and  tariff  of 
1816  —  Jackson's  letter  to  Coleman  —  No  farm  products  except  cotton 
have  markets  —  We  must  become  Americanized — Labor  must  be  dis- 
tributed—  John  Quincy  Adams  elected  by  House  of  Representatives  — 
Fierce  controversy  ensues  —  Adams  favors  protection  —  Jackson  again 
a  candidate  —  He  favors  protection  —  Murmurings  in  South  Carolina 
against  protection .180 


Vlll  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Adams  assailed  as  the  enemy  of  protection  —  Jackson  supported 
as  its  friend  —  Controversy  on  the  subject  —  The  United  States  Tele- 
graph urges  Jackson's  election  to  save  protection  —  Charges  Adams, 
Clay  and  Webster  with  a  combination  to  destroy  it  —  Also  charges  Adams 
with  opposition  to  internal  improvements  and  the  "American  System  "  — 
Defends  Jackson  as  the  friend  of  these  measures  —  Jackson  committee 
in  District  of  Columbia — His  friends  in  Pennsylvania  —  They  defend 
him  as  a  protectionist .188 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

Protection  in  the  West  —  Senate  of  Indiana  call  upon  Jackson 
for  his  views  —  His  reply  to  the  Governor,  strongly  indorsing  protec- 
tion —  That  was  the  leading  issue  in  the  election  —  Jackson  elected  upon 
it  —  Adams  defends  it  in  his  last  messsage .  201 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

Presidential  election  of  1828  indorsed  protection  —  Defended  in 
Congress  by  Jackson's  supporters  —  Also  by  Jackson  In  his  inaugural, 
and  in  his  first  message  —  Manufactures  increase  price  of  agricultural 
productions  —  They  create  home  markets  —  Jackson  favored  discrimi- 
nating and  not  horizontal  duties — Necessary  to  create  competition  .  209 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Jackson's  administration  —  Condition  of  the  treasury  and  the 
public  debt — He  did  not  favor  reduction  of  duties  to  avoid  a  surplus  — 
Favored  protection  notwithstanding  surplus — Recommended  distribu- 
tion of  surplus  —  Congratulations  on  account  of  tariff  of  1828  —  Pro- 
tection constitutional  —  Agrees  with  Madison  —  Revenue  the  primary 
object,  but  discrimination  for  protection  necessary — Up  to  that  time 
all  the  Presidents  favored  protection 219 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Sectional  controversy  approaching — Cotton  interest  aroused  — 
Free  trade  in  South — Tariff  of  1828  denounced  —  Defended  by  Jack- 
son —  His  exultation  at  general  prosperity  —  Revenue  and  public  debt  — 
Surplus  to  be  distributed  and  protection  maintained — His  spirit  of 
compromise  —  Revenue  limited  to  wants  of  government  and  surplus 
avoided —  War  upon  his  administration  —  Tariff  of  1832  passed  —  Duties 
upon  protected  and  non-protected  articles — Horizontal  duties  steps 
toward  free  trade  ...........  229 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

Condition  of  the  treasury  —  Duties  on  teas — Hayne  attacked 
protection  —  Opposition  to  Jackson's  administration  by  advocates  of  free 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  ix 

trade — Jackson  firm  —  Secretary  of  Treasury  favors  protection  and 
increase  of  salaries  and  expenses  to  avoid  surplus  —  No  abandonment  of 
protection  —  Proceeds  of  public  land  to  be  withdrawn  from  revenue  to 
avoid  surplus — Bounties  —  Protection  of  1789  —  Its  beneficial  effects  .  238 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 

House  of  Representatives — McDuffie  Chairman  Committee 
Ways  and  Means  —  Adams  of  Committee  of  Manufactures  —  Their 
reports:  former  against  protection,  the  latter  for  it  —  Effort  to  unite  cotton 
section  against  Jackson  —  Object  was  to  defeat  his  reelection  —  Free 
trade  arguments  —  Excitement  produced  by  tariff  of  1832  in  Southern 
section  —  Sectional  contest  inaugurated  .......  246 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

Presidential  campaign  of  1832  —  Calhoun  headed  party  against 
Jackson  —  Van  Buren  nominated  for  Vice-presidency  —  Party  organized 
against  protection  and  against  Jackson  —  Favored  horizontal  tariff  — 
Jackson  unterrified  —  South  Carolina  refuses  to  vote  for  him  —  Passed 
nullification  ordinance  —  Formed  military  organizations  —  Threats 
against  the  Union  —  Their  formidable  character  .  .  .  256 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

Jackson  reaffirms  the  propriety  of  protection  —  Opposed  nulli- 
fication—  His  proclamation  and  message  —  His  conciliatory  spirit  — 
Protection  must  be  preserved  —  Revenue  to  be  regulated  by  wants  of 
Government  —  Conciliation  scornfully  rejected  .....  265 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 

Jackson  stands  by  his  proclamation — Protection  constitutional — 
Motives  cannot  vitiate  a  law  —  Nor  inequality  —  Governor  of  South 
Carolina  issues  a  proclamation  —  He  denounces  Jackson  —  Special 
message  of  Jackson  —  Willing  to  reduce  revenue,  but  not  to  abandon 
protection 273 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

Force  bill  passed  —  South  Carolina  legislature  attacked  Jackson 
—  Passed  secession  resolutions—  Bill  to  modify  the  tariff  —  Compromise 
act  of  1833  passed  —  Its  principles  —  Duties  reduced  to  horizontal  standard 
in  1842  —  Receipts  from  customs  exceeded  expenditures  —  No  further 
reduction  in  1834 — Receipts  and  expenditures  for  several  years —  Pay- 
ment of  public  debt  —  Jackson  changed  his  opinion  about  surplus  — 
His  farewell  address  —  Protection  preserved  —  War  upon  his  policy  con- 
tinued—  Threats  of  Governor  McDuffie  —  He  advocates  free  trade  .  283 


X  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

Compromise  act  of  1833  a  peace  measure  —  It  imperiled  pro- 
tection —  Failed  as  a  revenue  measure  —  Van  Buren  President  in  1837  — 
Business  deranged  —  Revenue  declining  —  Extra  session  of  Congress  — 
Expenditures  exceed  receipts — Van  Buren  looked  to  cotton  for  relief  — 
His  mistake  —  He  encouraged  free  trade  —  He  received  the  vote  of  South 
Carolina  —  Condition  of  treasury  —  Van  Buren's  mistakes  defeated  him 
in  1840  .  ,  299 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 

Incidental  protection  —  What  it  means  —  Does  not  abandon 
discriminating  duties —  Protection  incidental  to  the  commercial  not  the 
revenue  power —  Each  is  substantive —  Revenue  tariff  gives  no  protec- 
tion —  Power  to  protect  distinct  from  revenue  power  —  If  revenue  tariff 
could  protect  it  would  be  accidental,  not  incident*!  ....  314 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

Compromise  act  of  1833  —  An  experiment  —  It  failed  —  Produced 
general  embarrassment — Harrison  elected  President  in  1840 — Tyler 
acting  President  —  Extra  session  of  Congress  —  Revenue  declining  — 
Treasury  embarrassed  —  Effect  of  duties  —  Tariffs  of  1828  and  1833  com- 
pared—  Tyler  on  discriminating  duties  —  Additional  duties  necessary  .  328 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

Tyler  in  favor  of  compromise  act  —  But  found  additional  duties 
necessary — His  idea  of  incidental  protection  —  Veto  tariff  of  1842  — 
Passed  over  his  veto  —  Grounds  of  the  veto  —  Tariff  of  1842  an  abso- 
lute necessity  . 340 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 

Tariff  of  1842  for  revenue  and  protection  —  Home  valuation  — 
Cash  payments  —  revival  of  business  —  Improved  condition  of  treasury  — 
Effect  upon  revenue — Presidential  contest  of  1844  —  Polk  and  Clay  — 
Protection  a  direct  issue  —  Clay  for  it — Polk  equivocal  —  Supported  by 
free  traders  in  South,  by  protectionists  in  the  North  —  His  circular  in 
Tennessee  —  His  letter  to  Kane  —  Canvass  in  Pennsylvania —  "History 
of  the  Polk  Administration" —  Polk  elected  by  protection  votes  —  Pro- 
cured by  fraud 347 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

Folk's  administration  —  Issue  between  revenue  tariff  and  pro- 
tection—  Ad  valorem  duties  and  duties  discriminating  for  protection  — 
Folk's  first  message  —  No  discrimination  except  below  the  revenue 
standard  —  Free  trade  interest  in  ascendant —  Administration  devoted  to 
ihe  cotton-growing  interest  —  Report  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury— 


TABLE     OF    CONTENTS.  XI 

Opposed  to  protection  —  Tariff  for  revenue  only  —  No  discrimination  for 
protection  ............  366 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury  advocates  free  trade  —  Thinks  number 
of  farmers  should  be  increased — Discards  Jackson's  opinion — Folk's 
administration  controlled  by  free  trade  and  nullifying  influences  —  Theory 
that  low-price   breadstuffs   make  high  prices   for    cotton  —  Free  trade_^ 
injurious  to  agriculture  —  Tariff  of  1846  passed  and  that  of  1842  repealed.  38  / 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

Tariff  of  1846  reduced  duties  to  increase  revenue  —  That  of  1842 
preferable  for  that'  purpose  —  Comparison  of  receipts  from  customs  — 
Expenditures  —  Public  Debt  increased  —  Tariff  of  1842  would  have  paid 
debt  and-left  surplus  —  Cotton  declined  in  prices  instead  of  advancing  — 
Causes  of  increase  of  imports  —  Tariff  of  1846  unwise  —  Failure  as 
revenue  measure  —  False  predictions  of  its  friends.  ....  393 

CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

Public  debt  increased  steadily  under  a  tariff  for  revenue  only  — 
Expenditures  exceeded  receipts  —  Tariff  of  1857  passed  under  Pierce  — 
Same  system  continued  and  same  consequences  followed  —  Government 
had  to  borrow  money  —  The  two  systems  compared  ....  409 

CHAPTER  XL. 

Treasury  almost  bankrupt  under  Buchanan  —  Loans  absolutely 
necessary  —  Public  credit  seriously  impaired  —  Difficulty  of  borrowing  — 
Large  interest  paid — Receipts  —  Dutiable  articles  —  Improved  condi- 
tion of  treasury  by  repeal  of  tariff  of  1846  and  1857  —  That  repeal  and 
the  tariff  of  1861  a  necessity  —  Further  comparison  of  the  two  systems.  424 

CHAPTER  XLI. 

Advantages  of  a  protective  over  a  revenue  tariff  —  Operations  for 
a  series  of  years — Commerce  —  Constitutional  obligation  to  regulate 
it  —  Regulated  by  protection  —  This  increases  our  ability  to  carry  it  on  — 
Constitutional  power  to  tax  gives  no  authority  to  regulate  commerce  — 
The  latter  an  express  power —  Not  incidental  —  Rule  of  interpretation  — 
Example  from  the  "Confederate  States"  Constitution  ....  434 

CHAPTER  XLll. 

Duty  should  be  laid  for  both  revenue  and  protection  —  Volun- 
tarily paid  —  Free  and  dutiable  lists  —  Increase  of  free  list  makes 
revenue  duties  higher  —  Duties  do  not  necessarily  increase  prices  — 
Prices  regulated  by  supply  and  demand  and  competition — Home 
markets  best  —  English  demand  for  wheat  —  England  prefers  the  prod- 
ucts of  her  Colonies  —  If  they  could  supply  her  she  would  not  buy  of  us.  447 


Xli  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

CHAPTER  XLIII. 

Home  markets  —  Free  trade  gives  preference  to  foreign  —  Wheat 
productions  —  Could  be  increased  by  home  markets  —  If  increased  with- 
out them  prices  would  decline  —  This  would  injure  us  and  benefit 
England  —  Producer  and  consumer  close  together  —  Manufactures 
necessary  to  this  —  Domestic  and  foreign  demand  compared  —  Growth 
of  manufactures — Protection  Society  in  New  York  —  Jefferson,  Madi- 
son, Monroe  and  Adams  all  members  of  it  460 

CHAPTER  XLIV. 

The  "Cobden  Club"  —  Free  trade  theories  of  Cobden  —  His 
object  to  reduce  prices  of  our  breadstuff  s  to  benefit  England  —  H  is  plan  — 
Repeal  of  the  English  corn  laws — He  desired  to  destroy  American  man- 
ufactures—  That  the  object  of  free  trade  —  Polk's  administration  agreed 
with  Cobden  —  Mutuality  between  labor  and  capital  —  If  all  were  farmers 
surplus  would  be  wasted 473 

CHAPTER  XLV. 

Taxation  inevitable — Direct  and  indirect  taxes  —  Free  trade 
leads  to  former  —  Value  of  real  and  personal  property  —  Direct  taxes 
fall  heavily  upon  the  farmer — They  are  compulsory  —  Taxes  upon  neces- 
saries and  luxuries — Direct  taxes  oppressive  to  labor — Class  society  in 
England  —  Effect  upon  labor  —  Laborers  kept  in  inferior  class  —  Free 
trade  derived  from  political  economy —  How  that  became  a  science  — 
English  laborers  are  not  relieved  —  Would  reduce  American  laborers 
to  same  condition 493 

CHAPTER  XLVI. 

L  glish  opinions  of  our  policy  —  By  free  trade  we  are  expected 
to  unite  in  European  affairs  —  Join  a  brotherhood  of  nations — This  for- 
bidden by  our  interests  —  Such  a  brotherhood  impossible  —  Nations  act 
as  they  always  have  done —  Each  takes  care  of  itself —  Our  duty  to  take 
care  of  ourselves  —  England  has  always  done  so  —  Gave  no  signs  of 
change  \intil  she  feared  our  rivalry — Wants  to  reduce  us  to  inferiority  — 
Our  duty  to  reject  free  trade  and  persist  in  the  policy  that  has  made  us 
great.  5*3 


PREFACE. 


'"THE  information  contained  in  this  publication  is  within 
*  the  reach  of  all  who  have  access  to  public  or  select 
libraries,  but  not  to  the  general  public.  It  has  been  put 
into  the  present  form  with  the  hope  that  it  may  indicate, 
to  such  of  the  latter  as  the  volume  may  reach,  the  sources 
of  trustworthy  information  upon  one  of  our  most  impor- 
tant and  interesting"  public  questions. 

The  arguments  with  reference  to  the  general  aspects 
of  the  subject  have  been  long  since  exhausted.  It  would 
be  as  difficult  to  add  any  new  ones  as  it  would  be  to  write 
an  original  essay  upon  the  causes  that  led  to  our  national 
independence.  In  arrangement  alone  can  there  be  any- 
thing like  originality. 

By  the  method  adopted,  opportunity  will  be  afforded 
to  such  as  desire  correct  and  non-partisan  information,  to 
understand  what  is  involved  in  each  of  the  opposing  prin- 
ciples of  protection  and  free  trade,  and  to  decide  intelli- 
gently between  them.  Nobody  ought  to  desire  anything 
more  than  such  an  adjustment  of  our  tariff  laws  as  shall  do 
equal  justice  to  all  our  business  and  industrial  interests. 
And  every  one  ought  to  be  satisfied  to  know  how  this  may 

13 


H  PREFACE. 

be  so  accomplished  as  to  supply  the  Government  with  the 
necessary  amount  of  revenue,  and,  at  the  same  time,  foster 
all  the  departments  of  labor  and  industry,  and  continue 
the  development  of  our  vast  natural  resources. 

If  protection  has  hitherto  produced  these  results,  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States  shall  be  assured  of  this,  it 
would  be  a  reflection  upon  their  intelligence  and  common 
sense  to  suppose  them  desirous  of  exchanging  it  for  the 
uncertain  experiment  of  free  trade.  If — as  the  fact  un- 
doubtedly is  —  the  necessity  for  protection  constituted  one 
of  the  principal  reasons  for  the  formation  and  ratification 
of  the  Constitution,  and  its  advantages  have  been  exhib- 
ited in  every  department  of  industry,  by  the  creation  of 
new  sources  of  public  and  individual  prosperity,  and  by 
assuring  to  the  nation  energy  and  strength  sufficient  for 
self-preservation, —  then  such  an  exchange  could  only  be 
incited  by  some  strange  form  of  popular  delusion.  It 
would,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  indicate  a  singular  unsteadi- 
ness of  purpose  to  destroy  a  system  so  commended  by 
accomplished  results  for  one  recommended  only  by  those 
who  desire  to  substitute  their  speculative  theories  for  actual 
realities,  and  their  sophistry  for  demonstrated  truth. 

What  the  continued  agitation  of  the  tariff  question 
requires  from  the  people  is,  that  they  should  make  them- 
selves familiar  with  it  by  thorough  investigation — under- 
stand its  relations  to  their  own  and  the  interests  of  the 
Government  —  take  it  out  of  party  politics — free  it  from 
the  dangerous  influences  of  sectional  controversy —  nation- 
alize it  in  the  broadest  and  most  comprehensive  sense  — 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  15 

and  thus  secure  to  it  that  stability  which  the  founders  of 
the  Union  endeavored  to  give  it.  By  these  means  we  may 
reasonably  expect  that  the  firm  establishment  of  protection 
will  furnish  abundant  revenue  for  the  Government,  proper 
encouragement  to  industry,  home  markets  and  fair  prices 
for  all  surplus  products,  just  compensation  to  labor,  the 
continued  development  of  our  vast  resources,  and  put  a 
stop,  as  far  as  well-regulated  national  policy  can  do  it,  to 
those  periodical  fluctuations  in  business  to  which  this 
agitation  has  invariably  led.  Every  citizen,  no  matter 
what  his  occupation,  is  interested  in  having  this  great 
question  thus  disposed  of,  and  every  voter  should  approach 
the  consideration  of  it  under  a  just  sense  of  his  responsi- 
bilities. This  volume  has  ho  other  object  than  to  contrib- 
ute somewhat  to  that  end. 

TERRE  HAUTE,  1888.  R.  W.  T. 


THE  HISTORY  AND  NECESSITY  OF  PROTECTIVE 
TARIFF  LAWS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

GENERAL  REFLECTIONS— NECESSITY  OF  MATERIAL  DEVELOPMENT 
TO  A  NATION— ENGLAND  HOSTILE  TO  IT  IN  THE  COLONIES  — 
HER  LEGISLATION  TO  PREVENT  IT. 

N  I ATIONS  have  their  periods  of  birth,  youth,  maturity 
and  decay.  Like  individuals,  they  are  influenced, 
through  all  the  stages  of  their  existence,  by  the  conditions 
and  circumstances  they  create  for  themselves,  as  well  as 
those  which  exist  independently  of  them.  All  persons 
who  observe  the  natural  laws  of  health  have  a  reasonable 
assurance  of  long  life,  while  those  who  violate  them  are 
apt  to  die  early.  So  it  is  with  nations.  Such  of  them 
as  so  conduct  their  affairs  as  to  foster  and  protect  their 
industrial  interests  and  stimulate  them  to  their  fullest 
development,  are  almost  certain  to  secure  firm  and  solid 
foundations.  But  such  as  fail  in  this  are  equally  sure  to 
lead  their  populations  into  idleness  and  imbecility,  and 
subject  their  fortunes  to  doubtful  and  hazardous  uncer- 
tainties. The  growth  and  durability  of  nations  depend 
upon  tueir  internal  and  domestic  policy.  If  that  is  wise, 
they  will  continue  in  prosperity  as  long  as  it  remains  so. 
2  17 


1 8  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

If  unwise,  they  may  be  assured  of  only  a  precarious  exist- 
ence, liable  to  end  when  circumstances  become  adverse. 
In  the  course  of  the  world's  history  the  latter  have  out- 
numbered the  former. 

The  policy  of  a  nation  is  well  defined  as  "  the  art  of 
ordering  all  things  for  the  common  benefit  of  the  citizens 
of  a  free  state."  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  it 
expresses  merely  "intrigues  of  state,"  or  the  schemes  and 
plottings  of  managing  politicians.  It  reaches  up  to  the 
true  standard  of  statesmanship,  and  consists  of  such  a  series 
of  public  measures  as  incite  all  citizens  to  strive  for  the 
advancement  of  their  own  and  the  public  welfare.  He 
who  recognizes  the  obligation  of  obedience  to  the  public 
policy  which  puts  it  in  his  power  to  do  this,  is  influenced 
by  what  is  called  public  spirit,  or,  more  aptly,  patriotism. 
All  sorts  of  people  —  whether  native  or  foreign-born  — 
willingly  yield  to  the  influence  of  this  sentiment  when 
they  find  themselves  in  a  country  like  ours,  and  realize 
that  the  government  gives  them  perfect  protection  in  their 
persons  and  property,  and  the  best  guarantee  of  liberty 
and  happiness. 

Patriotism  does  not  consist  alone  in  fighting  the  battles 
of  one's  country,  — although  that  is  one  of  the  most  attrac- 
tive forms  in  which  it  displays  itself.  It  is  a  sentiment 
firmly  imbedded  in  the'  mind,  and  is  exhibited  as  well  in 
peace  as  in  war.  It  bears  fruit  in  all  the  paths  of  life, 
among  the  humble  and  obscure  as  well  as  the  proud  and 
ostentatious.  In  the  United  States,  where  the  mass  of 
the  people  possess  their  own  homes  and  realize  the  sense 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  1 9 

of  independence  created  thereby,  it  is  as  strong,  and  vivid, 
and  durable,  around  the  remote  hearthstones,  in  the  most 
secluded  parts  of  the  country,  as  in  the  highest  places  of 
official  trust.  It  stimulates  the  desire  to  see  all  the  natur- 
al resources  of  the  country,  without  regard  to  sections  or 
localities,  so  developed  to  the  utmost  possible  extent  that 
the  nation  may  be  advanced  to  the  highest  point  of  great- 
ness. It  creates  a  universal  interest  in  all  the  forms  and 
methods  of  labor  and  industry,  because  these  are  the  surest 
foundations  of  public  prosperity.  It  rejoices  in  every  fur- 
row plowed  by  the  cultivator  of  the  soil,  in  every  stroke  of 
the  axe  and  the  hammer,  in  every  revolution  of  the  spindle 
and  the  water-wheel,  in  every  puff  of  the  engine  and  the 
locomotive,  and  in  all  the  movements  of  the  vast  machinery 
by  which  the  inventive  genius  of  our  countrymen  has 
excited  the  wonder  and  admiration  of  the  world.  Patri- 
otism is  always  generous,  unselfish,  manly. 

Possessed  as  we  are,  in  this  country,  of  all  the  elements 
of  material  wealth,  in  a  degree  hitherto  unknown  in  the 
world,  it  has  always  been  with  us  one  of  the  most  important 
problems  in  our  political  economy  to  ascertain  the  best 
and  most  certain  methods  of  accomplishing  their  develop- 
ment. Whatsoever  measures  of  policy  are  most  likely  to 
assure  this,  have  always  been,  and  yet  are,  best  for  the 
whole  country,  because  they  make  the  common  prosperity 
more  certain,  and  the  character  and  influence  of  the  nation 
more  conspicuous  and  lasting;  whereas  such  measures 
as  tend  to  arrest  or  limit  this  development  are  sure  to  pro- 
duce the  opposite  effect — to  narrow  the  fields  of  labor, 


20  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

shackle  industry,  crush  invention,  check  the  spirit  of  enter- 
prise, and  crowd  us  out  from  the  front  rank  among  the 
nations. 

Peoples  have  become  great  by  the  power  of  arms,  but 
only  at  times  when  monarchs  justified  their  conquests 
and  maintained  their  oppressions  by  the  claim  of  "  divine 
right."  But  these  times  are  passing  away  as  the  relations 
of  the  nations  to  each  other  are  changing.  They  are 
approaching  each  other  more  nearly  every  day,  and  learn- 
ing more  of  the  common  wants  and  necessities  of  man- 
kind. Commerce  goes  everywhere,  and  there  seems  to 
be  no  limit  to  its  expansion.  This  condition  of  the  world 
has  excited  a  tireless  race  for  commercial  supremacy,  and 
each  nation  must  decide  for  itself  how  it  shall  get  to  the 
front  and  keep  there.  Are  the  people  of  the  United 
States  entitled  to  this  position  ?  They  possess  a  greater 
combination  of  advantages  than  any  other  people  in  the 
world.  Their  territory  stretches  out  to  an  almost  unlimited 
extent.  The  richness  and  productiveness  of  their  soil  are 
unrivaled.  Their  climate  is  so  varied  as  to  answer  every 
want  and  provide  for  every  necessity.  Their  industry, 
enterprise  and  inventive  genius  are  unsurpassed.  Their 
modes  of  intercommunication  exceed  those  of  any  other 
country.  They  have  the  most  extensive  and  productive 
mineral  fields  hitherto  discovered.  The  eye  cannot  turn 
in  any  direction  without  observing  some  new  source  of 
wealth  and  material  greatness.  And  there  are  almost 
continually  sounding  in  our  ears  the  shouts  of  general 
rejoicing  at  the  rapid  growth  of  our  prosperity. 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  21 

Riches  are  not  absolutely  necessary  to  the  greatness  or 
happiness  of  individuals;  but  in  order  that  nations  may 
become  great  and  powerful,  and  exercise  a  controlling 
'  influence  in  the  world,  they  must  possess  material  wealth. 
And  their  greatness  and  power  is  increased  as  this  is  gen- 
erally distributed  among  their  citizens.  In  the  United 
States  we  see  the  effect  of  this  in  the  acquisition  of  homes 
and  the  titles  to  real  property,  by  which  the  inducements 
for  adding  to  the  comforts  and  conveniences  of  life  are 
increased.  In  no  other  country  do  these  advantages  exist 
in  so  great  a  degree.  But  even  amid  so  much  abundance 
as  we  possess  of  everything  material,  labor  cannot  be  dis- 
pensed with.  It  must  continue  to  remain,  as  it  has  always 
been,  the  most  important  and  essential  factor  in  the  nation's 
greatness.  Therefore,  the  Government  should  foster  and 
encourage  labor  and  industry,  in  all  their  forms,  as  the 
means  of  distributing  wealth  and  increasing  the  number 
of  hprhes  in  every  part  of  the  country. 

These  same  problems  were  before  the  founders  of  the 
Government,  to  be"  solved  by  them.  The  first  step  they 
took  had  in  view,  necessarily,  the  stability  of  our  political 
institutions ;  but  they  realized,  at  once,  that  this  could  not 
be  well  assured  without  the  discovery  of  some  means  of 
obtaining  for  the  body  of  the  people  the  improvement  of 
their  condition.  And  as  this  could  not  be  done  without 
the  general  distribution  of  the  sources  of  prosperity,  they 
found  it  necessary  to  adjust  their  commercial  relations  with 
Great  Britain  —  on  account  of  their  direct  intercourse  with 
that  country  —  upon  such  a  basis  as  would  secure  the 


22  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

necessary  protection  to  all  industrial  pursuits.  They  were 
convinced,  at  the  beginning,  that  in  no  other  way  could 
the  independence  of  the  country  be  made  complete  and 
permanent.  They  did  not  seek  independence  in  a  politi- 
cal sense  only — however  hard  they  struggled  to  obtain 
it  —  but  that  which  would  put  us  in  a  condition  to  take  care 
of  ourselves,  and  enable  us  to  compete  successfully  with 
other  nations  in  all  the  fields  of  industry,  enterprise,  and 
commerce.  And  they  had  sagacity  enough  to  foresee  that 
this  could  not  be  effectively  done  in  any  other  way  than 
by  developing  the  natural  resources  of  the^cpiintry,  which, 
even  then,  seemed  to  be  abundant. 

But  they  were  met  by  a  serious  difficulty  at  the  first 
step.  This  was  the  want  of  sufficient  power  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Union,  as  it  originally  stood,  to  pass  such 
laws  as  would  foster  and  encourage  domestic  labor,  in  order 
thereby  to  reach  a  condition  of  equality  with  other  nations. 
Upon  this  point  the  old  Articles  of  Confederation  were 
found  to  be  singularly  deficient.  That  form  of  govern- 
ment was  a  mere  league  between  independent  States,  so 
jealous  of  federal  encroachment  that  they  withheld  from 
Congress  the  power  to  maintain  national  existence.  The 
Confederation  became,  consequently,  the  representative  of 
distinct  sovereignties  and  not  of  the  whole  people  of  the 
country.  The  essential  -powers  to  levy  and  collect  taxes, 
and  to  regulate  commerce,  were  also  withheld.  There- 
fore, it  required  but  brief  experience  to  show  that  if  such 
important  interests  as  these  —  which  concerned  all  parts 
of  the  country,  and  not  particular  sections  merely  —  were 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  23 

to  remain  wholly  dependent  upon  the  action  of  the  sepa- 
rate States,  the  nation  would  be  left  without  the  means  of 
making  its  independence  complete,  on  account  of  the 
antagonisms  which  the  diversities  of  rival  and  local  inter- 
ests might  engender. 

The  discovery  of  this  existing  impediment  to  national 
development  and  growth  was  one  of  the  prime  causes - 
and,  perhaps,  the  most  influential  —  which  led  to  the  aban- 
donment of  the  Confederation  and  the  formation  and  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  In  that  instru- 
ment the  important  powers  to  "regulate  commerce  with 
foreign  nations,"  and  to  "  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties, 
imposts  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the 
common  defense  and  general  welfare,"  are  assigned  most 
prominent  and  conspicuous  places.  A  study  of  the  events 
contemporaneous  with  the  formation  of  the  Constitution 
will  abundantly  prove  that  these  powers  were  not  given  to 
Congress  merely  for  the  purpose  of  laying  and  collecting 
taxes  —  as  if  the  Government  had  nothing  to  do  but  to 
compel  contributions  from  the  people  for  its  own  sup- 
port—  but  to  enable  it  to  give  just  and  proper  protection 
to  every  branch  and  department  of  industry  —  agricul- 
tural, manufacturing,  and  commercial. 

Experience  in  the  affairs  of  government,  as  in  those 
of  private  life,  is  worth  far  more  than  theory.  When 
public  measures  have  accomplished  the  end  designed  by 
them,  they  may  be  safely  repeated  where  the  conditions 
and  circumstances  which  gave  birth  to  them  remain 
unchanged.  Speculative  schemes,  originating  in  ingenious 


24  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

minds,  have  been  often  exploded  by  being  brought  in  con- 
tact with  the  suggestions  of  common  sense.  When  a  gov- 
ernment disregards  the  admonitions  of  experience  and 
adopts  these  schemes,  it  creates  difficulties  for  itself  where 
none  might  otherwise  exist.  Therefore,  we  who  are  charged 
with  the  present  duty  of  seeing  that  our  public  affairs  are 
properly  conducted,  will  show  ourselves  wise  by  under- 
standing the  policy  upon  which  "the  fathers"  intended 
our  prosperity  to  rest — why  they  regarded  labor  as  its 
basis  and  built  upon  that  as  its  foundation. 

Until  the  time  when  the  Colonies  declared  their  inde- 
pendence and  established  a  government  for  themselves, 
everything  pertaining  to  their  industrial  interests  and 
domestic  policy  was  dependent' upon  the  omnipotent  will 
of  the  English  Parliament.  History  assures  us  of  nothing 
more  certainly  than  that  all  its  acts  relating  to  the  Col- 
onies were  expressly  intended  to  prohibit  the  creation  of 
American  commerce  in  rivalry  to  that  of  England,  or  the 
establishment  of  American  manufactures,  or  the  use  of  the 
natural  resources  and  advantages  of  this  country,  in  any 
manner  calculated  to  produce  material  wealth  and  abso- 
lute independence.  From  the  date  of  the  Navigation  laws, 
passed  during  the  Cromwellian  era,  all  legislation  concern- 
ing the  Colonies  had  been  dictated  by  the  determination 
to  hold  them  in  perpetual  inferiority.  In  1699  it  was 
enacted  "that  no  wool,  yarn,  or  woolen  manufactures  of 
the  American  plantations  shall  be  shipped  thence,  or  even 
laden,  in  order  to  be  transported,  on  any  pretense  what- 
ever." In  1719  Parliament  declared  "the  erecting  of 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  25 

manufactories  in  the  Colonies  tends  to  lessen  their  depend- 
ence upon  Great  Britain"  —  the  truth  of  which  cannot  be 
doubted.  In  1742  the  British  Board  of  Trade  reported  to 
Parliament  that  the  Americans  had  begun  to  manufacture 
paper,  which,  they  said,  "interferes  with  the  pro  jits  made 
by  the  British  merchants."  The  same  board  also  reported 
that  woolen  and  linen  fabrics  were  manufactured  in  the 
Colonies,  and  recommended  that  some  measure  should  be 
provided  to  prevent  this.  Parliament  instituted  an  inquiry, 
through  the  Colonial  Governors,  in  relation  to  the  prog- 
ress of  American  manufactures,  which  resulted  in  show- 
ing that  leather,  "a  little  poor  iron,"  and  cloths  for  domes- 
tic use,  were  manufactured  ;  —  all  of  which  was  considered 
to  be  "prejudicial  to  the  trade  and  manufactures  of  Great 
Britain"  In  response  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  Parliament, 
in  1732,  prohibited  the  exportation  from  the  Colonies  of 
such  articles  of  manufacture  as  interfered  with  like  articles 
in  England.  No  person  was  allowed  to  make  hats,  in  any 
part  of  this  country,  who  had  not  served  an  apprenticeship, 
and  the  number  of  apprentices  was  limited  to  two  in  each 
case,  and  these  had  to  be  white,  as  colored  apprentices 
were  forbidden.  In  1750  Parliament  permitted  the  expor- 
tation of  pig  iron  from  the  Colonies  to  England,  only 
because  the  necessities  of  English  manufacturers  required 
it.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  prohibited  the  erection 
of  mills  for  rolling  iron,  in  the  Colonies,  and  also  the  mak- 
ing of  steel,  —  no  act  of  oppression  being  considered  too 
severe  when  it  was  found  necessary  to  strengthen  and  per- 
petuate the  manufacturing  monopoly  of  England.  If  any 


UNIVEBSITl 

Gil  i 


26  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

such  mills  were  found  erected  in  any  part  of  the  Colonies, 
the  Colonial  Governors  were  required  to  treat  them  as 
nuisances  and  to  destroy  them,  under  severe  penalties  for 
disobedience.  Many  other  measures  of  equivalent  import 
and  severity  were  adopted  from  time  to  time,  but  these  are 
sufficient  to  show  the  spirit  which  influenced  all  of  them, 
—  that  the  fixed  and  unalterable  purpose  of  England  was 
to  prevent  the  United  States  from  ever  becoming  her 
commercial  rival. 

The  avowed  object  of  these  adverse  proceedings  was 
to  compel  the  people  of  the  Colonies  to  export  thejr  raw 
materials,  produced  by  their  own  labor,  to  the  markets  of 
England,  in  English  vessels,  where  they  were  to  be  manu- 
factured and  then  sent  back  to  them  in  the  same  vessels, 
for  consumption,  at  prices  dictated  by  English  manufac- 
urers.  By  these  methods  it  was  designed  to  draw  off  the 
wealth  of  the  Colonies  and  thereby  to  prevent  the  possi- 
bility of  building  up  a  commercial  nation  on  this  side  the 
Atlantic.  The  Navigation  laws  did  not  allow  any  articles 
of  Colonial  manufacture  to  be  exported,  or  any  foreign 
commodity  to  be  imported,  except  in  English  ships.  And 
as  the  Colonies  had  but  little  to  export,  and  no  ships,  the 
entire  carrying  trade  was  thus  concentrated  in  English 
hands.  When  the  vessels  in  which  the  manufactured  fab- 
rics of  England  were  brought  to  this  country  had  to  be 
taken  back  without  a  return  cargo,  in  ballast — which  was 
generally  the  case  —  the  consumer  here  was  required  to 
pay,  not  only  a  profit  to  the  English  manufacturer,  but 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  27 

double  freight  across  the  ocean.     All  payments  were  made 
in  specie  or  its  equivalent. 

In  the  presence  of  such  facts  as  these  our  early  states- 
men would  have  been  blind  not  to  have  foreseen  that 
unless  the  people  of  this  country,  after  their  political  inde- 
pendence was  established,  also  adopted  a  retaliatory  and 
defensive  commercial  policy,  they  could  have  neither  manu- 
factures nor  commerce  of  their  own;  that  the  immense 
material  advantages  they  possessed  would  have  availed 
nothing,  and  that  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  to 
build  up  a  great  and  powerful  nation.  Fortunately  for  us, 
and  for  the  world  also,  they  were  wise  and  prudent  men,  and 
conducted  our  national  affairs  with  sagacity  never  yet  sur- 
passed. They  adopted,  without  delay,  the  necessary  retali- 
atory and  defensive  measures ;  and  as  these  have  enabled 
us  to  counteract  all  the  early  adverse  influences  by  which 
England  intended  to  humiliate  us,  we  shall  omit  an  impor- 
tant duty  by  failing  to  investigate  thoroughly  their  char- 
acter and  import. 


CHAPTER  II. 

LIMITED  EXTENT  OF  UNITED  STATES— NO  COMMERCE  — TRIBUTE 
PAID  TO  ENGLISH  MANUFACTURERS  —  PUBLIC  SENTIMENT 
UNITED  IN  THE  DEMAND  FOR  AMERICAN  MANUFACTURES. 

\\  J  HEN  the  operations  of  the  Government  commenced, 
the  territorial  extent  of  the  United  States  was  small, 
compared  with  what  it  now  is.  The  original  thirteen 
States  were  bounded  on  the  north  by  Canada,  on  the 
south  by  Florida,  on  the  east,  as  they  yet  are,  by  the 
Atlantic,  and  on  the  west  by  Louisiana,  which  embraced 
the  territory  west  of  the  Mississippi  river.  The  three 
great  European  powers  —  Great  Britain,  France  and  Spain 
-  held  the  territory  immediately  contiguous  to  that  of  the 
United  States  on  three  sides,  leaving  the  fourth  or  eastern 
side  as  it  still  continues.  There  were  no  possessions  west 
of  the  Mississippi,  no  land  approaches  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  and  no  facilities  of  intercourse  between  the  eastern 
and  the  western  side  of  the  Alleghany  mountains.  The 
rivers  emptying  into  the  sea  between  Massachusetts  and 
South  Carolina  were  the  only  channels  of  interior  trade, 
and  the  navigation  of  these  was  confined  to  the  region  bor- 
dering upon  the  seaboard.  By  no  other  means,  except 
the  most  primitive,  could  domestic  commerce  reach  the 

few  cities  then  beginning  to  grow  upon  the  harbors  of  the 

28 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  29 

Atlantic.  By  a  chronicle  of  events  kept  for  the  year  1787 
it  appears  that,  in  August  of  that  year,  ship-building  was 
so  prostrated  that  there  was  but  one  small  vessel  on  the 
stocks  at  the  city  of  New  York.  At  the  same  time 
there  were  sixteen  British  vessels  discharging  and  taking 
in  cargoes,  and  only  "  one  solitary  American"  in  the  port 
of  Philadelphia,  and  the  latter  loading  with  lumber  for 
the  West  Indies.  The  whole  population  was  less  than 
that  of  either  of  the  present  States  of  New  York  or  Penn- 
sylvania, and  of  the  present  city  of  London. 

It  is  not  easy  for  us  at  this  time,  when  our  territorial 
dimensions  have  been  so  greatly  extended  and  our  facilities 
of  intercourse  so  increased,  to  conceive  what  the  scattering 
communities  then  existing  thought  of  the  future,  or  what 
they  imagined  would  be  the  degree  of  strength  the  nation 
would  ultimately  be  enabled  to  acquire.  Nor  can  we 
understand  or  fully  appreciate  the  innumerable  difficulties 
and  embarrassments  they  had  to  encounter.  A  large  pro- 
portion of  them  had  emigrated  from  different  parts  of 
Europe,  bringing  with  them  differences  of  habits,  customs 
and  religion.  These  were  so  marked  for  a  time  as  to 
create  serious  and  threatening  antagonisms.  /A  careful 
examination,  however,  of  the  history  of  those  times  will 
show  the  salutary  influences  which,  in  the  end,  swept  away 
the  bulk  of  these  prejudices,  and  so  united  the  whole  body 
of  the  population  as  to  bring  about  the  determination  to 
make  the  country  independent  in  fact,  as  it  was  in  name. 
But  for  the  train  of  circumstances  bearing  upon  and  con- 
tributing to  this  end,  the  scepter  of  government  might  not 


3O  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

have  been  successfully  wrenched  from  the  crown  of  Great 
Britain,  and  we  might  have  been  left  without  any  such 
history  as  now  not  only  furnishes  us  ground  for  national 
rejoicing,  but  excites  our  vanity  as  well. 

Besides  the  other  obstacles  to  be  overcome  in  order  to 
create  the  common  purpose  to  resist  foreign  aggression,  the 
pursuits  of  the  people  of  the  several  sections  were  so  varied 
by  local  causes  as  to  demand  the  most  conciliatory  meas- 
ures, in  order  to  escape  collisions  of  interest  which  would 
have  proved  injurious  to  all.  The  population  of  the 
Northeastern,  or  New  England  States,  was  engaged 
mostly  in  commercial  pursuits,  mainly  on  account  of  the 
severity  of  climate  and  the  want  of  a  fertile  and  productive 
soil.  That  of  the  South  Atlantic  States  was  engaged 
almost  entirely  in  agriculture.  And  that  of  the  Central 
States  exhibited  a  disposition,  from  an  early  period,  to 
pursue  manufacturing  enterprises.  There.was  no  neces- 
sary conflict  between  tnese  several  occupations,  howsoever 
seemingly  diverse  in  their  nature ;  and,  consequently,  the 
interests  of  all  became,  in  a  comparatively  short  time, 
active  and  united,  under  the  harmonizing  influences  which 
grew  out  of  a  sense  of  common  necessity,  and  which  have 
continued  to  constitute  the  substantial  source  of  our 
national  prosperity  and  greatness. 

There  were,  at  the  time  here  referred  to,  but  few  man- 
ufactures in  the  country.  Such  as  existed  had  been 
forced  to  struggle  against  the  direct,  active,  and  persistent 
opposition  of  England.  Our  entire  foreign  trade  was  of 
little  value.  All  our  markets  were  so  glutted  with  English 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  3! 

fabrics  that  the  wealth  of  the  country  was  threatened  with 
exhaustion,  in  order  to  procure  the  means  to  pay  for  them. 
Some  idea  of  the  severity  of  this  exhausting  process  may  be 
formed  by  comparing  our  imports  from  England  with  our 
exports  to  that  country.  A  table  compiled  by  .English 
authority  shows  how  much  we  bought  from  and  how  much 
we  sold  to  that  country  at  the  periods  referred  to : 

Exports.  Imports. 

1784 £     749.345 £  3,679,467 

1785 893,594 2,308,023 

1786 843,119 1,603,465 

1787 893,637 2,009,111 

1788 1,023,789 1,886,142 

1789 1,050,198 2,525,298 

1790 1,191,011 3,431,778 

^"6,644,753  ^"17,443,284 

Thus  we  see  what  an  enormous  tribute  the  people  of 
the  United  States  were  paying  to  England  during  those 
years.  The  aggregate  stated  now  does  not  seem  to  amount 
to  much,  since,  in  the  computation  of  our  national  resources, 
we  have  become  accustomed  to  such  enormous  sums.  But 
the  condition  of  the  country  was  then  very  different,  and  the 
payment  of  these  large  balances  was  a  burden  exceedingly 
difficult  to  bear.  The  excess  of  the  imports  over  the  exports 
for  the  whole  seven  years  was  £10, 798,531,  or  $52,372,875, 
that  is,  more  than  $15  for  each  individual  of  the  entire 
population.  And  as  this  large  .indebtedness  had  to  be 
paid  in  specie  or  its  equivalent,  it  was  easy  to  realize  that 
the  existing  condition  of  affairs  could  not  be  continued 
without  seriously  impairing  the  prosperity  of  the  country 
and  weakening  the  power  of  the  nation.  And  it  is  most 


32  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

instructive  even  now,  as  we  review  the  history  of  that 
period,  to  learn  how  all  classes  of  society,  in  every  section, 
realized  the  necessity  of  practicing  the  most  rigid  economy, 
in  order  thereby  to  dispense  with  articles  of  foreign  manu- 
facture and  supply  their  wants  at  home  by  encouraging 
domestic  manufactures.  From  among  numerous  evi- 
denceb  of  this  the  following  are  promiscuously  selected, 
to  show  the  character  of  the  public  sentiment  and  how 
completely  it  had  become  unified. 

The  ladies  of  Hartford,  Connecticut,  entered  into  an 
association  pledging  themselves  to  retrench  their  domestic 
expenses,  and  to  give  "  preference  to  the  manufactures  of 
their  own  country."  The  ladies  of  Halifax,  North  Caro- 
lina, formed  a  similar  association  and  made  the  same 
pledge.  And  these  examples  —  one  in  the  North  and  the 
other  in  the  South  —  led  to  like  results  in  other  States, 
where  the  same  kind  of  organizations  were  established  and 
the  same  pledges  made. 

An  association  was  organized  in  Richmond,  Virginia, 
composed  of  numerous  patriotic  citizens,  who  considered  it 
their  duty  to  do  whatsoever  lay  in  their  power  to  encour- 
age an  increased  production  in  this  country,  as  well  as  to 
practice  the  strictest  economy  in  their  domestic  affairs. 
They  passed  the  following  emphatic  and  expressive  reso- 
lutions : 

"  Resolved,  That  we  will  be  at  all  times  ready,  by  every  encour- 
agement in  our  power,  to  promote  any  well-founded  scheme  of 
trade  and  manufacture  to  which  the  circumstances  of  this  State 
are  adapted,  and  the  profits  of  which  shall  arise  and  center  with  her 
own  citizens. 


.*   -^ 


H 


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I 
m 


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O 


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CO 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  33 

"Resolved,  That  the  present  circumstances  of  this  State  are 
adapted  to  the  manufacture  of  the  coarser  woolens,  cottons,  linens, 
cordage,  leather,  and  iron  ;  and  the  production  of  salted  pork  and 
beef,  of  butter,  cheese,  soap,  tallow  and  candles. 

"  Resolved,  therefore,  That  we  will  use  the  utmost  of  our  exer- 
tions to  promote  agriculture  in  general,  and  more  particularly  those 
parts  of  it  which  tend  most  to  the  encouragement  of  our  manu- 
factures, and  to  the  diminution  of  our  foreign  importations." 

A  society  was  formed  in  the  city  of  Boston,  Massa- 
chusetts, which  expressed  its  purposes  in  the  following 
strong  and  earnest  language  : 

"  Whereas,  the  e-xcessive  use  of  articles  of  foreign  growth  and 
manufacture  has  been  attended  with  the  most  pernicious  conse- 
quences, by  exhausting  our  circulating  medium,  and  by  diffusing  a 
taste  for  extravagance;  and  whereas  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  encourage  industry,  frugality,  and  our  own  manufactures  —  to 
recover  a  circulating  medium  —  to  restore  public  credit  —  to  facili- 
tate the  payment  of  public  and  private  debts,  and  thereby  to  pro- 
mote the  welfare  and  happiness  of  our  country: 

"  With  a  view  to  these  salutary  and  important  purposes,  we, 
the  subscribers,  do  hereby  enter  into  a  solemn  agreement  and  asso- 
ciation, to  refrain  from,  and,  as  far  as  in  our  power,  to  prevent,  the 
excessive  use  and  consumption  of  articles  of  foreign  manufacture, 
especially  articles  of  luxury  and  extravagance;  and  that  we  will 
exert  our  best  endeavors  for  the  promotion  of  industry,  and  our 
own  manufactures." 

The  following  resolution  was  adopted  at  a  meeting  of 
the  inhabitants  of  Germantown,  Pennsylvania: 

"We  will  individually  exert  our  utmost  influence  for  the  pro- 
motion of  industry  and  our  own  manufactures;  and  will  refrain 
from,  and,  as  far  as  in  our  power,  prevent,  the  excessive  use  of  for- 
eign articles  of  luxury." 

A  State  society  was  formed  in  Pennsylvania,  known  as 
"The  Pennsylvania  Society  for  the  Encouragement  of 
Manufactures  and  the  Useful  Arts."  In  setting  forth  the 

3 


34  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

objects  of  the  organization    the  following   language  was 
employed  : 

"  The  United  States,  having  assumed  the  station  of  an  inde- 
pendent government,  require  new  resources  to  support  their  rank 
and  influence,  both  abroad  and  at  home.  Our  distance  from  the 
nations  of  Europe  —  our  possessing  within  ourselves  the  materials 
of  the  useful  arts,  and  articles  of  consumption  and  commerce  —  the 
profusion  of  wood  and  water,  those  powerful  and  necessary  agents 
in  all  arts  and  manufactures  —  the  variety  of  natural  productions 
with  which  this  extensive  country  abounds,  and  the  number  of  people 
in  our  towns,  and  most  ancient  settlements,  whose  education  has 
qualified  them  for  employments  of  this  nature  —  all  concur  to  point 
out  the  necessity  of  promoting  and  establishing  manufactures  among 
ourselves." 

If  history  teaches  any  philosophy  at  all,  it  is  the  out- 
growth of  the  sentiments  and  opinions  which  pervade 
society.  The  leading  events  in  the  life  of  a  nation  spring 
from  these,  and  are  fortunate  or  otherwise  as  they  are  wise 
or  unwise.  What  was  said  by  these  several  associations 
shows  an  extraordinary  unanimity  of  sentiment  in  the  sev- 
eral sections  of  the  country — otherwise  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  account  for  the  similarity  of  meaning.  Almost 
precisely  the  same  thoughts  are  expressed  with  reference 
to  the  wants  and  necessities  of  the  country,  the  demands 
of  the  times,  and  the  measures  of  relief.  We  cannot  fail 
to  see,  consequently,  that  the  demand  for  such  legislative 
action  as  should  develop  the  resources  of  the  mation  and 
establish  its  material  as  well  as  political  independence, 
was  practically  unanimous.  The  people,  everywhere,  were 
intelligent  enough  to 'know  that  it  would  be  impossible  for 
them  to  reach  a  high  point  of  national  greatness  by  any 
other  means,  and  their  patriotism  was  unselfish  and 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  35 

comprehensive  enough  to  unite  them  in  the  support  of  what- 
soever measures  should  be  found  necessary  to  achieve  this. 
If  there  had  been  local  prejudices  before  —  as  there  un- 
doubtedly were —  they  had  disappeared  under  the  influence 
of  this  spirit  of  patriotism,  which  kept  down  the  rancor 
of  party  and  united  the  sections  in  one  harmonious  whole, 
with  reference  to  the  necessary  measures  of  domestic  policy. 
The  foundation  of  our  subsequent  prosperity  was  thus  laid, 
and  well  laid,  by  wise  and  skillful  builders. 

Many  other  public  meetings  were  held  in  a  number  of 
the  States,  and  meant  more  in  that  day  than  they  do  now. 
In  Pennsylvania,  especially,  the  most  active  and  efficient 
measures  were  adopted,  all  looking  to  the  accomplishment 
of  the  great  end  then  so  anxiously  desired  by  the  whole 
country  and  all  classes  of  the  people.  At  a  meeting  held 
in  the  University  of  the  State,  over  which  Governor  Mifflin 
presided — the  avowed  object  of  which  was  "to  promote 
every  measure  that  will  give  our  new-born  States  the 
strength  of  manhood" — it  was  wisely  said: 

"  An  extravagant  and  wasteful  use  of  foreign  manufactures  has 
been  too  just  a  charge  against  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
since  the  close  of  the  war.  They  have  been  so  cheap,  and  so  easily 
obtained  on  credit,  that  the  consumption  of  them  has  been  abso- 
lutely wanton.  ...  It  behooves  us  to  consider  our  untimely 
passion  for  European  luxuries  as  a  malignant  and  alarming  symp- 
tom, threatening  convulsions  and  dissolution  to  the  political  body. 
Let  us  hasten,  then,  to  apply  the  most  efficient  remedies,  ere  the 
disease  becomes  inveterate,  lest  unhappily  we  should  find  it  incur- 
able." 

The  remedy  proposed  was  an  increase  of  manufacturing 
establishments  throughout  Pennsylvania,  as  advantageous 


36  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

to  every  part  of  society,  and  especially  to  such  as  were 
engaged  in  agriculture.     Upon  this  subject  it  was  said  : 

"Without  manufactures  the  progress  of  agriculture  must  be 
arrested  on  the  frontiers  of  Pennsylvania.  .  .  .  The  inhabitants 
of  the  fertile  tracts  adjacent  to  the  waters  of  the  Ohio,  Potomac  and 
Susquehanna,  besides  the  cultivation  of  grain,  must  extend  their 
views  immediately  to  pasturage,  and  grazing,  and  even  to  manu- 
factures. Foreign  trade  will  never  take  off  the  fruits  of  their  labor 
in  their  native  state.  They  must  manufacture  first  for  their  own 
consumption;  and  when  the  advantages  of  their  mighty  waters 
shall  be  no  longer  suspended,  they  must  become  the  great  factory 
of  American  raw  material  for  the  United  States.  Their  resources 
in  wood  and  water  are  very  great;  their  treasures  in  coal  are  almost 
peculiar." 

When  we  take  into  account  the  position  the  State  of 
Pennsylvania  has  since  reached  —  her  unsurpassed  pros- 
perity and  the  wonderful  development  of  her  resources  - 
it  would  seem  that  the  authors  of  the  foregoing  language 
were  almost  gifted  with  the  spirit  of  prophecy.  And  this 
also  may  be  said,  with  equal  propriety,  of  those  who 
expressed  the  sentiments  summed  up  in  an  essay  "On  the 
Promotion  of  American  Manufactures,"  which  was  exten- 
sively circulated  at  the  same  time.  The  following  is 
extracted  from  it : 

"  Every  man  must  be  convinced  that  a  people  who  have  recourse 
to  foreign  markets  for  almost  every  article  of  their  consumption, 
can  be  independent  in  name  only,  and  are  incapable,  under  such 
circumstances,  of  becoming  either  great  or  prosperous.  There  is 
not,  perhaps,  any  nation  that  is  rendered  so  dependent,  by  nature. 
And  yet,  how  extraordinary  is  it,  that  this  country,  to  which  Provi- 
dence has  been  peculiarly  bountiful  in  the  distribution  of  those 
things  that  contribute  to  the  convenience,  ease,  and  happiness  of 
man,  should  unnecessarily  and  wantonly  give  a  preference  to 
foreign  commodities,  although  at  the  expense  of  the  most  important 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  37 

interests  of  the  Government  and  individuals  !  There  is  no  coun- 
try possessing  greater  natural  advantages,  and,  consequently,  no 
nation  can  be  more  respectable  and  happy,  than  the  United  States 
may  become,  by  a  proper  improvement  of  these  advantages;  but  to 
make  the  most  of  them,  we  must  practice  the  virtues  of  industry 
and  economy  —  virtues  essential  to  the  well-being  of  a  republic. 
Our  Government  must  also  promote  the  introduction  of  useful 
manufactures  and  trades  among  us,  and  protect  such  as  are  already 
instituted.  Thus  we  shall  employ  and  enrich  our  citizens,  accel- 
erate the  population  of  an  extensive  and  valuable  country,  and 
increase  our  national  strength,  dignity,  and  independence." 

It  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  popular  government 
that  the  commands  with  reference  to  public  policy,  which 
proceed  from  the  people,  should  be  obeyed.  This  is  not 
invariably  done,  but  ought  to  be — for  whensoever  it  is 
not,  it  is  left  to  be  implied  that  some  power  superior  to 
the  people  exists.  This  cannot  be  safely  conceded  in  a 
government  like  ours.  At  the  time  referred  to  this  prin- 
ciple was  universally  accepted,  and  we  shall  see  as  we 
progress  that  it  was  obediently  adhered  to  in  the  legisla- 
tion that  followed,  after  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  was  ratified.  And  it  will  abundantly  appear  also 
that  the  measures  adopted  to  build  up  manufactures  were 
in  precise  conformity  to  the  public  sentiment  then  existing 
with  extraordinary  unanimity,  not  in  any  particular  section 
merely,  but  in  all  the  sections. 


CHAPTER  III. 

PETITIONS    IN    FAVOR    OF    PROTECTION— WASHINGTON     RECOM- 
MENDS PROTECTION  — NECESSARY  TO  INDEPENDENCE. 

A  MONG  the  first  petitions  presented  to  Congress  in 
/*  1789,  immediately  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, was  one  upon  the  subject  of  protecting  manufactures. 
It  came  from  tradesmen,  mechanics,  and  others,  of  the  city 
of  Baltimore,  Maryland.  After  asserting  it  as  an  acknowl- 
edged fact  that  the  manufacturing  and  trading  interests  of 
the  country  were  languishing,  because  no  effectual  pro- 
vision for  their  encouragement  had  been  or  could  be  made 
by  the  Legislatures  of  the  States,  nor  until  after  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  uniform  and  efficient  National  Government, 
the  petitioners  said: 

"  The  happy  period  having  now  arrived  when  the  United  States 
are  placed  in  a  new  situation,  when  the  adoption  of  the  General 
Government  gives  one  sovereign  Legislature  the  sole  and  exclusive 
power  of  laying  duties  upon  imports,  your  petitioners  rejoice  at  the 
prospect  this  affords  them,  that  America^reed  from  the  commercial 
shackles  which  have  so  long  bound  her,  will  see  and  pursue  her 
true  interest,  becoming  independent  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name;  and 
they  confidently  hope  that  the  encouragement  and  protection  of 
American  manufactures  will  claim  the  earliest  attention  of  the 
Supreme  Legislature  of  the  nation;  as  it  is  a  universally  acknowl 
edged  truth  that  the  United  States  contain  within  their  limits 
resources  amply  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  become  a  great  manu- 
facturing country,  and  only  want  the  patriotism  and  support  of  a 
wise,  energetic  Government." 

38 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  39 

And,  in  view  of  the  existing  condition  of  tha  country 
-the  poor  increasing  for  want  of  employment,  foreign 
debts  accumulating,  houses  and  lands  depreciating  in  value, 
trade  and  manufactures  languishing  and  expiring  —  they 
petitioned  Congress  to  "impose  on  all  foreign  articles 
which  can  be  made  in  America  such  duties  as  will  give  a 
just  and  decided  preference  to  their  labors,  and  thereby 
discountenance  the  trade  which  tends  so  materially  to 
injure  them  and  impoverish  their  country." 

Another  petition,  from  the  mechanics  and  manufacturers 
of  the  city  of  New  York,  was  presented  at  the  same  session 
of  Congress,  equally  expressive  of  the  public  desire.  Allud- 
ing to  the  political  independence  the  country  had  achieved, 
and  expressing  the  fear  that  it  might  have  gained  only  the 
form  of  liberty,  while  Great  Britain  still  possessed  the 
instruments  of  oppression  and  the  spirit  to  exercise  it,  in 
the  unjust  exactions  of  her  commercial  regulations,  these 
petitioners  thus  express  themselves  : 

"  Your  petitioners  soon  perceived,  with  the  deepest  regret,  that 
their  prospects  of  improving  wealth  were  blasted  by  a  system  of 
commercial  usurpation.  They  saw  the  trade  of  these  States  laboring 
under  foreign  impositions,  and  loaded  with  fetters  forged  in  every 
quarter,  to  discourage  enterprise  and  defeat  industry.  In  this 
situation  they  have  been  prevented  from  applying  to  those  abundant 
resources  with  which  nature  has  blessed  this  country.  Agriculture 
has  lost  its  capital,  stimulus;  and  manufactures,  the  sister  of  com- 
merce, have  participated  in  all  its  distresses. 

"Your  petitioners  conceive  that  their  countrymen  have  been 
deluded  by  an  appearance  of  plenty;  by.  the  profusion  of  foreign 
articles  which  have  deluged  the  country;  and  thus  have  mistaken 
excessive  importations  for  a  flourishing  trade. 

"Wearied  by  their  fruitless  exertions,  your  petitioners  have  long 


4O  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

looked  forward  with  anxiety  for  the  establishment  of  a  Govern- 
ment which  would  have  the  power  to  check  the  growing  evil,  and 
extend  a  protecting  hand  to  the  interests  of  commerce  and  the  arts. 
Such  a  Government  is  now  established.  On  the  promulgation  of 
the  Constitution  just  now  commencing  its  operations,  your  peti- 
tioners discovered  in  its  principles  the  remedy  which  they  had  so 
long  and  so  earnestly  desired.  To  your  honorable  body  the 
mechanics  and  manufacturers  of  New  York  look  up  with  confi- 
dence, convinced  that,  as  the  United  States  of  America  has 
furnished  you  with  the  means,  so  your  knowledge  of  our  common 
wants  has  given  you  the  spirit  to  unbind  our  fetters,  and  rescue 
our  country  from  disgrace  and  ruin." 

These  thoughts  were  expressed  by  practical  and  labor- 
ing men.  They  had  borne  the  weight  imposed  upon  them 
by  the  adverse  policy  of  Great  Britain  as  long  as  they  felt 
able  to  bear  it ;  and  realizing  that  the  new  Government 
had  been  formed  for  the  express  purpose  of  casting  off  the 
burden,  they  confidently  invoked  the  exercise  by  Congress 
of  its  acknowledged  power,  under  the  Constitution,  to 
grant  the  necessary  relief  to  their  own  and  other  industrial 
operations.  They  not  only  expressed  their  own  desires, 
but  displayed  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  condition  of 
the  country,  and  the  duties  of  Congress  under  the  Consti- 
tution. 

The  tradesmen  and  manufacturers  of  the  city  of  Boston 
also  addressed  a  petition  to  the  same  Congress,  wherein 
they  expressed  their  regret  at  the  decrease  of  American 
manufactures  and  the  stagnation  of  American  ship-building, 
and  said : 

"Your  petitioners  need  not  inform  Congress  that  on  the  re- 
vival of  our  mechanical  arts  and  manufactures  depend  the  wealth 
and  prosperity  of  the  Northern  States;  nor  can  we  forbear  men- 
tioning to  your  Honors  that  the  citizens  of  these  States  conceive 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  4! 

the  object  of  their  independence  but  half  obtained  till  those  national 
purposes  are  established  on  a  permanent  and  extensive  basis  by 
the  legislative  acts  of  the  Federal  Government." 

It  should  not  be  inferred  from  the  foregoing  that  this 
reference  to  "  the  wealth  and  prosperity  of  the  Northern 
States"  was  intended  to  have  any  sectional  meaning.  It 
was  not  so  understood,  at  the  time,  by  either  Congress  or 
the  country.  In  point  of  fact,  there  was  no  sectional 
sentiment  existing  anywhere.  We  have  seen  that  the 
North  was  mainly  commercial,  the  South  agricultural,  and 
the  central  part  of  the  Union  desirous  to  become  manu- 
facturing. Local  and  geographical  causes  gave  rise  to  this 
diversity  of  pursuits.  But  so  far  from  there  having  been 
any  jealousies  or  antagonisms  on  that  account,  the  general 
sentiment  was  that  the  public  prosperity  would  be  pro- 
moted and  the  government  become  more  efficient  if  manu- 
factures should  be  established  in  the  States  best  adapted 
to  them,  on  account  of  water  and  other  natural  privileges, 
so  that  the  raw  materials  of  the  agricultural  States  could 
be  converted  into  home  fabrics.  The  opinion  was  univer- 
sal that  by  this  means  every  part  of  the  country  would  be 
supplied  by  home  labor  and  industry  with  all  the  manufact- 
ured articles  necessary  for  consumption  ;  whereas,  without 
these  facilities,  all  such  articles  would,  from  necessity, 
have  to  be  imported  from  England,  thereby  rewarding 
foreign  labor  and  industry  and  giving  them  the  prefer- 
ence over  our  own.  The  harmony  of  sentiment  then 
existing  all  over  the  country  was  an  admirable  exhibition 
of  American  patriotism.  Whatsoever  sectional  animosities 


42  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

have  since  disturbed  our  quiet,  have  been  engendered 
more  by  the  rivalries  and  ambition  of  politicians  than  by 
all  other  causes  combined. 

Petitions  amounted  to  far  more  at  that  day  than  they 
do  now,  —  not  in  the  weight  that  should  properly  attach  to 
them  when  fairly  obtained,  but  under  the  circumstances 
then  existing,  and  on  account  of  the  condition  of  those 
from  whom  they  emanated.  There  was  no  large  aggrega- 
tion of  wealth,  no  great  monopolies  to  excite  opposition, 
and  no  inviting  fields  to  seduce  adventurers  to  large  specu- 
lations. Everywhere,  throughout  the  country,  the  strug- 
gle for  improvement  was  just  beginning,  and  as  the  new 
Government  had  been  formed  to  aid  the  people  to  benefit 
their  condition  and  thereby  give  the  nation  greater  security 
and  strength,  the  interference  of  Congress  was  invoked 
by  those  who  had  the  indisputable  right  to  invoke  it,  in 
language  plainly  expressive  of  the  public  will.  And  thus  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  foregoing  petitions,  interpreted  in  the 
light  reflected  by  the  condition  of  things  then  existing, 
gave  Congress  to  understand  how  firmly  the  conviction 
had  become  fixed  in  the  public  mind,  that  it  was  one  of 
the  primary  and  imperative  duties  of  the  new  Govern- 
ment, created  by  the  Constitution,  to  adopt  such  measures 
as  would  prove  effective  in  giving  encouragement  to  home 
industry.  On  every  hand  and  by  all  sorts  of  people,  how- 
soever engaged,  this  was  regarded  as  the  indispensable 
means  of  developing  the  natural  resources  of  the  country, 
and  of  securing  its  absolute  independence  of  Great  Britain 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  43 

—  not  in  a  political  sense  merely,  but  in  all  things  pertain- 
ing to  its  material  wealth  and  prosperity. 

The  proceedings  of  the  first  Congress  held  under  the 
Constitution,  and  the  action  of  the  Executive  department 
of  the  Government,  will  explain,  as  our  investigations  pro- 
gress, how  far  these  sentiments  were  also  entertained  by 
the  leading  -minds  of  the  Revolutionary  period.  At  no 
other  time  in  our  history,  and  upon  no  other  political 
subject,  has  there  ever  been  such  unanimity  of  opinion. 
There  is  scarcely  the  semblance  of  opposition  to  be  dis- 
covered. 

In  his  first  Presidential  message,  in  1790,  General 
Washington  said : 

"The  advancement  of  agriculture,  commerce,  and  manufact- 
ures, by  all  proper  means,  will  not,  I  trust,  need  recommendation  ; 
but  I  cannot  forbear  intimating  to  you  the  expediency  of  giving 
effectual  encouragement,  as  well  to  the  introduction  of  new  and 
useful  inventions  from  abroad,  as  to  the  exertions  of  skill  in  pro- 
ducing them  at  home,"  etc. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  these  were  the  utter- 
ances of  the  foremost  man  among  all  the  founders  of  the 
Government  —  of  him  who  stood  at  the  head  of  American 
statesmen  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  Government,  when 
its  track  had  t6  be  marked  out  through  new  fields,  hith- 
erto untried  and  unexplored.  It  was  then  manifest  to 
every  thoughtful  mind  that,  accordingly  as  the  Government 
should  begin  its  course,  wisely  or  unwisely,  so  would  it 
prove  to  be  success  or  failure.  And  who  was  there  at  that 
time,  or  has  there  been  at  any  other,  more  competent,  on 
the  score  of  wisdom,  or  patriotism,  than  Washington,  to 


44  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

point  out  the  paths  of  national  duty?  His  clear  and 
accurate  and  unbiased  judgment  enabled  him  to  know, 
with  almost  infallible  certainty,  that  unless  the  three 
great  and  leading  interests  of  the  country  —  agriculture, 
commerce,  and  manufactures  —  were  linked  together  and 
simultaneously  advanced  by  Congressional  legislation,  our 
independence  would  be  scarcely  half  achieved.  The  Con- 
stitution had  just  gone  into  operation..  The  contempo- 
raneous events  connected  with  its  creation  and  adoption 
were  perfectly  familiar  to  him.  He  had  presided  over 
the  Convention  which  framed  it.  He  had  observed  and 
thoroughly  understood  the  effects  consequent  upon  the 
want  of  power  by  Congress,  under  the  Old  Confederation, 
to  levy  customs  duties  and  to  regulate  commerce.  Con- 
sequently, his  first  thought  was  to  put  into  practical  opera- 
tion the  authority  over  these  important  national  interests 
which  the  people  had  conferred  upon  the  new  Govern- 
ment to  provide  for  the  acknowledged  defects  of  the  old 
and  original  plan.  And  in  view  of  the  conspicuous  suc- 
cess accomplished  by  the  measures  then  put  into  operation, 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  they  have  been  unsafe  coun- 
selors who  have,  since  then,  advised  a  disregard  of  his 
teachings. 

In  his  second  message  he  was  more  emphatic,  as  well 
as  more  specific,  than  in  the  first.  His  views  became  more 
enlarged  as  the  field  of  national  operations  opened  before 
his  sagacious  and  eminently  practical  mind.  Referring  to 
the  efforts  of  the  nations  most  concerned  in  active  com- 
merce with  this  country,  to  abridge  the  means,  and  thereby 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  45 

to  enhance  the  price  of  transporting  its  valuable  produc- 
tions to  their  proper  markets,  he  said: 

"  I  recommend  it  to  your  serious  reflections  how  far,  and  in 
what  mode,  it  may  be  expedient  to  guard  against  embarrassments 
from  these  contingencies,  by  such  encouragement  to  our  owr 
navigation  as  will  render  our  commerce  and  agriculture  less  depend- 
ent on  foreign  bottoms,  which  may  fail  us  at  the  very  moments 
most  interesting  to  both  of  these  objects.  Our  fisheries  and  the 
transportation  of  our  own  produce  offer  us  abundant  means  for 
guarding  ourselves  against  evil." 

These  recommendations  were  intended  as  the  basis  of 
a  general  policy  which,  although  called  retaliatory,  was, 
at  the  same  time,  strictly  defensive.  In  the  former  sense, 
its  object  was  to  teach  Great  Britain  that  the  United 
States  would  protect  their  own  interests  against  every  form 
and  measure  of  aggression;  and  in  the  latter,  that  this 
country  would  omit  nothing  necessary  to  secure  entire 
independence  in  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  its  natural 
advantages.  For  these  objects  the  foundation  was  to  be 
well  laid,  under  his  wise  counsel,  so  that  all  the  industries 
of  the  people,  in  every  department  of  society,  should  be 
so  encouraged  as  to  lead  to  their  best  and  fullest  develop- 
ment. The  wisdom  of  such  admonitions  from  such  a 
counselor  are  not  to  be  lightly  impeached.  There  were 
none  to  impeach  them  at  the  time — none  to  assert  that  it 
would  be  unwise  or  unsafe  for  the  nation  to  take  its  own 
future  destiny  in  its  own  hands.  On  the  contrary,  their 
influence  upon  the  country  was  exhibited  in  the  prompt 
action  of  Congress,  by  passing  the  necessary  laws  to  give 
them  full  effect  and  to  secure  the  contemplated  ends.  And 


46  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

thus  the  incipient  measures  of  our  domestic  policy  wu*J 
molded  under  the  guidance  of  a  man  more  eminently 
fitted  for  that  duty  than  any  other  then  living  or  who  has 
since  lived.  It  never  before  happened  with  any  people  to 
have  so  wise  a  beginning  of  their  national  existence. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FIRST  CONGRESS  ADOPTS  PROTECTION  —  ACTION  OF  THE  HOUSE 
OF  REPRESENTATIVES  —  MADISON  INTRODUCES  REVENUE  BILL 
—  AMENDED  BY  MAKING  IT  PROTECTIVE  —  MADISON  SUP- 
PORTS  THE  AMENDMENT—  HIS  OPINION  OF  ITS  CONSTITU- 
TIONALITY. 


T^HE  first  important  law  passed  by  the  first  Congress 
indicated  its  character  so  plainly  as  to  leave  no  room 
for  any  doubt  whatsoever.  Its  title  was,  "  An  act  for  lay- 
ing a  duty  on  goods,  wares  and  merchandises  imported 
into  the  United  States  ;"  and  its  first  section,  or  that  part 
which  properly  stands  as  its  preamble,  is  in  these  express- 
ive words  : 

"  Whereas,  it  is  necessary  for  the  support  of  the  Government, 
the  discharge  of  the  debts  of  the  United  States,  and  the  encourage- 
ment and  protection  of  manufactures,  that  duties  be  laid  on  goods, 
wares  and  merchandises  imported." 

Plainer,  simpler,  or  more  expressive  language  could 
not  be  found.  It  is  not  equivocal  in  the  least,  and  every 
common-sense  man,  with  ordinary  intelligence,  can  under- 
stand its  meaning.  It  asserts  three  distinct  propositions  : 
first,  that  duties  should  be  laid  for  the  support  of  the  Gov- 
ernment ;  second,  that  they  should  be  laid  for  the  payment 
of  the  public  debt  ;  and  third,  that  they  should  be  also  laid 
for  the  encouragement  and  protection  of  manufactures. 

47 


48  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

Each  of  these  propositions  was  distinct  from  the  other  two. 
Yet,  whether  considered  singly  or  combined,  they  involved 
the  exercise  by  Congress  of  clearly  granted  constitutional 
power —  about  which,  at  that  time,  there  was  no  difference 
of  opinion. 

It  has  been  said  that  this  preamble  was  written  by  Mr. 
Madison.  This  is  probably  true,  as  the  sentiments  con- 
veyed by  its  language  were  precisely  such  as  he  was  known 
to  entertain,  and,  more  than  once,  expressed.  His  author- 
ship of  it,  however,  is  not  material,  inasmuch  as  —  being  a 
member  of  Congress  at  the  time  —  he  supported  and  voted 
for  the  bill,  which  passed  the  House  of  Representatives  by 
a  vote  nearly  unanimous,  there  having  been  only  eight 
votes  against  it.  The  duties  discriminated  in  favor  of  manu- 
factures, and  were  therefore  protective,  as  the  language 
above  quoted  expressly  imports.  The  preamble  was  mani- 
festly intended  to  convey  this  idea,  for,  although  not 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  law,  it  furnishes  a  rule  of  inter- 
pretation by  which  its  true  meaning  is  to  be  ascertained  - 
it  is,  in  other  words,  an  index  to  point  out  the  legislative 
intention.  The  history  of  this  law  is,  consequently,  most 
instructive,  not  only  on  account  of  its  great  general  im- 
portance, but  because  it  identifies  Mr.  Madison,  by  his 
direct  agency  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and 
Washington,  by  his  approval  of  it  as  President,  and  nearly 
all  the  members  of  the  first  Congress,  with  the  first  distinct- 
ive measure  of  protection  which  the  exigencies  of  the 
public  service  and  the  common  interests  of  the  country 
demanded  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  Government. 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  49 

Upon  the  organization  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
Mr.  Madison,  without  any  delay,  introduced  a  proposition 
for  the  collection  of  import  duties.  Thus,  at  the  earliest 
opportunity  under  the  new  Government,  he  invoked  the 
exercise  by  Congress  of  one  of  the  most  important  powers 
confided  to  it  by  the  Constitution  —  that  of  laying  and 
collecting  taxes.  It  therefore  became  important  that  he 
should  accompany  his  proposition  with  such  an  explana- 
tion as  would  enable  the  country  to  understand  the  nature 
and  working  of  the  Government  under  the  Constitution. 
He  had  acquired  the  reputation  of  being  "  the  father  of  the 
Constitution  " — a  distinction  to  which  he  had  as  much 
claim  as  any  other  one  man  ;  and  this  rendered  it  mani- 
festly appropriate  that  he  should  occupy  this  conspicuous 
and  responsible  position.  No  man  realized  more  than 
Mr.  Madison  the  necessity  of  having  the  Government 
begin  right  —  of  having  the  principles,  upon  which  its 
foundations  should  thereafter  rest,  so  well  established  that 
no  subsequent  events  could  impair  them.  In  every  country 
the  taxing  power  is  a  most  delicate  one,  and  it  was  then 
especially  so  in  this  country,  on  account  of  the  condition  of 
the  people,  the  derangement  of  trade,  the  low  standard  of 
the  wages  of  labor,  the  absence  of  home  markets,  the  want 
of  a  national  currency,  and,  more  than  all,  the  dependence 
of  all  classes  of  society  upon  Great  Britain  for  the  neces- 
sary manufactured  fabrics.  Mr.  Madison  fully  realized  all 
this,  and  acted,  evidently,  under  a  full  sense  of  the  respon- 
sibilities of  his  position.  It  is  to  be  supposed,  therefofe, 
that  he  measured  the  meaning  of  every  word  he  uttered, 

4 


50  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

He  did  not  belong  to  that  class  of  men  who  employ  words 
to  conceal  ideas,  but  to  that  other  and  more  meritorious 
class  who  speak  only  when  some  object  is  to  be  accom- 
plished, and  then  with  a  view  of  being  understood.  In 
explanation  of  his  general  purpose  he  said :  , 

"The  Union,  by  the  establishment  of  a  more  effective  Govern- 
ment, having  recovered  from  a  state  of  imbecility  that  heretofore 
prevented  a  performance  of  its  duty,  ought,  in  its  first  act,  to  revive 
those  principles  of  honor  and  honesty  that  have  too  long  lain  dor- 
mant." 

Here,  the  idea  that  the  Government  was  strengthened 
and  made  more  vigorous  by  the  Constitution  was  distinctly 
expressed.  And,  in  equally  plain-spoken  language,  the 
obligation  to  adopt  more  effective  measures  than  had 
prevailed  under  the  Confederation,  was  also  inculcated. 
Unquestionably,  he  intended  to  lay  down  both  these 
propositions  as  absolutely  essential  to  the  new  Govern- 
ment ;  for,  understanding  as  he  did  the  causes  which  led 
to  the  creation  and  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  he  fore- 
saw that  the  failure  to  act  in  obedience  to  them  would  be 
taking  a  step  backward  and  not  forward  —  like  sending  a 
ship  out  to  sea  without  compass,  chart,  or  helmsman. 

The  primary  object  of  Mr.  Madison's  original  propo- 
sition was  revenue — a  supply  of  the  means  of  defraying 
the  ordinary  expenses  of  the  Government.  It  was,  con- 
sequently, a  temporary  measure,  and  provided  only  for 
laying  duties  upon  the  spring  importations  of  the  ensuing 
year.  But  accompanied,  as  it  was,  by  the  foregoing 
explanation,  it  was  manifest  that  it  involved  additional 
considerations,  and  invoked  the  exercise  of  broader  and 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  51 

more  «omprehensive  powers  than  Congress  had  hitherto 
possessed.  And  it  soon  became  apparent  to  Mr.  Madison 
and  others  that  the  best  interests  of  the  country  demanded 
that  these  powers  should  be  carried  to  the  extent  of  pro- 
viding, as  far  as  possible,  some  remedy  for  the  existing 
evils.  Everybody  realized  that  if  they  had  not  been  con- 
ferred upon  Congress,  or  if,  having  been  conferred,  Con- 
gress failed  to  employ  them  with  a  view  to  this  end,  the 
country  would  have  gained  nothing  by  the  change  of 
Government,  —  that  the  attempt  to  reach  a  higher  and 
more  national  plane  by  the  substitution  of  the  Constitu- 
tion for  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  would  prove  utterly 
abortive.  Consequently,  by  interpreting  what  followed  in 
the  light  of  Mr.  Madison's  explicit  declarations,  and  in  view 
of  his  direct  agency  in  producing  the  final  result  reached  by 
.Congress,  a  man,  even  at  this  day,  would  be  almost  blind 
who  does  not  see  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  new  powers 
conferred  by  the  Constitution  ;  —  that  is,  that  they  embrace 
not  alone  the  authority  to  levy  and  collect  taxes,  but  also 
the  authority  to  foster  manufactures  and  protect  every 
branch  of  American  industry. 

The  facts  about  to  be  stated  have  a  direct  bearing  upon 
the  question  whether  or  not  the  first  tariff  law  passed  by 
Congress  provided  for  revenue  only,  or  for  revenue  and 
protection.  By  carefully  observing  them  it  will  readily  be 
seen  that  there  is  no  ground  for  doubt  or  controversy 
about  the  matter,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  discrim- 
ination in  favor  of  protection  is  distinctly  and  palpably 
shown.  Revenue  was  the  primary  object,  and  protection 


52  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

secondary.  Each,  however,  was  independent  of  the  other. 
And  each,  as  will  be  hereafter  demonstrated,  involved  the 
exercise  of  a  distinct  and  independent  power  under  the 
Constitution. 

On  the  day  following  that  upon  which  the  bill  of  Mr. 
Madison  was  submitted  to  the  House  of  Representatives, 
Mr.  Fitzimons  of  Pennsylvania  brought  forward,  for  the 
first  time,  the  subject  of  protection  to  manufactures,  by 
suggesting  that  the  temporary  proposition  of  Mr.  Madison 
be  so  changed  as  to  convert  it  into  a  permanent  system. 
Instead  of  enacting  provisions  applicable  only  to  the 
importations  of  a  single  year,  he  considered  the  time  as 
having  arrived  when  a  general  policy  applicable  to  the  whole 
future  should  be  established.  Therefore,  he  proposed  to 
increase  the  duties,  and  in  support  of  this  proposition  said  : 

"  I  have  prepared  myself  with  an  additional  number,  which  I  wish 
subjoined  to  those  already  mentioned  in  the  motion  on  your  table; 
among  these  are  some  calculated  to  encourage  the  productions  of  our 
country ',  and  protect  our  infant  manufactures" 

This  declaration  was  plain  and  emphatic.  It  left  no 
room  for  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  the  true  meaning  and 
scope  of  Mr.  Fitzimons'  motion.  It  involved,  not  the 
question  of  expediency  alone,  but  of  constitutionality  as 
well.  As  regarded  the  former,  that,  of  course,  had  to  be 
determined  by  the  bearing  of  the  proposition  upon  the 
necessities  of  the  business  interests  of  the  country ;  and  as 
to  the  latter,  if  there  had  been  any  question  whatsoever 
about  the  constitutionality  of  the  proposed  measure,  that 
was  a  most  appropriate  time  for  the  suggestion  of  it. 
There  has  never  been  a  more  fitting  occasion  for  discussing 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  53 

and  settling  that  question  than  when  the  first  step  toward 
protection  was  about  to  be  taken,  while  Washington  was 
President,  with  Madison  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
and  many  other  leading  and  eminent  men  present,  all  of 
whom  were  familiar  with  the  contemporaneous  events  that 
led  to  the  establishment  of  a  strong  and  efficient  Govern- 
ment in  place  of  a  weak  and  inefficient  one. 

It  may  seem  strange  to  many  of  the  present  time,  who 
have  not  investigated  the  matter,  that  the  constitutional 
power  of  Congress  to  protect  manufactures  and  other 
American  industries,  was  not  then  denied ;  or  if  it  were, 
that  it  was  not  done  by  any  distinguished  enough  to 
entitle  their  opinions  to  be  handed  down  to  us.  U  ndoubtedly, 
it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  question  of  the  general  extent 
of  the  powers  granted  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution, 
was  present  in  the  minds  of  all  the  cautious  and  enlightened 
statesmen  who  were  then  engaged  in  the  important  work 
of  placing  the  Government  upon  solid  foundations  ;  to 
suppose  otherwise  would  be  to  lessen  their  claim  to  our 
veneration.  Manifestly,  Mr.  Madison  considered  it  when 
he  uttered  the  sentiments  already  quoted.  But  what  he 
then  said  was  not  in  answer  to  an  objection  from  any 
quarter.  It  was  the  mere  laying  down  of  an  affirmative 
proposition,  rendered  necessary  by  the  change  of  Govern- 
ment. And  such  was  the  case  also  when  —  still  without 
any  objection  on  the  score  of  constitutionality  —  he  went 
a  step  beyond  what  he  had  originally  said,  and  addressed 
himself  to  the  pending  motion  of  Mr.  Fitzimons,  which 


54  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

directly  involved  the  power  of  Congress  to  protect  manu- 
factures.    During  the  discussion  he  said  : 

"  I  presume  that,  however  much  we  may  be  disposed  to  pro- 
mote domestic  manufactures,  we  ought  to  pay  some  regard  to  the 
present  policy  of  obtaining  revenue." 

And,  to  make  himself  better  understood,  he  further 
said  : 

'*  Duties  laid  on  imported  articles  may  have  an  effect  which  comes 
within  the  idea  of  national  prudence.  It  may  happen  that  materials 
for  manufactures  may  grow  up  without  any  encouragement  for 
that  purpose.  It  has  been  the  case  in  some  of  the  States,  but  in 
others  regulations  have  been  provided,  and  have  succeeded  in 
producing  some  establishments,  which  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to 
perish  from  the  alteration  which  has  taken  place  ;  it  would  be 
cruel  to  neglect  them  and  direct  their  industry  to  other  channels  ; 
for  it  is  not  possible  for  the  hand  of  man  to  shift  from  one  employ- 
ment to  another  without  being  injured  by  the  change.  There  may 
be  some  manufactures  which,  being  once  formed,  can  advance 
toward  perfection  without  any  adventitious  aid,  while  others,  for 
want  of  \h&  fostering  hand  of  the  Government,  will  be  unable  to  go  on 
at  all." 

In  this  apt  language  Mr.  Madison  embraced  the  whole 
question  of  constitutional  power.  Although  it  had  not 
been  insisted  that  the  protection  of  manufactures  would 
violate  the  Constitution,  yet,  with  the  motive  already 
indicated,  he  probably  desired  to  place  the  question  of 
constitutionality  beyond  all  cavil,  by  asserting,  at  once 
and  unqualifiedly,  that  the  power  existed  as  a  necessary 
part  of  the  machinery  of  the  new  Government.  All  the 
proceedings  plainly  indicate  that  he  did  not  regard  it  as 
important  enough  to  require  serious  discussion,  and,  there- 
fore, he  treated  the  pending  proposition  to  increase  certain 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  55 

duties  as  involving  nothing  more  than  mere  expediency. 
Where  manufactures  had  grown  up  under  the  fostering 
care  of  the  States,  they  might  not,  in  his  opinion,  require 
the  same  amount  of  protection  as  those  still  in  their 
infancy.  But  the  latter  "ought  not  to  be  allowed  to 
perish"  for  the  want  of  such  protection  as  their  necessities 
required.  These  he  thought  might  not  be  able  to  go  on 
at  all,  if  " the  fostering  hand  of  the  Government"  were  not 
extended  to  them  ;  —  that  is,  unless  Congress  gave  them 
proper  protection.  In  his  'mind  the  question  of  constitu- 
tional power  was  the  same  in  both  cases  —  whether  manu- 
factures already  existed  or  should  be  thereafter  created  - 
and  he  treated  it  by  simple  and  direct  affirmance,  as  not 
open  for  argument,  and  as  not  furnishing  any  ground  for 
controversy. 

What  followed  before  the  measure  was  finally  disposed 
of  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  made  it  necessary 
that  he  should  give  even  more  emphatic  point  to  his  opin- 
ion ;  which  he  did  in  such  a  way  as  to  command  universal 
assent,  not  in  Congress  alone,  but  throughout  the  country. 
If  there  were  any  disposed  to  take  issue  with  him,  their 
adverse  opinions  have  not  been  deemed  worthy  of  preser- 
vation, or,  if  preserved  at  all,  it  has  been  so  obscurely  done 
as  to  render  them  now  impossible  of  access. 

The  fact  is  indubitable  that  Washington  and  Madison 
were  in  perfect  accord  with  regard  to  the  constitutionality 
and  necessity  of  protection  to  manufactures.  They  were, 
in  many  respects,  alike  —  especially  in  that  deliberateness 
of  purpose  and  clearness  of  judgment  which,  being  every- 


56  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

where  recognized,  gave  so  much  weight  and  influence  to 
their  opinions.  Their  minds  were  not  unlike  in  many 
respects,  and  although  differently  developed  by  circum- 
stances, they  were  equally  intent  in  making  the  welfare  of 
the  nation  their  chief  and  dominant  aspiration.  Especially 
did  this  purpose  influence  both  of  them  during  these  early 
years,  when  they  closely  and  intimately  united  in  the  great 
work  of  giving  vitality  and  vigor  to  the  Government.  It 
will  b^  an  evil  hour  for  the  country  when  we  shall  be  per- 
suaded to  regard  their  paternal  admonitions  in  any  other 
spirit  than  that  of  filial  reverence.  The  experience  of  our 
history  attests  this. 


CHAPTER  V. 

FIRST  ACT  OF  CONGRESS  FOR  BOTH  REVENUE  AND  PROTECTION 
—  OPPOSED  BY  THOSE  OPPOSED  TO  THE  GOVERNMENT  — PRO- 
TECTION  DEFENDED  BY  ABLEST  MEN  IN  CONGRESS— ITS  CON- 
STITUTIONALITY UNDOUBTED  —  TARIFF  OF  1789  PASSED - 
APPROVED  BY  WASHINGTON— UNIVERSALLY  CELEBRATED. 

TN  view  of  the  fact  that  the  motion  of  Mr.  Fitzimons 
[  directly  involved  an  increase  of  duties  over  and  above 
the  revenue  standard  fixed  by  Mr.  Madison  in  his  original 
bill,  and  his  express  avowal  that  it  was  his  object  thereby 
to  foster  and  protect  manufactures,  its  great  significance 
will  be  perceived.  The  discussion  and  final  adoption  of  it 
also  become  important. 

Mr.  Madison,  giving  his  assent  to  the  amendment,  said: 

"  I  have  no  objection  to  the  committee's  accepting  the  proposi- 
tion offered  by  the  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania.  ...  I 
think  some  of  the  propositions  may  be  productive  of  revenue,  and 
some  may  protect  our  domestic  manufactures"  etc. 

How  could  he  speak  more  plainly?  He  puts  both 
questions  —  revenue  and  protection  —  in  immediate  con- 
nection, and  in  the  briefest  possible  compass.  No  soph- 
istry, however  ingenious,  can  torture  what  he  said  into 
doubtful  meaning.  His  original  proposition  had  reference 
to  revenue  alone,  and  the  motion  of  Mr.  Fitzimons  to  pro- 
tection also.  Each  was  distinct  from  the  other  —  intended 
to  produce  its  own  independent  effect  —  but  combined 

57 


58  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

they  presented  precisely  the  same  questions  and  consid- 
erations as  have  always  arisen  in  tariff  legislation.  Con- 
sequently, Mr.  Madison's  acceptance  of  Mr.  Fitzimons' 
proposition  to  increase  the  duties  is  an  express  affirmance 
by  him  of  the  doctrine  of  protection,  as  it  regards  both 
its  expediency  and  constitutionality. 

An  attempt  has  been  made  to  escape  this  conclusion, 
upon  the  alleged  ground  that  this  first  bill,  as  introduced 
by  Mr.  Madison,  was  not  protective,  but  was  a  revenue 
measure  exclusively.  That  does  not  answer  the  allegation 
that  the  act  as  it  stands  upon  the  statute-book  is  protective. 
Independently  of  the  language  used  in  the  preamble,  and 
which  is  as  express  as  words  can  make  it,  the  other  evi- 
dence is  conclusive.  Mr.  Fitzimons  declared  his  object  to 
be  to  "  protect  our  infant  manufactures,"  and,  conse- 
quently, his  amendment  included,  not  only  an  increase  of 
the  duties  proposed  for  revenue  by  Mr.  Madison,  but  the 
introduction  of  an  "additional  number"  of  articles  for  pro- 
tection. The  discrimination  in  favor  of  protection  could 
not  have  been  made  more  direct  and  positive.  There  can 
be  no  room  for  equivocation  about  so  plain  a  matter.  But 
if  there  were,  all  doubt  must  be  dispelled  by  the  additional 
fact  that  the  amendment  of  Mr.  Fitzimons  was  opposed, 
by  a  few  only,  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  protective  — 
that  is,  because  it  embodied  the  independent  and  distinct- 
ive principle  of  discrimination  in  favor  of  manufactures, 
with  the  avowed  purpose  to  protect  them.  This  must  be 
held  to  have  been  full  notice  of  its  character ;  —  so  that 
everything  said  was  advisedly  spoken,  and  every  vote  was 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TiARIFF.  59 

cast  with  full  knowledge  of  its  effect.  This  opposition, 
however,  did  not  arise  out  of  any  doubt  about  the  con- 
stitutional power  of  Congress ;  but  was  based  upon  other 
and  wholly  distinct  grounds,  involving  alone  the  question 
of  expediency.  Pending  a  proposition  to  levy  a  duty  on 
salt,  Mr.  William  Smith,  of  South  Carolina,  attacked  it  by 
asserting  that  "  however  small  the  duty  it  will  furnish  a 
pretext  to  the  seller  to  extort  a  much  greater  sum  from  the 
consumer,"  etc.  Although  this  argument  did  not  produce 
the  slightest  effect  —  for  the  leading  minds  of  that  day  were 
too  wise  to  be  misled  by  such  fallacy  —  the  fact  of  its 
having  been  made  proves  satisfactorily  that  Mr.  Fitzimons* 
amendment  meant  protection  alone,  and  that  it  was  so 
understood.  All  that  Mr.  Smith  accomplished  was  to 
furnish  the  main  argument  which  the  enemies  of  protection 
have  ever  since  employed,  and  which  they  continue  to 
employ  to-day  with  as  much  seeming  confidence  as  if  it 
had  not  been  exploded  more  than  a  thousand  times.  But 
howsoever  unavailing  it  may  have  been  in  the  presence  of 
the  men  who  then  composed  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, its  having  been  made  proves  that  Mr.  Fitzimons' 
amendment  was  understood  and  voted  upon  in  the  precise 
sense  in  which  he  explained  it. 

This,  however,  was  not  the  only  ground  of  Mr.  Smith's 
opposition  to  the  levy  of  discriminating  or  protective 
duties.  And  what  he  said  beyond  this  is  worthy  of  remem- 
brance, because,  although  unimportant  at  the  time,  the  sen- 
timents he  uttered  have  since  worked  an  infinite  amount  of 
mischief —  far  more  than  he  designed  or  desired.  He  said  : 


60  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

"  It  is  believed  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  interior  of  South  Caro- 
lina are  opposed  to  the  new  Government;  it  will  be  a  melancholy  cir- 
cumstance to  entangle  ourselves  at  this  time  among  the  shoals  of 
discontent ;  yet  no  stronger  impulses  could  be  given  than  the  pro- 
posed tax.  Conceiving  it  in  this  light,  he  was  against  the  measure." 

Here  the  idea  of  opposition  to  the  Government  after 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  and  that  of  opposition  to 
protection  as  a  measure  of  public  policy,  were  united 
together ;  that  is,  it  was  threatened  that,  if  discriminating 
duties  were  levied  for  the  protection  of  manufactures, 
there  was  danger  of  resistance,  even  to  the  extent  of 
entangling  the  nation  "  among  the  shoals  of  discontent." 
This  diversity  of  sentiment,  whilst  not  extensive  enough  to 
influence  results,  nevertheless  divided  the  country  into  two 
classes :  the  first  represented  by  nearly  the  whole  popula- 
tion in  all  the  States,  and  the  second  by  a  small,  and,  in 
point  of  numbers  and  influence,  an  insignificant  faction. 
The  line  of  division  between  these  two  classes  is  perfectly 
apparent:  on  one  side  were  the  friends  and  supporters 
of  the  new  Government  advocating  protection  ;  on  the 
other  the  enemies  of  the  Government  were  the  opponents 
of  protection.  It  was  fortunate  for  the  country  that  Mr. 
Madison  was  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
when  the  attempt  was  first  made  to  draw  this  line,  both  on 
account  of  his  recognized  ability  and  the  conservative  tend- 
ency of  his  mind.  He  met  the  issue  promptly,  but  did 
not  rebuke  the  threat  with  any  sternness,  for  that  would 
not  have  been  consistent  with  his  nature  or  temperament. 
On  the  contrary,  he  quietly  withdrew  from  it  whatsoever 
sting  it  was  designed  it  should  have,  by  remarking  : 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  6 1 

"Certainly  it  requires  but  time  for  reflection  to  discover,  in 
every  point  of  view,  the  justice  of  the  measure  now  proposed." 

Not  only  was  the  question  then  pending  settled  in 
favor  of  protection,  under  his  commanding  influence,  but 
when  it  again  arose  in  other  stages  of  the  bill,  it  was 
invariably  determined  in  the  same  way  —  everybody  under- 
standing the  distinction  between  duties  levied  for  revenue 
only,  and  those  for  both  revenue  and  protection.  There 
is  abundant  evidence  of  this. 

A  proposition  was  submitted  by  Mr.  Sherman,  of  Con- 
necticut, to  levy  a  duty  on  manufactured  tobacco.  The 
avowed  object  was  to  afford  protection  to  the  manufactur- 
ers of  that  article ;  but  he  went  even  beyond  this,  in 
explaining  his  motion,  by  remarking  that  "  he  thought  the 
duty  ought  to  amount  to  a  prohibition"  Notwithstand- 
ing this  extreme  view  expressed  by  him,  his  motion  was 
adopted  without  any  debate  —  no  disposition  to  controvert 
his  theory  having  been  shown. 

Mr.  Carrol,  of  Maryland,  moved  to  insert  "  window  and 
other  glass"  as  dutiable  articles,  upon  the  alleged  ground 
that  "  a  manufactufe  of  this  article  was  begun  in  Maryland, 
and  attended  with  considerable  success,"  but  required  pro- 
tection. The  motion  was  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Clymer,  of  Pennsylvania,  insisted  on  giving  pro- 
tection to  the  paper  mills  of  that  State,  saying  that  "  as 
they  had  grown  up  under  legislative  encouragement,  it 
was  wise  to  continue  it." 

Mr.  Ames,  of  Massachusetts,  introduced  a  proposition 
for  protecting  the  manufacture  of  wool  cards,  and  insisted 


62  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

that,  by  that  means,  they  could  be  made  as  good  and 
as  cheap  as  those  imported  from  abroad. 

These  details  are  valuable  only  as  showing  the  general 
purpose  entertained,  inasmuch  as  every  important  amend- 
ment offered,  with  the  view  of  protecting  the  several 
branches  of  manufacturing  industry,  was  adopted  and 
became  part  of  the  law.  There  was  no  other  question 
with  reference  to  any  of  them,  except  the  extent  to  which 
the  duties  should  be  carried  for  the  purpose  of  protection. 
That  was  the  result  desired,  and  all  inquiries  centered  in  it. 
Upon  the  greater  part  of  the  articles  the  duties  were  seven 
per  cent,  for  the  purpose  of  revenue ;  but  upon  others  a 
specific  duty  of  fifteen  per  cent  was  laid  for  protection  - 
the  latter  being  over  a  hundred  per  cent  more  than  the 
former.  Everything  done  and  said,  in  fact,  exhibited  the 
fixed  determination  to  make  the  duties  protective  where  it 
was  necessary  to  encourage  manufactures. 

When  a  proposition  in  relation  to  coal  was  under  con- 
sideration, Mr.  Bland,  of  Virginia,  said : 

"  That  there  were  mines  in  Virginia  capable  of  supplying  the 
whole  United  States,  and  if  some  restraint  were  laid  on  the  importation 
of  foreign  coal,  these  mines  might  be  worked  to  advantage." 

Mr.  Madison,  participating  in  the  general  discussion, 
and,  manifestly  surveying  the  whole  field  of  national  duty, 
thus  expressed  himself : 

"  I  am  a  friend  to  free  commerce,  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  friend 
to  such  regulations  as  are  calculated  to  promote  our  own  interests, 
and  this  on  national  principles.  The  great  principle  of  interest  is  a 
leading  one  with  me,  and  yet  my  combination  of  ideas  on  this  head 
leads  me  to  a  very  different  conclusion  from  that  made  by  the 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  63 

gentleman  from  New  York  (Mr.  Lawrence).  I  wish  we  were  under 
less  necessity  than  I  find  we  are  to  shackle  our  commerce  with 
duties,  restrictions,  and  preferences;  but  there  are  cases  in  which  it 
is  impossible  to  avoid  following  the  example  of  other  nations  in  the 
great  diversity  of  our  trade." 

He  carried  the  discussion  to  the  point  of  considering 
the  question  of  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to 
protect  manufactures,  not  so  much  because  the  power  had 
been  expressly  denied,  but  because,  in  all  probability,  he 
considered  it  necessary  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  new 
Government  there  should  be  no  mistake  upon  a  question 
of  so  much  importance.  And  such  was  his  commanding 
authority  as  a  constitutional  lawyer,  that  what  he  said 
upon  that  subject  put  the  question  at  rest,  where,  but  for 
evil  counsel,  it  would  have  remained  during  all  our  subse- 
quent history.  He  said : 

"  There  is  another  consideration.  The  States  that  are  most 
advanced  in  population  and  ripe  for  manufactures  ought  to  have 
their  particular  interests  attended  to  in  some  degree.  While  these 
States  retained  the  power  of  making  regulations  of  trade,  they  had 
the  power  to  protect  and  cherish  such  institutions.  By  adopting  the 
present  Constitution  they  have  thrown  the  exercise  of  this  power  into  other 
hands.  They  must  have  done  this  with  an  expectation  that  these  interests 
would  not  be  neglected  here." 

When  the  character  and  ability  of  Mr.  Madison, 
together  with  his  prominent  agency  in  making  the  Con- 
stitution, are  taken  into  account,  this  would  seem  to  be  so 
conclusive  as  to  close  the  door  against  further  controversy. 
It  demonstrates  the  constitutional  power  and  duty  of 
Congress  to  protect  every  form  of  American  industry,  as 
clearly  as  Euclid  has  demonstrated  the  simplest  of  his 


64  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

mathematical  problems.  Under  the  Confederation  the 
States  retained  the  power  to  protect  their  own  manufact- 
ures; but  when  the  Confederation  was  abandoned  and 
the  Constitution  adopted,  this  power  was  turned  over  to 
the  new  National  Government  and  placed  in  the  hands  of 
Congress.  And  thus  the  whole  argument  is  so  condensed 
and  so  clearly  stated  by  Mr.  Madison,  that  it  may  be  fully 
comprehended  at  a  single  glance.  It  has  never  yet  been 
overthrown,  and  cannot  be.  It  is  denounced,  in  general 
terms,  as  unsound,  only  by  those  who  fail  to  realize  that 
such  persons  as  are  most  apt  at  denunciation  are  least  apt 
in  argument. 

But  Mr.  Madison  was  not  alone  in  making  this  argu- 
ment ;  he  was  supported  by  others  of  eminent  ability. 
Mr.  Baldwin,  of  Georgia,  who  was  also  a  member  of  the 
National  Convention  which  framed  the  Constitution,  was 
equally  emphatic  in  stating  his  views  of  the  necessity 
which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  in  so  far  as 
it  grew  out  of  the  derangement  of  trade  and  our  commer- 
cial relations  with  Great  Britain.  He  said: 

"  The  commercial  restrictions  Great  Britain  placed  upon  our 
commerce,  in  pursuing  her  selfish  policy,  gave  rise  to  an  unavailing 
clamor,  and  excited  the  feeble  attempt  which  several  of  the  State 
Legislatures  made  to  counteract  the  detestable  regulations  of  a 
common  enemy;  but  these  proving  altogether  ineffectual  to  ward  off  the 
effects  of  the  blow,  or  revenge  their  cause,  the  convention  at  Annapo- 
lis was  formed  for  the  express  purpose  of  counteracting  them  on  general 
principles.  This  Convention  found  the  completion  of  the  business 
impossible  to  be  effected  in  their  hands;  it  terminated,  as  is  well 
known,  in  calling  the  Convention  who  framed  the  present  Constitu- 
tion, which  has  perfected  a  revolution  in  politics  and  commerce. 

"  The  general  expectation  of  the  country  is,  that  there  shall  be  a 


HISTORY,  OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  65 

discrimination;  that  those  nations  who  have  not  yet  explained  the 
terms  on  which  an  intercourse  shall  be  carried  on,  or  who  have, 
by  establishing  regulations  bearing  hard  upon  such  intercourse, 
may  know  our  ability  and  disposition  to  withhold  or  bestow  advan- 
tages, according  as  we  find  a  principle  of  reciprocity  prevail. 
Thinking  a  discrimination  necessary,  and  knowing  that  the  voice  of 
the  people  calls  for  it,  we  shall  not  answer  the  end  for  which  we 
came  here  by  neglecting  or  refusing  to  make  it." 

This  argument  was  not  intended  to  apply  to  discrimi- 
nating duties,  but  to  our  discrimination  among  nations, — 
enforcing  our  duty  to  retaliate  against  those  which  did  not 
hold  commercial  intercourse  with  us  upon  principles  of 
reciprocal  friendship.  But  it  serves  to  show  how  well  it 
was  then  understood  that  the  new  Government  had  been 
substituted  for  the  old  one,  for  the  express  reason  that  the 
latter  had  not  and  the  former  had  the  power  to  regulate 
commerce  and  trade,  and  thereby  to  protect  all  the 
departments  of  industry.  Whensoever  it  should  become 
necessary  to  discriminate  in  our  own  favor,  as  against 
other  Governments,  by  protecting  any  of  our  domestic 
industries,  the  Constitution  has  given  to  Congress  the 
power  to  do  it.  The  premise  is  unquestionable,  and  the 
conclusion  logically  follows  it.  Mr.  Madison  affirmed 
these  views  more  directly  by  saying  : 

"  The  people  adopted  the  new  Constitution,  I  believe,  under  a 
universal  expectation  that  we  should  collect  higher  duties;  we  must 
do  this,  if  we  mean  to  avoid  direct  taxation,  which  was  always  a 
mean  of  revenue  in  the  particular  States." 

Again,  he  said : 

"Let  us  review  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  toward  us.  Has  she 
ever  shown  any  disposition  to  enter  into  reciprocal  regulations?  Has 


66  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

she  not,  by  a  temporary  policy,  plainly  declared  that,  until  we  are 
able  and  wftling  to  do  justice  to  ourselves,  she  will  shut  us  out  from  her 
ports,  and  make  us  tributary  tc  her  ?  Have  we  not  seen  her  taking  one 
legislative  step  after  another  to  destroy  our  commerce  ?  Has  not 
her  Legislature  given  discretionary  powers  to  the  Executive,  that  so 
she  might  ever  be  on  the  watch,  and  ready  to  seize  every  advantage 
the  weakness  of  our  situation  might  expose  ?  Have  we  not  reason  to 
believe  that  she  will  continue  a  policy  void  of  regard  to  us,  whilst 
she  can  continue  to  gather  into  her  lap  the  benefits  we  feebly 
endeavor  to  withhold,  and  for  which  she  ought  rather  to  court 
us  by  an  open  and  liberal  participation  of  the  commerce  we 
desire  ?  Will  she  not,  if  she  finds  us  indecisive  in  counteracting 
her  machinations,  continue  to  consult  her  own  interest  as  hereto- 
fore ?  If  we  remain  in  a  state  of  apathy,  we  do  not  fulfill  the  object 
of  our  appointment;  most  of  the  States  in  the  Union  have,  in  some 
shape  or  other,  shown  symptoms  of  disapprobation  of  British 
policy.  Those  States  have  now  relinquished  the  power  of  continuing 
their  systems,  but  under  an  impression  that  a  more  efficient  Government 
would  effectually  support  their  views.  If  we  are  timid  and  inactive,  we 
disappoint  the  just  expectations  of  our  constituents,  and,  I  venture 
to  say,  we  disappoint  the  very  nation  against  whom  the  measure  is 
directed." 

The  grasping  ambition  of  Great  Britain  in  seizing  to 
herself  every  adtantage  in  commerce  was,  more  than  once, 
referred  to  by  Mr.  Madison.  He  dwelt  upon  it  with  great 
earnestness,  as  an  argument  to  show  how  important  and 
necessary  it  was  that  the  United  States  should  counteract 
this  policy  by  protecting  and  developing  their  own  trade 
and  commerce.  And  he  did  not  hesitate,  when  the  occa- 
sion called  for  it,  to  express  his  readiness  to  aid  in  giving 
protection  to  manufactures  as  the  most  certain  and  effect- 
ive means  of  doing  this.  At  one  time,  speaking  directly 
upon  this  point,  he  said  : 

"  He  hoped  gentlemen  would  not  infer  from  this  observation  " 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  67 

[that  the  articles  in  the  bill  were  generally  taxed  for  the  benefit  of 
the  manufacturing  part  of  the  Northern  community]  "  that  he 
thought  the  encouragement  held  out  by  the  bill  to  manufactures 
improper.  Far  from  it.  He  was  glad  to  see  their  growing  consequence , 
and  was  disposed  to  give  them  every  aid  in  his  power." 

Supported,  as  the  question  of  constitutional  power  was, 
by  such  an  array  of  talent  and  strength  of  argument,  the 
opposition  to  the  bill  was  too  feeble  to  make  any  impres- 
sion. After  numerous  amendments  were  made,  levying 
discriminating  duties  for  the  protection  of  manufactures, 
it  passed  the  House  of  Representatives  with  so  little  oppo- 
sition as  to  make  it  almost  unanimous.  It  passed  the 
Senate  with  like  unanimity,  and  was  approved  by  President 
Washington,  July  4th,  1789  —  causing  the  event  to  be 
regarded  throughout  the  country,  on  account  of  the  gen- 
eral rejoicing  it  occasioned,  as  a  second  Declaration  of 
Independence. 

The  questions  involved  in  the  passage  of  this  bill  have 
since  given  rise  to  much  partisan  and  acrimonious  debate, 
yet  they  were  then  determined  so  calmly  and  dispassion- 
ately by  the  men  entitled  to  be  known  as  "  the  fathers,"  as 
to  give  their  opinions  the  greatest  possible  weight.  On 
all  hands,  it  was  agreed  that  the  power  to  foster  manufact- 
ures was  originally  lodged  in  the  States,  under  the  Con- 
federation, but  that,  as  the  States  could  not  carry  on  meas- 
ures of  proper  efficiency,  it  had  been  expressly  given  to 
Congress  by  the  Constitution.  There  was  no  denial  of 
this  by  anybody.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  frequently 
stated,  and  never  controverted,  that  to  effect  this  impor- 
tant change  was  one  of  the  main  objects  which  led  to  the 


68  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

formation  of  the  Constitution.  If  this  had  not  been  so, 
the  occasion  was  a  proper  one  for  denying  it,  when  there 
were  so  many  present  who  could  have  borne  testimony.  It 
has  been  denied  many  times  since  then,  with  a  sort  of 
impunity  that  can  be  entertained  only  by  those  who  scoff  at 
the  example  and  admonitions  of  the  founders  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, as  if  they  were  mere  empirics  and  pretenders. 
But  he  who  would  have  ventured  to  make  it  at  the  time 
this  first  tariff  law  was  under  consideration,  would  have 
exposed  his  own  ignorance  and  folly.  The  country  was 
not  then  far  enough  from  the  old  form  of  Government  to 
forget  its  weaknesses  and  defects.  It  was  in  the  act  of 
taking  the  initiatory  step  of  putting  the  new  Government 
into  operation,  for  the  express  purpose  of  removing  these 
weaknesses  and  defects,  and  the  history  of  the  times,  with 
which  all  were  familiar,  would  have  furnished  an  ample 
answer  to  any  objection. 

The  tariff  law  of  i  789,  therefore,  must  fairly  and  justly 
be  accepted  as  having  settled,  as  far  as  it  could  be  done  by 
legislation,  the  constitutionality  of  giving  protection  to 
manufactures,  and  as  having  laid  the  foundation  upon 
which  the  protective  policy  has  since  rested.  He  who, 
after  becoming  familiar  with  the  plain  and  precise  facts, 
perversely  insists  upon  putting  a  different  interpretation 
upom  them,  makes  his  "  wish  father  to  the  thought,"  or  is 
singularly  incapable  of  understanding  history  and  the 
philosophy  it  teaches. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

WASHINGTON  APPROVES  PROTECTION  OF  MANUFACTURES - 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  DIRECTS  REPORT  FROM  HAMIL- 
TON, SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY  — HIS  BROAD  FIELD  OF 
INQUIRY. 

T^HE  facts  heretofore  noted  show  that,  at  the  beginning 
*  of  the  Government  under  the  Constitution,  when  the 
duty  of  establishing  correct  policy  was  most  imperative, 
and  while  the  men  who  framed  the  Constitution  were  still 
in  active  public  life,  the  revenues  of  the  nation  were  raised, 
not  by  duties  upon  imports  laid  for  that  purpose  alone, 
but  by  discriminating  duties,  levied  so  as  to  protect  and 
encourage  manufactures.  The  avowed  object  was  to  pre- 
vent manufactured  articles  imported  from  other  countries 
from  being  brought  into  such  competition,  in  our  own 
markets,  with  those  manufactured  here  as  would  supersede 
the  domestic  use  and  sale  of  the  latter.  This  policy,  estab- 
lished with  singular  unanimity,  involved  the  direct  intro- 
duction into  our  national  affairs  of  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion, as  a  measure  absolutely  demanded  by  the  best  interests 
of  the  country  —  as  necessary  to  develop  its  immense 
natural  resources  and  increase  its  material  wealth.  From 
that  time  until  the  present  this  principle  has  never  been 
entirely  abandoned,  and,  in  every  form  in  which  the 
national  will  can  be  expressed,  it  has  received  the  popular 


7O  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

approval.  It  would  seem  that  a  principle  so  thoroughly 
engrafted  upon  the  policy  of  the  nation,  and  so  long 
acquiesced  in  by  the  people,  would  encounter  no  serious 
opposition  from  any  quarter.  And,  in  fact,  it  has  not, 
except  from  a  class  of  people  whose  distinguishing  charac- 
teristic is,  that  while,  in  one  breath,  they  admit  the  control" 
ling  influence  of  popular  sentiment  under  a  form  of  gov- 
ernment like  ours,  are  ready,  in  the  next,  to  enter  into 
combinations  of  any  kind  to  defeat  it.  Even  in  the  early 
period  of  Washington's  administration  the  policy  was  con. 
sidered  well  established.  In  his  last  message  to  Congress 
he  said : 

"  Congress  have  repeatedly,  and  not  without  success,  directed 
their  attention  to  the  encouragement  of  manufactures.  The  object 
is  "of  too  much  consequence  not  to  insure  a  continuation  of  their 
efforts  in  every  way  which  shall  appear  eligible." 

There  is  no  mistaking  such  language  as  this  ;  it  cannot 
be  tortured  by  misconstruction.  It  asserts,  first,  the  fact 
that  Congress  had  previously  exercised  the  constitutiona 
power  to  protect  manufactures,  and  then  expresses  the 
desire  to  see  this  principle  maintained  "  in  every  way  "  cal- 
culated to  build  up  and  sustain  manufacturing  enterprise. 
And,  not  content  with  leaving  so  important  a  matter  in  the 
mere  form  of  a  recommendation  to  Congress,  he  addressed 
these  words  of  admonition  to  the  country  with  reference 
to  manufactures  on  public  account : 

"  Ought  our  country  to  remain  in  such  cases  dependent  on 
foreign  supply,  precarious,  because  liable  to  be  interrupted  ?  If  the 
necessary  article  should,  in  this  mode,  cost  more  in  time  of  peace, 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  Jl 

will  not  the  security  and  indeoendence   thence  arising   form   an 
ample  consideration?" 

The  controling  idea  in  the  President's  mind  was  this  : 
That  it  was  our  duty  to  develop  our  extensive  resources, 
so  as  to  make  us  completely  independent  of  all  foreign 
Governments  and  influences,  as  well  in  peace  as  in  war  — 
both  in  fact  and  theory.  And  can  there  be  any  just  pre- 
tense for  saying  that  this  duty  is  not  as  obligatory  to-day 
as  it  was  during  the  period  of  Washington's  administra- 
tion ?  Our  development  was  then  just  beginning  ;  and 
although  it  has  now  reached  a  point  of  progress  perfectly 
marvelous,  yet  it  is  still  far  from  the  end  ;  no  human 
authority  can  limit  it,  and  no  human  sagacity  foretell  its 
future  extent.  If  the  principle  of  protection,  with  a  view 
to  this  development,  was  wrong  and  false  at  its  inception 
-  if  anybody  had  then  supposed  that  it  violated  the  Con- 
stitution or  concentrated  any  undue  powers  in  the  national 
Government,  at  the  expense  of  or  injurious  to  '  the  States, 
then  was  the  appropriate  and  most  fitting  time  to  make 
that  opinion  known  —  when  those  who  made  the  Consti- 
tution were  in  a  condition  to  explain  its  meaning.  The 
absence  of  such  an  avowal,  in  the  first  Congress,  when  the 
constitutionality  of  protection  was  emphatically  and  fre- 
quently affirmed,  ought  to  be  held  as  proving  that  there 
was  then  no  doubt  whatsoever  about  its  existence.  We 
have  seen  that  the  utmost  extent  of  the  opposition  was 
that  made  by  Mr.  Smith,  of  South  Carolina,  and  that  he 
only  intimated  the  existence  of  a  sentiment  of  hostility  to 
the  Government  itself,  as  a  whole^j^jjhout  averring  or 


UNIVERSITY 


72  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

pretending  that  Congress  did  not  possess  the  necessary 
power  to  protect.  To  him  it  seemed  inexpedient  to 
impose  protective  duties,  because  it  would  furnish  a  pre- 
text to  the  manufacturers  to  increase  the  prices  of  manu- 
factured articles  to  consumers  —  a  fallacy  which,  as  will 
be  hereafter  seen,  is  overthrown  by  all  experience.  He 
did  not — nor  did  any  others  —  impute  to  Washington, 
Madison,  and  their  compatriots,  any  purpose  to  violate 
the  Constitution,  when  enforcing  the  necessity  of  protec- 
tion. There  was  no  possibility  of  misunderstanding  their 
argument,  especially  that  of  Mr.  Madison  —  that  if  the 
power  did  not  exist  in  Congress,  it  did  not  exist  at  all, 
for  the  reason  that,  as  the  Constitution  took  it  away  from 
the  States,  it  must  have  been  totally  annihilated  if  not 
given  to  Congress.  It  was  a  part  of  the  public  history  of 
the  time,  well  understood  by  all,  that  its  annihilation  was 
neither  desired  nor  intended,  either  by  the  State  Govern- 
ment or  the  people.  Such  a  desire  would  have  been 
equivalent  to  a  wish  to  leave  the  industrial  interests  of  the 
whole  country  to  sink  into  decay  and  ruin,  whereas  the 
very  opposite  sentiment  existed  in  all  considerate  minds. 
In  the  House  of  Representatives,  especially,  this  senti- 
ment almost  universally  prevailed,  and  led  to  the  passage 
of  a  resolution  instructing  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
-then  Alexander  Hamilton  —  to  prepare  and  report  a 
plan  "for  the  encouragement  and  promotion  of  suck  manu- 
factures as  will  tend  to  render  the  United  States  inde- 
/  pendent  of  other  nationc  for  essential,  particularly  for 
military,  siipplies" 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  73 

This  resolution  was  undoubtedly  passed  in  response  to 
the  opinions  and  recommendation  of  Washington ;  and 
its  phraseology  was  well  considered.  It  was  a  measure  of 
wise  precaution  in  order  that  the  inquiry  should  be  calmly 
and  deliberately  made  and  a  satisfactory  result  reached. 
It  was  intended  to  cover  all  the  questions  involved,  and  to 
explain  fully  all  the  objects  expected  to  be  accomplished 
by  protecting  manufactures.  And  it  was  manifestly  de- 
signed to  convey  the  idea,  then  prominent  in  the  public 
mind,  that  the  only  way  to  make  this  country  "  independ- 
ent of  other  nations  "  was  to  foster  its  domestic  industry 
by  the  necessary  measures  of  legislation.  It  expresses 
what  was  frequently  said  in  debate  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives ;  and,  having  followed  so  immediately  the  pas- 
sage of  the  first  tariff  act,  it  must  be  considered  as  showing 
that  Congress  intended  to  employ  the  necessary  scrutiny 
to  make  the  protective  system  complete  arid  permanent. 

The  unanimity  upon  the  whole  subject  was  extraordi- 
nary—  it  was  probably  more  so  than  has  ever  existed  with 
regard  to  any  other  important  public  measure.  The  ques- 
tions involved  were  considered  in  their  national  aspects 
alone,  and  it  was  not  then  supposed  possible  that  anything 
would  be  likely  to  grow  out  of  them  which  could  give  rise 
to  sectional  jealousies  and  animosities.  The  country  had 
too  recently  passed  through  the  throes  of  the  Revolution- 
ary period  for  its  loyalty  to  all  the  sections  and  the  whole 
Union  to  undergo  any  abatement.  There  was  enough  to 
do  in  the  work  of  building  up  the  Nation,  without  wasting 


74  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  popular  energies  or  straining  the  popular  patriotism 
in  struggles  for  local  supremacy. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  obeying  this  resolu- 
tion, exhibited  a  proper  regard  for  the  general  welfare  by 
investigating  the  matters  submitted  to  him  with  the  utmost 
care.  That  he  was  qualified,  in  an  eminent  degree,  to  make 
such  an  investigation,  nobody  will  dispute, —  his  position  in 
the  front  rank  of  American  statesmen  being  universally 
recognized.  The  duty  was  a  most  delicate  one.  The 
country  occupied  an  intermediary  position,  between  the 
Colonial  dependence  it  had  thrown  off,  and  the  hope  of 
national  greatness  after  which  it  was  reaching  ;  and  what- 
soever step  was  to  be  taken  had  to  be  decided  with  the 
utmost  deliberation.  False  measures  of  policy  might  cause 
the  loss  of  all  that  had  been  gained  by  political  independ- 
ence. The  people  were  in  possession  of  a  magnificent 
territory,  and  were  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  creat- 
ing a  system  of  domestic  measures  upon  sufficiently  broad 
foundations  to  make  the  United  States  one  of  the  leading 
and  influential  powers  of  the  world.  The  whole  field  of 
investigation  and  thought  was  open,  therefore,  to  the 
statesmen  of  that  period  ;  and  as  no  parties  had  then  been 
formed  upon  sectional  issues,  and  public  men  were  appre- 
ciated, not  on  account  of  ability  alone,  but  their  integrity 
as  well,  what  was  then  said  and  done  remains  worthy  of 
lasting  remembrance.  The  disregard  of  the  lessons  they 
taught  so  wisely,  even  after  the  lapse  of  so  many  years, 
would  border  closely  upon  folly. 

The  report  of  Mr.   Hamilton,  made  in  obedience  to 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  75 

the  foregoing  resolution,  presents  the  necessities  and  wants 
of  the  country  so  clearly,  and  with  such  power  of  argument 
and  illustration,  that  nothing  has  ever  yet  been  said,  by  the 
ablest  theorizers  who  have  tried  to  overthrow  it,  to  contro- 
vert successfully  any  of  his  positions.  His  arguments  were 
unanswerable  then  and  still  remain  so.  An  examination 
of  them  cannot  fail  to  satisfy  all  who  take  the  pains  to 
make  it,  that  he  completely  covered  the  whole  ground,  and 
was  in  full  sympathy  with  the  recommendations  of  Wash- 
ington, the  opinions  of  Madison,  and  the  principles  em- 
bodied in  the  law  passed  by  Congress.  Although  worthy  of 
reproduction,  this  report  is  too  long  for  insertion  here ;  but 
the  general  scope  of  his  reasoning  may  be  perceived  in 
the  following  language  : 

'*  The  embarrassments  which  have  obstructed  the  progress  of 
our  external  trade  have  led  to  serious  reflections  on  the  necessity 
of  enlarging  the  sphere  of  our  domestic  commerce^  The  restrictive 
regulations  which,  in  foreign  markets,  abridge  the  vent  for  the 
increasing  surplus  of  our  agricultural  produce,  serve  to  beget  an 
earnest  desire  that  a  more  extensive  demand  for  that  surplus  may 
be  created  at  home;  and  the  complete  success  which  has  rewarded 
manufacturing  enterprise  in  some  valuable  branches,  conspiring 
with  the  promising  symptoms  which  attend  some  less  mature  essays 
in  others,  justify  a  hope  that  the  obstacles  to  the  growth  of  this 
species  of  industry  are  less  formidable  than  they  were  apprehended 
to  be,  and  that  it  may  not  be  difficult  to  find,  in  its  further  exten- 
sion, a  full  indemnification  for  any  external  disadvantages  which 
are  or  may  be  experienced,  as  well  as  an  accession  of  resources 
favorable  to  national  independence  and  safety." 

The  field  of  inquiry  upon  which  he  was  required  to 
enter  was  exceedingly  broad.  It  embraced  whatsoever 
there  was  in  political  economy  calculated  to  teach  the  best 


76  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

and  surest  methods  of  securing  national  prosperity  and 
elevation.  He  could  not  have  failed  to  see  before  him 
two  paths,  pointing  in  opposite  directions,  into  one  or  the 
other  of  which  the  nation  must  be  led :  the  return  to 
the  humiliating  condition  of  dependence  upon  Great 
Britain,  or  the  acquisition  of  such  permanence  to  our 
independence  as  would  assure  our  ultimate  equality  with 
the  best  and  strongest  among  the  nations.  With  the 
latter  end  especially  in  view,  there  were  difficulties  in 
the  way  which  had  to  be  cautiously  met  and  confronted, 
and  which  nothing  but  extreme  sagacity  would  be  likely  to 
overcome.  The  terrible  struggle  for  national  existence  had 
passed,  but  that  for  national  greatness  had  just  begun. 
The  seeds  of  independence  had  been  broadly  sown,  but 
they  had  to  be  nurtured  in  all  the  stages  of  their  growth, 
so  that  when  the  harvest  should  ripen  the  best  and  richest 
fruits  could  be  garnered.  The  whole  future  of  the  coun- 
try had  to  be  explored  by  anticipation,  and  a  single  mis- 
step might  have  surrounded  it  with  clouds  instead  of  sun- 
shine—  with  storms  instead  of  calm. 

Mr.  Hamilton  was  fully  equal  to  the  occasion.  His 
report  has  not  been  surpassed  in  wisdom  by  any  public 
document  produced  in  this  country.  It  shows  with  great 
clearness  that  the  welfare  of  the  nation  would  have  been 
placed  at  fearful  hazard  by  receding  from  the  steps  already 
taken  by  the  Government,  and  that,  by  giving  permanence 
to  the  system  it  had  inaugurated,  our  future  would  prove 
to  be  all  that  the  most  patriotic  heart  could  hope  for  or 
desire. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

REPORT  OF  SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY  — OVERTHROWS  THE 
DOCTRINE  OF  FREE  TRADE— NECESSITY  FOR  DIVERSITY  OF 
OCCUPATIONS—  IF  ALL  CULTIVATED  THE  SOIL  OUR  NATIONAL 
RESOURCES  COULD  NOT  BE  DEVELOPED. 

A  LT HOUGH  we  have  become  wiser  and  exhibit  more 
**  evidences  of  culture,  in  many  respects,  than  the  past 
generations  —  in  abstract  and  physical  science,  in  the 
mechanic  arts,  in  historic  research,  inliterary  refinement, 
in  the  broad  fields  of  discovery,  and  in  the  whole  circle  of 
general  knowledge — yet  we  cannot  assure  ourselves  with 
confidence  that  we  understand  the  science  of  government 
better  than  "the  fathers"  did,  or  even  as  well.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  they  were  more  unselfish  and  less  partisan  than 
we  are,  and  realized  their  responsibilities  in  a  greater  degree 
than  we  do.  As  the  builders  of  a  new  government  they 
were  constrained,  by  the  necessity  of  their  surroundings, 
to  employ  great  care  and  circumspection ;  whilst  we,  on 
our  part,  persuade  ourselves  to  believe  that  our  institutions, 
having  acquired  a  century  of  age,  can  stand  any  strain  to 
which  they  may  be  subjected.  Every  step  they  took  had 
to  be  measured  with  the  utmost  accuracy ;  whereas,  our 
private  occupations  are  so  numerous  and  varied,  and 
absorb  so  much  of  our  time  and  energy,  that  we  are  con- 
tent to  let  public  affairs  drift  along  to  accidental  results, 
and  never  realize  the  importance  of  popular  vigilance  until 

77 


78  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

almost  in  the  actual  presence  of  danger.  Do  we  not  risk 
too  much  by  this  manifest  dereliction  of  duty  ? —  by  getting 
too  far  away  from  the  lines  of  policy  marked  out  by  the 
early  statesmen?  —  by  neglecting  to  understand  how  and 
by  what  measures  the  greatness  of  our  country  was  devel- 
oped?—  by  submitting  to  the  misleading  influences  of 
ambitious  men,  who  have  personal  ends  to  accomplish, 
rather  than  to  the  counsels  of  those  who,  under  providen- 
tial care,  planted  our  institutions  both  wisely  and  well  ? 

Mr.  Hamilton's  report  reflected  the  public  sentiment 
then  existing,  as  well  as  the  policy  of  Washington's 
administration  and  that  established  by  the  act  of  Con- 
gress. It  constitutes,  therefore,  a  source  of  most  reliable 
information ;  and  whilst  its  republication,  on  account  of  its 
length,  is  inexpedient,  it  may  aid  an  intelligent  inquirer  to 
have  its  general  principles  brought  to  his  mind.  These 
cannot  be,  in  the  nature  of  things,  as  exhaustive  as  the 
argument  itself  ;  nevertheless,  it  may  prove  instructive. 
The  investigation  of  political  truths  is  no  less  the  duty  of 
the  citizen  of  a  free  country,  than  it  is  diligently  to  labor 
for  the  ends  to  which  they  legitimately  lead. 

As  Mr.  Hamilton  had  to  confute  the  assertions  of  the 
few  who  had  then  announced  their  theories  of  free  com- 
merce, it  is  necessary  that  they  shall  be  fully  comprehended, 
especially  as  some  of  them  are  yet  supposed  to  possess 
merit.  They  may  be  thus  summed  up:  (i)  That  as 
agriculture  is  the  most  beneficial  and  productive  object  of 
industry,  it  would  be  unwise  not  to  direct  all  the  energies 
of  our  people  to  the  conversion  of  all  our  lands  into 


HISTORY   OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  79 

cultivated  farms.  (2)  That  to  attempt  by  the  patronage  of 
the  Government,  to  accelerate  the  growth  of  manufact- 
ures, would  be  to  divert  labor  from  the  profitable  occupa- 
tion of  farming  to  a  less  beneficial  channel.  (3)  That 
industry  should  be  left  to  the  guidance  of  private  interest, 
which  will  always  incite  it  to  the  most  profitable  employ- 
ment. (4)  That  the  population  of  the  United  States  was 
so  small  that  a  sufficiency  of  labor  for  manufactures  could 
not  be  procured  without  injury  to  the  farming  interests. 
(5)  That  manufactures  cannot  be  successfully  carried  on, 
except  where  there  is  a  redundancy  of  population.  (6) 
That  there  was  not  capital  enough  in  the  country  to  carry 
on  manufactures.  (7)  That  if  the  attempt  were  made, 
we  could  not  successfully  compete  with  the  manufacturers 
of  Europe.  (8)  That  by  the  misdirection  of  labor  from 
the  cultivation  of  land  to  manufactures,  a  monopoly  would 
be  created  in  favor  of  those  engaged  in  the  latter,  which 
would  produce  an  enhancement  of  price,  at  the  expense  of 
the  other  parts  of  society.  (9)  "  It  is  far  preferable  that 
those  persons  should  be  engaged  in  the  cultivation  of  the 
earth,  and  that  we  should  procure,  in  exchange  for  its  pro- 
ductions, the  commodities  with  which  foreigners  are  able 
to  supply  us  in  greater  perfection,  and  upon  better  terms." 
Some  of  these  propositions,  when  merely  glanced  at, 
seem  plausible;  but,  upon  careful  examination,  they  all 
appear  specious  and  misleading.  Mr.  Hamilton  overthrew 
them  most  successfully.  Conceding  that  the  cultivation 
of  the  earth  is  the  immediate  and  chief  source  of  sub- 
sistence to  man,  in  his  opinion  it  did  not,  by  any  means, 


80  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

follow  that  it  is  the  only  productive  species  of  industry. 
In  that  form  of  labor  nature  cooperates  with  man,  not 
only  limiting  its  products  to  those  which  land  produces, 
but  curtailing  the  sphere  of  invention ;  whereas,  skill  and 
art,  properly  combined  and  stimulated  by  the  various 
demands  of  society,  —  which  necessarily  go  beyond  the 
things  produced  by  agriculture,  — may  become  more  valua- 

• 

ble  than  the  labor  of  nature  and  man  combined  together. 
Manufacturing  labor  is  not  necessarily  more  valuable  than 
agricultural  labor,  but  it  involves  the  employment  of  the 
total  mass  of  the  labor  of  a  country,  and  not  a  part  of  it 
merely,  and,  therefore,  adds  to  the  aggregate  wealth  of  the 
whole ;  whereas,  a  policy  that  would  cause  agriculture  to 
attract  the  entire  labor  of  the  country,  would  necessarily 
leave  a  portion  of  the  laborers  unemployed,  and  society 
would  be  thereby  injured.  If  all  were  farmers,  each  one, 
besides  cultivating  his  land,  would  be  compelled  to  de- 
vote some  portion  of  his  time  and  labor  to  the  fabrica- 
tion of  clothing  and  other  articles  necessary  for  domestic 
uses,  which  would  diminish  the  amount  of  agricultural 
labor  to  that  extent,  and  make  the  product  of  the  land 
proportionately  less  valuable.  But  where  there  are  both 
manufacturers  and  farmers,  not  only  can  the  latter  devote 
their  entire  time  and  labor  to  the  cultivation  of  their 
farms,  and  thereby  produce  a  greater  quantity  of  raw 
materials,  but  the  former  would  purchase  these  and  con- 
vert them  into  manufactured  commodities,  with  which  to 
repay  the  farmer  and  supply  himself.  And  thus  "  there 
would  be  two  quantities  of  values  in  existence  instead  of 


€ 

§ 


> 


o 

CO 


In 


CO 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  8 1 

one  ;  and  the  revenue  and  consumption  would  be  double, 
in  one  case,  what  it  would  be  in  the  other." 

Not  only  did  Mr.  Hamilton  argue  to  prove  that  manu- 
facturing establishments  would  augment  the  produce  and 
revenue  of  society,  but  he  pointed  out  the  methods  whereby 
this  result  would  be  effected  :  (i)  The  division  of  labor. 
(2)  An  extension  of  the  use  of  machinery.  (3)  Additional 
employment  to  classes  of  the  community  not  ordinarily 
engaged  in  the  business.  (4)  The  promotion  of  emi- 
gration from  foreign  countries,  and  the  consequent  in- 
crease of  population.  (5)  The  furnishing  greater  scope  for 
the  diversity  of  talents  and  dispositions,  which  discriminate 
men  from  each  other.  (6)  The  affording  a  more  ample 
and  various  field  for  enterprise.  (7)  The  creating,  in 
some  instances,  a  new,  and  securing,  in  all,  a  more  certain 
and  steady  demand  for  the  surplus  produce  of  the  soil. 
"  Each  of  these  circumstances,"  said  he,  "has  a  considera- 
ble influence  upon  the  total  mass  of  industrious  effort  of  a 
community ;  together  they  add  to  it  a  degree  of  energy 
and  effect,  which  are  not  easily  conceived." 

Contrasting  a  domestic  market  with  a  foreign  one,  he 
expressed  a  decided  preference  for  the  former,  because  it 
was  always  more  reliable  ;  and,  he  might  well  have  added, 
more  easy  of  access,  for  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the 
nearer  the  producer  and  the  consumer  are  together,  the 
better  it  is  for  both.  Upon  this  hypothesis  he  demon- 
strated that  it  should  be  a  primary  object  of  the  policy  of 
the  United  States  to  enable  the  people  to  supply  them- 
selves with  all  the  means  of  subsistence  from  their  own 


82  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

soil,  and  that  they  should  establish  manufactures  in  order 
to  procure  from  the  same  source  the  raw  materials  neces- 
sary for  their  own  fabrics.  And  then,  carrying  out  his 
general  ideas  to  their  logical  results,  he  laid  down  the  fol- 
lowing incontrovertible  doctrine  : 

"  In  such  a  condition  of  things  [as  the  impairment  of  our  manu- 
facturing industry]  the  United  States  cannot  exchange  with  Europe 
on  equal  terms  ;  and  the  want  of  reciprocity  would  render  them 
the  victim  of  a  system  which  should  induce  them  to  confine  their 
views  to  agriculture  and  refrain  from  manufactures.  A  constant 
and  increasing  necessity,  on  their  part,  for  the  commodities  of 
Europe,  and  only  a  partial  and  occasional  demand  for  their  own, 
in  return,  could  not  but  expose  them  to  a  state  of  impoverishment, 
compared  with  the  opulence  to  which  their  political  and  material 
advantages  authorize  them  to  aspire." 

Such  arguments  as  these  were  approved  by  the  wise 
and  prudent  men  who  achieved  our  Independence  and 
framed  our  Government,  and  by  the  people  of  every  sec- 
tion and  all  pursuits.  They  fully  justified  the  recognition 
and  establishment  of  the  principles  upon  which  the  pro- 
tective system  rested  at  the  beginning,  and  still  rests.  If 
the  result  had  been  otherwise  than  it  was  —  if,  instead  of 
following  these  common-sense  and  statesmanlike  sugges- 
tions, the  speculative  theories  which  came  from  the  closets 
of  political  economists  had  been  adopted,  the  labor  of  the 
country  would  have  been  left  unemployed,  and  multitudes 
of  people  would  have  been  plunged  into  poverty  and  pau- 
perism. And  not  that  alone  —  the  great  natural  advant- 
ages we  possessed  would  have  been  without  value,  our 
mines  would  have  remained  unworked,  our  minerals  in  the 
ground,  our  timber  rotting  in  the  forests,  and  we  should 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  83 

have  been  left  without  commerce,  either  domestic  or  for- 
eign, in  a  state  of  dependence  upon  England,  as  humiliat- 
ing as  that  existing  during  the  Colonial  period.  All  this 
was  realized  by  the  wisest  statesmen  of  that  day,  as  well  as 
by  the  great  mass  of  the  people,  regardless  of  their  pursuits 
—  which  accounts  for  the  unanimity  with  which  the  policy 
of  protection  was  accepted  as  the  only  and  sure  ground 
of  hope  for  the  future  material  prosperity  of  the  country. 
It  is  fortunate  for  us — and,  in  view  of  our  progress 
and  present  position,  it  is  fortunate  also  for  the  peoples  of 
other  countries —  that  the  statesmen  of  that  time  had  been 
taught  wisdom  and  unselfishness  by  the  lessons  of  the  Revo- 
lution, and  that  they  considered  themselves  the  custodians 
of  a  sacred  trust  which  they  were  required  to  administer 
with  the  strictest  fidelity,  and  with  reference  to  the  wel- 
fare of  all  the  people,  of  every  class  and  condition.  What- 
soever faults  they  had  —  and  human  nature  has  never  been 
so  purified  that  some  faults  do  not  exist  —  leaned  to  the 
side  of  the  country.  They  resolved  all  doubts  in  favor  of 
the  general  welfare.  If  they  had  ambition  it  was  purified 
by  patriotism.  If  they  had  passion  it  was  hushed  in  the 
universal  desire  to  make  the  nation  great  and  strong,  and 
worthy  of  the  people  whose  fortunes  had  been  imperiled 
in  its  defense.  If  party  spirit  displayed  itself  among  them 
it  was  abashed  in  the  presence  of  their  disinterested  patri- 
otism. And  if  they  were  threatened,  for  a  moment,  with 
supposed  conflicts  of  interest,  arising  out  of  geographical 
divisions,  they  gave  way  under  the  pressure  of  the  uni- 
versal desire  to  make  the  union  so  compact,  and  to  fix  its 
pillars  so  firmly,  that  its  benefits  would  be  perpetual 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

PROTECTION  SUPPORTED  BY  JOHN  ADAMS  — ALSO  BY  JEFFERSON 
-ITS  EFFECT  UPON  REVENUE  — PRODUCING  SURPLUS— ALSO 
UPON  TRADE  AND  COMMERCE— JEFFERSON  RECOMMENDS  IT, 
NOTWITHSTANDING  SURPLUS  —  PROPOSES  INTERNAL  IM- 
PROVEMENTS BY  AMENDING  THE  CONSTITUTION. 

*\  A  7 HEN  the  Government  passed  out  of  the  hands  of 
V  Washington  into  those  of  John  Adams,  as  Presi- 
dent, it  had  already  experienced  the  benefits  which,  on 
all  hands,  were  recognized  as  having  been  produced  by 
the  protective  policy.  Agriculture  had  become  more 
extensive  and  prosperous.  Commerce  was  increasing 
with  wonderful  rapidity.  Every  variety  of  domestic  trade 
was  improving.  Numerous  merchant  vessels  were  built 
in  the  Atlantic  cities.  Old  manufactures  were  revived, 
and  new  ones  were  springing  up  at  points  where  water- 
power  could  be  utilized.  The  nation  was  gradually  obtain- 
ing control  over  its  own  carrying-trade.  Mineral  deposits 
were  not  yet  discovered  extensively  enough  to  justify  the 
anticipation  of  a  large  increase  of  wealth  from  that  source, 
but  they  were  sufficiently  developed  to  give  fair  promise 
of  future  gains.  Everything,  however,  pertaining  to  in- 
dustrial pursuits  —  the  arts,  mechanics,  agriculture,  manu- 
factures, and  commerce  —  was  in  comparative  infancy. 
Yet,  at  the  same  time,  the  duties  laid  with  a  view  to 

encourage  and  protect  all  these    not  only  increased  the 

84 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  85 

revenues  of  the  Government,  but  gave  reliable  assurance 
of  future  beneficial  results. 

We  have  heretofore  seen  the  ruinous  condition  of  our 
trade  with  Great  Britain  for  the  seven  years  preceding 
1791,  when  our  imports  exceeded  our  exports  $52,372,875 
—  thus  making  the  balance  of  trade  that  much  against  us 
during  that  period.  A  comparison  of-these  years  with  the 
seven  beginning  in  1795 — by  which  time  the  benefits 
of  protection  were  beginning  to  be  exhibited  —  will  show 
the  rapidity  of  our  development  and  the  increase  of  our 
commerce.  The  following  is  a  table  of  our  exports  and 
imports  for  these  years — the  former  consisting  of  the 
produce  of  the  sea,  of  the  forest,  of  agriculture,  and  of 
manufactures  combined : 

Exports.  Imports. 

1795 • $23,313,121 $    6,324,066 

1796 31,928,685 17,143,313 

1797 27,303,067 6,637,423 

1798 ,         17,330,770 ,.  11,978,870 

1799 29,133,219 19,930,428 

1800 32,877,059 19,085,603 

1801 39,519,218 30,931,121 

$201,405,139  $112,030,824 

Thus,  within  the  brief  period  of  ten  years  of  the  opera- 
tion of  the  protective  policy,  our  commercial  relations  with 
England  had  become  so  changed  and  improved,  that  our 
expo'rts  had  been  made  to  exceed  our  imports  $89,374,315, 
making  the  balance  of  trade  that  much  in  our  favor. 
This  enabled  us  to  discharge  the  balance  that  stood  against 
us  in  1790  —  that  is,  $52,372,875 — and  bring  England,  at 
the  clo$£of  1801,  $37,001,440  in  our  debt 


86  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

Such  facts  as  these,  accumulating  every  year,  were  well 
calculated  to  excite  the  apprehension  of  England  that  the 
United  States  might  become  a  far  more  formidable  com- 
mercial rival  than  she  had  ever  anticipated,  while  they 
undoubtedly  stimulated  the  energies  of  the  American  peo- 
ple in  a  degree  surprising  even  to  themselves.  Our  ad- 
vancement was  so  rapid  that  the  history  of  it  reads  almost 
like  some  of  the  mythical  tales  found  in  the  books.  It 
caused  the  world  to  realize  that  the  United  States  were 
destined  to  become  one  of  the  great  and  commanding 
powers  of  the  earth,  if  nothing  should  occur  to  arrest  their 
progress.  As  Mr.  Adams  became  President  in  the  midst 
of  these  flattering  developments,  and  fully  sympathized 
with  the  policy  which  had  contributed  to  produce  them, 
he  availed  himself  of  the  occasion  of  his  inaugural  address 
to  congratulate  the  country  upon  the  happy  effects  that 
had  followed  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  which 
were  mainly  attributable  to  the  policy  of  protection. 

Although  Mr.  Adams  was  not  as  emphatic  as  Wash- 
ington—  there  being  no  occasion  for  it,  as  the  policy  of 
the  Government  had  been  established  —  yet  he  was  suf- 
ficiently so  to  show  that  he  fully  and  properly  appreciated 
the  advantages  and  benefits  of  the  existing  system.  In 
his  first  message  he  said : 

"The  commerce  of  the  United  States  is  essential,  if  not  to 
their  existence,  at  least  to  their  comfort,  their  growth,  pros- 
perity, and  happiness.  The  genius,  character,  and  habits  of  the 
people  are  highly  commercial.  Their  cities  have  been  founded  and 
exist  upon  commerce.  Our  agriculture,  fisheries,  arts,  and  manu- 
factures are  connected  with  and  dependent  upon  it.  In  short, 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF,  87 

commerce  has  made  this  country  what  it  is,  and  it  cannot  be  de- 
stroyed or  neglected  without  involving  the  people  in  poverty  and 
distress.  .  .  .  Under  this  view  of  our  affairs  I  should  hold 
myself  guilty  of  a  neglect  of  duty  if  I  forebore  to  recommend  that 
we  should  make  every  exertion  to  protect  our  commerce,  and  to 
place  our  country  in  a  suitable  posture  of  defense,  as  the  only  sure 
means  of  preserving  both." 

He  enumerated,  with  great  distinctness  and  accuracy, 
the  sources  of  national  prosperity  —  agriculture,  fisheries, 
arts,  and  manufactures.  From  these  he  considered  com- 
merce to  be  derived,  and  without  them  it  could  not  exist. 
As  they  are  developed,  so  it  increases  in  magnitude  and 
importance.  Agriculture  is  the  foundation.  Its  surplus 
products,  as  everybody  knows,  furnish  no  profit  unless 
transferred  to  market,  either  in  their  original  form,  as  raw 
materials,  or  in  the  shape  of  manufactured  articles.  If 
these  latter  are  imported  from  foreign  countries,  manu- 
facturing establishments  could  not  exist  in  the  United 
States,  and,  consequently,  the  surplus  products  of  agricult- 
ure would  be  left  to  decay  in  the  hands  of  the  producer, 
and  he  would  be  deprived  of  proper  reward  for  his  labor. 
Whilst  Mr.  Adams  did  not  express  himself  in  these  words, 
it  is  manifest  that  his  conclusions  were  arrived  at  by  this 
process  of  reasoning,  which  was  then  recognized  by  all 
intelligent  minds  and  has  since  become  axiomatic  in  our 
political  economy.  He,  however,  renewed  the  subject  in 
his  last  message,  in  1800,  and,  congratulating  the  country 
upon  the  condition  of  affairs  then  existing,  said : 

"  I  observe,  with  much  satisfaction,  that  the  product  of  the 
revenue  during  the  present  year  has  been  more  considerable  than 
during  any  former  period.  This  result  affords  conclusive  evidence 


88  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

of  the  great  resources  of  the  country,  and  of  the  wisdom  and 
efficiency  of  the  measures  which  have  been  adopted  by  Congress 
for  the  protection  of  commerce  and  preservation  of  the  public 
credit." 

Mr.  Adams  very  distinctly  shows  that  he  attributed 
the  increased  and  increasing  development  of  our  resources 
to  the  legislation  of  Congress  —  that  is,  mainly  to  the 
tariff  act  of  the  first  Congress,  which  levied  duties  upon 
imports  so  as  to  encourage  domestic  industry,  and  thereby 
increase  the  demand  for  agricultural  products  at  home,  and 
extend  commerce.  The  country  was  already  gathering 
the  fruits  of  this  policy,  and  this  was  realized  by  all  classes 
of  society,  in  every  part  of  the  Union.  The  general  ex- 
pectation was  that  there  would  be  a  rapid  increase  of  pros- 
perity in  the  future,  and  the  administration  of  Mr.  Adams 
closed  under  these  favorable  auspices. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  Mr.  Jefferson  was  one  of  the 
foremost  men  of  that  period.  As  Secretary  of  State  under 
the  administration  of  Washington  he  had  acquiesced  fully 
in  the  measures,  then  adopted,  with  regard  to  protection. 
In  an  able  and  exhaustive  report  laid  by  him  before  the 
President,  the  necessity  of  such  provisions  as  would  tend 
to  develop  our  internal  commerce  was  pointed  out  with 
great  clearness.  At  the  time  of  his  election  to  the  Presi- 
dency, therefore,  he  was  accepted  by  the  country  as  the 
distinctive  representative  of  the  existing  system  of  protec- 
tion. The  issues  in  the  contest  between  him  and  Mr. 
Adams  mainly  involved  other  matters.  They  did  not 
excite  any  apprehension  in  the  public  mind  that  the  prin- 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  89 

ciple  of  protection  would  be  impaired  during  his  adminis- 
tration. And  all  said  and  done  by  him  shows  conclusively 
that  he  did  not  desire  or  intend  that  it  should  be.  In  his 
first  message  to  Congress,  in  1801,  he  made  the  following 
general  reflections  : 

"  Agriculture,  manufactures,  commerce,  and  navigation,  are 
the  most  thriving  when  left  free  to  individual  enterprise.  Protec- 
tion from  casual  embarrassments,  however,  may  sometimes  be  rea- 
sonably interposed.  If  in  the  course  of  your  observations  or  inquir- 
ies they  should  appear  to  need  any  aid  within  the  limits  of  our  con- 
stitutional powers,  your  sense  of  their  importance  is  a  sufficient 
assurance  they  will  occupy  your  attention.  We  cannot,  indeed,  but 
feel  an  anxious  solicitude  for  the  difficulties  under  which  our  carry- 
ing-trade will  soon  be  placed.  How  far  it  can  be  relieved  otherwise 
than  by  time,  is  a  subject  of  important  consideration." 

Mr.  Jefferson  manifestly  did  not  intend,  by  this,  to  con- 
vey the  idea  that  a  nation  would  be  justified  in  not  making 
suitable  regulations  for  the  protection  of  its  own  com- 
merce ;  or  that  it  could  afford  to  allow  other  nations  to 
impose  restrictions  upon  it  without  interposing  defensive 
and  retaliatory  measures  of  its  own.  In  view  of  the  exist- 
ing system  —  which  he  did  not  desire  to  see  disturbed  — 
it  is  apparent  that  he  intended  the  reverse.  Whilst,  if 
there  were  no  restrictions  anywhere  and  all  commerce  was 
free,  he  supposed  general  industry  might  thrive ;  yet,  where 
restrictions  were  imposed  by  other  nations,  he  undoubtly 
considered  it  our  duty  to  counteract  them.  Hence,  he 
conceded  the  power  of  Congress  over  the  whole  question 
—  to  be  employed  whensoever  it  should  become  necessary 
for  self-protection.  It  is  evident  that  his  mind,  like  that  of 
Mr.  Adams,  was  directed  to  the  true  sources  of  prosperity, 


90  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

and  that  he  considered  the  four  great  interests  enu- 
merated by  him  —  agriculture,  manufactures,  commerce, 
and  navigation  —  as  so  united  in  interest  as  to  pos- 
sess a  common  claim  upon  the  Government  for  pro- 
tection and  development.  But  he  found  it  necessary  to 
express  his  opinions  more  decidedly  at  subsequent  periods 
of  his  administration,  when  the  questions  involved  became 
more  practical. 

The  protective  system  produced  such  admirable  and 
satisfactory  results,  that  by  the  year  1806  the  receipts  in  the 
Treasury  from  customs  had  very,  greatly  increased  —  even 
beyond  the  public  expectation.  Their  increase  was  pro- 
portionate to  the  augmentation  of  the  general  prosperity 
in  all  branches  of  industry.  By  the  payment  and  reim- 
bursements of  that  year  $23,000,000  of  the  public  debt 
were  extinguished.  It  was  believed  that  after  abolishing 
the  duty  on  salt  —  an  absolute  necessity  —  and  the  cessa- 
tion of  a  few  other  minor  duties  upon  luxuries,  there 
would  be  a  surplus  in  the  Treasury  to  be  disposed  of,  in 
some  way,  by  Congress.  Mr.  Jefferson  anticipated  this, 
and,  consequently,  in  his  message  of  that  year,  he  said  : 

"  When  both  of  these  branches  of  revenue  shall  in  this  way  be 
relinquished,  there  will  still  ere  long  be  an  accumulation  of  moneys  in 
the  Treasury  beyond  the  installment  of  the  public  debt  which  we  are  permitted 
by  contract  to  pay." 

It  having  become  thus  certain  that  there  would  be  a 
surplus  in  the  Treasury,  under  the  operation  of  the  existing 
laws — the  protective  principle  not  having  been  impaired 
—  it  became  necessary  to  determine  upon  the  best  and 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  9 1 

wisest  mode  of  disposing  of  it.     Consequently,  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son, in  the  same  message,  also  said  : 

"  The  question,  therefore,  now  comes  forward  :  To  what  other 
objects  shall  these  surpluses  be  appropriated,  and  the  whole  surplus 
of  import,  after  the  entire  discharge  of  the  public  debt,  and  during 
those  intervals  when  the  purposes  of  war  shall  not  call  for  them  ? 
Shall  we  suppress  the  impost  and  give  that  advantage  to  foreign  over 
domestic  manufactures  ?  On  a  few  articles  of  more  general  and  neces- 
sary use,  th.e  suppression  in  due  season  will  doubtless  be  right ; 
but  the  great  mass  of  the  articles  on  which  impost  is  laid  are 
foreign  luxuries,  purchased  by  those  only  who  are  rich  enough  to 
afford  themselves  the  use  of  them.  Their  patriotism  would  cer- 
tainly prefer  its  continuance  and  application  to  the  great  purposes  of 
public  education,  roads,  rivers,  canals,  and  such  other  objects  of 
public  improvemement  as  it  may  be  thought  proper  to  add  to  the 
constitutional  enumeration  of  federal  powers." 

This  condition  of  affairs  teaches  a  lesson  it  would  be 
unwise  to  overlook  or  forget.  The  accumulation  of  surplus 
revenue  was  occasioned  by  customs  duties,  laid  for  the 
protection  of  domestic  industry  and  home  manufactures ; 
this  has  been  shown  to  have  been  the  avowed  and  express 
object.  And  when  it  was  ascertained  that  the  revenue 
thus  raised  would  be  in  excess  of  the  immediate  wants  of 
the  Government,  the  necessity  of  deciding  whether  these 
protective  duties  should  be  continued  or  suppressed 
became  a  practical  question,  which  had  to  be  immediately 
decided.  There  certainly  could  have  been  no  more 
favorable  opportunity  for  introducing  the  principle  of  free 
trade,  if,  as  is  now  often  asserted,  it  is  right  and  proper 
under  all  circumstances  and  conditions.  Mr.  Jefferson 
understood,  as  well  as  any  man,  the  philosophy  of  govern- 
ment ;  and  his  acute  mind  enabled  him  to  see  the  full 


92  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

import  and  all  the  bearings  of  public  questions.  But  he 
did  not  regard  free  trade  either  right  or  proper,  although 
it  is  possible  he  might  have  done  so  if  it  had  prevailed 
universally  among  all  other  natinos.  Therefore,  he  con- 
sidered it  his  duty  to  advise  that  protective  duties  be  con- 
tinued. In  plain  words,  he  declared  that  to  " suppress  the 
impost "- -  that  is,  to  take  off  the  duties  —  would  give 
"  advantage  to  foreign  over  domestic  manufactures  ; " 
which  covers  the  whole  ground  with  regard  both  to  the 
constitutionality  and  expediency  of  the  principle  of  pro- 
tection. Nothing  in  addition  could  have  been  said  in 
favor  of  that  principle,  or  more  strongly  condemnatory  of 
free  trade. 

He  adhered  to  these  opinions  during  his  entire  ad- 
ministration, and  found  it  necessary  to  refer  again  espe- 
cially to  the  subject,  and  to  repeat,  in  his  next  message, 
in  1807,  what  he  had  already  said  with  reference  to  the 
continued  "  accumulation  of  the  surpluses  of  revenue  "- 
reinforcing  his  former  views.  It  did  not  appear  to  him 
either  wise  or  expedient  to  abandon  measures  which  had 
been  attended  with  so  many  beneficent  results,  and 
promised  so  many  more  ;  —  especially  as  the  advantages 
they  conferred  were  becoming  more  and  more  apparent 
every  day.  The  plain  historic  fact  is,  that  at  that 
time,  all  the  interests  of  agriculture,  manufactures,  com- 
merce, and  navigation,  were  resting  upon  such  solid  and- 
secure  foundations  —  owing  to  the  judicious  protection 
extended  to  them  by  Congress  —  that  no  statesman  of  any 
eminence  would  have  risked  his  reputation  by  expressing 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  93 

a  desire  to  see  them  injuriously  interfered  with.  The 
improving  and  progressive  condition  of  the  country  was 
such  as  to  forbid  any  tampering  with  its  common  interests, 
and  if  there  had  been  any  politicians  who  desired  to  do  so 
they  would  have  encountered  the  public  indignation.  The 
rejoicing  at  the  growth  and  prospects  of  the  nation  was 
universal  —  embracing  all  classes  of  people.  The  rapidity 
with  which  our  resources  were  developing  made  every 
patriotic  heart  glad  ;  whilst  it  served,  at  the  same  time,  to 
prove  to  England  that  she  had  to  apprehend  the  speedy 
arrival  of  the  time  when  we  should  be  fully  able  to  take 
care  of  ourselves,  to  work  our  own  mines,  utilize  our  own 
forests,  manufacture  our  own  fabrics,  and  be  able  to 
supply  other  nations  out  of  the  surplus  of  our  agricultural 
products. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE— EMBARGO  LAW  —  JEF- 
FERSON CONSIDERED  PROTECTION  IMPERATIVE  — DUTIES 
PROHIBITORY  IF  NECESSARY  — PROCEEDINGS  OF  CONGRESS- 
PROTECTION  REFERRED  TO  COMMITTEE  —  FAVORABLE  RE- 
PORT —  INCREASED  DUTIES  RECOMMENDED  —  QUESTION  RE- 
FERRED TO  GALLATIN,  SECRETARY  OF  TREASURY  —  FIRST 
OPPOSITION  TO  PROTECTION  — GALLATIN'S  REPORT  RECOM- 
MENDS BOUNTIES  TO  MANUFACTURES. 

""'HE  prosperity  of  our  affairs  was  somewhat  interrupted 
about  the  close  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  administration.  Our 
domestic  policy,  however,  did  not,  in  any  sense,  contribute 
to  this.  It  grew  out  of  the  war  between  Great  Britain 
and  France,  and  the  injuiry  to  our  commerce  occasioned 
by  the  hostile  measures  of  those  nations.  The  Berlin 
decree  of  Napoleon  led  to  the  British  orders  in  Council,  in 
1807,  which  prohibited  our  vessels  from  landing  their  car- 
goes in  French  ports,  and  subjected  them  to  capture  by 
British  cruisers  if  they  attempted  it.  In  retaliation,  Con- 
gress passed  an  Embargo  law,  which  prohibited  the  depart- 
ure of  our  own  vessels  from  the  ports  of  the  United  States  ; 
and  subsequently  also  passed  a  non-intercourse  act.  The 
consequence  was,  that  our  commercial  intercourse  with 
Europe  was  almost  entirely  suspended,  and  all  our  trading 
operations  and  industries  became  embarrassed.  General 
discouragement  took  the  place  of  former  exultation,  and  a 
condition  of  things  was  thus  occasioned  which  finally,  in 

94 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  95 

1812,  led  to  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States 
against  Great  Britain. 

But  Mr.  Jefferson  was  not  insensible  to  the  real  posture 
of  affairs  while  he  remained  President.  He  was  thor- 
oughly familiar  with  the  causes  which  had  led  to  our  pros- 
perity, as  well  as  with  those  that  checked  it.  And  whilst 
he  was  disposed  to  condemn  the  injustice  of  the  European 
belligerents  against  the  United  States,  he  considered  it  his 
duty  to  see  that  no  domestic  measures  should  be  adopted 
that  would  impede  our  development  and  thereby  weaken/^ 
the  power  of  the  nation.  In  evidence  of  this  we  find  him, 
in  his  message  of  1809,  thus  expressing  himself : 

"  The  suspension  of  foreign  commerce  produced  by  the  injus- 
tice of  the  belligerent  Powers,  and  the  consequent  losses  and  sacri- 
fices of  our  citizens,  are  subjects  of  just  concern.  The  situation 
into  which  we  have  thus  been  forced  has  impelled  us  to  apply  a 
portion  of  our  industry  and  capital  to  internal  manufactures  and  improve- 
ments. The  extent  of  this  conversion  is  daily  increasing,  and  little 
doubt  remains  that  the  establishments  formed  and  forming,  will, 
under  the  auspices  of  cheaper  materials  and  subsistence,  the  free- 
dom of  labor  from  taxation  with  us,  and  of  protecting  duties  and  pro- 
hibitions^ become  apparent." 

Not  often  do  we  find  a  principle  more  emphatically 
indorsed  than  was  that  of  protection  to  manufactures,  in 
the  foregoing  extract  from  Mr.  Jefferson's  message  ;  it 
is  even  carried  to  the  extent  of  prohibition,  whensoever 
that  shall  be  deemed  necessary  and  expedient.  He  consid- 
ered it  the  imperative  duty  of  the  Government  —  which 
it  owed  to  the  industrial  interest  involved  in  manufactures 
—  to  take  care  of  and  foster  them.  And  he  foresaw  that 
if  this  were  not  done,  the  advantages  they  had  already 


96  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

secured  to  the  country  would  be  lost.  He  was  too  wise  a 
statesman  to  desire  any  step  to  be  taken,  or  any  variation 
of  policy  ventured  upon,  that  would  be  likely  to  arrest  the 
industrial  development  so  auspiciously  begun. 

The  message  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  so  far  as  it  related  to 
protecting  manufactures,  was,  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, referred  to  the  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manu- 
factures, along  with  a  number  of  petitions  from  the  people 
upon  the  same  subject.  This  committee  was  composed  of 
seven  members,  as  follows  :  Mr.  Newton,  of  Virginia,  chair- 
man ;  Mr.  Dana,  of  Connecticut ;  Mr,  Marion,  of  South 
Carolina ;  Mr.  Cutts,  of  Massachusetts  ;  Mr.  Mumford,  of 
New  York  ;  Mr.  Porter,  of  Pennsylvania;  and  Mr.  McKim, 
of  Maryland;  —  three  from  the  Southern,  two  from  the 
Central,  and  two  from  the  New  England  States.  It;  was 
fairly  and  satisfactorily  constituted,  representing  every  part 
of  the  Union  and  all  the  diversified  industrial  interests,  - 
the  agricultural  being  in  the  ascendant.  The  result  reached 
by  it,  therefore,  evidences  the  fact  that,  at  that  time,  no 
sectional  animosities  had  been  engendered  by  the  policy 
of  protection. 

The  committee  made  a  unanimous  report.  After  set- 
ting forth  the  care  they  had  endeavored  to  employ  in 
investigating  "  the  policy  of  fostering  and  protecting  our 
manufactures"  they  recommended  perseverance  in  the 
plan  which  had  already  received  the  support  of  Congress, 
as  well  as  "the  countenance  of  the  nation,"  as  they  ex- 
pressed it.  The  plan  here  referred  to  was  that  established 
by  the  first  Congress,  under  the  administration  of  Wash- 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  97 

ington,  which  Madison  had  so  strenuously  advocated  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  which  had  been  approved  by 
Adams,  and  then  had  the  indorsement  of  Jefferson.  The 
committee  considered  it  recommended  by  the  considera- 
tion that  it  gave  "to  our  manufactures  the  support  neces- 
sary to  withstand  foreign  competition,  skill,  and  capital." 
Upon  the  general  question  of  protection,  they  employed 
this  expressive  language:  "A  nation  erects  a  solid  basis 
for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  its  independence  and 
prosperity,  whose  policy  is  to  draw  from  its  native  re- 
sources all  articles  of  the  first  necessity  /" — a  doctrine  which 
constitutes  the  central  feature  of  the  system  of  protection. 
With  the  special  view  of  protecting  home  manufactures, 
they  recommended  additional  duties  on  clothing,  milli- 
nery, cotton  manufactures,  bed  ticking,  corduroys,  shot 
and  other  manufactured  articles  in  which  lead  is  used, 
and  salt.  These  recommendations  were  adopted  by 
the  House  by  a  majority  of  nearly  two  to  one,  as  to 
all  the  articles  except  salt,  and  the  question  regarding 
that  single  article  was  merely  postponed  to  a  subse- 
quent time.  The  entire  proceedings,  on  the  part  both 
of  the  committee  and  the  House,  fully  recognized 
the  principle  of  laying  discriminating,  in  preference  to 
ad  valorem,  duties.  And  it  is  worthy  of  note,  in  this 
connection,  that  the  large  majority  which  sanctioned  this 
principle  was  composed  of  representatives  from  all  the 
States.  Congressional  action,  in  those  days,  was  of  higher 
value  than  it  has  since  become.  Public  office  was  then 
considered  a  sacred  trust,  to  be  administered,  not  for  the 

7 


98  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

personal  advancement  of  its  possessor,  but  for  the  public 
good.  There  were  none  bold  enough,  even  if  inclined, 
to  assail  the  principles  of  popular  representative  govern- 
ment, by  subjecting  the  great  question  of  material  develop- 
ment to  the  dominion  of  party  and  faction.  Whilst  the 
representative  in  Congress  was  understood  to  owe  a  proper 
degree  of  fidelity  to  his  immediate  constituents,  his  con- 
stitutional obligation  to  serve  the  Union  imposed  national 
duties  upon  him  which  he  had  no  right  to  disregard,  and 
which  he  could  not  disregard  without  endangering  the 
general  welfare,  for  the  protection  of  which  the  Union 
was  formed.  The  action  of  this  committee  shows  that 
they  held  this  national  obligation  in  the  highest  estimate; 
and,  therefore,  their  opinions  are  entitled  to  great  re- 
spect, which  is  increased  by  the  fact  that  they  were 
approved  by  Mr.  Jefferson's  administration,  by  Congress, 
and  by  the  country. 

The  following  resolution,  introduced  by  Mr.  Bacon, 
of  Massachusetts,  was  passed  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, at  the  same  session  : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  be  directed  to 
prepare  and  report  to  this  House,  at  their  next  session,  a  plan  for 
the  application  of  such  means  as  are  within  the  power  of  Congress, 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and  fostering  the  manufactures  of  the 
United  States;  together  with  a  statement  of  the  several  manu- 
facturing establishments  which  have  been  commenced,  the  progress 
which  has  been  made  in  them,  and  the  success  with  which  they 
have  been  attended,  and  such  other  information  as  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall  be  material  in  exhibiting  a 
general  view  of  the  manufactures  of  the  United  States." 

Less  than  twenty  years  —  a  short  period  in  the  life  of 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  99 

a  nation  —  had  then  passed  since  the  introduction  of  the 
policy  of  protection  in  the  United  States;  and,  as  the 
business  of  the  country  was  seriously  deranged  on  account 
of  European  complications,  it  was  a  wise  step  to  institute 
a  careful  inquiry  into  the  operations  and  effect  of  the  sys- 
tem. These  precautionary  investigations  always  serve  a 
valuable  purpose,  when  cautiously  and  intelligently  prose- 
cuted, and  furnish  far  more  reliable  means  of  reaching 
accurate  conclusions  than  party  platforms  or  caucus  reso- 
lutions. Facts  collected  in  this  mode  are  of  material  assist- 
ance to  Congress,  and  may  be  generally  relied  upon  as 
the  basis  of  legislative  procedure. 

This  resolution  opened  the  whole  question  of  protec- 
tion as  broadly  as  possible.  Under  these  circumstances, 
it  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  that  it  would  be  finally  dis- 
posed of  without  some  opposition,  inasmuch  as,  by  that 
time,  under  the  influence  of  English  teaching,  the  visionary 
doctrine  of  free  trade  had  found  an  occasional  advocate 
in  the  United  States.  Its  passage  was  opposed  by  Mr. 
Gardenier,  of  New  York,  and  Mr.  John  Randolph,  of 
Virginia, —  the  latter  of  whom,  then  and  always,  trained 
his  fertile  intellect  in  the  school  of  opposition.  The 
ground  of  their  objection  was  "the  inexpediency  of  legis- 
lative interference  for  the  encouragement  of  manufactures," 
which  they  characterized  as  wrong  because  it  amounted  to, 
what  is  now  called,  class  legislation,  for  the  benefit  and 
support  of  monopolies.  Notwithstanding  the  almost 
universal  public  sentiment,  and  the  utterances  of  Wash- 
ington, Adams,  Jefferson  and  Madison  to  the  contrary. 


100  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

these  gentlemen,  for  the  first  time  in  Congress,  made  the 
issue  between  protection  and  free  trade  sharp  and  clear,  so 
that  it  could  not  be  misunderstood.  Mr.  Randolph's 
method  of  announcing  his  propositions  left  no  room  for 
doubt  about  his  meaning.  Yet  the  resolution  was  passed 
by  a  majority  of  55  out  of  a  vote  of  131,  showing  how 
firmly  the  existing  system  of  protection  had  taken  root. 
Of  those  who  voted  for  it  12  were  from  Virginia,  8  from 
North  Carolina,  6  from  South  Carolina,  and  i  from 
Georgia,  making  27  in  all,  whilst  there  were  but  16  votes 
in  the  negative  from  the  South-Atlantic  States.  Of  the 
remaining  votes  in  the  negative  20  of  the  entire  38  were 
from  the  North- Atlantic  States.  So  that,  by  a  sectional 
comparison  of  the  vote,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  agricultural 
States  of  the  South  were  as  much  united  in  support  of  the 
principle  of  protection  as  were  the  commercial  States  of  the 
North.  The  precise  fact  is,  as  heretofore  stated,  that  the 
question  had  no  sectional  aspects,  but  was  considered  as 
entirely  national  —  as  important  alike  to  every  part  of  the 
country. 

Mr.  Albert  Gallatin  was  then  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, and  so  well  is  his  reputation  for  wisdom  known  to  all 
readers  of  our  history  that  everybody  will  recognize  his 
peculiar  fitness  for  the  duty  assigned  to  him.  In  the  report 
subsequently  made  by  him,  after  a  searching  investigation, 
he  gave  a  detailed  statement  of  the  progress  and  condition 
of  manufactures  in  the  United  States,  showing  that  their 
average  annual  product  exceeds  $120,000,000.  And,  in 
order  to  express  his  approval  of  the  argument  employed 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  IOI 

in  defense  of  their  right  to  the  fostering  care  and  protec- 
tion of  the  Government,  he  said : 

"And  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  raw  materials  used,  and  the 
provisions  and  other  articles  consumed,  by  the  manufacturers, 
create  a  home  market  for  agricultural  products  not  very  inferior  to  that 
which  arises  from  foreign  demand, —  a  result  more  favorable  than 
might  have  been  expected  from  a  view  of  the  natural  causes  which 
impede  the  introduction,  and  retard  the  progress,  of  manufactures 
in  the  United  States." 

He  attributed  the  introduction  and  progress  of  manu- 
factures in  the  United  States  to  the  low  taxes  required  to 
support  the  Government,  and  the  absence  of  any  restric- 
tions upon  the  objects  and  employment  of  labor ;  but 
regarded  the  most  powerful  obstacle  against  which  they 
had  to  struggle,  as  arising  from  the  superior  capital  of  the 
manufacturing  nations  of  Europe,  which  enabled  their 
merchants  to  give  long  credits,  to  sell  at  small  profits,  and 
to  make  occasional  sacrifices  in  order  to  destroy  American 
competition.  And  so  important  did  he  consider  it  that 
these  embarrassments  should  be  removed,  and  our  manu- 
factures be  fostered  by  Congressional  legislation,  that  he 
pointed  out  three  methods  as  presenting  the  obvious 
means  of  doing  this  :  (i)  by  bounties;  (2)  by  increased 
duties  on  imports ;  (3)  by  loans  from  the  Government. 
He  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  United  States 
should  create  a  circulating  stock,  bearing  a  low  rate  of 
interest,  and  lend  it  at  par  to  manufacturers,  on  the  princi- 
ple of  the  loan  offices  which  had  been  established  in  some 
of  the  States.  He  believed  that  $5,000,000  a  year,  but 
not  to  exceed  $20,000,000  in  all,  might  be  advantageously 


IO2  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

loaned  for  the  purpose,  "  without  any  material  risk  of  ulti- 
mate loss,  and  without  taxing  or  injuring  any  other  part 
of  the  community." 

These  facts  have  a  most  important  bearing  upon  the 
question  of  protection.  They  show  how  important  it  was 
considered  by  the  public  authorities,  during  the  period  of 
Mr.  Jefferson's  administration,  that  the  power  given  to 
Congress  by  the  Constitution  —  to  foster  manufactures, 
and  thereby  to  benefit  agriculture,  and  extend  commerce 
-  should  not  lie  dormant,  but  be  actively  and  energetic- 
ally employed  to  increase  the  prosperity  and  develop  the 
material  resources  of  the  country.  The  statesmen  of  that 
day  —  with  so  few  exceptions  as  not  to  impair  the  general 
rule  —  were  united  in  the  purpose  to  accomplish  these 
objects,  by  every  constitutional  method,  and  especially  by 
increasing  the  duties  on  imports,  whensoever  it  was  shown 
that  sufficient  protection  to  manufactures  had  not  been 
given.  Abundant  evidence  of  this  will  be  found  in  the 
history  of  subsequent  administrations. 


CHAPTER    X. 

MADISON  RECOMMENDS  PROTECTION  AS  NECESSARY  TO  INDE, 
PENDENCE  — MANUFACTURES  MADE  NECESSARY  BY  THE  WAR 
WITH  ENGLAND  —  NECESSARY  TO  INCREASE  OF  DOMESTIC 
STAPLES  — CANNOT  BE  INDEPENDENT  WITHOUT  THEM. 

'"PHE  active  agency  of  Mr.  Madison  in  procuring  the 
passage,  through  the  first  Congress,  of  the  tariff  act 
of  1 789,  has  been  already  stated.  If  there  were  any  special 
reason  why  that  measure  should  be  regarded  as  having 
had  an  individual  indorser,  the  paternity  of  it  might  be 
properly  assigned  to  him.  At  all  events,  he  bore  such  re- 
lations to  it  as  made  it  necessary  for  him  frequently  to 
express  opinions  with  reference  to  the  obligation  of  the 
Government  to  protect  manufactures.  These  opinions 
were  matured  and  strengthened  by  the  time  he  became 
President.  If  it  be  said  of  them  that  they  related  to  mere 
measures  of  expediency,  which  might  with  propriety  be 
changed  to  suit  the  shifting  exigencies  of  affairs,  a  suf- 
ficient answer  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  principle  of 
protection  was  understood  and  intended  to  be  established 
as  part  of  a  permanent  system.  That  such  was  the  opin- 
ion of  Mr.  Madison  is  sufficiently  proved  by  what  he  then 
and  subsequently  said. 

N  His  administration  commenced  during  the  deranged 
condition  of  affairs  which  had  originated  under  that  of 

Mr.  Jefferson,  growing  out  of  our  relations  to  the  bellig- 

103 


IO4  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

erent  powers  of  Europe,  and  our  embargo  and  non-inter- 
course laws.  He  realized,  at  the  outset,  the  injurious 
effects  which  had  been  produced  upon  the  revenues  of  the 
Government,  and  consequently,  in  his  first  annual  mes- 
sage in  1809,  expressed  his  apprehension  that  there  would 
be  a  deficiency  in  the  receipts  of  the  ensuing  year.  This 
he  attributed  to  the  insecurity  and  derangement  of  our 
commerce;  —  in  other  words,  to  the  cessation  of  our  ex- 
ports to  foreign  countries,  whereby  our  imports  were  less- 
ened. He  saw  at  home  all  the  elements  of  wealth  and 
material  prosperity  profusely  scattered  in  every  direction; 
but  the  surplus  products  of  our  labor  were  wasted  in  our 
own  hands  for  the  want  of  home  markets.  He  thus 
described  the  condition  of  the  country: 

"The  face  of  our  country  presents  everywhere  the  evidence  of 
laudable  enterprise,  of  extensive  capital,  and  of  durable  improve- 
ment. In  a  cultivation  of  the  materials  and  the  extension  of  useful  manu- 
factures, more  especially  in  the  general  application  to  household 
fabrics,  we  behold  a  rapid  diminution  of  our  dependence  on  foreign  sup- 
plies. Nor  is  it  unworthy  of  reflection  that  this  revolution  in  our 
pursuits  and  habits  is  in  no  slight  degree  a  consequence  of  those 
impolitic  and  arbitrary  edicts  by  which  the  contending  nations,  in 
endeavoring  each  of  them  to  obstruct  our  trade  with  the  other, 
have  so  far  abridged  our  means  of  procuring  the  productions  and 
manufactures  of  which  our  own  are  now  taking  the  place." 

Nations,  like  individuals,  when  thrown  by  necessity 
upon  their  own  resources,  frequently  find  themselves  to 
possess  energies  of  which  they  had  no  previous  knowl- 
edge. This  is  more  apt  to  be  the  case  under  a  popular 
than  under  a  monarchical  form  of  government;  for  the 
reason  that,  in  the  one  case,  public  policy  is  influenced  by 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  105 

the  collective  energies  of  an  intelligent  population,  and  is 
responsive  to  their  will;  whilst,  in  the  other,  the  people 
have  no  voice,  and  are  kept  in  ignorance  that  they  may  be 
more  easily  held  in  inferiority.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  were  not  aware  of  the  extent  of  their  resources,  or 
conscious  of  their  capacity  to  develop  them,  until  they 
found  themselves  under  the  pressure  of  necessity.  Mr. 
Madison  saw  this,  not  alone  with  the  keen  sagacity  of  a 
wise  statesman,  but  the  intelligence  of  a  philosopher,  and 
availed  himself  of  the  opportunity  furnished  by  his  Presi- 
dency to  impress  his  matured  sentiments  upon  the  public 
mind,  already  prepared  by  previously  existing  convictions. 
It  was  well  for  the  country  that  the  helm  of  government 
was,  at  that  time,  in  the  hands  of  such  a  man  —  of  one 
who  had  no  personal  ends  of  his  own  to  serve,  but  devoted 
himself  unselfishly  to  the  advancement  of  the  public  wel- 
fare. 

We  shall  have  occasion,  in  the  progress  of  our  inquir- 
ies, to  insist  upon  the  necessity  of  home  markets  for  the 
sale  of  our  surplus  agricultural  products.  It  may  be  well, 
however,  to  anticipate  the  general  argument  by  calling 
attention  to  the  fact  that  this  necessity  is  demonstrated 
conclusively  by  our  condition  under  the  administrations  of 
Jefferson  and  Madison.  It  requires  but  a  limited  amount 
of  intelligence  to  see  that  our  domestic  trade  was  embar- 
rassed by  the  cessation  of  our  commercial  intercourse  with 
Europe  —  by  the  want  of  foreign  markets  for  our  surplus. 
If  these  markets  had  existed  at  home,  through  the  instru- 
mentalities of  our  own  manufactures,  this  surplus  could 


106  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

have  been  disposed  of,  and  the  financial  and  business 
derangement  in  a  great  measure,  if  not  entirely,  avoided. 
It  is  impossible  for  a  nation  to  be  otherwise  than  depend- 
ent when  it  permits  its  domestic  interests  to  become  sub- 
ject to  contingencies  which  are  or  can  be  controlled  by 
foreign  nations.  At  the  time  it  may  most  need  its 
strength,  whether  for  development  or  self-defense,  it  may 
suit  their  interest  to  impair  it. 

Mr.  Madison  so  fully  realized  this  that,  in  his  second 
message,  in  1810,  he  thus  expressed  himself  —  enforcing 
his  former  views  : 

"  I  feel  particular  satisfaction  in  remarking  that  an  interior  view 
of  our  country  presents  us  with  grateful  proofs  of  its  substantial 
and  increasing  prosperity.  To  a  thriving  agriculture,  and  the  im- 
provements relating  to  it,  is  added  a  highly  interesting  extension  of 
useful  manufactures,  the  combined  product  of  professional  occupa- 
tions and  of  household  industry.  Such,  indeed,  is  the  experience 
of  economy,  as  well  as  of  policy,  in  these  substitutes  for  supplies 
heretofore  obtained  by  foreign  commerce,  that  in  a  national  view 
the  change  is  justly  regarded  as  of  itself  more  than  a  recompense 
for  those  privations  and  losses  resulting  from  foreign  injustice  which 
furnished  the  general  impulse  required  for  its  accomplishment. 
How  far  it  may  be  expedient  to  guard  the  infancy  of  this  improve- 
ment in  the  distribution  of  labor  by  regulations  of  the  commercial  tariff^ 
is  a  subject  which  cannot  fail  to  suggest  itself  to  your  patriotic 
reflections." 

The  sentiments  and  purposes  of  Mr.  Madison  were  in 
no  way  concealed.  He  attributed  the  progress  of  interior 
development  to  "  a  cultivation  of  the  materials  and  the 
extension  of  useful  manufactures ;"-  -that  is,  to  the  con- 
version of  the  surplus  products  of  labor  into  manufactured 
fabrics.  In  his  opinion  we  were,  by  means  of  these, 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

diminishing  "  our  dependence  on  foreign  supplies,"  because 
we  had  become  able  to  supply  ourselves,  or  were  rapidly 
becoming  so.  In  this  he  saw  evidences  of  our  being  en- 
abled, not  only  to  bring  our  internal  commerce  into  an 
improved  and  healthy  condition,  but  to  keep  it  so.  And, 
therefore,  he  submitted  to  Congress  the  question  of  so 
laying  duties  upon  imports  as  to  give  proper  protection 
and  encouragement  to  all  our  diversified  industrial  inter- 
ests. This,  he  well  understood,  could  only  be  done  by 
adhering  to  the  system  which  had  prevailed  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Government,  and  throughout  the  adminis- 
trations of  Washington,  Adams  and  Jefferson.  Conse- 
quently, in  his  third  message,  in  1811,  he  expressed  his 
opinion  of  the  national  advantages  of  manufactures  in 
these  words : 

"  Although  other  subjects  will  press  more  immediately  on  your 
deliberations,  a  portion  of  them  cannot  but  be  well  bestowed  on 
\htjust  and  sound  policy  of  securing  to  our  manufactures  the  success  they 
have  attained,  and  are  still  attaining,  in  some  degree,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  causes  not  permanent ;  and  to  our  navigation,  the  fair  ex- 
tent of  which  is  at  present  abridged  by  the  unequal  regulations  of 
foreign  governments. 

"  Besides  the  reasonableness  of  saving  our  manufactures  from 
sacrifices  which  a  change  of  circumstances  might  bring  on  them, 
the  national  interest  requires  that,  with  respect  to  such  articles  at 
least  as  belong  to  our  defense  and  our  primary  wants,  we  should  not 
be  left  in  unnecessary  dependence  on  external  supplies." 

He  who  is  unable  to  comprehend  the  plain  meaning  of 
Mr.  Madison  must  possess  an  obtuse  intellect ;  and  he  who, 
understanding  it,  endeavors  to  pervert  it  with  a  view  to 
mislead,  is  an  evil  and  dangerous  adviser.  It  was  the  fixed 


108  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

conviction  of  his  mind  —  as  it  was  also  of  the  minds  of  the 
most  eminent  and  conspicuous  statesmen  of  his  day  —  that 
the  only  safe  line  of  policy  for  the  Government  was  that 
which  would  most  readily  lead  to  a  development  of  our 
natural  resources,  and  thereby  prevent  us  from  becoming 
dependent  "  on  external  supplies  ;"  that  is,  on  manufactured 
articles  imported  from  foreign  countries.  And  so  con- 
trolling did  this  sentiment  become  in  the  public  mind 
that,  during  the  war  with  Great  Britain,  under  Madison's 
administration,  the  various  fields  and  spheres  of  labor  were 
steadily  enlarged  throughout  the  country.  Agriculture 
was  stimulated,  manufactures  were  increased,  and  the 
nation  so  rapidly  gained  in  strength  as  to  surprise  the 
world.  Although  that  war,  with  the  most  powerful  among 
the  nations,  taxed  the  energies  of  our  people  to  the  utmost, 
yet  there  were  not  many,  out  of  the  active  military  service, 
who  did  not  realize  the  necessity  of  devoting  their  ener- 
gies to  such  industrial  pursuits  as  promised  an  increase  of 
individual  and  national  wealth.  Mr.  Madison,  in  his 
message  of  1813,  thus  explained  our  condition  during  the 
war : 

"  If  the  war  has  increased  the  interruptions  of  our  commerce, 
it  has  at  the  same  time  cherished  and  multiplied  our  manufactures  so 
as  to  make  us  independent  of  all  other  countries  for  the  more  essen- 
tial branches  for  which  we  ought  to  be  dependent  on  none,  and  is  even 
rapidly  giving  them  an  extent  which  will  create  additional  staples 
in  our  future  intercourse  with  foreign  markets." 

How  wisely  and  prophetically  were  these  words  spoken  ! 
The  proposition  that  we  ought  not  to  be  dependent  on 
other  countries  for  our  manufactured  fabrics,  into  which  our 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

own  raw  materials  were  capable  of  being  converted,  was 
considered  at  that  time  incontrovertible  by  all  thoughtful 
and  practical  minds  ;  and  it  should  never  have  been  other- 
wise regarded  at  any  subsequent  period.  Just  so  far  as 
we  have  been  led  astray  by  the  opposing  theory  of  vision- 
ary minds,  to  that  extent  have  we  suffered  the  conse- 
quences of  our  own  folly.  What  Mr.  Madison  said  upon 
the  subject  was  but  the  echo  of  public  opinion  —  formed 
under  influences  and  circumstances  too  palpable  to  mis- 
lead. And  when,  looking  forward  into  the  future,  he  ex- 
pressed the  belief  that  by  the  continued  increase  of  our 
manufactures  we  should  "create  additional  staples"-  -that 
is,  create  a  demand  not  only  for  materials  then  known, 
but  for  others  thereafter  to  be  discovered  —  he  was  abso- 
lutely prophetic.  His  prediction  has  been  verified  with 
wonderful  minuteness.  We  see  this  in  the  fact,  familiar 
to  everybody,  that  there  is  scarcely  an  ounce  of  our  sur- 
plus products,  of  whatsoever  kind,  that  may  not  be  so 
converted  by  the  manufacturers  of  our  own  time,  as  to  be 
made  useful  in  supplying  the  wants  and  conveniences  of 
society.  Everything — even  much  that  is  of  no  apparent 
value —  can  be  turned  to  practical  uses,  and  nothing  is  nec- 
essarily wasted  or  lost.  The  ingenuity  and  skill  of  our 
artisans  have  been  employed  in  the  invention  of  machinery 
of  every  possible  variety,  capable  of  producing  almost 
every  imaginable  result.  And  every  new  invention  in  the 
unlimited  field  of  the  mechanic  arts  has  given  fresh  im- 
pulse to  labor,  until  all  the  avenues  of  commerce  through- 
out the  world  are  crowded  with  the  varied  productions  of 
our  industry. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

MADISON  RECOMMENDS  PROTECTION  AFTER  THE  WAR  WITH  ENG- 
LAND—NECESSARY TO  PAY  DEBT  OF  THE  WAR  — ALSO  TO 
ENCOURAGEMENT  OF  AGRICULTURE  — TARIFF  ACT  OF  1816- 
MADISON  ON  CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  PROTECTION  —  PROTEC- 
TION DIRECT,  NOT  INCIDENTAL  — PERTAINS  TO  COMMERCE, 
NOT  REVENUE. 

T^HE  close  of  the  war  with  Great  Britain  led  to  the 
necessity  of  reducing  the  expenses  of  the  Government 
to  the  demands  of  a  peace  establishment ;  but  it  left  a 
large  war  debt  for  which  provision  had  to  be  made.  Fi- 
nancial problems  are  not  always  easy  of  solution.  They 
were  not,  however,  so  difficult  then  as  now,  for  the  reason, 
among  others,  that  conflicting  interests  were  not  so  numer- 
ous or  so  sharply  defined.  Either  the  existing  measures 
for  raising  revenue,  by  discriminating  duties  laid  with  a 
view  to  protect  manufactures,  upon  some  articles,  and  for 
revenue  alone  upon  others,  had  to  be  adhered  to,  or,  if 
abandoned,  some  new  and  untried  policy  had  to  be  inau- 
gurated. Theoretical  speculations  were  not  then  so  com- 
mon as  they  now  are ;  and  it  had  not  occurred  to  any  con- 
siderable numberof  those  who  had  claim  to  statesmanship, 
that  the  protective  policy  which  had  done  so  well  could 
be  safely  abandoned.  It  had  not  then  been  discovered 
that  "the  balance  of  trade"  was  a  "delusive  phantom." 
The  philosophic  researches  of  Smith  and  of  Hume  were 


no 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  Ill 

familiar  only  to  a  few  men  of  letters  who,  in  the  seclusion 
of  their  closets,  held  no  intercourse  with  the  business 
world.  The  leading  statesmen  of  England,  who  were  in 
direct  contact  with  public  affairs,  had  neither  promul- 
gated nor  conceived  the  idea  that  free  trade  was  an  infal- 
lible panacea  for  all  the  practical  ills  of  government.  The 
theories  of  Cobden  did  not  exist  even  in  his  own  brain, 
and  Bright  was  still  a  school-boy.  They  were  of  subse- 
quent birth  and  growth,  when  England  realized  that,  by 
steadily  persevering  in  our  own  system  of  encouragement 
to  manufacturing  industry,  we  had  entered  upon  successful 
competetion  with  her  in  the  markets  of  the  world.  Not 
before  then  did  the  statesmen  of  that  country  discover 
this  new  process  of  arresting  the  career  of  a  successful 
rival,  and  not  until  more  recent  times  have  they  derived 
assistance  from  the  cooperation  of  American  politicians. 
The  course  of  the  former  has  been  characterized  by  the 
most  adroit  cunning,  whilst  that  of  the  latter  indicates  the 
want  of  practical  sagacity. 

Mr.  Madison  was  unwilling  to  see  the  course  of  the 
Government  changed,  or  the  principle  of  protection  aban- 
doned. He  had  seen  too  clearly  the  beneficial  conse- 
quences of  the  policy  established  under  Washington,  and 
persevered  in  under  Adams  and  Jefferson.  Consequently, 
in  a  special  message  in  1815 — wherein  he  communicated 
the  close  of  the  war  with  England  and  the  treaty  of  peace  — 
he  declared  that  there  were  "important  considerations 
which  forbid  a  sudden  and  general  revocation  of  the  meas- 
ures that  had  been  produced  by  the  war,"  and  in  addition, 
said : 


112  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

"The  resources  of  our  country  were  at  all  times  competent  to 
the  attainment  of  every  national  object;  but  they  will  now  be  en- 
riched and  invigorated  by  the  activity  which  peace  will  introduce 
into  all  the  means  of  domestic  enterprise  and  labor.  ,  .  The 
reviving  interests  of  commerce  will  claim  the  legislative  attention  at 
the  earliest  opportunity,  and  such  regulations  will,  I  trust,  be 
seasonably  devised  as  shall  secure  to  the  United  States  their  just 
proportion  of  the  navigation  of  the  world.  .  .  .  But  there  is 
no  subject  that  can  enter  with  greater  force  and  merit  into  the  delibera- 
tions of  Congress,  than  the  consideration  of  the  means  to  preserve  and 
promote  the  manufactures  which  have  sprung  into  existence,  and  attained 
an  unparalleled  maturity  throughout  the  United  States  during  the  period 
of  the  European  wars.  This  source  of  national  independence  and  wealth 
I  anxiously  recommend,  therefore,  to  the  prompt  and  constant  guardianship 
of  Congress" 

These  were  earnest  words,  fitly  and  wisely  uttered  by 
a  man  always  distinguished  for  his  ability,  whose  motives 
have  never  been  impeached,  whose  integrity  was  never 
questioned,  and  whose  wisdom  as  a  patriot  and  statesman 
the  whole  nation  still  attests.  Under  all  the  great  responsi- 
bilities of  his  position  as  President,  and  at  a  time  when 
the  obligations  of  duty  to  the  country  required  him  to 
employ  the  utmost  care  and  circumspection,  he  considered 
it  imperative  upon  him  to  recommend  to  Congress  the  pro- 
tection and  preservation  of  manufactures  as  one  of  the 
essential  means  of  reviving  commerce,  advancing  the 
public  prosperity  and  general  welfare,  and  placing  the 
country  in  a  condition  of  complete  independence  and 
security.  Notwithstanding  all  this,  however,  it  is  common 
in  our  day  to  hear  some  politicians  talk  about  these  great 
national  affairs,  and  these  important  questions  of  govern- 
ment policy,  as  if  they  were  of  no  more  consequence  than 
the  business  of  an  insignificant  corporation,  and  declare 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  113 

that  the  Presidential  recommendations  of  Madison,  and 
of  all  his  predecessors,  are  false  and  empirical.  With  an  ex 
cathedra  air  of  wisdom  they  affirm  that  they,  as  the  dis- 
ciples of  English  philosophers  and  statesmen,  know  more 
of  what  is  demanded  by  the  vast  industrial  interests  of  this 
country  than  the  great  statesmen  who  laid  so  well  the 
foundations  of  the  nation's  prosperity.  We  shall  have 
occasion  hereafter  to  refer  again  to  this  class  of  vision- 
aries, and  to  point  out  wherein  the  ignorance  they  charge 
upon  others  is  in  reality  their  own.  The  concurring  opin- 
ions of  such  men  as  Washington,  Adams,  Jefferson  and 
Madison  alone  —  to  say  nothing  of  succeeding  Presidents- 
are  of  more  value  in  the  practical  affairs  of  government 
than  those  of  a  multitude  of  these  theorizers,  more  numer- 
ous than  an  army. 

When  the  war  with  Great  Britain  commenced  our  pub- 
lic debt  was  $39,000,000  ;  but  when  it  closed  it  had  reached 
$120,000,000 —  made  up  of  $64,000,000,  the  actual  cost  of 
the  war,  and  $  1 7,000,000  of  floating  debt,  and  Treasury 
notes.  This  involved  the  necessity  of  providing  a  sufficiency 
of  revenue,  and  also  such  a  currency  as  would  facilitate  busi- 
ness. These  objects  had  to  be  reached  by  different  meas- 
ures, yet  were  so  allied  in  their  effects  that  it  was  impossi- 
ble to  omit  either  without  serious  embarrassment  to  the 
Government  and  the  country.  Mr.  Madison  gave  the 
matter  his  most  serious  consideration  —  assisted  by  a  Cab- 
inet of  which  Mr.  James  Monroe  was  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Alexander  J.  Dallas  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and 
Mr.  Richard  Rush  Attorney-General  —  and  recommended 


114  HISTORY   OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

a  national  currency,  in  order  to  provide  a  common  medium 
of  circulation,  not  then  furnished  by  the  existing  State 
banks.  And,  after  surveying  the  whole  ground  of  our 
national  wants  and  necessities,  he  thus  expressed  himself 
with  reference  to  the  best  mode  of  raising  revenue : 

"  In  adjusting  the  duties  on  imports  to  the  object  of  revenue, 
the  influence  of  the  tariff  on  manufactures  will  necessarily  present 
itself  for  consideration.  However  wise  the  theory  may  be  which 
leaves  to  the  sagacity  and  interest  of  individuals  the  application  of 
their  industry  and  resources,  there  are  in  this,  as  in  other  cases, 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule.  Besides  the  condition  which  the 
theory  itself  implies,  of  a  reciprocal  adoption  by  other  nations,  expe- 
rience teaches  that  so  many  circumstances  must  concur  in  intro- 
ducing and  maturing  manufacturing  establishments,  especially  of 
the  most  complicated  kind,  that  a  country  may  remain  long  with- 
out them,  although  sufficiently  advanced,  and  in  some  respects  even 
peculiarly  fitted  for  carrying  them  on  with  success.  Under  cir- 
cumstances giving  a  powerful  impulse  to  manufacturing  industry, 
it  has  made  among  us  a  progress,  and  exhibited  an  efficiency,  which 
justify  the  belief  that,  with  a  protection  not  more  than  is  due  to  the 
enterprising  citizens  whose  interests  are  now  at  stake,  it  will  be- 
come, at  an  early  day,  not  only  safe  against  occasional  competition 
from  abroad,  but  a  source  of  domestic  wealth,  and  even  of  external 
commerce.  In  selecting  the  branches  more  especially  entitled  to 
\hz  public  patronage,  a  preference  is  obviously  claimed  by  such  as  will 
relieve  the  United  States  from  a  dependence  on  foreign  supplies,  ever 
subject  to  casual  failures,  for  articles  necessary  to  the  public  de- 
fense, or  connected  with  the  primary  wants  of  individuals.  It  will 
be  an  additional  recommendation  of  particular  manufactures  where  the 
materials  of  them  are  extensively  drawn  from  our  agriculture,  and  conse- 
quently impart  and  secure  to  that  great  fund  of  national  prosperity  and 
independence  an  encouragement  which  cannot  fail  to  be  rewarded" 

The  meaning  of  this  cannot  be  misunderstood.  He 
considered  agriculture  the  foundation  of  all  national  pros- 
perity, and  that  its  surplus  products  would  be  lost,  instead 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  115 

of  becoming  sources  of  domestic  wealth,  unless  they  were 
converted  into  manufactured  articles  for  consumption  at 
home  and  for  exportation  abroad.  He  realized,  as  every- 
body then  did,  that  if  we  had  no  manufactures  of  our  own, 
we  should  be  compelled  to  supply  ourselves  with  necessary 
articles  from  the  manufacturers  of  Europe,  especially  of 
England  —  a  policy  which  would,  inevitably,  destroy  our 
commerce  and  diminish  our  wealth.  Consequently,  he 
recognized  encouragement  to  manufactures  as  encourage- 
ment to  agriculture  also  —  considering  the  interests  of 
both  as  inseparably  blended.  And  as  it  was  necessary  to 
raise  revenue  for  the  support  of  the  Government,  his  wis- 
dom and  experience  enabled  him  to  know  that  the  only 
proper  and  judicious  mode  of  doing  it  was  by  duties  on 
imports  discriminating  in  favor  of  our  own  labor  and 
industry,  and  thereby  giving  protection  to  manufactures. 
These  recommendations  of  Mr.  Madison  resulted  in 
the  passage  of  the  tariff  law  of  1816,  which  was  made  to 
conform,  as  nearly  as  possible,  to  his  opinions.  The  duties 
were  laid  for  the  double  purpose  of  revenue  and  protec- 
tion—  discriminating  in  favor  of  the  latter  upon  such  arti- 
cles of  import  as  required  it.  Each  object  was  sought 
after,  as  having  special  and  substantial  value  of  its  own. 
To  raise  revenue  was  the  primary  object,  and  protection 
secondary  —  but  not  incidental  merely.  The  idea  of  pro- 
tection as  simply  incidental  to  revenue,  and  nothing  more, 
would  have  appeared  to  the  enlightened  and  practical  mind 
of  Mr.  Madison,  and  to  the  whole  country  at  that  time,  as 
approaching  absurdity;  —  for  if  it  had  been  expedient  to 


Il6  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

support  the  Government  without  any  customs  duties  at 
all,  it  would,  nevertheless,  have  been  necessary  to  protect 
manufactures,  as  the  only  ascertained  method  of  devel- 
oping the  resources  of  the  country,  increasing  the  aggre- 
gate wealth  of  the  nation,  and  making  us  independent 
of  foreign  countries  —  especially  England.  Mr.  Madison 
expressed  this  idea  so  frequently,  and  in  such  variety  of 
forms,  that  nothing  would  have  surprised  him  more  than 
to  find  himself  quoted  as  the  advocate  of  mere  incidental 
protection  —  that  is,  for  protection  as  merely  incident  to 
revenue.  At  a  subsequent  period  of  his  life,  as  late  as 
1828  —  eleven  years  after  the  close  of  his  Presidential 
term  —  when  efforts  were  made  to  create  a  party  of  oppo- 
sition to  the  principle  of  protection,  on  the  ground  of  both 
its  unconstitutionality  and  inexpediency,  he  rebuked  the 
agitators  in  unequivocal  terms,  by  saying: 

"A  further  evidence  of  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  pro- 
tect and  foster  manufactures  by  regulations  of  trade  (an  evidence  that 
ought  itself  to  settle  the  question),  is  the  uniform  and  practical  sanc- 
tion given  to  that  power  for  near  forty  years." 

The  power  to  lay  and  collect  impost  duties  is  one 
7  thing — that  to  regulate  commerce  is  another  thing.  Each 
power  is  distinct  in  itself,  and  substantially  granted,  inde- 
pendently of  the  other.  Consequently  the  idea  expressed 
by  Mr.  Madison  is  plainly  this:  —  that,  as  the  Constitution 
had  been  understood  and  uniformly  interpreted  for  nearly 
forty  years,  it  grants  the  power  to  protect  manufactures 
"by  regulations  of  trade"  and  not  as  a  mere  incident  to 
the  power  to  collect  revenue;  and  therefore,  the  question 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  I  IJ 

of  the  constitutionality  of  protection,  as  well  as  its  expedi- 
ency, ought  to  be  considered  finally  settled.  It  is  proper, 
then,  to  say  that  the  kind  of  protection  so  frequently  and 
earnestly  recommended  by  him,  was  not  incidental  to  the 
revenue  power,  but  direct  and  substantive,  as  a  necessary 
part  of  the  power  to  "  regulate  commerce,"  expressly  con- 
ferred by  the  Constitution. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CONGRESSIONAL  PROCEEDINGS  —  TARIFF  OF  1816  —  PROTECTION 
OF  COTTON  AND  WOOL  — MADISON  IN  FAVOR  OF  PROTECTION 
—LEADERS  OF  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  — BILL  REPORTED 
—  OPINION  OF  COMMITTEE  — OPPOSED  TO  FREE  TRADE  AND 
FAVORING  PROTECTION  —  THREAT  BY  LORD  BROUGHAM  — 
CONGRESS  FIRM  FOR  PROTECTION. 

r"PHE  tariff  law  of  1816  was  not  considered  an  adminis- 
tration measure,  in  any  proper  sense.  Mr.  Madison's 
recommendations  upon  the  subject  so  accurately  reflected 
the  public  sentiment,  that  its  passage  occasioned  as  much 
popular  enthusiasm  as  did  that  of  the  first  tariff  act,  under 
Washington's  administration.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  continua- 
tion of  the  same  system  —  another  important  step  toward 
absolute  independence.  Nevertheless,  the  administration 
employed  whatsoever  influence  it  fairly  and  legitimately 
could,  not  only  to  furnish  correct  information  to  Congress 
and  the  country,  but  to  contribute  toward  the  desired 
result.  Mr.  Madison  was  never  suspected  of  the  improper 
use  of  executive  authority  to  direct  legislation,  but  so  kept 
himself  aloof  from  all  mere  party  alliances  as  to  make  his 
administration  conform  in  all  its  distinctive  measures  of 
policy,  to  the  popular  will.  Such  was  undoubtedly  the 
case  with  reference  to  this  important  tariff  law — which 
was  strongly  and  especially  protective. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Mr.  Dallas,  made  a 

118 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  I  19 

report  to  Congress  recommending  an  increase  of  duties 
upon  cotton  and  woolen  goods  —  not  as  a  revenue  measure 
alone,  but  with  the  alleged  purpose  of  giving  additional 
protection  to  manufactures.  The  report  shows,  in  a  suc- 
cint  manner,  the  principles  which  underlie  our  entire  sys- 
tem of  tariff  legislation,  in  so  far  as  it  has  been  protective. 
In  this  view  its  importance  is  not  yet  lessened,  because  it 
treats  of  a  general  principle  as  applicable  to  one  period  as 
to  another.  The  Secretary  says: 

"  There  are  few,  if  any,  governments  which  do  not  regard  the 
establishment  of  domestic  manufactures  as  a  chief  object  of  public 
policy.  The  United  States  have  always  so  regarded  it.  In  the  ear- 
liest acts  of  Congress,  which  were  passed  after  the  adoption  of  the 
present  constitution,  the  obligation  of  providing,  by  duties  on  im- 
ports, for  the  discharge  of  the  public  debts,  is  expressly  connected 
with  the  policy  of  encouraging  and  protecting  manufactures" 

Upon  the  effect  of  the  protective  policy  upon  domestic 
labor,  he  said  : 

"  The  interests  of  agriculture  require  a  free  and  constant  access 
to  a  market  for  its  surplus,  and  a  ready  supply  of  all  the  articles  of 
use  and  consumption  on  reasonable  terms;  but  the  national  interest 
may  require  the  establishment  of  a  domestic  in  preference  to  a  foreign  mar- 
kety  and  the  employment  of  domestic  in  preference  to  foreign  labor, 
in  furnishing  the  necessary  supplies." 

The  practical  bearing  of  this  opinion  will  be  readily 
perceived,  and  its  truthfulness  has  long  since  been  realized 
in  every  neighborhood  where  manufactures  have  existed. 
Mr.  Dallas  was  so  impressed  by  it  that  he  predicted  that 
some  of  the  manufacturing  establishments  then  existing, 
in  comparative  infancy,  would  become  permanent,  if  a 
proper  degree  of  government  protection  should  be 


I2O  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

extended  to  them.     He  enforced  this  idea  by  the  following 
sensible  and  practical  views  : 

"  The  means  of  promoting  this  object  are  various  ;  but  it  appears 
to  have  been  the  early  and  continued  practice  and  policy  of  the 
Government  to  afford  encouragement  to  domestic  products  and  manu- 
factures, rather  by  the  imposition  of  protective  duties  than  by  the 
grant  of  bounties  and  premiums;  and,  indeed,  it  is  in  that  course  alone 
that  the  subject  properly  falls  within  the  scope  of  the  present  report. 
Although  some  indulgence  will  always  be  required  for  any  attempt 
so  to  realize  the  national  independence  in  the  department  of  man- 
ufactures, the  sacrifice  cannot  be  either  great  or  lasting.  The 
inconveniences  of  the  day  will  be  amply  compensated  by  future 
advantages.  The  agriculturalist,  whose  produce  and  whose  flocks  depend 
for  their  value  upon  the  fluctuations  of  a  foreign  market,  will  have  no 
occasion  eventually  to  regret  the  opportunity  of  a  ready  sale  for  his  wool  or 
his  cotton  in  his  own  neighborhood;  and  it  will  soon  be  understood  that 
the  success  of  the  American  manufacturer,  which  tends  to  diminish 
the  profit  (often  the  excessive  profit)  of  the  importer,  does  not  neces- 
sarily add  to  the  price  of  the  article  in  the  hands  of  the  consumer" 

One  can  scarcely  imagine  plainer  or  more  expressive 
language  than  this.  Coming,  as  it  did,  from  Mr.  Madi- 
son's Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  who  was  a  man  of  dis- 
tinguished ability,  it  was  considered  as  expressing  the 
opinion  and  desire  of  the  administration,  and  undoubtedly 
contributed  to  the  legislative  result.  The  policy  of  pro- 
tection was  already  sufficiently  popular,  both  in  Congress 
and  the  country ;  but  if  it  had  not  been,  these  arguments 
of  the  Secretary —  especially  when  it  was  understood  that 
they  conformed  to  the  frequently-expressed  opinions  of 
Mr.  Madison  —  would  have  made  it  so.  And  yet  it  is  not 
n  little  amusing,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  to  witness  the  self- 
complacency  of  some  modern  politicians  who  assume 
themselves  able  to  demonstrate  that  the  great  statesmen 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  121 

of  that  day  knew  nothing  of  the  true  principles  and  science 
of  government ! 

The  House  of  Representatives  contained,  at  that  time, 
some  men  of  very  great  ability,  who  then  and  subsequently 
exercised  almost  unlimited  influence  in  molding  and 
directing  public  opinion.  Some  of  them  will  always 
occupy  conspicuous  positions  in  our  history,  and  deserv- 
edly so —  for,  differ  with  them  as  men  may  upon  some 
points  of  policy,  very  few  are  inclined  to  impeach  their 
integrity  of  purpose  or  to  charge  them  with  any  want  of 
patriotism.  Without  intimating  that  there  were  not  others 
entitled  to  high  consideration,  the  following  are  worthy  of 
being  especially  named  :  Daniel  Webster,  Timothy  Pick- 
ering, and  Nathaniel  Ruggles,  of  Massachusetts;  Daniel 
Chipman,  of  Vermont ;  Samuel  D.  Ingham,  and  John  Ser- 
geant, of  Pennsylvania ;  Philip  P.  Barbour,  William  H. 
Roane,  and  Henry  St.  George  Tucker,  of  Virginia; 
Nathaniel  Macon,  of  North  Carolina  ;  John  C.  Calhoun, 
William  Lowndes,  and  Henry  Middleton,  of  South  Caro- 
lina;  John  Forsyth,  and  William  Lumpkin,  of  Georgia; 
Henry  Clay,  and  Richard  M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky,  and 
John  McLean,  of  Ohio.  Whatsoever  differences  of  opinion 
may  have  existed  among  these  gentlemen  with  reference 
to  the  best  methods  of  conducting  public  affairs,  they  were 
agreed  in  the  general  wish  to  see  them  so  conducted  as  to 
advance  the  common  interests  of  the  country.  The  crisis 
was  then  such  as  to  invite  their  cooperation  in  the  support 
of  such  measures  as  had  that  tendency.  The  war  with 
Great  Britain  had  erased  many  of  the  distinctive  lines 


122  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

which  had  divided  parties,  and  the  patriotic  conservatism 
of  Mr.  Madison's  administration  was  universally  recog- 
nized. The  main  object  which  influenced  each  one  of 
them,  was  to  do  whatsoever  would  most  likely  tend  to 
restore  our  imperiled  commerce,  reestablish  trade,  rein- 
vigorate  the  energies  of  the  people,  and  so  foster  all  the 
industrial  interests  of  the  country  as  to  place  its  prosperity 
upon  solid  and  permanent  foundations.  Whatsoever  parts 
they  may  have  severally  performed  in  our  history  since 
then,  we  cannot  be  deprived  of  the  example  they  then 
furnished.  That,  at  least,  is  secure  as  the  common  prop- 
erty of  the  nation. 

The  portion  of  Mr.  Madison's  message  which  recom- 
mended increased  protection  to  manufactures,  was  re- 
ferred to  the  Committee  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures 
in  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  members  of  that 
committee  represented  the  six  following  States :  Virginia, 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Pennsylvania,  Massachu- 
setts and  Rhode  Island, —  there  being  an  equal  number 
from  each  section,  North  and  South.  Mr.  Newton,  of 
Virginia,  was  the  chairman,  and  through  him  the  commit- 
tee, in  February,  1 8 1 6,  submitted  a  unanimous  report,  which 
shows,  with  exceeding  clearness  and  perspicuity,  the  basis 
upon  which  the  final  legislation  of  that  session  of  Congress 
rested.  Their  argument  was  unanswerable  then,  and 
deserves  repetition,  because  it  is  equally  so  now. 

The  committee  were  not  inclined  to  make  "a  display 
of  speculative  opinions,"  but,  being  practical  men,  and 
engaged  in  the  practical  work  of  conducting  public  affairs, 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  123 

they  confined  themselves  to  a  statement  of  facts,  and  to 
the  recommendation  of  such  measures  as  were  suggested 
by  them.  As  an  example  of  the  increase  of  manufactur- 
ing industry  in  the  United  States,  they  showed  that  only 
500  bales  of  cotton  were  manufactured  in  1800,  whereas,  in 
1815,  the  number  had  increased  to  90,00x5  bales,  and  that 
the  capital  employed  was  $40,000,000.  The  number  of 
persons  engaged,  including  all  classes,  was  100,000.  The 
wages  paid  to  these  amounted  to  $15,000,000  annually. 
The  statement  was  designed  to  show  that,  although  man- 
ufacturing had  advanced  with  commendable  rapidity,  con- 
sidering the  period  of  the  -war,  yet  that  the  establishments 
had  only  reached  a  condition  in  which  they  were  consid- 
ered insecure,  unless  their  permanency  was  assured  by 
additional  protection, —  that  is,  by  higher  duties  upon  the 
necessary  articles  than  were  authorized  by  the  existing 
laws.  Upon  this  point  their  reasoning  is  conclusive  ;  as  it 
also  is  upon  the  general  principle  involved  in  the  policy  of 
protection.  They  said : 

"  The  States  that  are  most  disposed  to  manufactures  as  regular 
occupations,  will  draw  from  the  agricultural  States  all  the  raw  materials 
which  they  want,  and  not  an  inconsiderable  portion^  also,  of  the  necessaries 
of  life;  while  the  latter  will,  in  addition  to  the  benefits  which  they 
at  present  enjoy,  always  command,  in  peace  or  in  war,  at  moderate 
prices,  every  species  of  manufacture  that  their  wants  may  require. 
Should  they  be  inclined  to  manufacture  for  themselves,  they  can  do 
so  with  success,  because  they  have  all  the  means  in  their  power  to 
erect  and  extend  at  pleasure  manufacturing  establishments.  Oiir 
wants  being  supplied  by  our  own  ingenuity  and  industry ',  exportation  of 
specie,  to  pay  for  foreign  manufactures,  will  cease" 

This  paragraph,  brief  as  it  is,  contains  as  much  wisdom 


124  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

as  is  sometimes  found  in  an  entire  volume.  It  is  of  infi- 
nitely more  value  in  influencing  the  formation  of  correct 
opinions  about  the  practical  affairs  of  government,  of 
which  it  treats,  than  the  speculate  theories  of  all  the  polit- 
ical economists  who  have  asserted  the  contrary  combined. 
And  that  it  was  so  considered  when  the  report  was  made, 
can  be  easily  ascertained  by  any  who  will  examine  the  his- 
tory of  the  tariff  law  of  1816,  to  the  passage  of  which  it 
materially  contributed. 

But  the  committee  did  not  stop  at  this  point.  They 
continued : 

"  Every  State  will  participate  in  these  advantages.  The  resources 
of  each  will  be  explored,  opened  and  enlarged.  Different  sec- 
tions of  the  nation  will,  according  to  their  position,  the  climate,  the 
population,  the  habits  of  the  people,  and  the  nature  of  their  soil, 
strike  into  that  line  of  industry  which  is  best  adapted  to  their  inter- 
est and  the  good  of  the  whole  ;  an  active  and  free  intercourse,  pro- 
moted and  facilitated  by  roads  and  canals,  will  ensue  ;  prejudices, 
which  are  generated  by  distance,  and  the  want  of  inducements  to 
approach  each  other  and  reciprocate  benefits,  will  be  removed  ; 
information  will  be  extended,  the  Union  will  acquire  strength  and 
solidity,  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  that  of  each 
State,  will  be  regarded  as  fountains  from  which  flow  numerous 
streams  of  private  and  public  prosperity." 

They  also  said : 

"  In  proportion  as  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  depends  on 
agriculture  and  manufactures  as  a  common  basis,  will  it  increase 
and  become  independent  of  those  revolutions  and  fluctuations, 
which  the  ambition  and  jealousies  of  foreign  governments  are  apt 
to  produce.  Our  navigation  will  be  quickened  ;  and  supported  as 
it  will  be  by  internal  resources,  never  before  at  the  command  of 
any  nation,  will  advance  to  the  extent  of  those  resources. 

"New  channels  of  trade  and  enterprise,  no  less  important  than 
productive,  are  opening,  which  can  be  secured  only  by  a  wise  and 
prudent  policy  appreciating  their  advantages, 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  125- 

"  If  want  of  foresight  should  neglect  the  cultivation  and 
improvement  of  them,  the  opportune  moment  may  be  lost,  perhaps, 
for  centuries,  and  the  energies  of  this  nation  be  thereby  prevented 
from  developing  themselves,  and  from  making  the  boon  which  is 
proffered  our  own.  By  trading  on  our  own  capital,  collisions  with 
other  nations,  if  they  be  not  entirely  done  away,  will  be  greatly 
diminished. 

"  This  natural  order  of  things  exhibits  the  commencement  of  a 
new  epoch,  which  promises  peace,  security  and  repose,  by  a  firm 
and  steady  reliance  on  the  produce  of  agriculture;  on  the  treasures 
that  are  embosomed  in  the  earth;  on  the  genius  and  ingenuity  of 
our  manufacturers  and  mechanics,  and  on  the  intelligence  and 
enterprise  of  our  merchants." 

If  any  who  are  skeptical  about  the  advantages  to  be 
expected  from  protection  shall  pronounce  this  argument 
unsound,  and  set  up  the  theory  of  free  trade  in  opposition 
to  it,  they  are  fully  and  sufficiently  answered  by  the  fact 
that  all  the  predictions  of  this  committee  have  been  ful- 
filled. We  are  now  in  the  presence  of  such  rapid  and 
unexampled  progress  as  to  make  these  predictions,  uttered 
nearly  three-quarters  of  a  century  ago,  more  descriptive  of 
what  actually  exists  than  anticipations  of  what  the  future 
shall  develop.  Possessing,  as  we  do,  everything  that 
makes  a  people  great,  powerful  and  prosperous,  we  can- 
not fail  to  congratulate  ourselves  upon  the  influence  which 
these,  and  other  kindred  sentiments,  exercised  over  the 
tariff  legislation  of  1816, —  at  a  time  when  a  single  retro- 
grade step  might  have  checked,  possibly  for  ever,  the 
career  of  our  prosperity  and  progress.  And  the  more  we 
ponder  upon  the  principles  embodied  in  that  legislation  - 
in  view  of  the  results  they  have  produced  —  the  more 
earnest  will  become  our  conviction  that  they  were  not 


126  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

only  suitable  for  that  time,  but  for  all  the  periods  of  our 
history,  present  as  well  as  future.  The  nation  that  does 
not  extend  its  care  and  protection  to  every  element  of 
industry  it  possesses,  so  that  it  shall  be  fostered  to  its  full 
capacity  for  development,  can  have  no  assurance  of  sta- 
bility. Whereas,  we  have  proved  by  our  own  history  and 
experience,  that  a  popular  government  like  ours  may,  in 
only  one  century  of  time,  by  just  and  constitutional  pro- 
tection to  labor  in  its  various  departments,  reach  a  posi- 
tion of  greatness  from  which  it  is  not  likely  to  be  dislodged 
by  any  of  the  known  instrumentalities  by  which  other 
nations  have  been  overthrown. 

This  committee  were  fully  apprised  of  the  efforts 
which  the  manufacturers  of  Europe,  and  especially  those 
of  England,  were  then  making  to  cripple  our  energies  and 
arrest  our  progress,  by  inducing  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  abandon  the  policy  of  protection.  They 
insisted  that  it  would  be  to  our  advantage  to  do  so, 
because  they  could,  by  means  of  their  cheap  labor,  furnish 
us  with  manufactured  fabrics  at  less  prices  than  we  could 
manufacture  them  for  ourselves.  It  did  not  seem  to  occur 
to  them,  however,  that  they  should  at  least  put  on  the 
appearance  of  disinterestedness  by  leaving  their  own  man- 
ufacturers to  take  care  of  themselves,  without  any  govern- 
ment aid.  Their  plan  of  operations  did  not  extend  so  far, 
however,  as  the  sacrifice  would  have  been  greater  than 
they  were  prepared  to  make.  We  already  had  a  balance 
of  $125,000,000  standing  against  us  in  our  trade  with 
Great  Britain  alone  —  which  drained  us  of  our  gold  and 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  127 

silver  to  that  extent  annually  —  and,  of  course,  if  we  could 
have  been  persuaded  to  abandon  our  own  manufactures 
and  consume  those  of  that  country,  we  should  have  been 
compelled  to  pay  whatsoever  tribute  her  manufacturers 
levied  upon  us.  Even  so  liberal  an  English  statesman  as 
Lord  Brougham — who  was  not,  in  a  general  sense, 
unfriendly  to  the  United  States  —  encouraged  the  perse- 
verance in  this  plan  of  operations,  even  to  the  extent  of 
subjecting  the  British  manufacturers  to  large  losses,  if 
thereby  they  could  gain  their  end.  In  a  speech  in  Parlia- 
ment he  said: 

"It  is  well  worth  while  to  incur  a  loss  upon  the  first  exporta- 
tions,  in  order,  by  the  glut,  to  stifle  in  the  cradle  the  rising  manufact- 
ures in  the  United  States,  which  the  war  had  forced  into  existence 
contrary  to  the  natural  course  of  things." 

It  is  not  at  all  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  sentiments 
of  this  House  Committee  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures, 
as  well  as  the  policy  of  Mr.  Madison's  administration,  and 
the  action  of  Congress,  were  more  or  less  influenced  by 
the  course  adopted  by  the  English  statesmen  and  manu- 
facturers. It  became  apparent  that,  apart  from  any  ques- 
tion of  political  economy  merely,  the  simple  law  of 
self-defense  required  us  to  take  care  of  ourselves,  and  to 
see  that  our  immense  means  of  material  prosperity  were 
retained  by  ourselves,  and  not  emptied  into  the  lap  of 
Europe.  This  committee  perfectly  understood  this,  and, 
in  reference  to  it,  said: 

"The  foreign  manufacturers  and  merchants  will  put  in  requisi- 
tion all  the  powers  of  ingenuity;  will  practice  whatever  art  can 
devise,  and  capital  can  accomplish,  to  prevent  the  American  manu- 


128  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

facturing  establishments  from  taking  root  and  flourishing  in  their 
rich  and  native  soil/' 

Congress  was  equal  to  the  necessities  of  the  crisis;  and 
it  is  manifestly  true  that  the  English  threat  to  glut  our 
markets,  even  at  a  temporary  loss,  so  as  to  destroy  our 
manufactures  and  obtain  control  of  our  markets,  had  its 
proper  influence  upon  the  legislation  of  1816,  when  the 
duties  were  made  more  strongly  protective  than  they  had 
ever  been  before.  It  made  Congress,  and  the  President, 
and  the  Country,  more  resolute  in  maintaining  this  princi- 
ple, not  merely  because  it  was  right  in  itself,  but  because 
by  its  abandonment,  our  most  thriving  industries  would 
be  in  danger  of  destruction. 


COMPARATIVE  WEALTH,  INCOME  AND  DEBT 

OF  VARIOUS  COUNTRIES. 


Wealth, 
$47,475  Millions 


Wealth, 
$43,600  Millions. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PROCEEDINGS  OF  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  ON  TARIFF  OF 
1816— OPINIONS  OF  CLAY,  LOWNDES  AND  INGHAM  — CALHOUN 
IN  CHARGE  OF  BILL  — DEFENDS  IT  AGAINST  RANDOLPH  OF 
VIRGINIA  — HIS  CONCLUSIVE  ARGUMENT  —  HE  FAVORS  PRO- 
TECTION—NECESSARY FOR  HOME  MARKETS  — BILL  PASSED. 

\A7HILST  the  bill  which  became  the  tariff  law  of  1816 
was  pending  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  an 
elaborate  discussion  took  place,  during  which  the  policy 
of  protection  underwent  a  scrutinizing  investigation.  This 
is  an  important  and  instructive  discussion,  not  alone  be- 
cause it  explains  the  legislative  intention,  but  shows  the 
opinions  of  the  distinguished  men  who  participated  in  it, 
with  reference  to  the  necessity  of  our  being  supplied  with 
manufactures  of  our  own,  made  out  of  materials  of  our 
own  production,  and  by  our  own  industry,  in  preference 
to  those  of  foreign  countries,  produced  by  foreign  labor. 
It  would  be  unfair,  however,  not  to  say  that  some  of  these 
gentlemen  subsequently  gave  up  the  opinions  they  then 
expressed,  and  adopted  others  in  opposition  to  them.  But 
this  has  no  necessary  bearing  upon  our  present  inquiries. 
All  men  have  the  right  to  change  their  opinions  when  and 
as  they  please,  to  meet  any  changed  condition  of  circum- 
stances. He  who,  convinced  of  error,  does  not  abandon 
it,  but  persists  in  doing  what  his  conscience  assures  him 
is  wrong,  merely  to  preserve  his  personal  consistency,  is 
9  129 


130  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

not  worthy  of  public  trust.  Such  men  have  not  the  moral 
courage  to  pursue  the  right  as  their  consciences  teach  it 
to  them.  In  so  far  as  the  opinions  of  individuals  are  per- 
sonal they  concern  themselves  alone.  When,  however, 
they  employ  an  argument  in  support  of  public  policy  which 
they  cannot  recall,  if  they  subsequently  fail  to  destroy  or 
weaken  the  force  of  their  own  logic,  they  should  not  com- 
plain, nor  should  others  for  them,  if  the  argument  should  be 
held  to  stand  against  them.  Argument  is  worth  nothing 
unless  sustained  by  reason.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  reason  of 
an  argument  that  produces  conviction  in  the  minds  of 
those  to  whom  it  is  addressed,  and  it  amounts  to  nothing 
unless  it  does  this.  Such  will  be  found  to  be  the  charac- 
ter of  those  made  in  support  of  increased  duties  for  pro- 
tection, in  the  i4th  Congress. 

The  general  sentiment  entertained  by  the  friends  of 
protection  was  forcibly  expressed  by  Mr.  Clay,  of  Ken- 
tucky, when  he  said:  "  The  object  of  protecting  manufact- 
ures is,  that  we  might  eventually  get  articles  of  necessity 
made  as  cheap  at  home  as  they  could  be  imported,  and 
thereby  produce  an  independence  of  foreign  countries." 

Mr.  Lowndes,  of  South  Carolina,  said  "that  he  believed 
the  manufacture  of  woolens,  and  particularly  of  blankets, 
required  a  decided  present  encouragement." 

Mr.  Ingham,  of  Pennsylvania,  favored  the  highest  prac- 
ticable duty  for  the  purpose  of  protection. 

The  defense  of  the  principle  of  protection  rested,  how- 
ever, mainly  upon  Mr.  Calhoun,  of  South  Carolina,  to 
whom  it  was,  by  general  consent,  confided,  on  account  of 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  13! 

his  acknowledged  ability.  When  Mr.  John  Randolph,  of 
Virginia,  attacked  the  system,  in  a  fierce  philippic,  alleging, 
as  he  had  done  in  a  former  Congress,  that  it  proposed  to 
levy  "  an  immense  tax  on  one  portion  of  the  community  to 
put  money  in  the  pockets  of  another" — the  common 
assertion  of  anti-protectionists  then  as  now  —  Mr.  Calhoun 
entered  upon  a  full  discussion  and  elaborate  defense  of  it, 
in  which  he  displayed,  as  he  always  did  up  to  the  close  of 
his  life,  the  very  highest  order  of  reasoning  powers.  He 
considered  the  subject  of  "  vital  importance  "  —  as  touch- 
ing "  the  security  and  permanent  prosperity  of  our  country." 
He  claimed  that  his  opinions  should  be  regarded  as  disin- 
terested, because  "he  was  no  manufacturer,"  and  did  not 
come  "  from  that  portion  of  our  country  supposed  to  be 
peculiarly  interested,"  but  from  the  South,  and  had,  "in 
common  with  his  immediate  constituents,  no  interest  but 
in  the  cultivation  of  the  soil,  in  selling  its  products  high, 
and  buying  cheap  the  wants  and  conveniences  of  life." 
And  basing  his  premises  upon  what  he  considered  the 
leading  sources  of  wealth  in  this  country  —  agriculture, 
manufactures  and  commerce  —  and  upon  the  duty  of  the 
Government  to  adopt  such  measures  as  would  ensure  their 
development  to  the  utmost  degree  possible,  he  said  : 

"  Neither  agriculture,  manufactures,  nor  commerce,  taken  separately, 
is  the  cause  of  wealth  ;  it  flows  from  the  three  combined,  and  cannot  exist 
without  each.  The  wealth  of  any  single  nation,  or  any  individual,  it 
is  true,  may  not  immediately  depend  on  the  three,  but  such  wealth 
always  presupposes  their  existence.  He  viewed  the  words  in  the 
most  enlarged  sense.  Without  commerce  industry  would  have  no  stim- 
ulus ;  without  manufactures  it  would  be  without  the  means  of  production  ; 
and  without  agriculture  neither  of  the  others  can  subsist \  When  separated 

LIB! 

rut 

UNIVERSITY 


Cd/  irrtDKk\&. 


132  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

entirely  and  permanently,  they  perish.  .  .  .  It  is  admitted,  by 
the  most  strenuous  advocates  on  the  other  side,  that  no  country 
ought  to  be  dependent  on  another  for  its  means  of  defense  ;  that, 
at  least,  our  musket  and  bayonet,  our  cannon  and  ball,  ought  to  be 
of  domestic  manufacture.  But  what,  he  asked,  is  more  necessary 
to  the  defense  of  a  country  than  its  currency  and  finance  ?  Cir- 
cumstanced as  our  country  is,  can  these  stand  the  shock  of  war  ? 
Behold  the  effect  of  the  late  war  on  them  !  When  our  manu- 
factures are  grown  to  a  certain  perfection,  as  'they  soon  will  under 
the  fostering  care  of  government ',  we  will  no  longer  experience  these 
evils.  The  farmer  will  find  a  ready  market  for  his  surplus  produce  ; 
and,  which  is  almost  of  equal  consequence,  a  certain  and  cheap  supply 
of  all  his  wants.  His  prosperity  will  diffuse  itself  to  every  class 
of  the  community ;  and  instead  of  that  languor  of  industry,  and 
individual  distress,  now  incident  to  a  state  of  war  and  suspended 
commerce,  the  wealth  and  vigor  of  the  community  will  not  be 
materially  impaired." 

These  propositions  are  laid  down  with  the  skill  of  a 
practiced  debater.  They  are  not  mere  opinions,  which 
may  be  adopted  or  rejected  at  pleasure  ;  but  principles 
essentially  pertaining  to  the  science  of  government. 
They  point  out  the  relations  between  cause  and  effect  — 
showing  each  link  in  the  chain  connecting  them.  They 
are  applicable  to  all  governments  whose  strength  has  to  be 
derived  from  their  own  internal  resources,  and  as  much  to 
one  time  as  another  —  to  the  present  and  future  as  the 
past.  The  argument  comes  up  directly  and  squarely  to 
the  issue  between  protection  and  free  trade  —  supporting 
the  former,  repudiating  the  latter.  It  tersely  states  propo- 
sitions which  our  national  experience  has  made  political 
truisms.  There  has  not  been,  and  is  not  likely  ever  to  be, 
any  period  in  our  history  when  they  will  not  be  of  more 
value  to  the  nation  than  volumes  of  theoretical  specu- 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  133 

lations  about  what  all  the  nations  ought  to  do,  but  have 
never  done  and  never  will  do. 

But  Mr.  Calhoun  did  not  let  his  argument  rest  at  this 
point.  Proceeding  to  show,  among  other  causes  of  busi- 
ness derangement,  that  the  specie  of  this  country  was 
drawn  to  Europe  to  pay  the  balances  perpetually  accumu- 
lating against  us,  in  consequence  of  the  purchase  of  for- 
eign articles  for  domestic  consumption,  he  said  : 

"  To  this  distressing  state  of  things  there  were  two  remedies, 
and  only  two:  one  in  our  power  immediately,  the  other  requiring 
much  time  and  exertion;  but  both  constituting,  in  his  opinion,  the 
essential  policy  of  this  country;  he  meant  the  Navy  and  domestic  manu- 
factures. By  the  former  we  could  open  the  way  to  our  markets;  by 
the  latter,  we  bring  them  from  beyond  the  ocean,  and  naturalize 
them.  .  .  .  He  firmly  believed  that  the  country  is  prepared,  even 
to  maturity,  for  the  introduction  of  manufactures.  We  have  abun- 
dance of  resources,  and  things  naturally  tend  at  this  moment  in  that 
direction-.  .  .  .  What  channel  can  it  [our  active  capital]  take 
but  that  of  manufactures  ?  This,  if  things  continue  as  they  are, 
will  be  its  direction.  It  will  introduce  a  new  era  in  our  affairs,  in 
many  respects  highly  advantageous,  and  ought  to  be  countenanced  by 
the  Government.  ,  .  .  Objections  of  a  political  character  were 
made  to  the  encouragement  of  manufactures.  It  is  said  they 
destroy  the  morals  and  physical  character  of  the  people.  This 
might  formerly  have  been  true  to  a  considerable  extent,  before  the 
perfection  of  machinery,  and  when  the  success  of  the  manufactures 
depended  on  the  minute  subdivisions  of  labor.  At  that  time  it 
required  a  large  portion  of  the  population  of  a  country  to  be  engaged 
in  them;  and  every  minute  subdivision  of  labor  is  undoubtedly 
unfavorable  to  the  intellect;  but  the  great  perfection  of  machinery 
has  in  a  considerable  degree  obviated  these  objections.  ...  It 
lias  been  further  asserted  that  manufactures  are  the  fruitful  cause 
of  pauperism,  and  England  has  been  referred  to  as  furnishing  con- 
clusive evidence  of  its  truth.  For  his  part,  he  could  perceive  no 
such  tendency  in  them,  but  the  exact  contrary,  as  they  furnished 
new  stimulus  and  means  of  «"hsistence  to  the  laboring  classes  of 


134  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

the  community.  ...  It  [the  manufacturing  system]  produced 
an  interest  strictly  American,  as  much  so  as  agriculture;  in  which  it 
had  the  decided  advantage  of  commerce  and  navigation.  The  country 
will  from  this  derive  much  advantage.  Again,  it  is  calculated  to  bind 
together  more  closely  our  widely-spread  Republic.  It  will  greatly  increase 
our  mutual  dependence  and  intercourse;  and  will,  as  a  necessary  con- 
sequence, excite  an  increased  attention  to  internal  improvement  — 
a  subject  every  way  so  intimately  connected  with  the  ultimate  attain- 
ment of  national  strength,  and  the  perfection  of  our  political  insti- 
tutions. He  regarded  the  fact  that  it  would  make  the  parts  adhere 
more  closely;  that  it  would  form  a  new  and  most  powerful  cement,  far 
outweighing  any  political  objections  that  might  be  urged  against  the  system" 

These  sentiments  were  not  narrowed  by  any  sectional 
interests  or  animosity  —  if  any  of  the  latter  existed  at  all, 
at  that  time,  to  disturb  the  general  harmony.  They  were 
broad,  patriotic  and  statesmanlike  in  the  highest  and  best 
sense.  The  argument  was  unanswerable,  and  did  more 
than  any  other  then  made,  or  that  could  have  been  made, 
to  influence  the  action  of  Congress  and  give  stability  to 
public  opinion.  Subsequently,  when  Mr.  Randolph  re- 
newed his  attack  upon  the  pending  bill,  Mr.  Calhoun  was 
reinforced  by  his  distinguished  colleague,  Mr.  Lowndes, 
whose  eminent  abilities  made  him  a  conspicuous  coadjutor 
in  the  cause  of  protection.  And  when,  under  these  auspices, 
the  bill  reached  a  final  vote,  it  passed  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives by  88  yeas  to  54  nays,  having  received  the  sup- 
port of  representatives  from  every  section  of  the  Union. 
Mr.  Barbour,  of  Virginia ;  Messrs.  Calhoun  and  Lowndes, 
of  South  Carolina ;  Mr.  Lumpkin,  of  Georgia,  and  Col.  R. 
M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky,were  prominent  among  those  who 
voted  for  it.  These  gentlemen  not  only  followed  their  own 
conscientious  convictions  of  duty,  but  acted  in  obedience 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

to  the  will  of  their  constituents.     The  vote,  classified  by 
sections,  was  as  follows  : 


Yeas. 
16  

Nays. 
,  .  .  .  .         10  

Absent. 
16 

Middle  States  

10  

Western  States 

14.  . 

•2      . 

e 

Southern  States 

14. 

<»I 

7 

Total.. 

88.. 

54.. 

41 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  measure  was  not  sup- 
ported by  a  majority  of  the  representatives  from  either 
the  New  England  or  the  Southern  States ;  but  that  the 
country  was  mainly  indebted  for  it  to  the  Middle  and 
Western  States — the  belt  of  States  which  constitute  the 
central  section  of  the  Union,  as  between  the  North  and 
the  South.  The  representatives  from  these  Middle  and 
Western  States  gave  58  out  of  the  88  votes  cast  for  the 
bill.  But  nobody,  at  that  time,  regarded  what  little  con- 
troversy there  was  about  protection  to  manufactures  as 
having,  in  the  least  degree,  any  sectional  aspects.  On  the 
contrary,  the  universal  judgment  was  that  it  was  entirely 
national.  So  settled  was  this  conviction  that  the  bill  passed 
the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  25  yeas  to  7  nays  —  nearly  four 
to  one. 

If  there  had  then  been  any  so  insensible  to  the  general 
welfare  of  the  nation  as  to  have  attempted  to  array  one 
section  of  the  country  against  the  other,  on  the  ground 
that  they  had  interests  naturally  antagonistical,  they  would 
have  been  indignantly  rebuked.  There  was  no  attempt,  or 
suspicion  of  it,  on  the  part  of  one  section  to  obtain  any 
local  advantage  over  another.  The  feeling  existing,  in 


136  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

every  section,  was  that  of  generous  emulation.  Every- 
where, and  among  all  classes,  the  system  of  protection  was 
regarded  as  absolutely  essential  to  the  prosperity  and 
development  of  the  whole  Union,  as  the  only  means  by 
which  the  people  could  be  kept  in  a  condition  to  hold  their 
own  destiny  in  their  own  hands,  and  secure  permanence  to 
the  Union. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

TARIFF  OF  1816  PRODUCES  GENERAL  REJOICING  —  JEFFERSON'S 
LETTER  TO  AUSTIN  DEFENDING  PROTECTION  — HIS  LETTER  TO 
SIMPSON  TO  SAME  EFFECT  — THE  ACT  OF  1816  STRONGLY  PRO- 
TECTIVE—NO  SECTIONAL  ISSUES  EXISTING  — CLOSE  OF  MADL 
SON  S  ADMINISTRATION— HIS  POPULARITY. 

^PHE  discussions  which  preceded  and  were  called  forth 
by  the  tariff  law  of  1816  were  not  confined  to  Con- 
gress alone,  but  became  general  throughout  the  country,  on 
account  of  the  great  public  satisfaction  felt  at  the  result. 
Mr.  Jefferson  was  then  in  retirement  at  his  home  in  Vir- 
ginia, but  his  interest  in  matters  concerning  the  general 
welfare  was  not  abated  on  account  of  his  declining  years, 
as  is  shown  by  his  celebrated  letter,  written  in  1816,  to 
Mr.  Benjamin  Austin,  wherein  he  professed  himself  as 
continuing  to  be  the  earnest  friend  of.  the  protective  sys- 
tem. His  observations  and  experience  had  thoroughly 
matured  his  judgment,  and  the  occasion  enabled  him  to 
reaffirm  the  principles  he  had  avowed  during  his  Presi- 
dency. In  this  letter  he  said: 

"Compare  the  present  state  of  things  with  that  of  '85,  and  say 
whether  an  opinion  founded  in  the  circumstances  of  that  day  can 
be  fairly  applied  to  those  of  the  present.  We  have  experienced 
what  we  then  did  not  believe,  that  there  exists  both  profligacy  and 
power  to  exclude  us  from  the  field  of  interchange  with  other 
nations  —  that  to  be  independent  for  the  comforts  of  life,  we  must  fabri- 
cate them  for  ourselves.  We  must  now  place,  the  manufacturer  by  the 
side  of  the  agriculturalist  The  former  question  is  suppressed,  or 

i37 


138  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

rather  assumes  anew  form.  The  grand  inquiry  is,  now,  shall  we 
make  our  own  comforts  ^  or  go  without  them  at  the  will  of  another  nation  ? 
He,  therefore,  who  is  now  against  domestic  manufactures,  must  be 
for  reducing  us  either  to  a  dependence  on  that  nation,  or  be  clothed 
in  skins,  and  to  live  like  wild  beasts  in  dens  and  caverns.  I  am 
proud  to  say,  /  am  not  of  them.  Experience  has  taught  me  that 
manufactures  are  now  as  necessary  to  our  independence  a$  to  our  comfort; 
and  if  those  who  quote  me  as  of  a  different  opinion  will  keep  pace 
with  me  in  purchasing  nothing  foreign,  where  an  equivalent  of 
domestic  fabric  can  be  obtained,  without  regard  to  any  difference 
of  price,  it  will  not  be  our  fault  if  we  do  not  have  a  supply  at  home 
equal  to  our  demand,  and  wrest  that  weapon  of  distress  from  the 
hand  that  has  so  long  wantonly  violated  it." 

So  thoroughly  imbued  was  Mr.  Jefferson's  mind  with 
these  sentiments,  and  so  ardent  was  he  in  his  friendship 
for  the  system  of  protection,  that,  during  the  next  year, 
1817,  he  substantially  repeated  them  in  another  letter 
written  to  Mr.  William  Simpson,  who  had  forwarded  to 
him  a  pamphlet  wherein  direct  protection  to  home  manu- 
factures was  advocated.  He  then  said: 

"  I  have  read  with  great  satisfaction  the  eloquent  pamphlet 
you  were  so  kind  as  to  send  me,  and  sympathize  with  every  line  of  it.  I 
was  once  a  doubter  whether  the  labor  of  the  cultivator,  aided  by  the 
creative  power  of  the  earth  itself,  could  not  produce  more  than  that  of 
the  manufacturer,  alone  and  unassisted  by  the  dead  subject  on  which 
he  acted  ;  in  other  words,  whether  the  more  we  could  bring  into 
action  of  the  energies  of  our  boundless  territory  in  addition  to  the 
labor  of  our  citizens,  the  more  would  be  our  gain.  But  the  inven- 
tions of  the  later  times,  by  labor-saving  machines,  do  now  as 
much  for  the  manufacturer  as  the  earth  for  the  cultivator.  Experi- 
ence, too,  has  proved  that  mine  was  but  half  the  question:  the 
other  half  is,  whether  dollars  and  cents  are  to  be  weighed  in  the 
scale  against  real  independence.  The  question  is  then  solved,  at 
least  as  far  as  respects  our  wants. 

"  I  much  fear  the  effects  on  our  infant  establishments  [manufact- 
ures] of  the  policy  avowed  by  Mr.  Brougham  and  quoted  in  the 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  139 

pamphlet.  Individual  British  merchants  may  lose  by  the  late 
immense  importations,  but  British  commerce  and  manufactures  in  the 
mass  will  gain  by  beating  down  the  competition  of  our  sin  our  own  markets." 

There  is  no  difficulty  in  perceiving  the  method  of  reas- 
oning by  which  Mr.  Jefferson,  if  he  had  ever  inclined  to  a 
different  theory,  reached  these  conclusions  —  the  same  as 
influenced  the  minds  of  so  many  other  eminent  statesmen. 
He  saw,  what  others  also  saw,  that  the  manufacturers  of 
the  United  States  were  standing  face  to  face  with  those  of 
Great  Britain,  and  that  they  were  confronted,  by  the  latter, 
with  the  threat,  as  expressed  by  Lord  Brougham  in  Parlia- 
ment, that  they  would  glut  our  markets  with  excessive 
importations,  even  at  a  large  sacrifice,  until  they  were 
broken  down  and  destroyed.  And  knowing,  at  the  same 
time,  how  competent  this  country  was  to  supply  all  its  own 
necessary  wants,  and  the  suicidal  policy  of  its  becoming 
dependent  upon  foreign  nations  for  them,  he  unhesitatingly 
threw  the  great  weight  of  his  character  in  the  scale  on 
the  side  of  his  own  countrymen  against  those  who  were 
striving  to  levy  tribute  upon  us  in  our  own  markets.  He 
could  not  have  expressed  other  views  without  un-Ameri- 
canizing  himself. 

The  popular  feeling  in  favor  of  protection  grew 
stronger  and  stronger  during  all  the  period  of  Mr.  Madi- 
son's administration.  The  prominent  statesmen  whose 
names  have  been  mentioned  were  supported  by  the  ver- 
dict of  the  general  public.  All  classes  exhibited  the 
deepest  anxiety  upon  the  subject,  as  indicated  by  numer- 
ous public  meetings.  Not  the  rich  alone,  who  represented 


140  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

capital,  but  the  poor,  and  those  in  moderate  circumstances, 
saw  in  protection  to  manufactures  the  only  means  of  dif- 
fusing prosperity,  and  making  the  nation  entirely  inde- 
pendent. The  agriculturist  realized  that  the  prosperity 
of  the  manufacturer  was  so  inseparable  from  his  own  that 
the  impairment  of  one  would  prove  equally  injurious  to 
both.  The  merchant  knew  that  his  commercial  enterprise 
would  terminate  whensoever  these  two  great  interests 
became  paralyzed  by  neglect.  And  the  laborer  well  under- 
stood that  with  such  a  state  of  affairs  as  made  these  inter- 
ests hostile  to  jeach  other,  there  would  be  no  compensation 
for  his  labor,  and  he  would  be  in  danger  of  the  pauperism 
which  prevailed  in  Europe.  Consequently,  the  great 
questions  involved  underwent  a  thorough  investigation, 
both  in  the  legislative  and  popular  forums,  and  when  the 
duties  upon  a  number  of  articles  were  increased,  with  the 
sole  purpose  of  protection,  universal  satisfaction  was 
expressed.  Intelligent  opinion  centered  in  the  belief  that 
direct  and  immediate  benefit  would  result  to  agriculture 
and  manufactures  —  to  the  former  by  furnishing  a  steady 
home  market  for  its  surplus ;  to  the  latter  by  being  sup- 
plied with  the  necessary  raw  materials  for  conversion  into 
domestic  fabrics.  It  was  not  believed  that  injurious  ani- 
mosities existed,  or  were  likely  to  exist,  between  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  country,  on  account  of  their  diversified 
pursuits.  Each  section  realized  that,  in  order  to  secure 
the  perfect  independence  of  the  nation,  the  whole  country 
must  be  united  in  everything  pertaining  to  its  common 
happiness.  The  times  which  grew  out  of  the  war  with 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  14! 

Great  Britain  were  unfavorable  for  letting  loose  the  pas- 
sions, and  the  public  mind  quietly  settled  down  into  a  calm 
and  peaceful  inquiry  as  to  the  best  methods  of  securing 
the  independence  so  anxiously  sought  after.  Mr.  Madi- 
son's administration  closed  under  the  influences  thus  be- 
neficently existing,  and  he  was,  consequently,  enabled  to 
hand  over  the  Government  to  his  successor,  with  nothing 
to  mar  the  peace  or  check  the  public  prosperity,  but  with 
all  its  industries  fostered  by  the  national  guardianship. 

A  gentleman  who  did  much  to  influence  the  sentiments 
then  prevailing  thus  happily  and  enthusiastically  expressed 
himself,  with  reference  to  the  existing  state  of  affairs  and 
the  effects  of  protection : 

"  Agriculture  is  the  heart,  the  fountain  of  life,  from  which  the 
blood  proceeds,  and  to  which  it  returns.  Manufacture  is  the 
hands,  the  instruments  of  labor,  ingenuity  and  art,  preparing  food 
and  raiment.  Commerce  is  the  feet,  performing  the  necessary 
transportations  and  changes  of  place.  And  government  is  the  head, 
the  seat  of  intellect,  which  directs  the  whole  with  energy  and  wis- 
dom." 

Another  of  more  celebrity  and  influence  furnished  the 
following  as  a  key  to  the  course  it  was  the  nation's  duty 
to  pursue : 

*'  To  cultivate  the  resources  of  our  country,  and  depend  on 
ourselves  only,  under  Providence,  for  the  means  of  happiness  and 
comfort.  To  treat  all  foreign  nations  honestly  and  fairly,  but  to 
watch  their  movements  to  impair  the  strength  or  jeopardize  the 
great  interests  of  the  American  people  in  agriculture,  manufactures, 
and  commerce." 

In  continuation  of  the  same  subject,  but  with  refer- 
ence, more  especially,  to  the  tariff  law  of  1816,  the  same 
distinguished  gentleman  said : 


142  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

"  A  new  struggle  has  already  commenced  with  the  same  nation 
[Great  Britain]  in  the  arts,  as  connected  with  agriculture,  com- 
merce and  manufactures.  The  high  ground  so  fairly  won  in  the 
honorable  and  happy  result  of  the  former  [the  war]  can  be  main- 
tained only  by  activity,  vigilance  and  perseverance  in  the  latter. 
If  the  object  of  the  one  was  to  reduce  us  to  'unconditional  sub- 
mission,'—  'to  cripple  us  for  fifty  years,' — the  effect  of  the  other 
will  not  be  less  calamitous  in  bringing  upon  us  a  state  of  depend- 
ence and  penury,  if  we  blindly  reject  the  dictates  of  reason  and 
common  sense,  as  founded  upon  the  experience  of  nations.  The 
general  peace  of  Europe,  and  the  natural  progress  of  things  under 
such  a  circumstance,  will  probably  bring  about  revolutions  in  the 
arts,  and  especially  in  the  commerce  of  the  world,  not  less  extraor- 
dinary than  those  we  have  witnessed  in  government,  strange  as  they 
have  been.  There  is  nothing  more  evident  to  me  than  that  the 
prosperity  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  must  rest  upon  their  own 
vast  resources,  as  applicable  to  the  great  interests  of  agriculture^  commerce 
and  manufactures.  But  these  resources  may  easily  receive  a  wrong 
direction,  or  be  neglected  ;  and  there  is  too  much  of  a  disposition 
wantonly  to  waste,  or  indignantly  to  reject  them,  from  the  habit 
we  so  long  have  had  of  gaping  over  the  Atlantic  for  the  means  of 
comfort  and  of  business,  instead  of  seeking  them  at  home.  This 
propensity,  the  source  of  so  many  evils  to  the  Republic,  must  be 
checked  by  the  sober  reason  of  persons  not  interested  in  the  sale  of 
British  bobbins  and  tapes  —  or  poverty  is  entailed  upon  us  as  an 
inheritance,  justly  deserved." 

So  strong  was  the  conviction  in  the  public  mind  that 
the  ascendency  of  these  principles  —  which  were  the  reflex 
of  those  of  Mr.  Madison's  administration  —  was  necessary 
to  the  public  prosperity,  that  when  his  administration 
closed,  evidences  of  popular  approval  appeared  in  every 
direction.  The  Legislature  of  South  Carolina  unani- 
mously passed  a  resolution  complimenting  his  "wisdom, 
firmness  and  patriotism," — manifestly  having  reference 
to  his  general  policy,  but  necessarily  including  his  earnest 
support  of  the  protective  system.  And  by  no  one  was  the 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  143 

beneficence  of  the  Government,  as  exhibited  in  the  meas- 
ures then  existing,  more  eloquently  vindicated  than  by  the 
Governor  of  that  State,  when  he  spoke  of  the  elevated 
condition  of  the  people  —  blessed  with  a  government 
"  which,  like  the  atmosphere,  pervades  everything,  yet  is 
nowhere  felt."  This  sentiment  was  beautifully  expressed, 
but  its  chief  merit  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  attested  the  per- 
vading influence  of  protection,  which  was  felt  in  all  the 
departments  of  society. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

MONROE  BECOMES  PRESIDENT  — APPROVES  PROTECTION  — ADVO- 
CATES HOME  MARKETS— PROTECTION  INCREASES  PROSPERI- 
TY—ARRESTED BY  CURRENCY  CONTRACTION  — RESTORED  BY 
PROTECTION  — MONROE  FAVORS  DIRECT  NOT  INCIDENTAL 
PROTECTION  — NECESSARY  TO  INDEPENDENCE  — NOT  TO  BE 
ABANDONED  EVEN  IF  DEMAND  FOR  LABOR  REDUCED  — FREE 
TRADE  INTENDED  BY  ENGLAND  TO  DESTROY  OUR  MANUFACT- 
URES—MONROE OPPOSES  IT  BY  RECOMMENDING  ADDITION- 
AL PROTECTION. 

MR.  MONROE,  when  he  became  President,  was 
undoubtedly  influenced  by  the  opinions  expressed 
by  all  his  predecessors,  Washington,  Adams,  Jefferson, 
and  Madison  —  especially  the  latter,  under  whom  he  had 
served  as  Secretary  of  State  and  Secretary  of  War —  and 
by  the  policy  of  protection  which  had  prevailed  uninter- 
ruptedly from  the  beginning  of  the  Government  under  the 
Constitution.  He  seemed  so  well  convinced  that  an  aban- 
donment of  this  policy  would  result  disastrously  to  the 
public  welfare,  that  he  departed  from  the  customary  course 
and  referred  to  the  subject  in  his  inaugural  address  in 
1817  by  saying: 

"  Our  manufactures  will  require  the  systematic  and  fostering  aid  of  the 
Government.  Possessing,  as  we  do,  all  the  raw  materials,  the  frurt 
of  our  own  soil  and  industry,  we  ought  not  to  depend  in  the  degree 
we  have  done  on  supplies  from  other  countries.  While  we  are  thus 
dependent,  the  sudden  event  of  war,  unsought  and  unexpected,  can- 
not fail  to  plunge  us  into  the  most  serious  difficulties.  It  is  impor- 
tant, too,  that  the  capital  which  nourishes  our  manufactures  should 
be  domestic  as  its  influence  in  that  case,  instead  of  exhausting,  as 

144 


HISTORY   OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  145 

it  may  do  in  foreign  hands,  would  be  felt  advantageously  on  agri- 
culture, and  every  other  branch  of  industry.  Equally  important  is 
it  to  provide  at  home  a  market  for  our  raw  materials,  as  by  extending 
the  competition  it  will  enhance  the  price  and  protect  the  cultivator  against 
the  casualties  incident  to  foreign  markets" 

Every  idea  is  here  expressed  with  great  clearness.  The 
whole  argument  is  in  favor  of  protection  —  direct  and  not 
incidental  merely.  He  considered  it  the  duty  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  to  work  up  the  raw  materials  produced  by 
their  industry,  into  manufactured  fabrics  for  their  own  use, 
instead  of  depending  on  supplies  from  other  countries ; 
and  no  less  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  exercise  its  con- 
stitutional powers  in  the  protection  of  manufactures  for 
that  purpose.  And  he  pointed  out  the  advantages  agri- 
culture would  derive  from  this  policy,  in  that  it  would 
furnish  a  home  market  for  its  surplus  products,  which,  by 
competition,  would  enhance  their  price,  and  thus  accom- 
plish the  purpose  of  increasing  the  value  of  agricultural 
labor.  Any  practical  mind,  not  impressible  by  vague  and 
speculative  theories,  can  comprehend  and  appreciate  the 
force  of  this. 

When  calling  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  subject 
in  his  first  annual  message,  also  in  1817,  he  said  : 

"  Our  manufactures  will  require  the  continued  attention  of  Congress* 
The  capital  employed  in  them  is  considerable,  and  the  knowledge 
required  in  the  machinery  and  fabric  of  all  the  most  useful  manu- 
factures is  of  great  value.  Their  preservation,  which  depends  on  due 
encouragement,  is  connected  with  the  high  interests  of  the  nation" 

At  the  time  this  was  written  the  prosperity  of  the 
country  was  gradually  increasing,  occasioned  mainly  by 
the  protection  given  by  the  Government  to  the  various 


10 


146  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

domestic  industries.  A  member  of  Mr.  Monroe's  cabinet, 
referring  afterward  to  the  condition  of  affairs  then  exist- 
ing, said  "  there  was  a  powerful  feeling  manifested  at 
this  time  in  favor  of  affording  protection  to  the  infant 
manufactures  of  the  country."  And  this  was  exhibited  by 
an  amendment  of  the  law  of  1816,  so  as  largely  to  increase 
the  duties  on  copper,  cut-glass,  Russia  sheetings,  iron,  nails, 
and  cotton  and  woolen  goods,  with  only  three  votes  in  the 
Senate  and  sixteen  in  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
opposition  to  it. 

In  1819,  however,  there  was  a  general  depression  in  all 
values  throughout  the  United  States,  which,  of  course, 
lessened  the  prices  of  labor  in  all  its  departments,  as  well 
as  the  business  and  profits  of  manufactures.  This  depres- 
sion was  said  to  have  been  produced  by  the  reduction  of 
the  currency,  made  in  order  to  keep  the  bank  circulation 
of  equal  value  with  specie.  Whether  this  was  the  real 
cause  or  not  it  must  have  contributed  to  the  result  in  a 
considerable  degree.  But  however  this  may  have  been, 
the  derangement  of  business  was  only  temporary — for 
then,  as  now,  the  American  people  were  competent  to  con- 
tend successfully  against  any  unfavorable  condition  of  their 
affairs.  The  public  debt  was  regularly  and  promptly  paid 
as  the  bonds  matured,  with  the  accruing  revenue  from 
customs,  aided  by  limited  internal  duties  and  excise  taxes; 
so  that,  by  1821,  brighter  financial  prospects  began  to  dawn. 
And,  when  this  occurred,  the  state  of  things  not  only 
demonstrated  the  advantages  that  had  been  previously 
derived  from  protection  to  manufactures  and  the  conse- 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  147 

quent  increase  in  the  general  wealth  of  the  country,  but  it 
induced  Mr.  Monroe  to  remind  Congress  again  of  its  duty 
on  this  important  and  vital  subject.  Accordingly,  in  his 
message  of  1821,  he  said  : 

"It  may  fairly  be  presumed  that  under  the  protection  given 
to  domestic  manufactures  by  the  existing  laws,  we  shall  become,  at 
no  distant  period,  a  manufacturing  country  on  an  extensive  scale. 
Possessing  as  we  do  the  raw  materials  in  such  vast  amount,  with 
a  capacity  to  augment  them  to  an  indefinite  extent;  raising  within 
the  country  aliments  of  every  kind  to  an  amount  far  exceeding  the 
demand  for  home  consumption,  even  in  the  most  unfavorable 
years,  and  to  be  obtained  always  at  a  very  moderate  price  ;  skilled 
also,  as  our  people  are,  in  the  mechanic  arts,  and  in  every  improve- 
ment calculated  to  lessen  the  demand  for  and  the  price  of  labor,  it 
is  manifest  that  their  success  in  every  branch  of  domestic  industry 
may  and  will  be  carried,  under  the  encouragement  given  by  the  present 
duties^  to  an  extent  to  meet  any  demand  which  under  a  fair  com- 
petition may  be  made  on  it. 

. "  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  more  complete  our  internal 
resources,  and  the  less  dependent  we  are  on  foreign  powers  for 
every  national  as  well  as  domestic  purpose,  the  greater  and  more 
stable  will  be  the  public  felicity.  By  the  increase  of  domestic  manu- 
factures will  the  demand  for  the  n<de  materials  at  home  be  increased, 
and  thus  will  the  independence  of  the  several  parts  of  our  Union  on 
each  other,  and  the  strength  of  the  Union  itself,  be  proportionately 
augmented." 

If  the  topic  we  are  considering  did  not  involve  so 
many  and  such  diversified  interests,  and  were  not,  on  that 
account,  of  so  much  importance,  these  frequent  repetitions 
of  the  same  arguments  would  be  tedious  and  unprofitable. 
But  when  we  consider  how  anxious  the  early  statesmen 
were  that  the  advantages  of  protection  should  be  realized 
and  the  system  persevered  in,  it  not  only  does  not  excite 


'148  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

any  surprise  to  find  them  falling  into  the  same  line  of 
reasoning,  but  justifies  the  repetition,  because  it  shows  such 
a  degree  of  unanimity  as  could  have  alone  arisen  out  of  a 
just  sense  of  obligation  to  the  country.  The  grandest 
truths  are  frequently  repeated  in  words  of  equivalent 
meaning,  but  they  do  not  become  any  less  important  on 
that  account.  Protection  finds  the  fullest  justification  in 
the  fact  that  so  many  enlightened  and  thoughtful  minds 
have  entirely  agreed  with  regard  to  it. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing' general  reflections,  Mr. 
Monroe  considered  the  matter  with  reference  to  the 
amount  of  revenue  to  be  raised,  under  the  existing  tariff 
laws,  and  the  the  possibility  of  a  deficiency.  His  whole 
argument,  however,  went  to  show  that  —  like  Washington, 
Adams,  Jefferson,  and  Madison  —  he  had  no  idea  of  the 
sufficiency  of,  what  has  been  since  called,  incidental  protec- 
tion ;  or,  if  he  had,  that  he  gave  no  countenance  to  any  such 
meaning  of  it,  as  that  employed,  in  these  days,  by  the  free- 
trade  enemies  of  protection.  He  regarded  revenue,  of 
course,  as  necessary  for  the  support  of  the  Government, 
and  justified  its  being  raised  by  duties  upon  imports  in 
preference  to  direct  taxation,  because  they  were  indirect 
and  dispensed  with  the  presence  of  the  odious  tax-gatherer. 
But  he  considered  protection  as  necessary  to  the  develop- 
ment and  improvement  of  the  country.  Thus,  both  were 
looked  upon  as  essentially  important,  but  each  as  independ- 
ent of  and  distinct  from  the  other —  accomplishing  its  own 
object. 

Although   Mr.    Monroe  regarded  it  as   possible  that 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  149 

labor-saving  machines  —  such  as  mechanical  ingenuity 
would  be  likely  to  invent  in  aid  of  manufactures  —  might 
lessen  the  demand  for  and  the  price  of  labor,  yet  so  essen- 
tial did  he  consider  the  principle  of  protection  that  he  was 
unwilling  to  see  it  abandoned,  on  that  account.  This 
belief  once  prevailed  extensively,  and,  for  that  reason,  the 
general  introduction  of  such  machines  was  viewed  with 
much  suspicion.  Many  intelligent  and  thoughtful  people 
entertained  the  opinion  that  they  would,  in  all  probability, 
throw  out  of  employment  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
laboring  population.  But  the  effect  of  their  introduction 
has  been  precisely  the  reverse.  They  have  increased  the 
demand  for  labor  in  every  department  of  industry ;  and 
there  is  nothing  better  understood  than  that,  by  an  invari- 
able law,  wages  increase  as  the  demand  for  labor  increases. 
The  present  increased  demand  for  labor  is  occasioned 
more  by  the  success  of  manufactures  than  by  any  other 
cause.  They  have  become  so  diversified  as  to  create  this 
demand  for  every  variety  of  raw  materials,  the  production 
and  manufacture  of  which  require  every  form  of  skilled 
and  unskilled  labor.  They  have,  in  fact,  caused  the  intro- 
duction of  many  new  kinds  of  labor  hitherto  unknown  ;  so 
that  no  matter  what  a  laboring  man  is  fitted  to  do,  he  may 
find  employment  if  he  will.  It  is  well  understood  that  a 
surplus  of  labor  will  produce  depression,  as  a  surplus  of 
agricultural  products  reduces  prices.  This  depression  is 
frequently  produced  by  causes  independent  of  the 
demand  created  by  manufactures  and  not  influenced 
by  their  existence  or  non-existence,  such  as  war,  decrease 


I5O  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

of  currency,  bad  crops,  embarrassed  trade,  and  other  kin- 
dred matters.  When  manufactures  are  in  a  flourishing 
condition,  and  the  currency  is  good  and  sufficient,  and  the 
crops  are  abundant,  commerce  is  always  prosperous  ;  and 
these  combined  influences  invariably  enhance  the  demand 
for  and  the  value  of  labor. 

The  country  reached  this  condition  during  Mr.  Mon- 
roe's administration,  when  it  became  manifest  that  it  pos- 
sessed the  means  of  fully  recovering  from  the  effects  of 
the  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  providing  for  all  its  wants 
by  domestic  means.  But  the  evidences  of  prosperity  then 
exhibited  caused  the  introduction  of  a  new  element  of 
disturbance,  in  the  increased  and  more  active  efforts  of 
Great  Britain  to  counteract  the  effects  of  our  protective 
policy,  to  which  she,  very  properly,  attributed  the  growth 
of  our  manufactures.  She  could  easily  foresee  that,  unless 
this  were  accomplished,  the  United  States  would  soon 
become  her  most  formidable  rival  in  all  the  markets  of  the 
world,  with  a  merchant  marine  of  their  own,  and  with 
manufactured  fabrics  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  any  she  was 
capable  of  producing.  Our  progress  was  becoming  so 
rapid  that  almost  every  day  furnished  more  and  better 
evidence  of  this.  It  became,  therefore,  a  most  vital  ques- 
tion for  Great  Britain  to  decide  by  what  means  she  could 
hold  the  United  States  in  inferiority  and  retain  her  own 
supremacy.  She  had  been  accustomed  to  deal  with  mat- 
ters of  "  great  pith  and  moment,"  and  always  to  decide  with 
promptitude  and  sagacity  —  the  promotion  of  her  own  inter- 
ests being,  under  all  circumstances,  her  leading  and 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  151 

governing  motive.  She  possessed  wise  and  experienced 
statesmen,  who  understood  the  springs  and  motives  of 
human  conduct,  and  were  practiced  in  the  art  of  govern- 
ment. The  nature  of  the  protective  policy  which  had 
caused  our  development  was  well  understood  by  them. 
They  were  witnesses  to  its  practical  effects  upon  their  own 
manufactures,  and  the  general  interests  dependent  upon 
them.  And,  realizing  that  so  long  as  our  system  of  pro- 
tection continued  our  growth  could  not  be  checked,  they 
deemed  it  expedient  to  enter  the  field  of  argument,  with 
a  view  to  persuade  us  that  we  could  not  persist  in  laying 
discriminating  duties  for  the  encouragement  of  our  manu- 
factures without  violating  the  spirit  of  fairness,  which 
nations  should  exhibit  in  their  intercourse  with  each  other. 
Like  a  class  of  men  found  in  the  world  who  complain  of 
others  for  doing  what  they  do  themselves,  they  did  not 
deem  it  expedient  to  slacken  their  own  exertions  in  pro- 
tecting their  own  manufactures,  but  devoted  themselves 
actively  to  the  work  of  trying  to  convince  us  that  it  was  a 
duty  we  owed  to  the  advancing  civilization  of  the  age,  to 
take  the  initiatory  step  in  the  establishment  of  free  trade. 
This  was  the  beginning  of  the  agitation  in  favor  of  free 
trade  —  the  first  sowing  of  the  seed  which  it  was  hoped, 
by  the  English  manufacturers  especially,  would  sprout  and 
grow,  and  ripen  into  an  abundant  harvest  of  profit  to 
themselves. 

If  there  had  been  any  indications  tending  to  show  that 
this  agitation  was  designed  to  influence  the  policy  of  the 
British  Government,  so  as  to  cause -it  to  abandon  the 


152  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

principle  of  protection  and  to  allow  American  manufact- 
ures to  enter  its  ports  without  duties,  it  did  not  attract 
serious  attention  in  this  country.  The  evidences  were 
all  to  the  effect  that  the  object  was  to  induce  us  to 
allow  British  manufactures  to  enter  our  ports  without 
dutit  .  whilst  the  British  system  of  levying  duties  upon 
ours  -i.jias  continued.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the  citi- 
zens of  this  country,  —  the  most  of  whom  were  students, 
college-professors,  and  men  of  letters,  who  had  no  experi- 
ence in  government  or  active  business  affairs,  —  imagined 
they  saw  humanitarian  principles  at  the  bottom  of  this 
movement,  and  that  these  might  be  so  cultivated  and 
expanded  as  to  create  a  sort  of  millennium  among  the 
nations,  when,  in  the  spirit  of  universal  brotherhood,  man- 
kind would  labor  and  carry  on  commercial  intercourse 
without  reward  or  the  hope  of  profit.  Mr.  Monroe  had 
no  sympathy  whatsoever  with  the  visionary  doctrines  of 
these  enthusiasts,  and,  being  watchful  of  the  public  welfare, 
felt  it  to  be  his  duty,  as  President,  to  meet  the  issue 
between  protection  and  free  trade  promptly  and  vigor- 
ously. He  did  this  by  recommending  to  Congress  an 
increase  of  protective  duties,  as  the  most  suitable  response 
that  could  be  made  to  free-trade  speculations.  In  his 
message  of  1823  he  said  : 

"  Having  communicated  my  views  to  Congress,  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  last  session,  respecting  the  encouragement  which 
ought  to  be  given  to  our  manufactures,  and  the  principle  on  which  it 
should  be  founded,  I  have  only  to  add  that  those  views  remain 
unchanged,  and  that  the  present  state  of  those  countries  with  which 
we  have  the  most  intimate  political  relations  and  greatest  commer- 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  153 

cial  intercourse  tends  to  confirm  them.  Under  this  impression  I 
recommend  a  review  of  the  tariff,  for  the  purpose  of  affording  such 
additional  protection  to  those  articles  which  we  are  prepared  to  manu- 
facture, or  which  are  more  immediately  connected  with  the  defense 
and  independence  of  the  country." 

Here  the  purpose  of  the  President  in  recommending 
an  increase  of  duties  is  expressly  and  distinctly  ^  ?wed. 
It  has  not  the  slightest  relation  to  revenue,  wKLn  was 
then  sufficient  for  all  government  purposes,  but  to  the 
protection  of  manufactures  alone.  The  amount  of  pro- 
tection then  afforded  under  the  existing  tariff  laws  not 
being  deemed  sufficient,  he  recommended  that  they  should 
be  increased  until  it  became  so.  The  proposition  was 
plain,  simple,  and  well  understood  by  Congress  and  the 
country.  And  by  keeping  it  in  mind  we  shall  be  able  to 
interpret  understandingly  the  laws  subsequently  passed, 
and  to  see  that  they  were  absolutely  necessary,  not  only 
because  they  constituted  an  important  part  of  our  exist- 
ing national  policy,  but  were  strictly  in  self-defense. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

MONROE  RECOMMENDED  ADDITIONAL  DUTIES  WHILE  REVENUE 
WAS  SUFFICIENT  AND  INCREASING— TARIFF  OF  1824  PASSED 
FOR  THAT  PURPOSE  — MONROE'S  ADMINISTRATION  FAVORA- 
BLE TO  PATRIOTIC  LEGISLATION  — NO  PARTY  PLATFORMS  — 
ENGLAND  PROPOSES  FREE  TRADE  TO  COUNTERACT  PROTEC- 
TION —  HER  WEALTH  PRODUCED  BY  PROTECTION  —  HER 
OBJECT  IN  PROTECTIVE  AND  NAVIGATION  LAWS  — HER  CLAIM 
OF  SUPERIORITY  FOR  HER  MANUFACTURERS. 

IT  has  been  heretofore  stated  that  the  tariff  law  of 
1816  was  as  strongly  protective  as  the  necessities  of 
the  country  then  demanded.  By  the  year  1823,  the  influ- 
ence of  protection  had  been  exhibited  in  the  general  pros- 
perity derived  from  the  increase  of  manufactures,  and  as  the 
attempt  was  then  made  to  set  up  against  it  the  rival  prin- 
ciples of  free  trade,  the  most  successful  mode  of  meeting 
the  question  was  that  adopted  by  Mr.  Monroe,  —  that  is, 
by  "  additional  protection"  for  the  encouragement  of  our 
own  manufactures,  and  further  material  development, 
already  so  auspiciously  begun.  In  this  way,  and  this 
alone,  he  met  the  sophistry  of  free  trade. 

The  avowed  purpose  of  Mr.  Monroe  was  to  provide, 
not  for  revenue  alone,  but  for  protection  also,  as  a  distinct 
and  substantive  principle.  There  was  no  necessity  for  any 
change  in  the  existing  laws  on  account  of  revenue,  for  in 
the  same  message  in  which  he  recommended  "  additional 
protection"  he  said :  "The  actual  condition  of  the  public 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  155 

finances  more  than  realizes  the  favorable  anticipations 
that  were  entertained  of  it  at  the  opening  of  the  last 
session  of  Congress."  The  balance  in  the  treasury  had 
been  steadily  increasing  during  the  year  —  as  it  did,  in 
fact,  during  all  the  years  of  his  administration.  There- 
fore, as  the  revenue  was  abundant  for  all  the  wants  of 
the  Government,  the  only  object  of  his  recommendation 
was  protection  —  substantive  and  direct.  He,  like  all  his 
predecessors  in  the  Presidency,  had  no  thought  of  leaving 
the  development  of  our  vast  resources  to  either  chance 
or  accident ;  but,  realizing  the  importance  and  magnitude 
of  the  immediate  issue,  he  met  it  with  the  courage  and 
sagacity  which  belong  to  true  statesmanship.  And  the 
result  was  seen  in  the  adoption  of  his  recommendation  by 
Congress,  and  the  passage  of  the  tariff  law  of  1824,  which 
gave  the  "  additional  protection  "  to  manufactures  desired 
by  him,  Thus  the  country  was  taught  a  lesson  of  practical 
wisdom,  which  it  hailed  with  general  satisfaction.  On  all 
hands  it  was  regarded  as  the  promise  of  increased  pros- 
perity in  every  branch  of  business  and  industry.  There 
was  no  room  for  scheming  politicians —  if  there  were  any 
so  disposed  —  to  plan  for  the  defeat  of  the  popular  will, 
nor  any  opportunity  for  them  to  indulge  their  ambition  at 
the  expense  of  the  public  welfare.  The  country  demanded 
with  authoritative  voice,  that  the  affairs  of  the  nation  should 
be  patriotically  conducted,  and  the  times  were  so  free  from 
all  the  bad  influences  of  party  that  the  popular  command 
was  promptly  obeyed  by  the  adoption  of  the  Presidential 
recommendation.  Those  familiar  with  our  history  will 


150  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

recognize  Mr.  Monroe's  administration  as  a  most  favorable 
time  for  such  legislation.  That  period  was  known  as  "the 
era  of  good  feeling."  No  such  violence  of  party  existed 
as  requires  blind  obedience  to  its  commands,  or  visits  a 
refusal  with  ostracism.  It  was  before  the  days  of  party 
platforms  —  those  Procrustean  beds  upon  which  all  who 
lie  down  must  submit  to  be  made  of  the  same  length.  Mr. 
Monroe  had  been  nominated  by  the  Republican  members 
of  Congress,  "as  a  suitable  person  for  the  office  of  Presi- 
dent," without  being  required  to  pledge  himself  to  the 
support  of  any  particular  measures  of  policy.  Conse- 
quently, his  administration  transpired  at  a  time  most  favor- 
able for  consideration  and  calm  discussion,  and  for  the 
ascertainment  of  the  public  will.  And  when  it  is  remem- 
bered that,  under  these  circumstances,  his  recommendation 
for  "  additional  protection"  was  adopted  by  Congress,  the 
flippant  assertion  that  protection  is  both  unconstitutional 
and  inexpedient,  made  by  some  politicians  in  our  day,  is 
calculated  to  excite  a  smile,  if  the  subject  were  not  too 
serious  for  levity. 

We  have  seen  that,  at  the  time  here  referred  to,  a 
movement  had  been  inaugurated  in  England  in  favor  of 
free  trade  in  the  United  States,  and  that  it  originated  in 
the  spirit  of  rivalry  combined  with  fear  —  of  rivalry  excited 
by  our  rapidly-increasing  national  greatness,  and  the  fear 
of  our  ultimate  national  superiority.  Nobody  ever  doubted 
the  sagacity  of  the  English  people,  or  the  great  influence 
invariably  exercised  by  their  Government.  And  in  the 
circumstances  now  to  be  stated,  we  shall  find  abundant 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  157 

evidence  of  both; — circumstances  necessary  to  be  detailed 
in  order  to  comprehend  the  character  of  their  national 
policy,  and  the  ends  designed  to  be  accomplished  by  it. 

It  is  a  well  attested  fact  that  the  commercial  wealth  of 
Great  Britain  had  its  origin  in  the  principle  of  protection 
—  in  the  policy  which  gave  preference  to  her  own  products 
over  those  of  other  countries.  By  means  of  this  policy  she 
was  enabled  to  employ  her  own  labor  and  capital  for  the 
maintenance  of  her  own  industry  and  the  development  of 
her  own  resources.  She  was  selfish  in  all  this,  but  not 
unduly  so  —  for  other  nations  do,  or  ought  to  do,  the 
same  things.  It  may  be  well  enough,  in  the  abstract,  to 
talk  about  liberality,  reciprocity,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing, 
among  different  peoples  ;  and  for  closeted  students  of 
political  economy  to  construct  theories  based  upon  these 
considerations,  as  if  the  "golden  rule  "were  universally 
observed.  But  in  the  practical  operations  of  Govern- 
ments, self-interest  is,  always  has  been,  and  is  likely  here- 
after to  be,  the  great  and  governing  motive.  Nations, 
like  the  bulk  of  mankind,  do  what  is  deemed  best  for 
themselves — which  they  do  without  violating  the  laws  of 
morality  or  intercourse — and  never  become  great  and 
powerful  if  they  do  not.  They  find  better  assurance  of 
distinction,  permanence,  and  especially  of  wealth,  in  com- 
mercial activity,  than  they  do  in  letters  and  art, —  as  is 
seen  by  comparing  the  countries  of  the  present  time  with 
such  as  flourished  in  the  earlier  ages.  And  as  commerce 
cannot  exist  without  manufactures,  nor  manufactures 
without  a  developed  agriculture,  nor  a  developed  agri- 


158  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

culture  without  manufactures,  so  the  protection  of  manu- 
factures is  the  encouragement  of  labor  in  all  its  depart- 
ments. Hence,  protection  is  as  necessary  to  the  greatness 
of  a  nation  as  the  circulation  of  the  blood  is  to  animal  life. 
No  nation  is  better  advised  of  this  than  Great  Britain  ; 
and,  therefore,  she  has  taken  care,  from  an  early  period,  to 
see  that  her  own  manufactures  were  fostered  and  built  up 
by  proper  Government  protection.  Whilst  the  continental 
nations  of  Europe  have  been  engaged  in  wars  about  "  the 
balance  of  power,"  and  she  has  been  compelled  to  take 
some  part  in  them,  on  account  of  her  geographical  posi- 
tion, she  has  kept  herself  under  the  guidance  of  discreet 
and  sagacious  statesmen,  who  have  administered  her 
affairs  with  profound  wisdom  —  which  has  been  exhibited 
in  nothing  more  conspicuously  than  in  those  measures  by 
which  her  commercial  supremacy  has  been  created.  She 
long  since  foresaw  that  her  limited  extent  of  territory  would 
prevent  her  from  becoming  a  successful  rival  to  other 
great  powers,  unless  she  held  her  own  fortunes  in  her  own 
hands  and  guided  them  as  her  own  peculiar  interests 
demanded.  Consequently,  her  colonial  possessions  have 
been  extended  until  they  reach  all  the"  continents  and 
every  sea,  in  order  to  obtain  markets  for  every  variety  of 
her  products.  And  with  the  view  of  securing  the  means 
to  supply  these  markets,  she  has  incited  her  people  to 
build  up  manufactures,  and  has  protected  them,  to  the 
utmost  of  her  power,  by  whatsoever  legislation  she  has 
found  necessary  for  that  purpose.  Her  former  wars  with 
France  and  other  European  powers  diminished  her  wealth 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  159 

and  impaired  her  strength,  for  a  time.  But  when  she  real- 
ized what  benefits  France  had  derived  from  the  system  of 
protection  to  manufactures,  introduced  by  the  sagacious 
and  cool-headed  Colbert,  under  Louis  XIV.,  she  entered, 
with  her  accustomed  energy  and  alacrity,  upon  the  sanv 
course  of  policy  for  herself.  As  in  France,  the  theories 
and  fine-spun  speculations  of  Quesnay  and  Turgot  had 
weighed  but  little  against  the  practical  wisdom  of  Colbert, 
so,  in  Great  Britain,  the  free-trade  notions  of  Hume  and 
Smith  were  of  no  avail  against  the  teachings  of  experience 
and  common  sense,  so  long  as  she  could  find  fresh  fields 
for  her  commerce,  or  until  a  new  nation  appeared,  on  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic,  to  whom,  by  possibility,  she  might  be 
compelled  to  surrender  up  the  scepter  of  commercial 
supremacy. 

The  commercial  policy  of  Great  Britain,  therefore,  was 
based  strictly  upon  her  protective  system.  The  importation 
of  foreign  commodities  of  every  kind  was  almost  entirely 
prohibited  by  duties  levied  with  that  express  view ;  - 
some  articles  were  excluded  by  absolute  prohibition.  Navi- 
gation laws  were  passed  requiring  ocean  trade  to  be  carried 
on  in  British  ships  alone.  And,  in  order  to  develop  every 
possible  source  of  domestic  industry  and  wealth,  the  impor- 
tation of  food  from  other  countries  was  forbidden  by  what 
were  known  *  as  "  corn-laws."  Substantially,  the  Eng- 
lish people  shut  themselves  up  in  their  "  island-home," 
almost  entirely  excluded  everything  that  was  not  the  prod 
uct  of  their  own  industry,  and  employed  all  their  energies 


160  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

in  making  themselves,   what   they   actually  became,   the 
greatest  and  most  influential  power  upon  earth. 

We  have  seen  that  when  we  achieved  our  Independ- 
ence these  measures  were  in  successful  operation,  and  that 
they  bore,  most  oppressively,  upon  the  people  of  this 
country.  We  should,  therefore,  have  been  singularly 
remiss  in  duty  to  ourselves  if  we  had  not  profited  by  an 
example  so  directly  in  our  view.  Under  this  conviction 
our  early  statesmen  acted  when  they,  with  so  much  una- 
nimity, established  the  system  of  protection.  And  we, 
who  are  now  alive,  are  living  in  the  midst  of  the  benefits 
conferred  upon  us  by  their  wise  and  prudential  policy. 
We  see  them  in  every  direction.  Each  step  in  our  mar- 
velous progress  is  marked  by  new  developments,  and  each 
new  development  leads  to  increased  skill  and  industry. 
The  spirit  of  invention  has  been  aroused,  and  almost  every 
day  is  ushered  in  with  the  announcement  of  some  new  and 
valuable  discovery. 

It  was  the  unmistakable  evidence  of  this  progress 
which  alarmed  the  British  nation  and  manufacturers,  and 
caused  their  fears  to  suggest  the  theory  of  free  trade - 
not  for  adoption  by  Great  Britain,  but  by  the  United 
States  !  When,  however,  they  saw  that  our  tariff  law  of 
1824  was  passed — based  upon  Mr.  Monroe's  recommen- 
dation of  "  additional  protection  "  —  they  realized  that  some 
other  argument  than  that  which  alleged  the  illiberality  of 
protection  would  have  to  be  employed,  in  order  to  bring 
us  within  the  meshes  of  the  net  they  had  so  adroitly  woven. 
Accordingly,  they  endeavored  to  convince  us  that,  on 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  l6l 

account  of  the  superior  skill  of  their  manufacturers,  they 
could  employ  our  raw  materials  better  than  we  could  our- 
selves ;  and  that  it  would  be  to  our  interest  to  submit 
to  this,  because  it  would  be  cheaper  for  us,  inas- 
much as  the  reward  of  labor  was  much  less  in  Great  Brit- 
ain than  in  the  United  States.  This  theory  was  supported 
by  the  assumption  that  governments  should  not  interfere, 
even  for  purpose  of  raising  revenue,  between  the  producer 
and  the  consumer,  notwithstanding  they  belonged  to  dif- 
ferent countries ;  but  that  they  should  be  left  to  sell  in  the 
highest  and  buy  in  the  cheapest  markets,  wheresoever 
they  were  found.  And  being,  themselves,  accustomed  to 
direct  as  well  as  indirect  taxation  for  the  support  of  Gov- 
ernment, they  seemed  to  suppose  that  we  could  be  pre- 
vailed upon  to  abandon  our  system  of  raising  revenue  by 
adopting  the  theory  of  free  trade,  and  thus  to  oppress  our 
laboring  population  by  heavy  burdens  of  internal  taxation, 
according  to  the  method  by  which  their  own  laboring 
people  had  been  kept  in  poverty.  And  yet,  at  the  same 
time,  they  failed  to  put  their  own  theory  of  free  trade  into 
practice,  and  retained  their  system  of  indirect  as  well  as 
direct  taxation  ; — in  other  words,  they  asked  us  to  take 
off  all  our  protective  duties,  while  they  persevered  in 
theirs. 


ii 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

PRODUCERS  OF  COTTON  INFLUENCED  BY  ENGLAND  TO  ADVOCATE 
FREE  TRADE  — THEY  PREFER  ENGLISH  TO  AMERICAN  MANU- 
FACTURES—THEIR INTERESTS  PROMOTED  BY  PROTECTION 
—  COTTON  MANUFACTURES  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  — AMER- 
ICAN COTTON  NOT  FAVORED  AT  FIRST  BY  ENGLAND— THAT 
FROM  HER  COLONIES  PREFERRED  — COTTON-GIN  AND  SEA- 
ISLAND  COTTON  PRODUCED  CHANGE  — GAVE  UNITED  STATES 
ADVANTAGE— FREE  TRADE  INTENDED  TO  CONTINUE  ENG- 
LISH MONOPOLY  — ENGLISH  RELATIONS  TO  FOREIGN  TRADE. 

THE  passage  of  the  tariff  law  of  1824  was  an  event  of 
no  special  significance  in  itself,  for  the  reason  that 
it  was  only  a  single  forward  step  in  the  progressive  meas- 
ures of  policy  which  had  existed  during  the  entire  life- 
time of  the  Government  under  the  Constitution.  It  was  a 
natural  thing  to  do  in  the  ordinary  and  wise  administration 
of  public  affairs.  Yet  it  was  followed  by  consequences 
which  proved  ultimately  to  be  of  the  most  serious  and 
threatening  character.  It  led  to  an  organized  opposition 
to  protection,  to  manufacturing  industry,  and  to  the  whole 
system  of  tariff  legislation ; —  culminating  in  sectional 
strife  and  the  direct  advocacy  of  free  trade.  A  little 
patience  only  is  required  in  the  investigation  to  see  and 
understand  the  new  agencies  created  for  these  purposes ; 
-without  which  many  of  the  subsequent  events  in  our 
history  cannot  be  appreciated  as  they  deserve. 

The  cultivation  of  cotton,  in  what  came  to  be  known 

162 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  163 

as  the  planting  States,  created  a  new  and  important  in- 
dustry, which  was  finally  made  to  assume  an  unfortunate 
and  mistaken  attitude  of  opposition  to  manufactures. 
This  was,  in  the  end,  carried  to^  such  an  undue  extent  as 
to  demand  an  entire  change  in  the  policy  and  practice  of 
the  Government; — in  other  words,  an  abandonment  of 
the  principle  of  protection,  which  the  cotton-gnrvers  had 
themselves  materially  aided  in  establishing. 

Although  this  interest  was  included  in  the  general 
designation  of  agriculture,  it  soon  acquired  a  significance 
peculiarly  its  own.  In  1800  there  were  only  500  bales  pro- 
duced in  the  United  States;  but  by  1824  it  had  come  to 
be  the  most  valuable  article  of  export  from  this  country, 
and  was  steadily  increasing.  During  the  progress  of  this 
increase  it  had  required  and  obtained  from  Congress  what 
was  deemed  to  be  a  full  measure  of  protection, —  given 
with  the  express  view  of  obtaining  a  home  market  for  the 
raw  material.  For  this  purpose  the  duty  on  foreign 
cottons  was  increased,  in  1816,  from  fifteen  to  twenty-five 
per  cent,  at  the  instance  and  under  the  championship  of 
some  of  the  leading  and  most  distinguished  members  of 
Congress  from  the  cotton-producing  States,  with  Mr.  Cal- 
houn  at  their  head.  This  rate  of  duty  was  a  compromise 
between  the  manufacturing  and  the  cotton  interests.  No 
actual  antagonism  existed  rendering  a  compromise  neces- 
sary, but  only  a  difference  of  opinion  with  regard  to  the 
amount  of  duty  necessary  to  assure  the  proper  degree  of 
protection,  which  all  were  inclined  to  give.  The  friends 
of  the  cotton  interest  thought  that  a  duty  of  thirty  per 


164  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

cent  was  required  for  that  purpose,  but  it  was  objected  to 
this  that  it  might  have  the  effect  of  lessening  the  revenue 
by  prohibiting  importations.  Therefore  the  duty  was 
fixed  at  twenty-five  per  cent  by  agreement.  And  the 
result  proved  the  wisdom  of  the  arrangement,  inasmuch 
as  it  turned  out  that  the  cultivation  of  cotton  was  stimu- 
lated in  an  unexampled  degree;  so  that,  in  1824,  the 
necessity  for  the  continuation  of  the  same  duty  was  recog- 
nized both  by  the  manufacturers  and  cotton  producers. 
Mr.  Monroe's  recommendation  for  "  additional  protec- 
tion "  was  not  regarded  as  having  special  reference  to 
cotton,  for  that  was  sufficiently  protected,  as  eight  years 
of  experience  had  proved.  Consequently  the  cotton  duty 
fixed  in  1816  was  continued  in  the  tariff  law  of  1824, 
whilst  the  duties  were  increased  upon  numerous  other 
articles.  Protection  was  given  to  all  the  interests  requir- 
ing it,  and  there  was  nothing  better  or  more  satisfactorily 
provided  for  than  cotton. 

By  1824  establishments  for  the  manufacture  of  cotton 
goods  had  grown  up,  first  in  Rhode  Island,  and  after- 
ward in  New  York,  New  Jersey,  and  generally  through- 
out the  New  England  States,  Many  enterprising  citizens 
had  been  induced  by  the  policy  and  encouragement  of 
the  Government  to  withdraw  their  capital  from  ocean 
commerce  and  to  invest  it  in  this  important  enterprise 
at  home.  This  was  considered  mutually  beneficial  to 
all  the  sections,  especially  to  the  manufacturing  and  the 
cotton-growing  States,  because  the  producers  of  cotton 
were  furnished  with  a  steady  and  profitable  market  for 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  165 

their  raw  material,  and  with  manufactured  fabrics  in 
exchange  for  it  at  fair  prices.  Thus  there  was  assured 
to  each  increasing  general  prosperity  and  wealth,— 
the  profits  of  the  interchange  going  into  the  pockets 
of  their  own  countrymen  and  not  into  those  of  the 
already  wealthy  manufacturers  of  Europe.  Manifestly, 
Mr.  Monroe  had  this  state  of  things  in  his  mind 
when,  in  his  message  to  Congress,  he  recommended  that 
the  system  of  protection  should  be  persevered  in,  and  also 
when,  at  the  close  of  his  peaceful  and  conservative  ad- 
ministration, he  congratulated  the  country  upon  the 
extraordinary  and  unprecedented  degree  of  prosperity  it 
had  reached. 

The  first  importations  of  cotton  from  the  United  States 
into  Great  Britain  were  not  favorably  regarded  by  the 
manufacturers  of  that  country.  The  quality  was  not  con- 
sidered equal  to  that  obtained  from  other  countries,  espec- 
ially from  the  possessions  of  the  East  India  Company, 
which  were  entirely  under  English  control.  Whilst  this 
opinion  prevailed  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  did 
everything  in  its  power,  by  protective  and  prohibitory  laws, 
to  give  to  the  cotton  of  other  countries,  especially  that  from 
its  own  Colonies,  preference  over  that  produced  in  the 
United  States.  Its  legislation  with  reference  to  the  latter 
was  essentially  adverse,  —  so  much  so  as  to  create  in  the 
minds  of  the  British  manufacturers  of  cotton  goods  a  belief 
that  they  possessed  the  power  to  control  entirely  the  Amer- 
ican trade,  and  that  there  was  no  probability  that  they 
would  encouatei  any  formidable  rivalry  from  the  cotton 


1 66  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

manufacturers  of  the  United  States.  They  based  this 
belief  upon  two  considerations :  first,  that  they  supposed 
our  cotton  inferior  to  theirs,  and  second,  that  as  their  labor 
was  much  cheaper  than  ours  they  could  afford  to  under- 
sell our  manufacturers  in  our  own  markets.  Neither  the 
Government  nor  manufacturers  of  England  expected  this 
state  of  affairs  to  continue  beyond  the  point  of  destroying 
our  manufactures.  That  being  accomplished,  as  they  con- 
fidently thought  it  would  be,  they  expected  to  continue  a 
monopoly  of  the  American  market,  and  reward  themselves 
by  prices  regulated  by  their  own  interests,  without  any 
competition  in  this  country  to  resist  them. 

This  uncertainty  of  the  English  market  for  American 
raw  cotton  accounts  for  the  anxiety  of  the  producers  of 
that  article  for  the  protection  given  to  their  interest  by  the 
laws  of  1816  and  1824.  Realizing  that  the  British  manu- 
facturers would  withdraw  their  demand  when  they  could 
procure  the  raw  material  elsewhere,  and  that  the  most 
active  measures  had  been  adopted  to  enable  them  to  obtain 
it  from  the  British  Colonies,  they  foresaw  that,  unless  man- 
ufactures were  built  up  in  the  United  States,  there  was 
imminent  danger  of  their  being  left  without  any  market 
whatsoever  for  their  cotton.  Hence,  they  asked  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Government,  and  it  was  given  them,  as  a  nec- 
essary part  of  the  system  which  had  been  established  for 
national  purposes.  And  it  is  now  scarcely  possible  for  the 
most  fertile  imagination  to  picture  the  beneficial  conse- 
quences, to  all  parts  of  the  Union,  which  would  have  fol- 
lowed their  continued  acquiescence  in  the  measures  of  pro- 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  167 

tection  asked  for  by  themselves  and  ungrudgingly  granted 
by  Congress.  Unfortunately,  however,  for  themselves 
and  the  country,  they  were  so  misled  by  evil  counsels  as, 
ultimately,  to  involve  themselves  in  an  alliance  with  the 
English  manufacturers  against  whom,  in  1816  and  1824, 
they  earnestly  asked  protection.  We  shall  see,  as  we  pro- 
gress, how  this  alliance  was  produced,  as  well  as  the  motives 
and  consequences  of  it. 

The  invention  of  the  cotton-gin  enabled  the  American 
producers  to  clean  their  cotton  better,  and  put  it  in  a  more 
suitable  condition  for  market,  than  they  had  previously 
been  able  to  do.  This  was  the  beginning  of  a  revolution 
in  the  cotton  trade.  Its.  first  effect  was  to  excite  the 
apprehension  in  Great  Britain  that,  by  possibility,  the  time 
might  come  when  American  cotton  would  supersede  that 
of  India  in  the  English  market.  Besides,  the  cultivation 
of  Sea-island  cotton  in  the  United  States,  with  its  longer 
and  finer  fiber,  had  introduced  an  article  superior  to  any 
hitherto  known,  and  not  likely  to  be  equaled  by  the  pro- 
duction of  any  other  country.  These  facts  caused  the 
statesmen  and  manufacturers  of  England  unprecedented 
surprise.  They  then  began  to  see  the  probability  of  a 
rivalry  they  had  not  before  regarded  possible,  and,  without 
delay,  inaugurated  efforts  to  overcome  it  by  cautious  and 
well-matured  policy.  They  manifested  their  alarm  in 
many  ways,  but  chiefly  by  measures  looking  to  either  one 
of  two  results:  the  production,  in  India  or  elsewhere 
within  the  British  possessions,  of  as  good  cotton  as  the 
otton  of  the  United  States;  or  the  destruction, 


1 68  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

in  some  mode,  of  the  manufactures  of  the  United  States, 
so  as  to  compel  our  producers  to  export  their  raw  material 
to  them  and  to  take  their  manufactured  fabrics  in  exchange, 
paying  them,  of  course,  in  specie,  whatsoever  balance 
there  might  be  in  their  favor.  It  made  but  little  difference 
to  their  interests  which  of  these  projects  proved  success- 
ful. Either  was  sufficient  for  their  purpose.  And  there- 
fore they  entered  upon,  what  was  called,  a  "  new  departure," 
with  their  accustomed  zeal  and  alacrity — with  what  is 
regarded  as  true  English  pluck. 

It  soon  came  to  be  demonstrated,  however,  that  our 
Sea-island  cotton  was  without  a  successful  rival  in  the 
world,  and  that  it  was  likely  to  remain  so.  Its  superiority 
was  acknowledged,  and  the  hope  of  being  able  to  produce 
its  equal  in  India  or  elsewhere,  had,  from  necessity,  to  be 
abandoned.  Consequently,  the  other  alternative  course 
only  remained  —  which  was  to  breakdown  American  man- 
ufactures. The  magnitude  and  importance  of  this  was 
well  understood,  and  the  measures  deemed  necessary  to 
accomplish  it  were  cautiously  and  intelligently  planned. 
Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  plan  involved  the  necessity 
of  inducing  the  United  States  to  adopt  the  policy  of  free 
trade  —  which  had  been  expressly  repudiated  by  the  Gov- 
ernment —  it  was  greatly  weakened  by  the  fact  that  the 
British  Government  still  continued  to  adhere  to  its  own 
favorite  system  of  protective  and  prohibitory  duties. 
There  was  not  an  article  that  could  be  produced  in  that 
country  that  was  not  placed  upon  the  dutiable  list.  The 
only  difference  between  raw  materials  and  manufactured 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  169 

articles  was  that  rendered  necessary  for  protection.  The 
importation  of  wheat  was  entirely  prohibited  until  the  price 
was  reduced  to  seventy  shillings  per  quarter —  or  eight 
bushels — which  was  only  a  reduction  of  a  few  shillings  per 
quarter  from  what  it  was  in  the  Corn-law  of  1815.  No 
importation  could  be  made  of  commodities  produced  in 
foreign  countries  unless  in  British  ships,  or  in  those  of  the 
countries  from  which  they  were  exported,  or  where  they 
were  produced.  The  original  Navigation  law  had  only 
been  so  far  modified  as  to  allow  the  exportation  of  British 
goods  in  foreign  ships ;  but  even  this  concession  was  embod- 
ied in  a  commercial  treaty  with  the  United  States,  and 
arose,  in  a  large  degree,  out  of  the  fear  of  retaliation.  The 
question  was  difficult  to  manage.  An  English  advocate  of 
free  trade  says  with  reference  to  it: 

"  It  will  be  observed  that  there  was  not  a  single  avenue  through 
which  the  produce  of  foreign  labor  could  obtain  admittance  in  this 
country  [Great  Britain]  without  the  payment  of  heavy  toll.  Every 
device  was  resorted  to  in  order  to  induce  the  foreigner  to  buy  of  us,  and  to 
prevent  us  from  buying  of  him.  This  was  called  *  maintaining  the  bal- 
ance of  trade  in  our  favor.' " 

Thus  we  are  furnished  with  a  key  which  enables  us  to 
interpret  the  motives  of  our  great  commercial  adversary. 
Whilst,  with  one  hand,  she  presented  us  the  banner  of 
peace  and  concord,  bearing  the  motto  of  "free  trade,"  she 
held  the  other  in  readiness  to  seize  upon  our  resources  and 
exhaust  bur  wealth.  She  was  to  buy  nothing  of  us,  but  we 
were  to  be  compelled  to  buy  all  our  fabrics  from  her !  And 
to  accomplish  this  we  were  asked,  with  wonderful  compla- 
cency, to  adopt  the  principles  of  free  trade,  whilst  her  own 


I7O  HISTORY    OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

illiberal  policy  was  in  no  essential  degree  relaxed.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  complain  of  her  for  thus  doing  what, 
under  like  circumstances  and  conditions,  any  other  nation 
would  have  been  likely  to  do,  and  what,  when  done  by  a 
people  who  are  diligent  in  the  promotion  of  their  own 
interests,  is  commended  as  wise  and  sagacious  policy.  Yet 
this  knowledge  of  the  end  she  desired,  and  of  the  means 
employed  to  reach  it,  will  enable  us  to  interpret  much  that 
transpired  in  our  own  history, — .with  which  our  present 
investigations  are  mainly  concerned. 


CHAPTER  XVFII. 

ENGLISH  MANUFACTURES  INJURED  BY  COMPETITION  WITH 
THOSE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  FRANCE—  MOVEMENTS 
TOWARD  FREE  TRADE— HUSKISSON,  FREE-TRADE  LEADER  — 
HIS  POLICY  TO  PRODUCE  IT  — CHEAP  LABOR  MAKES  CHEAP 
MANUFACTURES— INFLUENCE  OF  ENGLISH  ARGUMENTS  IN 
UNITED  STATES— THEY  CRITICIZE  PROTECTION  —  CHIEF 
OBJECTION  THAT  IT  DRAWS  LABOR  AWAY  FROM  CULTIVA- 
TION OF  LAND  — WE  MUST  CULTIVATE  ALL  OUR  LAND 
BEFORE  MANUFACTURING  — PEOPLE  HERE  TOO  INDEPENDENT 
FOR  MANUFACTURING  LABORERS  — ENGLAND  SHOULD  CON- 
TINUE MANUFACTURING  BECAUSE  OF  HER  CHEAP  LABOR. 

ROM  some  cause  or  other,  not  necessary  to  be  inquired 
into  here,  the  manufacturers,  merchants  and  traders 
of  England  were,  at  the  period  referred  to  in  the  last  chap- 
ter, plunged  into  great  financial  embarrassment.  All  pur- 
suits were,  more  or  less,  affected  by  it ; —  the  land-owners  in 
less  degree  than  others,  because  of  the  fact  that,  under 
the  land  system  of  that  country,  their  incomes  are  mainly 
derived  from  rents,  which  are  not  subject  to  fluctua- 
tion by  the  ordinary  laws  that  regulate  the  prices  of  labor 
and  its  products.  It  was  sufficient  to  excite  the  most  seri- 
ous apprehensions  with  reference  to  the  continuance  of 
British  preeminence  as  a  commercial  nation,  and  to  call 
for  Parliamentary  relief.  This  was  afforded,  of  course, 
as  far  as  it  could  be  done  by  legislation, —  for  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  never  fails  to  intercede  in  behalf  of 

British  trade  and  commerce  when  they  require  it.     What 

171 


1 72  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

was  done  by  Parliament,  however,  had  reference  to  inter- 
course with  foreign  nations,  especially  with  France  and 
the  United  States, —  a  fact  which  demonstrates  that  the 
existing  embarrassment  had  been  occasioned  by  the 
deranged  condition  into  which  manufacturing  industry- 
had  been  thrown  by  French  and  American  competition. 
French  silk  manufactures  were  entirely  excluded  from 
British  ports ;  and  the  inability  of  the  manufacturers  of 
that  country  to  produce  as  good  an  article  as  that  which 
France  was  able  to  supply,  had  almost  driven  English 
silks  from  the  other  markets  of  the  world.  And  the 
superiority  of  our  cotton  fabrics  over  those  of  that  coun- 
try —  owing  both  to  the  excellency  of  our  Sea-island 
cotton  and  the  ingenuity  of  our  artisans  —  had  threatened 
the  same  result  in  the  trade  in  cotton  goods.  Both  these 
consequences  had  to  be  provided  against,  or  Great  Britain 
would  be  compelled  to  submit  to  the  loss  of  much  of  the 
importance  she  had  acquired  in  the  commercial  world. 

About  this  time  the  theory  of  free  trade  was  earnestly 
enforced  by  extensive  circulation  of  the  arguments  of 
Hume,  Smith,  Ricardo,  and  other  political  economists  in 
Great  Britain,  who  gave  to  it  the  influence  of  their  emi- 
nent abilities.  It  consequently  became  a  more  important 
factor  in  directing  public  sentiment  than  it  had  previously 
been ;  and  it  was  insisted  that  the  British  ports  should  be 
made  entirely  free,  under  the  professed  belief  that  the 
example  would  be  followed  by  other  nations,  especially 
the  United  States,  through  the  influence  of  immedi- 
ate commercial  intercourse.  It  now  found  advocates 


HISTORY   OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  173 

in  Parliament.  Mr.  Huskisson  was  foremost  among 
these,  and,  as  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  dis- 
tinguished himself  by  proposing  a  departure  from  the 
old  system  of  protective  duties,  by  such  gradual  steps  as 
should  ultimately  lead  to  its  entire  abandonment.  To 
counteract  the  adverse  influences  which  had  been  experi- 
enced with  reference  to  French  silk  manufactures,  the 
prohibition  of  them  was  made  to  cease  prospectively  in 
July,  1826,  and  the  duties  on  raw  silk  were  immediately 
reduced.  As  regarded  cotton  goods  Mr.  Huskisson 
favored  a  reduction,  but  not  the  immediate  abolition  of 
the  duties.  He  proposed  to  leave  these  still  protective. 
He  assigned  as  a  reason  that  he  considered  the  reduced 
duties  •'  sufficient  to  counteract  the'small  duty  levied  upon 
the  importation  of  the  raw  material  into  this  country 
[Great  Britain]  and  the  duty  upon  any  other  articles 
used  in  the  manufacture."  He  proposed  the  reduction  of 
the  duties  upon  other  articles,  such  as  woolens,  linens, 
glass,  and  iron,  all  with  the  same  end  in  view, —  that  is, 
ultimate  free  trade.  His  propositions,  however,  were  not 
adopted  by  Parliament,  as  they  were  considered  too  radi- 
cal, as  making  a  more  rapid  advance  toward  free  trade 
than  the  country  was  prepared  for.  Mr.  Huskisson  was 
not  seriously  disconcerted,  nor  did  he  abandon  his  pur- 
pose, which  was  to  reach  the  result  he  desired  by  slow  and 
regular  approaches,  like  a  skillful  military  engineer  who 
seeks  the  capture  of  an  enemy's  fort.  He  well  under- 
stood the  magnitude  and  difficulty  of  the  work  he  had 
undertaken,  inasmuch  as  the  protective  system  had  become 


174  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

so  interwoven  with  British  policy,  and  had  borne  such  rich 
and  valuable  fruits,  that  it  would  be  hard  work  to  break 
it  down  —  if,  indeed,  it  could  be  accomplished  at  all.  His 
only  hope  of  success  lay  in  the  probability  of  his  being 
able  to  convince  the  British  manufacturers  themselves, — 
who  had  derived  special  benefits  from  protection,  that  free 
trade  furnished  the  only  method  by  which  their  interests 
could  be  maintained  and  their  establishments  saved  from 
destruction.  H  e  appealed  to  their  interests,  and,  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  cause  in  which  he  was  so  earnestly  enlisted, 
he  made  his  appeal  in  such  methods  as  he  designed  should 
also  reach  the  cotton  growers  of  the  United  States.  The 
plan  involved  an  alliance  between  the  British  manufact- 
urers and  the  American  producers  of  cotton,  the  central 
feature  of  which  should  be  a  common  warfare  upon  Amer- 
ican manufactures.  The  argument  addressed  to  the 
first  —  that  is,  the  British  manufacturers  —  was  this:  that 
as  the  cheapness  of  their  fabrics  had  been  caused  and 
could  only  be  maintained  by  the  depressed  and  pauper 
rate  of  wages  paid  to  their  laborers,  therefore  as  free 
trade  would  keep  wages  down  almost  to  the  starvation 
point,  they  would  be  able,  by  means  of  it,  to  undersell  all 
rival  manufacturers,  especially  those  of  the  United  States, 
where  wages  were  higher,  and  thus  continue  to  monopo- 
lize the  markets  of  the  world.  And  to  the  producers  of 
cotton  in  the  United  States,  the  special  argument  was 
addressed  that  it  would  be  to  their  interest  to  buy  their 
fabrics  from  British  manufacturers  on  account  of  their 
low  prices,  and  rely  upon  the  British  market  for  the  sale 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  1 75 

of  their  cotton  ; —  in  other  words,  that  it  was  their  duty 
to  sell  in  the  dearest  and  buy  in  the  cheapest  markets,  no 
matter  what  other  considerations  were  involved. 

In  one  of  his  Parliamentary  speeches  Mr.  Huskisson 
said: 

41  To  bring  this  subject  more  particularly  before  the  House,  I 
will  begin  with  our  greatest  manufacture,  that  of  cotton.  It  will 
not  be  denied  that,  in  this  manufacture,  we  are  superior  to  all 
other  countries ;  and  that,  by  the  cheapness  and  quality  of  our 
goods,  we  undersell  our  competitors  in  all  the  markets  of  the  world, 
which  are  open  alike  to  us  and  to  them.  I  do  not  except  the  mar- 
kets of  the  East  Indies  (the  first  seat  of  the  manufacture),  of  which 
it  may  be  said  to  be  the  staple,  where  the  raw  material  is  grown, 
and  where  labor  is  cheaper  than  in  any  other  country,  and  from 
which  England  and  Europe  were,  for  a  long  time,  supplied  with 
cotton  goods.  Now,  however,  large  quantities  of  British  cottons 
are  sold  in  India  at  prices  lower  than  can  be  produced  by  the 
native  manufacturers.  If  any  possible  doubt  could  remain,  that 
this  manufacture  has  nothing  to  apprehend  from  competition  any- 
where, and,  least  of  all,  from  a  competition  in  our  own  home  mar- 
ket, it  must  vanish  when  I  state  to  the  committee,"  etc. 

There  is  no  special  reference  here  to  the  United  States, 
but  it  is  evident  that  Mr.  Huskisson  intended  to  include 
every  country  from  which  competition  could  possibly  come. 
His  controlling  idea  was  that,  as  against  it,  from  any  part 
of  the  world,  Great  Britain  was  prepared,  by  reason  of  the 
cheapness  of  her  cotton  goods,  for  which  she  was  indebted 
to  the  low  rates  of  wages  paid  by  her  manufacturers. 
Therefore  he  intended  that  his  argument  should  reach  the 
cotton-growers  of  the  United  States,  because  he  supposed 
they  would  permit  their  interests  to  be  appealed  to  by  the 
low  prices  of  cotton  goods.  And  in  this — unfortunately 
for  the  cotton-growers  themselves  —  he  was  not  mistaken 


176  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

It  so  turned  out,  in  a  short  time,  that  the  arguments  of 
the  free-trade  party  in  England  and  the  opponents  of  pro- 
tection in  the  United  States,  were  substantially  the  same 

-that,  in  fact,  the  former  dictated  the  opinion  of  the  lat- 
ter almost  entirely.  They  acted  conjointly,  in  the  United 
States  and  England,  each  furnishing  aid  to  the  other,  in 
the  effort  to  bring  the  people  of  this  country  to  the  point 
of  acknowledging  that  all  their  past  experience  was  mis- 
leading; that  they  had  not  understood  their  true  interests  ; 
that  Washington,  Adams,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe, 
and  a  host  of  other  eminent  statesmen,  were  mere  political 
empirics,  who  did  not  comprehend  the  true  character  of 
the  Constitution,  or  the  structure  of  the  Government,  or 
the  necessities  of  the  public  welfare  ;  and  that  the  only  true 
friends  of  this  country  were  those  who  desired  to  destroy 
the  measures  which  had  produced  prosperity,  and  substi- 
tute for  them  such  as  British  interests  and  cupidity  should 
prescribe. 

Those  familiar  with  the  free-trade  arguments  employed 
in  this  country  will,  by  comparing  them  with  such  as  have 
been  used  in  England,  have  no  difficulty  in  detecting  their 
resemblance — which  has  frequently  amounted  almost  to 
identity  of  thought  and  language.  Only  a  single  example 
of  this  —  bearing  upon  the  point  we  are  now  considering 

—  is  practicable.  An  article  was  inserted  in  the  Encyclo- 
pedia Britannica — a  standard  work  of  national  character 

-which  was  intended  as  responsive  to  our  protective  leg- 
islation, more  particularly  that  embodied  in  our  tariff  law 
of  1824,  It  appeared  soon  after  Mr.  Monroe's  recommen- 


RECEIPTS   AND    EXPENDITURES 
UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT. 


Year  ending  June  30,  1887. 


INTERNAL 
REVENUE, 


.     SPIRITS 

$65,829,321,71 
•  Fermented 
.     Liquors 
'21, 922, 187, 49- 
J  Tobacco 
30,108467,13 

Total 
18,697,526, 


CUSTOMS 

RECEIPTS. 

$204,779,280,53 


Benedict  &Co.,Rngr's.Ch\. 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  177 

dation  for  "additional  protection,"  and  was  intended  to 
show  how  erroneous  were  the  opinions  prevailing  in  this 
country.  It  treats  of  "  the  premature  attempts  which  have 
been  made  to  establish  cotton  manufacture  in  the  United 
States,"  and  criticises  our  protective  policy,  and  its  ultimate 
influence,  entirely  from  an  English  standpoint.  On  this 
account  it  is  specially  worthy  of  reproduction  to  the  extent 
of  showing  the  main  points  of  the  English  free-trade  argu- 
ment. It  says : 

"  The  American  Government  has  evinced  great  anxiety  for  the 
accomplishment  of  this  object  [establishing  cotton  manufactures] 
without  considering  that  manufactures  are  valuable  to  a  country, 
only  in  so  far  as  by  their  means  the  people  can  be  supplied  with  the 
article  cheaper  than  they  are  able  to  procure  it  elsewhere.  When  a 
manufacture  requires  the  support  of  bounties,  or  of  laws  prohibiting 
the  importations  of  similar  articles,  it  is  the  consumption  of  the 
national  wealth  to  encourage  the  prosecution  of  a  branch  of  indus- 
try incapable  of  maintaining  itself.  There  is  no  greater  error  in 
policy  than  this;  and  yet  we  see  it  every  day  committed  by  young 
nations  forcing  manufactures,  before  the  circumstances  of  the 
country  admit  of  such  undertakings  ;  and  by  old  nations  persist- 
ing in  the  manufacture  of  articles  which,  from  natural  disadvan- 
tages, they  cannot  produce  at  so  low  a  price  as  that  at  which  they 
might  purchase  them  from  others. 

"The  favorite  system  of  a  country  supplying  everything  within 
itself  is  alike  adverse  to  individual  advantage,  and  to  the  increase 
of  national  riches.  .  .  .  It  is  not  by  a  nation  manufacturing 
everything  tt  consumes  that  it  is  to  be  made  rich,  but  by  its  people 
being  profitably  employed;  and  this  can  only  be  accomplished  by 
the  industry  which  every  individual  practices,  being  what  he  can, 
with  advantage  to  himself,  exchange  with  the  industry  practiced  by 
others.  ...  If  these  principles  be  just,  it  must  be  a  misapplica- 
tion of  American  capital  and  industry  to  withdraw  them  from  their 
present  employment,  in  extending  the  cultivation  of  the  soil,  and  in 
circulating  its  products  —  undertakings  which  the  people  find 

13 


178  HISTORY   OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

profitable  —  to  force  them  into  manufacturing  concerns  supported 
by  monopolies  and  bounties. 

"Before  America  can  be  in  a  state  to  carry  on  manufactures  in 
competition  with  those  of  Europe,  her  vast  tracts  of  unoccupied  land, 
into  which  the  growing  population  of  her  older  settlements  is  regu- 
larly flowing,  must  be  stocked.  Until  this  is  the  case,  her  supply  of 
laborers  will  be  kept  below  the  demand,  and  the  wages  above  those 
paid  in  the  better  peopled  countries  of  Europe.  Besides  the  effect  which 
this  state  of  the  supply  of  labor  has  in  increasing  the  cost  of  the 
article,  it  is  adverse  to  the  proper  and  advantageous  execution  of 
the  work.  The  workmen  are  too  independent,  and  in  conseqence  too 
unsettled,  to  submit  to  that  discipline  and  course  of  training  from 
which  alone  excellence  of  quality,  and  a  steady  production  of 
quantity,  are  to  be  obtained." 

This  author  did  not  understand  our  system  of  protec- 
tion, for  it  has  never  been  carried  to  the  extent  of  sustain- 
ing manufactures  either  by  prohibitory  laws  or  by  boun- 
ties. But  he  was  doubtless  sincere  in  his  exertion  to 
prove  to  us  that  it  would  be  better  for  us  if  we  were  all 
cultivators  of  the  soil,  and  compelled  to  buy  our  manufact- 
ured goods  from  Great  Britain,  than  to  undertake  to 
manufacture  them  at  home.  He  wrote  as  a  citizen  of 
Great  Britain  —  a  rival  nation  —  being  fully  competent  to 
understand  that,  if  we  should  adopt  the  policy  of  free 
trade,  we  would  be  kept  in  a  condition  of  inferiority  and 
dependence.  His  effort,  to  a  certain  extent,  was  success- 
ful —  for  his  arguments,  almost  as  soon  as  made,  were 
adopted  by  the  enemies  of  protection  in  the  United  States, 
and  have  ever  since  furnished  them  with  the  materials  of 
agitation.  There  is,  however,  this  difference  :  that,  in  this 
country,  they  are  less  frank  than  the  English  author,  in 
concealing  one  of  the  strong  points  in  favor  of  free  trade ; 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  179 

which  is,  that  manufactures  in  this  country  will  increase 
the  wages  of  labor  far  above  those  paid  in  Europe,  and 
tend  to  build  up  a  large  class  of  independent  laborers  and 
artisans.  He  desired  to  prove  that,  because  of  the  low 
wages  paid  for  labor  in  Great  Britain,  manufactures  could 
be  conducted  there  much  cheaper  than  here,  which  would 
lower  the  price  to  the  consumer;  whereas,  they  accept  as 
true  only  that  part  of  his  theory,  and  are  ready  to  give 
the  preference  to  British  over  American  fabrics,  notwith- 
standing such  a  policy  would  tend  to  keep  down  the  wages 
of  labor  here  to  the  pauper  standard  of  Europe.  An 
accurate  tracing  of  the  growth  and  effect  of  these  ideas  in 
this  country,  would  make  a  most  instructive  chapter  in  our 
national  history.  Our  present  inquiries  lead  only  to  gen- 
eral allusions  to  them. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

PRESIDENTIAL  CONTEST  OF  1824  — ALL  THE  CANDIDATES  FAVOR 
PROTECTION— JACKSON  VOTED  FOR  TARIFF  OF  1824  — CLAY 
FOR  THAT  AND  TARIFF  OF  1816  — JACKSON'S  LETTER  TO  COLE- 
MAN—NO  FARM  PRODUCTS  EXCEPT  COTTON  HAVE  MARKETS 
-NECESSITY  FOR  HOME  MARKETS  — WE  MUST  BECOME  AMER- 
ICANIZED—LABOR MUST  BE  DISTRIBUTED  — JOHN  QUINCY 
ADAMS  ELECTED  BY  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES —  FIERCE 
CONTROVERSY  ENSUED  — ADAMS  FAVORED  PROTECTION  — 
JACKSON  AGAIN  A  CANDIDATE— HE  FAVORED  PROTECTION  — 
MURMURINGS  IN  SOUTH  CAROLINA  AGAINST  PROTECTION. 

AA7E  have  now  reached  a  new  and  most  important  era 
in  our  political  history  —  some  of  the  events  of 
which  will  be  remembered  by  persons  yet  living.  It  is  a 
period  which  should  not  be  lightly  passed  over,  for  it  wit- 
nessed the  inauguration  of  a  contest  not  yet  fully  ended, 
although  it  has  thus  far  resulted  in  consequences  which 
have  caused  millions  of  hearts  to  bleed.  It  k  not  now 
referred  to  for  the  purpose  of  reviving  any  of  the  old 
antagonisms  and  fierce  animosities  to  which  it  has  given 
birth  ,  but  only  in  order  that  we  may  profit  by  experience, 
and  avoid  everything  in  the  future  that  could,  by  possibil- 
ity, disturb  our  national  harmony.  "  Errors  cease  to  be 
dangerous  when  it  is  permitted  freely  to  contradict  them." 
And  when  we  learn  that  they  have  borne  bitter  fruits,  it 
will  be  worse  than  criminal  to  repeat  them. 

The  second  term  of  Mr.  Monroe  closed  in  March,  1825 

180 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  l8l 

—  after  the  tariff  law  of  1824  had  been  passed  in  response 
to  his  recommendation  for  "  additional  protection."  This 
made  it  necessary  to  elect  a  new  President  in  1824,  and 
with  that  view  the  several  candidates  were  put  in  nomina- 
tion early  in  the  year.  At  that  time  there  existed,  through- 
out the  whole  country,  such  hearty  approval  of  the  policy 
of  protection  to  manufactures,  and  it  had  become  so  well 
established,  that  the  candidates  were  chosen  with  reference 
to  their  willingness  to  preserve  it.  The  fact  is  —  as  the 
history  of  that  period  well  establishes  —  that  no  man,  how- 
ever distinguished  for  the  highest  qualities  of  statesman- 
ship, could  have  had  the  slightest  possible  chance  of  elec- 
tion without  the  distinct  understanding  that  he  was  in 
favor  of  protection.  There  was  no  man  of  special  promi- 
nence who  was  not  so ;  —  or,  at  all  events,  there  were  none 
who,  at  that  time,  advocated  its  abandonment.  The 
candidates  were  John  Quincy  Adams,  Andrew  Jackson, 
Henry  Clay,  and  William  H.  Crawford.  Mr.  Adams,  who 
was  Secretary  of  State  under  Mr.  Monroe,  had  been  so 
identified  with  the  interests  of  a  manufacturing  commu- 
nity that  no  doubt  was  entertained  about  his  views.  Gen- 
eral Jackson  was  a  member  of  the  United  States  Senate,  and 
had  voted  for  and  earnestly  supported  the  tariff  law  just 
passed.  Mr.  Clay  had  also  voted  for  and  supported  that 
law,  as  he  had  previously  the  law  of  1816.  Mr.  Crawford 
was  also  a  member  of  Mr.  Monroe's  Cabinet,  as  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  and  was  fully  committed  to  the  recom- 
mendation for  "additional  protection."  All  of  them, 
therefore,  were  in  favor  of  protection,  and  the  whole  coun- 
try so  understood  it, 


1 82  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

Perhaps  not  one  of  them  expressed  himself  so  strongly 
and  earnestly  upon  the  subject  as  did  General  Jackson, 
who  had  a  habit  of  being  so  frank  and  outspoken  in  the 
avowal  of  his  opinions  as  never  to  leave  any  room  for  doubt 
about  his  meaning.  He  had  occasion  to  write  to  Dr. 
Coleman  of  North  Carolina  upon  the  special  subject  of 
protection,  and  in  a  letter  dated  April  26,  1824,  said: 

"  Heaven  smiled  upon  and  gave  us  liberty  and  independence. 
The  same  Providence  has  blessed  us  with  the  means  of  national 
independence  and  national  defense.  If  we  omit  or  refuse  to  use 
the  gifts  which  have  been  extended  to  us,  we  deserve  not  the  con- 
tinuance of  His  blessing.  He  has  filled  our  mountains  and  our 
plains  with  minerals  —  with  lead,  iron  and  copper  —  and  given  us  a 
climate  and  soil  for  the  growing  of  hemp  and  wool.  These  being 
the  greatest  materials  of  our  national  defense,  they  ought  to  have 
extended  to  them  adequate  and  fair  protection^  that  our  manufacturers 
and  laborers  may  be  placed  in  a  fair  competition  with  those  of  Europe,  and 
that  we  may  have  within  our  country  a  supply  of  those  leading  and 
important  articles  so  essential  in  war. 

"  I  will  ask,  what  is  the  real  situation  of  the  agriculturalist  ? 
Where  has  the  American  farmer  a  market  for  his  surplus  produce  ? 
Except  for  cotton,  he  has  neither  a  foreign  nor  a  home  market. 
Does  not  this  clearly  prove  when  there  is  no  market  at  home  or 
abroad,  that  there  is  too  much  labor  employed  in  agriculture  /  Common 
sense  at  once  points  out  the  remedy.  Take  from  agriculture  in  the 
United  States  six  hundred  thousand  men,  women  and  children,  and 
you  will  at  once  give  a  market  for  more  breadstuffs  than  all  Europe 
now  furnishes  us.  In  short,  sir,  we  have  been  too  long  subject  to  the 
policy  of  British  merchants.  It  is  time  we  should  become  a  little  more 
Americanized,  and,  instead  of  feeding  paupers  and  laborers  of  England, 
feed  our  own;  or  else,  in  a  short  time,  by  continuing  our  present 
policy,  we  shall  all  be  rendered  paupers  ourselves.  It  is,  therefore, 
my  opinion,  that  a  careful  and  judicious  tariff  is  much  wanted  to 
pay  our  national  debt,  and  to  afford  us  the  means  of  that  defense 
within  ourselves  on  which  the  safety  of  our  country  and  liberty 
depends  ;  and  last,  though  not  least,  give  a  proper  distribution  to 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  183 

our  labor,  which  must  prove  beneficial  to  the  happiness,  independ- 
ence and  wealth  of  the  community." 

In  order  to  interpret  this  letter  rightfully,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  observe  the  fact  that  it  was  written  while  the  bill 
which  subsequently  became  the  tariff  law  of  1824  was 
pending  in  Congress, —  that  is,  between  three  and  four 
weeks  before  the  final  vote  was  taken  in  the  Senate  upon 
the  bill,  when  General  Jackson  voted  for  it.  When,  there- 
fore, he  said,  "  We  have  been  too  long  subject  to  the  policy 
of  British  merchants,"  he,  undoubtedly,  intended  to  express 
his  full  concurrence  in  the  recommendation  of  Mr.  Monroe 
for  "  additional  protection  ;"  in  other  words,  to  convey  the 
idea  that  we  had  not,  up  to  that  time,  sufficiently  protected 
our  manufactures.  The  whole  context  of  the  letter  shows 
that  he  distinctly  favored  such  duties  as  discriminated  in 
favor  of  protection,  and  that  by  the  law  of  1816  they  had 
not  been  made  sufficiently  high  for  that  purpose.  This 
was  the  distinct  purpose  of  his  whole  argument,  which  he 
based  upon  the  express  idea  that  it  was  our  duty  to 
develop  our  resources,  and  to  place  our  manufacturers  and 
laborers  in  fair  competition  with  those  of  Europe,  so  that 
we  might  hold  in  our  own  hands  the  means  of  making  our- 
selves permanently  independent  and  of  increasing  our 
wealth; — in  other  words,  become  more  Americanized,  as 
he  expressed  it,  and  not  Europeanized. 

In  consequence  of  the  general  concurrence  of  opinion 
among  the  candidates  with  reference  to  protection,  it  was 
not  expected  during  the  canvass  that  the  election  would 
have  any  special  bearing  upon  it.  And  it  did  not,  in  con- 


1 84  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

sequence  of  the  general  belief  that,  no  matter  which  one 
of  the  candidates  was  elected,  the  protective  principle 
would  be  maintained  and  carried  to  whatsoever  extent  the 
interests  of  the  country,  and  the  necessity  for  additional 
development  of  its  natural  resources,  should  require. 

The  election  of  Mr.  Adams  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives—  after  the  failure  to  elect  by  the  electoral 
college  —  gave  rise  to  an  exceedingly  fierce  and  angry  con- 
test between  the  friends  of  General  Jackson  and  the  sup- 
porters of  the  former.  But  as  this  did  not  involve  the 
policy  of  protection  in  any  sense,  Mr.  Adams'  administra- 
tion was  left,  without  opposition,  to  carry  out  the  meas- 
ures established  under  Mr.  Monroe.  The  principle  of 
protection  by  specific  and  discriminating  duties  was  con- 
sidered, on  all  hands,  as  permanently  settled.  The  only 
question  likely  to  arise  was  that  involving  the  increase  of 
duties  as,  from  time  to  time,  this  might  become  necessary. 
All,  or  nearly  all,  were  agreed  that  whensoever  there 
should  arise  the  necessity  for  an  increase,  it  should  be 
made.  The  purpose  of  Mr.  Adams'  administration,  there- 
fore, may  be  easily  seen.  Inasmuch  as  no  necessity  arose, 
for  several  years,  for  additional  affirmative  legislation,  he 
withheld  any  special  recommendations  with  regard  to  the 
tariff  until  near  the  close  of  his  administration,  and  after 
the  next  Presidential  election,  when  he  was  defeated  by 
General  Jackson.  He,  undoubtedly,  considered  himself 
so  identified  with  the  doctrine  of  protection,  inasmuch  as 
he  had  been  a  member  of  Mr.  Monroe's  cabinet,  that  he 
was  not  required  to  make  any  direct  avowal  of  its  support, 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  185 

or  any  recommendations  upon  the  subject,  in  his  messages. 
The  question  of  increasing  duties  involved  only  expe- 
diency, which  it  was  peculiarly  the  province  of  Congress 
to  decide.  He  did  not,  however,  omit  to  express  his 
approval  of  the  system  in  general  terms,  so  as  not  to  be 
left  in  an  equivocal  position  with  reference  to  a  matter  of 
so  much  public  interest.  When,  in  his  inaugural,  he 
referred  to  the  administration  of  Mr.  Monroe  in  strong 
terms  of  commendation,  he  took  occasion  to  enumerate 
the  wholesome  and  beneficent  measures  of  policy  which  it 
had  promoted.  Among  them  was  the  "  equal  protection 
of  all  the  great  interests  of  the  nation,"  which  was  intended 
to  include  protection  to  manufactures  and  every  other  kind 
of  industry  ;  inasmuch  as  Mr.  Monroe's  administration  had 
been  specially  conspicuous  in  recommending  measures 
having  that  end  in  view. 

In  October,  1825,  during  the  first  year  of  Mr.  Adams' 
administration,  General  Jackson  was  again  brought  forward 
as  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  by  the  Legislature  of 
Tennessee.  The  purpose  at  that  time,  on  the  part  of  his 
friends,  was  to  make  what  was  called  "bargain  and  cor- 
ruption," between  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Clay,  the  leading 
feature  of  the  contest.  General  Jackson  having  received 
a  plurality,  but  not  a  majority,  of  the  popular  vote  at  the 
election  in  1824,  it  was  insisted  that  he  was  deprived  of  the 
Presidency  by  a  combination  between  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr. 
Clay, —  to  the  effect  that,  in  consideration  that  the  vote  of 
Kentucky  should  be  cast  for  the  former,  upon  the  condition 
the  latter  should  be  made  Secretary  of  State.  The  fact 


1 86  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

that  he  was  so  made  was  interpreted  as  giving  plausibility 
to  the  charge.  Of  course,  such  a  controversy  as  this 
aroused  a  great  deal  of  asperity,  as  from  its  nature  it 
involved  the  impeachment  of  the  personal  integrity  of  both 
Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Clay — an  impeachment  which,  now 
that  the  parties,  along  with  the  excitement  of  the  contest, 
have  all  passed  away,  there  are  not  many  to  believe.  But 
violent  as  the  controversy  was,  it  did  not,  on  that  account, 
cause  the  omission  to  canvass  questions  purely  political. 
The  general  anxiety  on  the  subject  of  protection  was  so 
great,  that  it  was  impossible  to  keep  that  question  out  of 
view,  and  the  discussion  of  it  became  more  earnest  as  the 
election  approached.  By  that  time  some  of  the  politicians 
in  the  cotton-growing  States,  especially  South  Carolina, 
had  indicated  opposition  to  protection,  which  created 
apprehensions  in  other  parts  of  the  Union  that  it  might,  in 
the  end,  be  endangered.  These  politicians  made  the 
British  argument  their  own,  that,  as  their  cotton  could 
find  a  market  in  England,  where  cotton  fabrics  could  be 
obtained  cheaper  than  in  the  United  States,  it  was  more 
to  their  interest  to  give  their  support  to  British  than  to 
American  manufacturers.  This  attempt  to  subordinate  a 
policy  which  had  been  always  regarded  as  purely  Ameri- 
can, to  English  ideas  and  theory,  somewhat  startled  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  and  especially  those  who  had 
been  accustomed  to  regard  the  protective  system  as  per- 
manently established,  on  account  of  its  long  continuance 
and  the  support  it  had  received  from  so  many  eminent 
advocates,  and  from  all  previous  administrations.  It  was 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  187 

natural,  under  such  circumstances,  that  the  controversy 
should  become  an  exciting  one,  and  that  somewhat  of 
violent  passion  should  attend  it,  especially  among  those 
who  had  supported  the  tariff  of  1824.  And  this  excite- 
ment was  not  in  the  least  abated  because  of  the  fact  that 
General  Jackson  and  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  were  the 
only  candidates,  were  both  the  professed  advocates  of  the 
same  political  principles,  and  belonged  to  the  same  politi- 
cal party. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

ADAMS  ASSAILED  AS  THE  ENEMY  OF  PROTECTION  — JACKSON 
SUPPORTED  AS  ITS  FRIEND  — CONTROVERSY  ON  THE  SUB- 
JECT  — THE  "UNITED  STATES  TELEGRAPH"  URGES  JACK- 
SON'S ELECTION  TO  SAVE  PROTECTION —  CHARGES  ADAMS, 
CLAY  AND  WEBSTER  WITH  A  COMBINATION  TO  DESTROY 
IT  — ALSO  CHARGES  ADAMS  WITH  OPPOSITION  TO  INTERNAL 
IMPROVEMENTS  AND  THE  "AMERICAN  SYSTEM "— DEFENDS 
JACKSON  AS  THE  FRIEND  OF  THESE  MEASURES  — JACKSON 
COMMITTEE  IN  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA  — HIS  FRIENDS  IN 
PENNSYLVANIA  — THEY  DEFEND  HIM  AS  A  PROTECTIONIST. 

T^HE  omission  of  Mr.  Adams,  up  to  the  Presidential 
contest  of  1828,  to  recommend  protection  to  manu- 
factures, in  direct  and  express  terms,  in -either  of  his 
messages,  subjected  him  to  the  charge  of  opposition  to 
that  doctrine.  His  general  indorsement  of  the  policy  of 
Mr.  Monroe's  administration  was  not  considered  satisfac- 
tory upon  a  question  which,  from  its  nature,  demanded 
open  and  unequivocal  advocacy.  And  although  his  silence 
did  not  justify  the  impression,  it  was  used,  by  his  adversa- 
ries, as  the  basis  of  an  argument  that  he  could  not  be 
cafely  trusted,  inasmuch  as  the  subject  did  not  admit  of 
neutrality.  Not  only  was  he  arraigned  upon  this  ground, 
but  it  was  also  charged  that  Mr.  Clay,  his  Secretary  of 
State,  was  insincere  in  his  professed  friendship  for  protec- 
tion ;  and  this  led  to  the  general  accusation  that  the 
administration  of  Mr.  Adams  could  not  be  relied  on  to 

188 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  l8g 

support  such  a  levy  of  duties  as  the  manufacturing  interests 
required. 

Those  who  thus  assailed  Mr.  Adams  and  his  adminis- 
tration were  the  friends  and  supporters  of  General  Jack- 
son,—  who,  they  insisted,  had  invariably  shown  himself  to 
be  an  ardent  and  unfaltering  friend  of  protection.  They 
contrasted  the  course  of  the  two  candidates  in  terms  very 
uncomplimentary  to  the  former,  who  was  accused  of 
duplicity,  while  they  insisted  that  the  latter  was  frank  and 
undisguised.  Charges  and  counter-charges  were  made, 
with  the  asperity  usual  upon  such  occasions.  But  these 
are  of  no  present  moment,  except  so  far  as  they  have 
relation  to  the  "tariff  question,"  which  then  absorbed 
more  attention  than  any  other  except  that  of  "bargain 
and  corruption." 

Some  members  of  Congress  who  were  laboring  to  secure 
an  increase  of  duties  upon  wool  and  woolen  goods,  and 
who  were  the  supporters  of  Mr.  Adams,  sent  out  circulars 
from  Washington  City,  wherein  it  was  charged  that  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  who  was  elected 
as  a  friend  of  General  Jackson,  had  appointed  a  majority 
of  anti-tariff  men  upon  the  Committee  of  Manufactures, 
and  that  they  had  so  prepared  the  bill  then  pending  as  to 
secure  the  votes  of  certain  free-trade  representatives  from 
the  South,  and  thereby  to  endanger  its  passage  in  a  satis- 
factory form.  The  charge,  substantially,  was  to  the  effect 
that  the  supporters  of  General  Jackson  were  insincere  in 
their  professions  of  friendship  for  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion, and  were  willing  to  combine  with  the  advocates  of 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

free  trade,  in  order  to  secure  General  Jackson's  election, 
even  if  it  resulted  in  the  rejection  of  the  proposition  for 
increased  duties.  In  other  words,  it  was  an  attempt  to 
place  General  Jackson  in  the  attitude  of  being  an  opponent 
of  the  protection  of  manufactures,  whilst  it  was  insisted 
that  Mr.  Adams  was  its  friend.  The  issue  was  made  with 
such  emphasis  as  is  common  under  like  circumstances. 

The  United  States  Telegraph  was,  at  that  time,  pub- 
lished in  Washington  City,  under  the  editorial  manage- 
ment of  General  Duff  Green,  who  was  a  prominent  figure 
in  the  politics  of  this  country  for  many  years.  Extra 
numbers  of  this  publication,  "devoted  exclusively  to  the 
Presidential  election,"  were  regularly  issued  in  pamphlet 
form,  advocating,  with  intense  earnestness,  the  election  of 
General  Jackson.  In  one  of  these,  for  April  19,  1828, 
the  foregoing  charge  was  answered  in  detail,  and  the 
"war  carried  into  Africa"- —according  to  the  avowal  —  by 
counter-charges  against  Mr.  Adams  and  his  supporters. 
Each  party  accused  the  other  of  opposition  to  protection 
and  manufactures;  and  thus  the  issue  which  had  to  be 
tried  at  the  election  was  made  up  that  early  in  the  canvass. 

Mr.  Adams,  Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  Webster  were  charged 
with  having  formed  a  combination  "  to  defeat  the  tariff," 
even  if  it  had  to  be  accomplished  by  free-trade  votes,  in 
order  to  elect  Mr.  Adams  to  the  Presidency.  It  was 
alleged  that  they  were  endeavoring  to  bring  about  this 
result  "by  inducing  the  people  to  believe  that  Mr.  Adams 
is,  and  that  General  Jackson  is  not,  the  friend  of  American 
manufactures."  And  it  was  considered  sufficient  ground  to 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  IQI 

charge  Mr.  Adams  with  being  the  enemy  of  manufactures  to 
ask,  "  Why  did  he  not  recommend  their  protection  in  his 
messages  to  Congress?"  But  the  following  covers  so 
thoroughly  the  whole  ground  of  this  controversy,  that  it  is 
now  given  in  the  conspicuous  form,  and  with  the  capitals 
and  italics  as  they  appear  in  the  original,  and  which  were 
manifestly  employed  to  command  attention,  and  give  prom- 
inence to  the  accusation.  The  matter  was  thus  stated  : 

"  PRESIDENT  ADAMS. 

"Article  II.— Section  I. —  Clause  VIII.  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  declares  that  the  President  shall  swear  or  affirm 
that  he  will  '  faithfully  execute  the  office  of  President  of  the  United 
States.'" 

"Article  II. —  Section  III. —  Enjoins  upon  the  President  to 
'recommend  to  the  consideration  of  Congress  such  measures  as 
he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient.' 

"  Mr.  Adams  in  his  last  message  does  not  recommend  a  revision 
of  the  Tariff: — he  does  not  recommend  any  measure  for  *he  encour- 
agement of  DOMESTIC  MANUFACTURES: —  he  does  not  recommend  any 
measure  for  the  encouragement  of  WOOL-GROWERS: —  he  does  not 
recommend  the  AMERICAN  SYSTEM: — he  does  not  say  one  word  on 
the  subject  of  the  Tariff  —  or  domestic  manufactures  —  or  wool  — 
or  the  AMERICAN  SYSTEM. 

"  THE  CASE  stands  thus: — Mr.  Adams  under  the  obligation  of 
an  oath,  to  'recommend  to  the  consideration  of  Congress  such 
measures  as  he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient,' — does  noi 
recommend  the  American  System  —  a  tariff  —  the  encouragement 
of  domestic  manufactures,  or  the  growth  of  wool. 

"ON  HIS  OATH,  then,  he  does  not  consider  the  encouragement  of 
domestic  manufactures  —  wool  —  a  tariff  —  or  the  American  System 
'necessary  and  expedient.' 

"THE  FRIENDS  of  General  Jackson,  far  from  charging  Mr. 
Adams  with  the  heinous  crime  of  violating  his  oath,  are  perfectly 
willing  that  entire  credit  be  given,  for  the  utmost  sincerity;  and 
only  complain,  that  certain  designing  politicians,  have  craftily  im- 
posed upon  a  number  of  patriotic  and  honest  citizens,  and  induce 


I Q2  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

them  to  believe,  that  he  is  in  favor  of  what,  on  his  oath,  he  DIS- 
AVOWS. 

"  DOUBT  on  this  subject  can  no  longer  exist.  Every  man  can 
now,  wide-awake,  take  his  side. 

"  General  Jackson  has  repeatedly  and  publickly  —  in  Congress  by 
his  votes  —  and  out  of  Congress  as  a  citizen,  manifested  his  friend- 
ship for  the  American  System;  Mr.  Adams  —  NEVER: — but  in  the 
public  discharge  of  an  imperious  and  all-important  duty,  Mr. 
Adams,  in  effect,  proclaims  to  the  whole  nation  that  he  does  NOT 
consider  the  American  System  '  necessary  and  expedient.'  " 

Immediately  following  this  the  editor  proceeds  to  say : 

"  General  Jackson  is  in  favor  of  a  tariff  that  shall  promote  the 
prosperity  of  the  whole  nation,  and  has  so  declared  by  his  votes  in 
Congress.  Mr.  Adams  has  never  committed  himself  on  the  subject, 
and  we  defy  any  of  his  adherents  to  produce  a  single  sentence 
from  any  public  document  offered  by  him,  which  contains  a  distinct 
and  specific  declaration  in  favor  of  the  manufacturing  interest." 

It  is  then  declared  that  "the  Southern  people  are 
opposed  to  all  tariffs  for  any  other  purpose  than  revenue, 
under  the  impression  that,  any  duties  beyond  what  are  neces- 
sary to  this  object  would  operate  as  a  tax  upon  their  neces- 
saries and  comforts,  to  the  exclusive  benefits  of  the 
Northern  manufacturers ;" — that  "the  people  of  the  Middle 
and  Western  States  are  in  favor  of  a  tariff  that  shall  pro- 
tect their  agriculture  and  manufactures,  and  are  therefore 
opposed  to  the  free-trade  system  of  the  South  ;" —  and 
that  the  people  of  the  North  are  divided  in  opinion  accord- 
ingly as  they  are  engaged  in  commerce,  navigation,  or 
manufactures.  And,  having  laid  the  foundation  of  an 
attack  upon  Mr.  Clay  as  well  as  Mr.  Adams,  it  is  said  : 

"  Under  such  a  state  of  facts,  we  would  advise  all  who  are  desir- 
ous of  promoting  the  prosperity  of  the  country,  to  be  awake,  and 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  193 

fall  into  no  traps  baited  by  Mr.  Clay.  He  no  more  regards  the 
manufacturing  interest  of  this  country  than  of  China.  All  he  says 
about  the  American  System  is  miserable  cant,  intended  to  deceive 
the  honest  and  purchase  the  venal." 

And,  then,  to  bring  the  matter  to  the  customary  parti- 
san climax,  it  is  insinuated  against  Mr.  Clay  that,  on 
account  of  the  insincerity  of  his  professions  of  friendship 
for  protection,  he  should  be  treated  as  a  "  political  prosti- 
tute who  would  sell  his  country  for  an  office !" 

Mr.  Clay  defended  himself  against  the  charges  then 
industriously  circulated  against  him.  But  it  does  not  enter 
into  our  present  inquiries  to  state  in  what  manner  he  did 
it,  except  to  say  that  it  was  done  with  eloquence  and  power, 
not  often  equaled  and  never  surpassed.  One  of  his 
addresses  made  by  him  met  the  objections  made  against 
Mr.  Adams  and  himself  with  so  much  manly  vigor  as  to 
attract  universal  attention.  It  called  forth  a  special  "reply 
by  the  Jackson  Corresponding  Committee  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,"  which  was  of  sufficient  length  to  require 
several  numbers  of  the  extra  Telegraph  for  its  publica- 
tion. It  is  a  justifiable  inference  that  this  was  prepared 
under  the  special  supervision  of  the  friends  of  General 
Jackson  in  Congress,  as  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  so 
important  a  document  would  otherwise  have  been  issued. 
Its  whole  character  is  indicated  by  the  following  extract : 

"Mr.  Trimble,  and  others  of  Mr.  Clay's  witnesses,  as  well  as 
Mr.  Clay  himself,  now  pretend  to  have  voted  for  Mr.  Adams  on 
account  of  his  known  attachment  to  the  Tariff  and  Internal  Improve- 
ments, and  against  General  Jackson  on  account  of  his  hostility  to 
those  interests. 
13 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

"A  more  shallow  artifice  was  never  invented.  Never  to  this  day  has 
Mr.  Adams  avowed  himself  in  favor  of  Internal  Improvements  on 
the  principles  maintained  by  Mr.  C'ay.  On  the  contrary,  in  a  letter 
to  a  gentleman  in  Maryland,  in  1824,  he  declared  himself  in  favor 
of  making  roads  and  canals,  with  the  consent  of  the  States,  and  a  res- 
ervation of  their  territorial  jurisdiction.  Nor  has  he  ever,  to  this  day, 
in  any  manner  or  form,  avowed  himself  in  favor  of  a  Tariff.  Although 
his  own  supporters,  out  of  Congress,  have  been  loud  in  demanding 
an  increase  of  duty  on  certain  imports  as  necessary  to  save  our  man- 
ufactories from  ruin,  he  has  never  recommended  any  such  measure  in  any 
one  of  his  messages.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the  very  moment  Mr. 
Trimble  says  he  made  up  his  mind  to  vote  for  Mr.  Adams  on  account 
of  his  devotion  to  these  interests,  the  Tariff  of  1824  was  before  Con- 
gress, of  which  General  Jackson  was  a  member.  ///  every  step  of  the 
progress  of  this  bill  before  the  Senate  he  voted  for  it,  and  it  is  believed 
that,  without  his  aid,  it  would  not  have  passed.  He  also  voted  in  favor 
of  every  measure  of  Internal  Improvement  which  was  presented  while  he 
was  a  member  of  the  Senate.  That  any  person  voted  for  Mr. 
Adams  because  he  was  known  to  be  more  devoted  to  these  interests 
than  General  Jackson,  is,  therefore,  wholly  untrue.  The  tale  was 
invented  to  operate  on  the  Middle  and  Western  States,  with  the 
object  of  bringing  them,  by  an  artful  and  deceptious  appeal  to 
their  interests,  into  the  support  of  a  wicked  coalition.  But  it  has 
been  found  impossible  to  persuade  the  people  out  of  that  which 
they  know  —  to  make  them  believe  that  General  Jackson,  who  voted 
for  these  measures,  is  their  enemy,  or  that  he  will  neglect  any  interest 
of  that  country  which  he  has  hazarded  his  life  and  fortune  to 
defend." 

When  it  is  considered  that  the  matters  here  treated  of, 
and  the  principles  involved  in  them,  are  not  such  as  vary 
according  to  the  shifting  events  of  the  day,  but  that  they 
always  have  involved  —  and  yet  do  —  the  same  modes  of 
constitutional  interpretation,  the  same  estimate  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  national  Government  and  the  States, 
and  the  protection  and  preservation  of  the  same  common 
interests  of  the  country, —  these  words  sound  somewhat 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  195 

strangely  in  modern  ears.  Nevertheless,  they  instruct 
those  who  do  not  remember  the  Presidential  contest  of 
1828,  with  regard  to  the  principles  upon  which  it  turned. 

The  Chairman  of  the  Committee  by  whom  this  "  reply" 
was  prepared,  and  under  whose  immediate  auspices  it  was 
issued,  was  General  John  P.  Van  Ness,  who  was,  at  one 
time,  a  member  of  Congress  —  was  the  confidential  friend 
of  Mr.  Jefferson,  Mr.  Madison,  Mr.  Monroe,  and  General 
Jackson  —  and  who  was  subsequently  made  Minister  to 
Spain  by  the  latter,  after  his  election  to  the  Presidency. 
The  document,  therefore,  from  which  the  above  extract  is 
taken,  had  something  more  than  ordinary  significance 
attached  to  it,  and  was  undoubtedly  intended,  at  the  time 
it  was  issued,  to  state  fully  and  fairly  the  issue  involved  in 
the  Presidential  contest  of  1828.  For  that  purpose  alone 
is  it  now  referred  to.  But  there  is  other  important  evi- 
dence to  the  same  effect. 

The  question  of  a  tariff  for  protection  then  assumed - 
as  it  always  has  done  —  so  much  importance  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, as  to  require  that  there  should  be  no  misunderstand- 
ing about  the  opinions  of  the  Presidential  candidates  with 
regard  to  it.  It  was  well  understood  that  no  man  opposed 
to  protection  could  obtain  the  vote  of  that  State.  Conse- 
quently, it  became  necessary  that  the  supporters  of  Gen- 
eral Jackson  should  explain,  distinctly  and  undisguisedly, 
what  his  position  was,  and  what  the  protectionists  of  that 
State  might  expect,  in  the  event  of  his  election.  This  was 
undertaken  by  a  committee  organized  in  Philadelphia,  by 

a  State  Convention  of  his  supporters.     Mr^^illiam 

ELIBI 
OF  rue 

[(  UNIVERSITY 


196  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

Duane,  afterwards  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  under  Gen- 
eral Jackson,  was  placed  upon  this  committee,  on  account, 
it  may  be  supposed,  of  his  eminent  character  and  ability. 
In  a  published  and  extensively  circulated  letter  addressed 
by  the  committee  to  prominent  friends  of  Mr.  Adams,  the 
charge  made  against  him  in  the  Washington  City  Tel&- 
graph  is  repeated  —  that  he  "violated  his  duty  "as  Pres- 
ident, in  not  recommending  ihe  American  System  to  Con- 
gress. And  to  show  the  contrast  between  him  and  Gen- 
eral Jackson,  they  say: 

"No  such  dilemma  exists  in  the  case  of  General  Jackson. 
When  he  came  to  act  upon  his  oath,  he  did  not  shun  the  question  as 
Mr.  Adams  did.  The  father  of  the  tariff  of  1824,  Mr.  Henry  Bald- 
win, thus  speaks  on  this  subject : 

"'We  support  as  our  candidate  the  man  [General  Jackson]  who,  in  every 
emergency,  risked  his  life  for  his  country,  and  who,  disregarding  all  considera- 
tions of  local  popularity,  took  his  stand  in  the  South,  in  favor  of  the  American  Sys- 
tem, and  with  the  same  firmness  with  which  he  had  often  foiled  our  enemies,  boldly 
announced  his  devotion  to  its  principles.  In  him  there  is  no  mystery,  no  diplomacy  ; 
every  one  can  understand  his  meaning  —  these  are  the  words  of  General  Jack- 
son. .  .  .' 

"  'Heaven  smiled  upon,  and  gave  us  liberty  and  independence.  The  same 
Providence  has  blessed  us  with  the  means  of  national  independence  and  national 
defense.  If  we  omit  or  refuse  to  use  the  gifts  which  He  has  extended  to  us,  we 
deserve  not  the  continuance  of  His  blessings.  He  has  filled  our  mountains  and  our 
plains  with  minerals  —  with  lead,  iron,  and  copper — and  given  us  climate  and  soil 
for  the  growing'  of  hemp  and  wool.  These  being  the  grand  materials  for  our 
national  defense,  they  ought  to  have  extended  to  them  adequate  and  fair  protection,  that 
our  own  manufacturers  and  laborers  may  be  placed  on  a  fair  competition  with 
those  of  Europe,  and  that  we  may  have,  within  our  country,  a  supply  of  those  lead- 
ing and  important  articles,  so  essential  in  war.'"* 

From  these  facts  it  will  be  seen  how  important  the 
Presidential  election  of  1828  was  considered  at  the  time. 
It  occurred,  in  fact,  at  a  period  when,  in  so  far  as  measures 

*  Extract  from  General  Jackson's  letter  to  Dr.  Coleman.    See  ante,  chap.  XKU  p.  182. 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  197 

of  domestic  policy  were  concerned,  its  importance  could 
not  well  be  overestimated.  The  men  of  the  Revolutionary 
period  were  passing  away,  and  new  men  were  taking  the 
places  they  left  vacant ;  —  the  management  of  public  affairs 
was  already  in  the  hands  of  a  new  generation.  Of  the 
Presidents,  Washington,  Adams  and  Jefferson  were  dead; 
Madison  and  Monroe  were  in  retirement;  and  John 
Quincy  Adams,  then  President,  was  at  the  head  of  an 
administration  which  was  arraigned  with  a  degree  of  vio- 
lence to  which  neither  of  the  two  immediately  preceding 
administrations  had  been  subjected.  The  condition  of 
affairs,  therefore,  involved  the  introduction  of  new  ele- 
ments of  warfare,  along  with  new  men,  into  the  politics  of 
the  country,  and  rendered  the  closest  scrutiny  not  a  duty 
merely,  but  a  necessity.  It  was  a  period  from  which  the 
impartial  student  of  American  history  cannot  fail  to 
derive  valuable  instruction  and  much  wisdom. 

We  have  seen  the  importance  attached  to  a  protective 
tariff,  and  that  it  constituted,  in  reality,  the  leading  politi- 
cal issue  between  the  supporters  of  Mr.  Adams  and  those 
of  General  Jackson.  Like  all  other  similar  contests,  when 
sufficiently  violent  to  arouse  the  spirit  of  party,  it  involved 
matters  not  merely  pertaining  immediately  to  that  partic- 
ular measure,  but  some  that  were  collateral  to  it,  yet  bear- 
ing indirectly  upon  it.  The  fact  that  Mr.  Calhoun,  of 
South  Carolina,  was  a  candidate  for  the  Vice-Presidency 
on  the  same  ticket  with  General  Jackson,  was  one  of  these, 
and  gave  rise  to  much  of  the  acrimony  introduced  into  the 
canvass.  Nobody  objected  to  Mr.  Calhoun  on  the  ground 


198  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

of  the  want  of  fitness  or  qualifications,  for,  on  all  hands, 
he  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  ablest  and  purest  of  our 
public  men.  But,  notwithstanding  he  had  voted  for,  and 
was  the  special  champion  of,  the  protective  tariff  of  1816, 
he  had,  by  this  time,  shown  some  indications  of  a  leaning 
toward  free  trade, — at  all  events,  the  only  advocates  of 
free  trade  in  the  country  were  his  supporters.  Among 
them  in  South  Carolina  there  had  already  been  open  dem- 
onstrations to  that  effect,  under  the  lead  of  Mr.  McDuffie 
and  a  few  others  equally  excitable,  who  had  gone  so 
far  as  to  threaten  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  unless  the 
powers  of  the  national  Government,  exercised  in  passing 
laws  for  the  protection  of  manufactures,  were,  in  some 
way,  curtailed.  Inasmuch  as  those  who  made  this  threat 
were  the  supporters  of  General  Jackson  and  of  Mr.  Cal- 
houn,  on  the  same  ticket,  the  friends  of  Mr.  Adams  found 
in  that  fact  a  reason  for  charging  that  the  election  of  the 
former  to  the  Presidency,  by  means  of  this  free-trade  influ- 
ence, would  seriously  imperil  the  policy  of  protection, 
because  it  would  place  the  friends  of  free  trade  in  a  posi- 
tion to  assail  it  with  the  hope  of  ultimate  success. 

The  accusation  against  General  Jackson  personally 
was  carried  somewhat  beyond  this,  in  the  charge  that  he 
had  shown  himself  opposed  to  the  administration  of 
Washington.  As  the  policy  of  protection  was  one  of  the 
prominent  measures  of  that  administration,  it  was  argued 
that  he  could  not  then  be  relied  upon  as  its  friend,  after 
having  united  with  those  who  had  refused  to  express  con- 
fidence in  it.  This  accusation  had  for  its  basis  the  follow- 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF  199 

ing  facts:  General  Jackson  was  a  member  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  from  Tennessee  during"  the  4th  Con- 
gress, 1796-97,  at  the  close  of  which  Washington's  ad- 
ministration expired.  Before  his  retirement,  however,  the 
form  of  an  address  complimentary  to  him  was  pending 
for  adoption  in  the  House,  which  gave  rise  to  some  debate. 
It  contained,  among  many  other  things,  an  expression  of 
the  wish,  on  the  part  of  the  House,  that  the  wise  example 
of  Washington  might  be  the  guide  of  his  successors  in 
the  Presidency.  Opposition  was  made,  especially  to  this 
feature  of  the  address,  by  Mr.  William  B.  Giles  of  Vir- 
ginia, who  displayed  his  hostility  to  Washington's  admin- 
istration by  declaring  that  he  did  not  consider  it  to  have 
been  wise,  and  a  motion  was  made  to  strike  out  that  por- 
tion of  it.  General  Jackson  voted  with  Mr.  Giles  and 
twenty- two  others  in  favor  of  this  proposition,  but  it  was 
retained  by  a  majority  of  more  than  two  to  one  in  favor 
of  it.  When  the  final  vote  was  taken  upon  the  adoption 
of  the  address  as  a  whole,  he  also  voted,  with  only  eleven 
others,  against  it.  On  this  account  the  friends  of  Mr. 
Adams  insisted  that  the  opposition  of  General  Jackson  to 
the  administration  of  Washington — during  which  protec- 
tion was  first  established — -was  sufficient  ground  to  justify 
the  fear  that,  if  elected  by  the  aid  of  free-trade  votes,  he 
would  lend  the  influence  of  his  administration  against 
protection.  The  argument  to  this  effect  became  the  more 
earnest  because  of  the  fact  that  Mr.  Calhoun  was  asso- 
ciated on  the  same  ticket  with  him,  which  brought  to  the 
support  of  the  ticket  those  in  South  Carolina  who  had 


2OO  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

already  threatened  the  Union  on  account  of  protection. 
The  friends  of  protection  earnestly  opposed  everything 
which,  even  by  implication,  could  endanger  the  existence 
and  perpetuation  of  the  established  system. 

This  accounts  for  the  active  efforts  made  by  the  friends 
of  General  Jackson  to  show  that  he  had  voted  for  and 
supported  protection,  internal  improvements,  and  the 
American  System,  and  that  Mr.  Adams  had  not  done  so; 
and  for  their  earnestness  in  insisting  that  his  election  and 
the  defeat  of  Mr.  Adams  was  absolutely  necessary  to  give 
perpetuity  to  these  great  measures  and  the  principles 
underlying  them.  As  to  the  threat  of  Mr.  McDuffie  and 
other  agitators  of  South  Carolina  to  dissolve  the  Union 
on  account  of  protection,  it  cut  no  special  figure,  for  the 
reason  that  nobody  suspected  General  Jackson  of  having 
any  sympathy  whatsoever  with  such  a  purpose.  The  con- 
sideration given  to  it  was  not  of  consequence  enough  to 
attract  general  notice.  The  venerable  James  Ritchie,  of 
the  Richmond  Enquirer,  regarded  himself  as  "quizzing" 
his  Virginia  readers  by  seriously  replying  to  it. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

PROTECTION  IN  THE  WEST  —  SENATE  OF  INDIANA  CALL  UPON 
JACKSON  FOR  HIS  VIEWS— HIS  REPLY  TO  THE  GOVERNOR, 
STRONGLY  INDORSING  PROTECTION —  THAT  WAS  THE  LEAD- 
ING ISSUE  IN  THE  ELECTION  — JACKSON  ELECTED  UPON  IT  — 
ADAMS  DEFENDS  IT  IN  HIS  LAST  MESSAGE. 

'"PHE  cause  of  protection  did  not  receive  its  only  earnest 
defense  in  the  States  east  of  the  Allegany  mount- 
ains, during  the  Presidential  contest  of  1828.  It  had  warm 
supporters  in  the  West  also  —  especially  in  Indiana.  This 
State  became  a  member  of  the  Union  during  the  year  that 
the  tariff  law  of  1816  was  passed,  and  had  approved  all 
the  subsequent  measures  looking  to  protection.  Although 
the  population  was  then  sparse,  and  much  of  the  finest 
land  was  occupied  by  the  aboriginal  inhabitants,  their 
intelligence  enabled  them  to  foresee  that  no  portion  of  the 
territory  of  the  United  States,  of  the  same  number  of 
square  miles,  could  be  made  susceptible  of  a  higher  mate- 
rial development,  with  the  aid  of  those  measures  of  Govern- 
ment policy  which  had  proved  beneficial  to  the  older 
States.  The  early  emigrants  were  from  all  parts  of  the 
Union  —  mainly  from  States  outside  of  New  England  - 
and  had  brought  with  them  such  political  opinions  as  were 
formed  under  the  influence  of  the  measures  of  national 
policy  then  existing.  There  were  very  few  opposed  to 
protection, —  not  enough  to  create  even  a  ripple  uoon  the 


2OI 


202  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

surface  of  public  opinion.  This  unanimity  of  sentiment 
caused  the  Presidential  contest  to  partake  somewhat  of 
the  same  character  as  that  in  Pennsylvania  and  other 
strongly  "  tariff "  States.  The  same  charges  and  counter- 
charges, as  elsewhere,  were  made  by  the  friends  of  Mr. 
Adams  and  General  Jackson  —  all  centering  in  the  inquiry, 
Which  of  the  two  could  be  most  safely  relied  upon  as  the 
friend  of  protection  ?  The  friends  of  General  Jackson 
were  not  fully  satisfied  with  what  had  been  done  and  said 
elsewhere;  and  being  protectionists  themselves,  and  fully 
assured  of  his  fidelity  to  that  cause,  they  caused  a  resolu- 
tion to  be  introduced  into  the  Senate  of  Indiana,  and 
passed,  requesting  from  General  Jackson  himself  a  full 
explanation  of  his  views  and  opinions,  to  be  communicated 
through  the  Governor  of  the  State.  This  resolution  hav- 
ing reached  General  Jackson,  he  responded  to  it  as  follows: 

"HERMITAGE,  February  28,  1828. 

"SiR: — I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  Excellency's  letter 
of  the  30th  ultimo,  enclosing  resolutions  of  the  Senate  of  Indiana, 
adopted,  as  it  appears,  with  a  view  of  ascertaining  my  opinions  on 
certain  political  topics.  The  respect  which  I  entertain  for  the 
Executive  and  Senate  of  your  State  excludes  from  my  mind  the 
idea  that  an  unfriendly  disposition  dictated  the  interrogatories 
which  are  proposed.  But  I  will  confess  my  regret  at  being  forced 
by  this  sentiment  to  depart,  in  the  smallest  degree,  from  that  deter- 
mination on  which  I  have  always  acted.  Not,  sir,  that  I  would 
wish  to  conceal  my  opinions  from  the  people  upon  any  political  or 
national  subjects  ;  but  as  they  were,  in  various  ways,  promulgated 
in  1824,  I  am  apprehensive  that  my  appearance  before  the  public,  at 
this  time,  may  be  attributed,  as  has  already  been  the  case,  to 
improper  motives. 

"  With  these  remarks,  I  pray  you,  sir,  respectfully,  to  state  to  the 
Senate  of  Indiana,  that  my  opinions,  at  present,  are  precisely  what  they 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

were  in  1823  and  1824,  when  they  were  communicated  by  letter  to  Doctor 
Cole  man,  of  North  Carolina,  and  when  I  voted  for  the  present  tariff  and 
appropriations  for  internal  improvements.  As  that  letter  was  written  at 
a  time  when  the  divisions  of  sentiment,  on  this  subject,  were  as 
strongly  marked  as  they  now  are,  in  relation  both  to  the  expediency 
and  constitutionality  of  the  system,  it  is  enclosed  herein  ;  and  I  beg 
the  favor  of  your  Excellency  to  consider  it  a  part  of  this  communica- 
tion* The  occasion,  out  of  which  it  arose,  was  embraced  with  a 
hope  of  preventing  any  doubt,  misconstruction,  or  necessity  for 
further  inquiry  respecting  my  opinions  on  the  subject  to  which  you 
refer;  particularly  in  those  States  which  you  have  designated  as 
cherishing  a  policy  at  variance  with  your  own.  To  preserve  our 
invaluable  Constitution,  and  be  prepared  to  repel  the  invasion  of  a 
foreign  foe,  by  the  practice  of  economy,  and  the  cultivation,  within 
ourselves,  of  the  means  of  national  defense  and  independence, 
should  be,  it  seems  to  me,  the  leading  object  of  any  system  which 
aspires  to  the  name  of  '  American,'  and  of  every  prudent  adminis- 
tration of  our  Government. 

"  I  trust,  sir,  that  these  general  views,  taken  in  connection  with  the 
letter  enclosed,  and  the  votes  referred  to,  will  be  received  as  a  sufficient 
answer  to  the  inquiries  suggested  by  the  resolutions  of  the  Senate. 
I  will  further  observe  to  your  Excellency,  that  my  views  of  constitu- 
tional power  and  American  policy  were  imbibed,  in  no  small  degree,  in  the 
times  and  from  the  sages  of  the  Revolution,  and  that  my  experience  has  not 
disposed  me  to  forget  their  lessons;  and,  in  conclusion,  I  will  repeat  that 
my  opinions  remain  as  they  existed  in  1823  and  1824,  uninfluenced  by  the 
hopes  of  personal  aggrandizement,  and  I  am  sure  they  will  never 
deprive  me  of  the  proud  satisfaction  of  having  always  been  a  sincere 
and  consistent  Republican. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"ANDREW  JACKSON. 

"  His  Excellency, 

"jAMEs'B.  RAY, 

"  Governor  of  Indiana." 

It  does  not  require  much  reflection  to  perceive  the  full 
purport  and  meaning  of  this  letter.  The  language  is  so 

*  For  this  letter,  see  ante,  chap,  xix.,  p.  182. 


204  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

plain  and  expressive  as  not  to  allow  of  misconstruction. 
General  Jackson  undoubtedly  meant  what  he  said  —  noth- 
ing more,  nothing  less  —  and  it  would  be  an  unjust  asper- 
sion upon  his  name  and  memory  to  say  or  even  to  insinuate 
the  contrary.  It  was  the  only  letter  written  by  him  during 
the  Presidential  campaign,  and  was,  manifestly,  intended 
to  be  exhaustive  upon  the  subjects  of  which  it  treated. 
Therefore,  he  sent  along  with  it  his  letter  to  Dr.  Cole- 
man,  written  four  years  before,  so  that  his  opinions  should 
be  fully  and  perfectly  understood.  The  two  letters  were, 
as  he  specially  requested,  to  be  taken  as  one  for  that  pur- 
pose. In  this  way  it  was,  undoubtedly,  his  purpose  to 
maintain,  affirmatively,  every  principle  involved  in  the 
protective  system,  whether  it  had  reference  to  expediency 
or  constitutionality.  And  the  two  letters,  taken  together, 
do  unequivocally  maintain  the  following  propositions  :  (i) 
That  we,  in  this  country,  possess  all  the  elements  of  mate- 
rial wealth,  as  gifts  of  nature,  and  it  is  our  duty  to  develop 
them  by  our  own  industry  and  for  our  own  uses  ;  (2)  That 
if  we  do  not  do  so,  we  do  not  deserve  a  continuance  of 
Divine  protection;  (3)  That  this  development  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  our  national  independence  and  defense ;  (4) 
That  protection  by  the  national  Government  is  essential 
to  it;  (5)  That  this  protection  should  be  extended  to  our 
manufacturers  and  laborers,  so  that  thereby  they  "  may  be 
placed  in  a  fair  competition  with  those  of  Europe;"  (6) 
That  this  protection  is  necessary  in  order  to  secure  to  us 
the  "  leading  and  important  articles  so  essential  in  war ;" 
(7)  That  we  have  no  reliable  foreign  market  for  any  of  our 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  2O5 

products  except  cotton:  (8)  That  there  was,  at  that  time, 
"  too  much  labor  employed  in  agriculture  ;"  (9)  That  by 
reducing  the  amount  of  agricultural  labor  we  create  a 
home  market  for  our  surplus  breadstuff's;  (10)  That  "  we 
have  been  too  long  subject  to  the  policy  of  British  mer- 
chants;" (n)  That  we  should  become  "Americanized,  and 
instead  of  feeding  paupers  and  laborers  of  Europe,  feed 
our  own  ;"  (12)  That  if  we  do  not,  "we  shall  all  be  ren- 
dered paupers  ourselves;"  (13)  That,  for  these  purposes, 
we  must  have  careful  and  judicious  protection  to  manufact- 
urers and  laborers  ;  (14)  That,  in  order  to  secure  all  these 
benefits,  he  voted  for  the  protective  tariff  of  1824,  and  also 
for  appropriations  for  internal  improvements;  (15)  That 
these  measures  are  both  expedient  and  constitutional;  (16) 
That  his  "views  of  constitutional  power  and  American 
policy"  were  imbibed  "from  the  sages  of  the  Revolution," 
and  have  been  confirmed  by  experience. 

As  these  were  the  only  opinions  publicly  announced  by 
General  Jackson  during  the  Presidential  contest  of  1828, 
it  must  be  accepted  as  a  fact  that  he  and  his  friends  con- 
sidered the  question  of  the  tariff — that  is,  of  protection  — 
as  presenting  the  most  material  and  important  issue; 
otherwise,  he  would  not  have  departed  from  the  rule  he 
had  laid  down  for  himself,  and  would  have  left  the  letter 
from  the  Governor  of  Indiana  unanswered.  Having  de- 
cided to  answer  it,  however,  he  dealt  fairly  and  truthfully 
with  the  public,  and  stated  the  foregoing  convictions  upon 
his  mind  so  plainly  and  frankly  that  they  could  not  be 
misunderstood.  And  they  were  not  misunderstood,  for 


2O6  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

they  were  specially  the  subject  of  public  inquiry  in  all 
parts  of  the  country.  This  was  unavoidable,  for  the  rea- 
son that  the  claims  of  each  candidate — Mr.  Adams  and 
General  Jackson — were,  by  their  respective  supporters, 
put  upon  the  express  ground  of  his  being  the  undeviating 
friend  of  protection.  The  main  question  was  one  of 
rivalry  between  them;  that  is,  which  of  the  two  could  be 
most  safely  relied  on  as  the  friend  of  that  measure  ? 

And  when  it  is  considered  that  out  of  a  total  popular 
vote  of  1,156,328,  General  Jackson  received  a  majority  of 
138,134  votes,  and  that  nearly,  if  not  entirely,  all  the  votes 
given  to  Mr.  Adams  were  in  favor  of  protection,  the  infer- 
ence is  entirely  justified  that,  at  that  time,  the  American 
people  were  almost  unanimous  in  favor  of  protection  to 
manufactures,  as  essential  to  the  development  of  agricult- 
ure, commerce,  and  navigation.  The  electoral  vote  of 
South  Carolina  —  which  was  cast  by  the  Legislature  and 
not  by  the  people  —  was  not  withheld  from  General  Jack- 
son, although,  as  already  stated,  efforts  were  made  to  build 
up  a  free-trade  party  in  that  State.  But  this  is  accounted 
for  by  the  fact  that  Mr.  Calhoun  was  elected  Vice-Presi- 
dent  on  the  same  ticket  with  General  Jackson,  and  by  the 
additional  fact  that  he  had  not  yet  fully  identified  himself 
with  the  free-trade  movement,  although,  to  some  extent, 
acquiescing  in  it.  In  whatsoever  way  the  election  may  be 
viewed,  the  success  of  General  Jackson  was  a  triumph  for 
the  principle  of  protection, —  an  affirmance  by  the  people 
of  that  mode  of  interpreting  the  Constitution,  which  gives 
the  power  to  Congress  to  lay  specific  duties  discriminating 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  2OJ 

in  favor  of  manufactures,  to  appropriate  money  for  internal 
improvements,  when  deemed  expedient,  and  to  maintain 
the  "  American  System." 

Mr.  Adams  must  have  so  regarded  it,  for,  in  his  last 
message,  in  December,  1828, —  after  the  election  —  he  was 
most  explicit  in  favor  of  protection,—  far  more  so  than  he 
had  previously  been.  He  said: 

*'  The  great  interests  of  an  agricultural,  commercial,  and  manu- 
facturing nation  are  so  linked  in  union  together,  that  no  permanent 
cause  of  prosperity  to  one  of  them  can  operate  without  extending 
its  influence  to  the  others.  All  these  interests  are  alike  under  the  pro- 
tecting power  of  the  legislative  authority,  and  the  duties  of  the  repre- 
sentative bodies  are  to  conciliate  them  in  harmony  together." 

Counseling  equality  in  the  imposition  of  the  burdens 
of  taxation,  he  then  proceeded  to  point  out  the  illiberality 
and  unfairness  of  Great  Britain  toward  this  country,  with 
reference  to  all  our  products  not  needed  by  her  own  manu- 
factures, and  said: 

"Is  the  self-protecting  energy  of  this  nation  so  helpless  that 
there  exists  in  the  institutions  of  our  country  no  power  to  counter- 
act the  bias  of  this  foreign  legislation  ?  that  the  growers  of  grain 
must  submit  to  this  exclusion  from  the  foreign  markets  of  their 
produce  ?  that  the  shippers  must  dismantle  their  ships,  the  trade  of 
the  North  stagnate  at  the  wharves,  and  the  manufacturers  starve  at 
their  looms,  while  the  whole  people  shall  pay  tribute  to  foreign 
industry,  to  be  clad  in  foreign  garb  ?  that  the  Congress  of  the  Union 
are  impotent  to  restore  the  balance  in  favor  of  native  industry, 
destroyed  by  the  statutes  of  another  realm  ?  More  just  and  more 
generous  sentiments  will,  I  trust,  prevail." 

Not  to  be  misunderstood  with  regard  to  the  complaints 
which  some  of  the  growers  of  cotton  were  then  beginning 
to  make  against  the  principle  of  protection,  and  the  charge 


208  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

that  it  operated  unequally  upon  their  section  of  the  Union, 
he  said,  speaking  of  the  existing  tariff  law : 

"Its  object  was  to  balance  the  burdens  upon  native  industry 
imposed  by  the  operation  of  foreign  laws  ;  but  not  to  aggravate  the 
burdens  of  one  section  of  the  Union  by  the  relief  afforded  to  another. 
To  the  great  principle  sanctioned  by  that  act  [that  of  1828]  one  of 
those  upon  which  the  Constitution  itself  was  formed,  I  hope  and 
trust  the  authorities  of  the  Union  will  adhere.  But  if  any  of  the 
duties  imposed  by  the  act  only  relieve  the  manufacturer  by  aggra- 
vating the  burden  of  the  planter,  let  a  careful  revisal  of  its  pro- 
visions, enlightened  by  the  practical  experience  of  its  effects,  be 
directed  to  retain  those  which  impart  protection  to  native  industry,  and 
remove  or  supply  the  place  of  those  which  only  alleviate  one  great 
national  interest  by  the  depression  of  another." 

Here  Mr.  Adams  was  explicit  in  defense  of  the  princi- 
ple of  protection,  but  very  properly  invoked  the  spirit  of 
compromise  in  applying  it,  so  as  to  avoid  any  conflict  of 
interest  between  the  sections.  But  as  the  election  had 
passed  and  he  had  been  defeated  by  General  Jackson, 
these  avowals  in  his  last  message  become  important  only 
as  showing  that,  up  to  that  time,  the  opinions  of  all  the 
Presidents  had  concurred  in  favoi  of  protection.  What 
would  have  been  the  effect  upon  the  Presidential  contest 
of  1828,  if  he  had  expressed  himself  thus  fully  and  clearly 
before  instead  of  after  it  transpired,  is  an  inquiry  more 
easily  suggested  than  answered.  Such  an  inquiry,  how- 
ever, is  not  within  the  scope  of  our  present  investigations, 
any  more  than  those  which  invoke  the  antagonisms  of 
party. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  OF  1828  INDORSED  PROTECTION  - 
DEFENDED  IN  CONGRESS  BY  JACKSON'S  SUPPORTERS  — ALSO 
BY  JACKSON  IN  HIS  INAUGURAL,  AND  IN  HIS  FIRST  MESSAGE 
—  MANUFACTURES  INCREASE  PRICE  OF  AGRICULTURAL  PRO^ 
DUCTIONS  — THEY  CREATE  HOME  MARKETS  — JACKSON  FA- 
VORED DISCRIMINATING  AND  NOT  HORIZONTAL  DUTIE£- 
NECESSARY  TO  CREATE  COMPETITION. 

N  JOT  only  did  the  necessities  of  the  country  require,  but 
the  almost  universal  public  sentiment  justified,  the 
increase  of  duties  by  the  tariff  of  1828,  over  those  fixed  by 
that  of  1824.  The  latter,  under  Mr.  Monroe's  adminis- 
tration, had  been  so  framed  expressly  as  to  give  "  additional 
protection" — beyond  that  given  by  any  of  the  laws  previ- 
ously passed- — and  by  1828  the  necessity  for  another 
advance  step  was  so  palpable  that,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Presidential  election  was  decided  mainly  with  reference  to 
it.  Besides  what  has  already  been  stated  upon  this  point, 
there  is  abundant  evidence  to  show  that  the  friends  of 
General  Jackson  in  Congress  exhibited  as  honest  a  deter- 
mination as  he  did  himself,  to  prove  to  the  country  that 
they  did  not  seek  his  election  except  upon  the  distinct 
ground  that  he  and  they  were  resolved  that  all  the  depart- 
ments of  American  industry  should  be  afforded  a  proper 
degree  of  national  protection. 

When  a  motion  was  made  in  the  Senate,  by  Mr.  Kane, 

of  Illinois,  to  "lay  a  duty  on  lead  in  pigs,  bars,  or  sheets 
i*  209 


2  JO  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

of  three  cents  per  pound;  on  lead  shot,  four  cents  per 
pound ;  on  litharge  and  lead,  manufactured  into  pipes,  five 
cents  per  pound "-  -  all  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the 
manufacturers  of  lead — Mr.  Thomas  H.  Benton,  of  Mis- 
souri, said: 

"  He  was  a  memoerof  the  Senate  in  1824,  when  the  (then)  exist- 
ing tariff  was  enacted,  and  was  in  favor  of  a  higher  duty  upon  lead 
and  its  manufactures  at  that  time,  but  was  prevented  from  making 
any  motion  to  that  effect,  by  the  admonition,  often  repeated,  that 
the  whole  bill  might  be  lost  if  alterations  were  attempted." 

Mr.  Benton  supported  the  proposition  of  Mr.  Kane, 
upon  the  ground  that  it  would  be  beneficial  to  the  lead 
regions  of  Missouri  and  Illinois,  and  said  also  that  he 
"  considered  lead  as  one  of  the  articles  of  domestic  pro- 
duction on  which  the  system,  of  protecting  duties  might 
legitimately  be  carried  to  the  prohibitory  point  against  its 
foreign  rival. " 

While  the  bill  was  pending  in  the  Senate,  Colonel 
Richard  M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky,  said: 

"The  State  of  Kentucky  has  been  much  agitated,  but  not  much 
divided,  uoon  the  *  American  System.'  It  is  with  us  a  favorite  svs- 
tem." 

Again: 

*  Why  shall  we  of  the  interior  be  left  to  grapple  with  foreign 
competition  in  all  the  productions  of  our  farmers  and  manufacturers, 
who  constitute  the  body  and  soul  of  our  population,  while  the 
woolens  and  cottons  of  the  East  are  effectually  protected,  and,  in  a 
great  degree,  at  the  expense  of  the  West?" 

Again: 

"  I  have  always  been  one  among  the  Western  members  to  ele- 
vate New  England  above  foreign  competition  in  the  manufacture  of 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  211 

hats,  shoes,  ready-made  clothing,  woolens,  and  cottons.     In  this  I 
have  obeyed  the  will  of  my  constituents." 

And  again  : 

"If  gentlemen  will  do  me  the  favor  to  examine  the  journal  of 
1824,  when  the  former  tariff  bill  was  pending,  they  will  find  my 
name  among  the  supporters  of  the  measures  for  the  protection  of 
domestic  cottons  and  woolens." 

Mr.  Benton  moved  "  to  impose  a  duty  of  twenty-five 
cents  per  pound  on  imported  indigo,  with  a  progressive 
increase  at  the  rate  of  twenty-five  cents  per  pound  per 
annum  until  the  whole  duty  amounted  to  one  dollar  per 
pound."  And  in  support  of  the  motion  he  declared  his 
'  object  to  be  two-fold  in  proposing  this  duty :  first,  to 
place  the  American  System  beyond  the  reach  of  its  enemies  > 
by  procuring  a  home  supply  of  an  article  indispensable  to 
its  existence  ;  and,  next,  to  benefit  the  South  by  reviving 
the  cultivation  of  one  of  its  ancient  and  valuable  staples." 
During  a  discussion  of  the  bill  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, Mr.  James  Buchanan,  of  Pennsylvania,  said  : 

"  For  my  own  part,  I  am  a  sincere  friend  of  the  tariff,  and  have 
no  doubt  that  the  manufacture  of  woolens  requires  additional  pro- 
tection. The  great  question  is,  in  what  degree?  We  must  know  the 
extent  of  the  evil  before  we  can  proportion  the  remedy  to  it.  Upon 
this  subject  my  principles  have  never  changed.  I  have  ever  been 
in  favor  of  affording  such  protection  to  our  domestic  manufactures  as 
will  enable  them  to  enter  into  fair  and  successful  competition  with 
foreign  manufactures  in  our  domestic  market." 

At  another  time,  when  referring  to  the  duty  on  wool- 
ens, Mr.  Buchanan  also  said: 

"  Let  us,  then,  tread  in  the  plain  path  of  our  predecessors.  The 
duty  is  now  33^3  per  cent  ad  valorem.  Let  us  raise  it  so  much  as  to 


212  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

afford  a  fair  protection  to  the  woolen  manufacturers.  The  people  will 
then  understand  what  we  are  doing.  This  has  ever  been  my 
opinion." 

Besides  the  gentlemen  whose  opinions  are  here  quoted, 
the  bill  was  supported  and  voted  for  by  Mr.  Martin  Van 
Buren  and  Mr.  Silas  Wright,  of  New  York.  It  need  not 
be  stated,  for  the  benefit  of  any  familiar  with  our  political 
history,  that,  among  all  the  distinguished  supporters  of 
General  Jackson  for  the  Presidency  in  1828,  none  deserved 
more  to  be  so  considered  than  those  whose  opinions  and 
votes  are  now  given.  The  bill  defended  and  supported  by 
them,  as  his  special  and  ablest  friends,  was  pending  in 
Congress  when  he  wrote  his  letter  to  the  Governor  of  In- 
diana, during  the  canvass,  and  what  they  said  and  did 
would  be  merely  cumulative  proof  of  his  own  purposes, 
which  he  distinctly  avowed  for  himself.  Therefore,  in 
view  of  all  the  facts  pertaining  to  the  canvass,  the  conclu- 
sion is  unavoidable  that  General  Jackson  became  President 
under  the  emphatic  pledge  that  he  was  the  friend  of  the 
system  of  protection,  as  embodied  in  the  law  of  1828,  and 
all  previous  tariff  laws;  and  that  he  occupied  the  same 
position  with  reference  to  it  as  Washington,  Adams,  Jef- 
ferson, Madison,  and  Monroe, —  to  say  nothing  of  John 
Quincy  Adams.  The  line  of  the  Presidential  supporters 
of  protection  was,  consequently,  up  to  that  time,  unbroken. 

General  Jackson  was  inaugurated  as  President,  March 
4,  1829,  and  in  his  inaugural  address,  then  said  : 

"With  regard  to  a  proper  selection  of  the  subjects  of  impost, 
with  a  view  to  revenue,  it  would  seem  to  me'that  the  spirit  of  equity, 
caution  and  compromise,  in  which  the  Constitution  was  formed, 


HISTORY    OF    TIIK    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  213 

requires  that  the  great  interests  of  agriculture,  commerce,  and  manu- 
factures should  be  equally  favored:  and  that  perhaps  the  only  excep- 
tion to  this  rule  should  consist  in  the  peculiar  encouragement  of  any 
of  the  products  of  either  of  them  that  may  be  found  essential  to  our 
national  independence." 

Interpreted  in  the  light  of  his  own  previous  pledges, 
and  of  the  course  of  his  friends  and  supporters,  this  was 
accepted  as  a  promise  that,  during  his  administration, 
there  would  be  no  departure  from  the  policy  of  protection, 
or  from  the  course  pursued  by  his  Presidential  predeces- 
sors. By  placing  agriculture,  commerce  and  manufact- 
ures upon  a  common  footing  of  equality,  to  be  " equally 
favored,"  because  their  industrial  interests  were  insepar- 
ably united,  he  was  understood  to  put  himself  squarely 
upon  the  ground  where  the  protective  policy  had  always 
rested.  He  encountered  no  opposition,  therefore,  upon  that 
ground,  except  that  which  was  beginning  to  exhibit  itself 
in  the  South,  among  those  who  had  supported  him  for  the 
Presidency,  mainly,  as  some  supposed,  because  the  Vice- 
Presidency  was  secured  to  Mr.  Calhoun.  Whatsoever 
opposition  to  him  was  exhibited  in  the  North  and  West 
had  reference  to  other  matters  not  proper  to  be  discussed 
here. 

In  his  first  message,  delivered  in  December,  1829,  he 
expressed  himself  at  some  length  with  reference  to  the 
tariff,  and  it  is  deemed  necessary  to  give  his  precise  words, 
that  his  views  may  be  fully  understood.  He  said: 

v  "  No  very  considerable  change  has  occurred  during  the  recess 
of  Congress  in  the  condition  of  either  our  agriculture,  commerce, 
or  manufactures.  The  operation  of  the  tariff  has  not  proved  so 


214  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

injurious  to  the  two  former,  or  as  beneficial  to  the  latter,  as  was 
anticipated.  Importations  of  foreign  goods  have  not  been  sensibly 
diminished,  while  domestic  competition,  under  an  illusive  excite- 
ment, has  increased  the  production  much  beyond  the  demand  for 
home  consumption.  The  consequences  have  been  low  prices,  tem- 
porary embarrassment,  and  partial  loss.  That  such  of  our  manu- 
facturing establishments  as  are  based  upon  capital,  and  are  pru- 
dently managed,  will  survive  the  shock,  and  be  ultimately  profitable, 
there  is  no  good  reason  to  doubt. 

"To  regulate  its  conduct,  so  as  to  promote  equally  the  prosperity 
of  these  three  cardinal  interests,  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  of 
government;  and  it  may  be  regretted  that  the  complicated  restric- 
tions which  now  embarrass  the  intercourse  of  nations,  could  not  by 
common  consent  be  abolished,  and  commerce  allowed  to  flow  in 
those  channels  to  which  individual  enterprise,  always  its  surest 
guide,  might  direct  it.  But  we  must  ever  expect  selfish  legislation  in 
other  nations;  and  are  therefore  compelled  to  adapt  our  own  to  their  reg- 
ulations, in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  avoid  serious  injury,  and 
to  harmonize  the  conflicting  interests  of  our  agriculture,  our  com- 
merce, and  our  manufactures.  Under  these  impressions,  I  invite 
your  attention  to  the  existing  tariff,  believing  that  some  of  its  pro- 
visions require  modification. 

"The  general  rule  to  be  applied  in  graduating  the  duties  upon 
articles  of  foreign  growth  or  manufacture,  is  that  which  will  place 
our  own  in  fair  competition  with  those  of  other  countries;  and  the  induce- 
ments to  advance  even  a  step  beyond  this  point are  controlling  in  regard 
to  those  articles  which  are  of  primary  necessity  in  time  of  war. 
When  we  reflect  upon  the  difficulty  and  delicacy  of  this  operation, 
it  is  important  that  it  should  never  be  attempted  but  with  the 
utmost  caution.  Frequent  legislation  in  regard  to  any  branch  of 
industry,  affecting  its  value,  and  by  which  its  capital  may  be  trans- 
ferred to  new  channels,  must  always  be  productive  of  hazardous 
speculation  and  loss. 

"  In  deliberating,  therefore,  on  these  interesting  subjects,  local 
feelings  and  prejudices  should  be  merged  in  the  patriotic  determi- 
nation to  promote  the  great  interests  of  the  whole.  All  attempts 
to  connect  them  with  the  party  conflicts  of  the  day  are  necessarily 
injurious,  and  should  be  discountenanced.  Our  action  upon  them 
should  be  under  the  control  of  higher  and  purer  motives.  Legis- 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  21$ 

lation,  subjected  to  such  influences,  can  never  be  just,  and  will  not 
long  retain  the  sanction  of  a  people  whose  active  patriotism  is  not 
bounded  by  sectional  limits,  nor  insensible  to  that  spirit  of  conces- 
sion and  forbearance  which  gave  life  to  our  political  compact,  and 
still  sustains  it.  Discarding  all  calculations  of  political  ascendancy, 
the  North,  the  South,  the  East,  and  the  West  should  unite  in 
diminishing  any  burden  of  which  either  may  justly  complain. 

"  The  agricultural  interest  of  our  country  is  so  connected  with 
every  other,  and  so  superior  in  importance  to  them  all,  that  it  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  invite  to  it  your  special  attention.  It  is  prin- 
cipally as  manufactures  and  commerce  tend  to  increase  the  value  of  agri- 
cultural productions,  and  to  extend  their  application  to  the  wants  and  com- 
forts of  society,  that  they  deserve  the  fostering  care  of  government. 

"  Looking  forward  to  the  period,  not  far  distant,  when  a  sinking 
fund  will  no  longer  be  required,  the  duties  on  those  articles  of  im- 
portation which  cannot  come  in  competition  with  our  own  productions,  are 
the  first  that  should  engage  the  attention  of  Congress  in  the  modi- 
fication of  the  tariff.  Of  these,  tea  and  coffee  are  the  most  promi- 
nent; they  enter  largely  into  the  consumption  of  the  country,  and 
have  become  articles  of  necessity  to  all  classes.  A  reduction,  there- 
fore, of  the  existing  duties  will  be  felt  as  a  common  benefit;  but  like 
all  other  legislation  connected  with  commerce,  to  be  efficacious,  and 
not  injurious,  it  should  be  gradual  and  certain." 

By  a  careful  reading  of  the  foregoing,  any  man  of  ordi- 
nary intelligence  can  perceive  the  course  of  policy  Gen- 
eral Jackson  had  then  marked  out  for  his  administration; 
and  also  that  it  was  consistent  with  his  vote  for  the  tariff 
of  1824,  with  his  letters  to  Dr.  Coleman  and  to  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Indiana,  and  with  the  pledges  and  avowals  of  his 
leading  and  most  influential  friends  during  the  Presiden- 
tial canvass.  Realizing,  as  he  did,  that  the  tariff  of  1828 
had  not  produced  the  injurious  results  predicted  by  they 
advocates  of  free  trade,  and  that  it  had  been  less  bene-/// 
ficial  to  the  manufacturers  than  they  had  anticipated,  it  was 
apparent  to  him  that  our  home  markets  were  insufficient 


2 1 6  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

for  the  sale  of  our  own  manufactured  goods,  because  of 
the  undiminished  supply  of  foreign  manufactures,  and  that, 
consequently,  our  manufacturers  had  been  subjected  to  in- 
jurious losses.  The  remedy  for  this  condition  of  things 
was,  in  his  opinion,  such  a  modification  of  the  tariff  as 
would  enable  our  manufacturers  to  compete  more  success- 
fully with  those  of  foreign  countries,  by  the  increase  of 
home  markets,  inasmuch  as  their  goods  were  shut  out,  in  a 
great  measure,  from  foreign  markets.  It  did  not  occur  to 
him  —  as  it  has  since  then  occurred  to  some  modern  poli- 
ticians-—  that  the  Government  should  withdraw  its  protec- 
tion from  manufactures ;  or  that  the  whole  of  our  labor 
should  be  applied  to  agriculture,  because  of  the  superior 
importance  of  that  pursuit,  as  the  basis  of  our  prosperity; 
or  that  we  should  buy  the  fabrics  necessary  for  our  con- 
sumption from  foreign  manufacturers,  merely  because  they 
were  offered  cheaper  than  our  own;  or  that  we  should 
leave  our  markets  subject  to  such  fluctuations  and  uncer- 
tainties as  might  be  occasioned  by  the  policy  of  other  gov- 
ernments. On  the  contrary,  he  recognized  agriculture, 
commerce,  and  manufactures  as  the  "  three  cardinal  inter- 
ests "  which  demanded  the  fostering  care  of  the  Govern- 
ment,—  each  equally  with  the  other.  And  whilst,  if  all  the 
other  nations  had  adopted  the  policy  of  free  trade,  we 
might,  in  his  opinion,  safely  follow  their  example,  yet,  as 
they  had  not,  it  was  our  duty  to  maintain  the  principle  of 
protection. 

He  did  not  hesitate  to  recommend  the  adoption  of  a 
"  general  rule  to  be  applied  in  graduating  the  duties  upon 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  21 7 

articles  of  foreign  growth  or  manufacture."  The  problem 
to  be  solved  he  considered  a  difficult  one,  but  the  first  step 
toward  its  solution  was,  in  his  opinion,  the  graduation  of 
the  duties.  He  had  no  such  idea  as  that  the  duties  should 
be  the  same  upon  all  articles,  or,  in  other  words,  accord- 
ing to  a  horizontal  scale.  This,  as  he  could  readily  see, 
tended  toward  free  trade,  and  as  it  would  apply  to  all  im- 
portations, would  leave  the  duties  upon  necessaries  con- 
sumed by  those  who  subsisted  by  wages,  the  same  as  those 
upon  luxuries  consumed  by  the  wealthy.  Therefore,  his 
"general  rule"  consisted  "  in  graduating  the  duties  upon 
articles  of  foreign  growth  and  manufacture ;"  that  is,  in 
proportioning  or  adjusting  them  so  as  to  "  place  our  own 
[manufacturers]  in  fair  competition  with  those  of  other 
countries."  This  could  only  be  done  by  discriminating 
against  foreign  manufactures  and  in  favor  of  our  own,  by 
means  of  specific  duties  laid  accordingly  as  each  article  of 
"  foreign  growth  or  manufacture "  should  interfere  with 
any  of  our  home  industries.  He  would  even  have  us  go 
beyond  this  point  of  mere  protection,  where  the  articles 
imported  were  such  as  we  would  require  in  a  state  of  war. 
Although  he  did  not,  in  so  many  words,  recommend  it, 
he  manifestly  meant  that,  as  to  all  such  articles,  it  was  our 
duty  to  go  to  the  extent  ^{prohibition,  for  the  reason  that 
we  should  not  depend  for  our  war  material  upon  any 
foreign  country. 

Upon  no  point  is  he  more  clear  and  explicit  than  that 
which  assigns  the  reason  he  entertained  why  duties  should 
discriminate  in  favor  of  manufactures.  It  is  simply  and 


2l8  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

plainly  this  :  That  they  "  tend  to  increase  the  value  of  agri- 
cultural productions"  by  creating  a  demand  and  home 
market  for  them,  and  by  adapting  their  products  to  "the 
wants  and  comforts  of  society,"  and  thereby  supply  the 
public  with  what  they  need  for  consumption.  And  it  is 
because  of  this  mutuality  of  interest  between  agriculture 
and  manufactures  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  latter  "  deserve 
the  fostering  care  of  government." 

The  administration  of  General  Jackson  commenced, 
therefore,  as  distinctively  in  favor  of  protection  as  any 
preceding  it;  and  with  the  recommendation  on  his  part 
that  if  the  tariff  of  1828  did  not  protect  sufficiently, 
it  should  be  changed  to  that  end.  Whatsoever  was 
involved  in  the  question  of  expediency  was  submitted,  of 
course,  to  Congress,  to  which  it  properly  belonged  to 
decide  how  far  the  principle  of  discrimination  should  be 
carried.  But  as  it  regarded  the  duty  of  exercising  the 
power  when  necessary,  his  recommendations  were  obvi- 
ously intended  to  inculcate  it  so  plainly  that  his  meaning- 
should  not  be  left  in  any  doubt. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

JACKSON'S  ADMINISTRATION  — CONDITION  OF  THE  TREASURY 
AND  THE  PUBLIC  DEBT  — HE  DID  NOT  FAVOR  REDUCTION 
OF  DUTIES  TO  AVOID  A  SURPLUS  — FAVORED  PROTECTION 
NOTWITHSTANDING  SURPLUS  —  RECOMMENDED  DISTRIBU- 
TION OF  SURPLUS  — CONGRATULATIONS  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  TAR- 
IFF OF  1828  — PROTECTION  CONSTITUTIONAL  — AGREES  WITH 
MADISON  — REVENUE  PRIMARY  OBJECT,  BUT  DISCRIMINA- 
TION FOR  PROTECTION  NECESSARY— UP  TO  THAT  TIME  ALL 
THE  PRESIDENTS  FAVORED  PROTECTION. 

A  T  the  date  of  the  message  from  which  the  extract  in 
^^  the  last  chapter  was  taken,  the  financial  condition  of 
the  country  was  satisfactory  At  the  beginning  of  the  cal- 
endar year  the  balance  in  the  Treasury  exceeded  $5,000,- 
ooo,  and  it  was  estimated  that  on  January  i,  1830,  it  would 
exceed  $4,000,000.  Over  $12,000,000  of  the  public  debt 
had  been  paid  during  the  year,  and  it  was  stated  by  the 
President  that  "in  a  very  short  time"  thereafter,  the 
entire  debt  would  be  extinguished. 

Like  Mr.  Jefferson,  therefore,  who  had  an  actual  sur- 
plus in  the  Treasury  to  dispose  of,  and  Mr.  Monroe,  who 
anticipated  a  surplus,  General  Jackson  found  himself  in  a 
condition  requiring  him  to  decide  which  one  of  two  courses 
should  be  adopted  —  either  to  lower  the  duties  upon 
imports  to  what  is  now  called  a  revenue  standard,  so  as  to 
collect  no  more  from  customs  than  necessary  to  defray 

the  expenses  of  Government ;  or  to  adhere  to  the  principle 

219 


220  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

of  protection  by  levying  duties  with  that  view,  without 
regard  to  the  amount  of  revenue  produced.  If  he  had 
favored  a  purely  revenue  tariff,  the  occasion  was  a  most 
proper  and  suitable  one  for  him  to  announce  it ;  and  if  the 
idea  of  incidental  protection  —  that  is,  such  protection  as 
a  revenue  duty  may,  by  possibility,  afford  —  had  then 
occurred  to  him,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  he  would  have 
availed  himself  of  so  favorable  an  opportunity  to  make  it 
known.  But  he  did  not  intend  to  be  misunderstood  upon 
either  of  these  important  propositions.  He  was  opposed 
to  a  mere  revenue  tariff,  and  to  mere  incidental  protection  , 
and  was  in  favor  of  preserving  the  principle  of  discrimi- 
nating duties,  no  matter  how  much  revenue  was  produced. 
And,  consequently,  in  the  same  message,  he  said : 

"After  the  extinction  of  the  public  debt,  it  is  not  probable  that 
any  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  upon  principles  satisfactory  to  the 
people  of  the  Union,  will,  until  a  remote  period,  if  ever,  leave  the 
Government  without  a  considerable  surplus  in  the  Treasury,  beyond 
ivhat  may  be  required  for  its  current  service" 

He  was  considering  the  fact  that  the  annual  receipts 
of  revenue  exceeded  the  annual  expenditures  ;  and,  conse- 
quently, that  the  surplus  had  to  be  disposed  of  in  some 
way,  inasmuch  as  the  public  debt  would  soon  be  paid.  All 
this  was  directly  before  his  mind,  and  the  occasion  furnished 
him  a  fit  opportunity  for  suggesting  a  strictly  revenue 
tariff  if  it  had  met  his  approval.  But,  looking  forward,  he 
could  see  that  if  a  protective  tariff  were  persevered  in,  the 
surplus  would  continue  to  exist, —  increasing,  probably, 
from  year  to  year.  And  with  these  convictions  influencing 
him,  he  considered  it  his  duty  to  declare  that,  in  his 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  221 

opinion,  so  long  as  the  tariff  remained  adjusted  "  upon 
principles  satisfactory  to  the  people" — which  he  favored  — 
it  would  produce  so  much  more  revenue  than  was  neces- 
sary for  ordinary  expenses,  as  always  to  leave  a  surplus  to 
be  otherwise  disposed  of.  And  how  to  dispose  of  this 
surplus  was  the  practical  question  present  in  his  mind.  To 
say  that  he  did  not  understand  it,  and  that  he  did  not  act 
with  the  wisdom  of  a  statesman,  when  he  decided  to  adopt 
the  views  of  all  his  predecessors  by  maintaining  the  prin- 
ciple of  protection,  is  an  accusation  which  the  advocates 
of  free  trade  have  accustomed  themselves  to  make,  without 
seeming  to  realize  that  their  charge  of  ignorance  against 
him  recoils  upon  themselves. 

By  the  principles  of  the  "American  System" — which 
General  Jackson  had  approved  —  there  would  have  been 
no  difficulty  in  disposing  of  this  surplus  by  applying  it  to 
works  of  internal  improvement.  But  this  course  presented 
some  embarrassments,  which  he  did  not  deem  advisable  to 
encounter.  Besides  the  troublesome  question  of  constitu- 
tionality, local  interests  and  antagonisms  left  all  such 
matters  in  a  condition  of  doubtful  propriety.  General 
Jackson,  therefore,  after  pointing  out  some  of  the  difficul- 
ties which,  in  his  opinion,  had  "attended  appropriations 
for  internal  improvements,"  recommended  to  Congress 
what  he  considered  to  be  a  proper  and  suitable  remedy,  as 
follows  : 

"  To  avoid  these  evils,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  most  safe,  just 
and  federal  disposition  which  could  be  made  of  this  surplus  revenue, 
would  be  its  apportionment  among  the  several  States,  according  to 
their  ratio  of  representation;  and  should  this  measure  not  be  found 


222  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

warranted  by  the  Constitution,  that  it  would  be  expedient  to  pro- 
pose to  the  States  an  amendment  authorizing  it." 

He  could  not  have  found  apter  language  to  express  his 
desire  for  the  continuance  of  the  existing  protective  system. 
His  whole  argument  maintains  protection  for  its  own  sake 
—  as  a  distinct  and  substantive  measure  of  national  policy, 
independent  and  regardless  of  revenue.  If  his  opinion 
had  been  otherwise,  he  would  have  recommended  a  reduc- 
tion of  all  duties  to  a  revenue  standard,  so  as  to  provide 
against  the  possible  accumulation  of  a  surplus  in  the  Treas- 
ury. So  far,  however,  from  favoring  such  a  policy,  or 
from  desiring  to  see  the  Government  make  the  slightest 
advance  toward  free  trade,  he  maintained  his  own  consist- 
ency by  throwing  the  whole  weight  of  his  character  in  favor 
of  protection,  as  he  had  already  done  by  his  vote  for  the 
tariff  of  1824,  and  in  the  pledges  made  by  himself,  and  by 
his  friends  for  him,  during  the  contest  which  resulted  in 
his  election  the  year  before. 

But  the  evidence  that  this  was  the  settled  conviction 
of  his  mind  is  not  confined  to  what  he  said  in  this  message 
of  1829.  In  his  veto  message,  May  27,  1830,  declining  to 
approve  the  bill  appropriating  money  for  the  Maysville 
turnpike  road,  he  was  even  more  explicit.  In  that  mes- 
sage he  said : 

"Will  not  the  people  demand,  as  they  have  a  right  to  do,  such 
a  prudent  system  of  expenditure  as  will  pay  the  debts  of  the 
Union,  and  authorize  the  reduction  of  every  tax  to  as  low  a  point 
as  the  wise  observance  of  the  necessity  to  protect  that  portion  of  our 
manufactures  and  labor,  whose  prosperity  is  essential  to  our  national 
safety  and  independence,  will  allow?  When  the  national  debt  is  paid, 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  223 

the  duties  upon  those  articles  which  we  do  not  raise  may  be  repealed 
with  safety,  and  still  leave,  I  trust,  without  oppression  to  any  sec- 
tion of  the  country,  an  accumulating  surplus  fund,  which  may  be  ben- 
eficially applied  to  some  well  digested  system  of  improvement.  " 

He  said  also  in  this  same  message  : 

"As  long  as  the  encouragement  of  domestic  manufactures  is  directed 
to  national  ends,  it  shall  receive  from  me  a  temperate  but  steady  support. 
There  is  no  necessary  connection  between  it  and  the  system  of  appropria- 
tions. On  the  contrary,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  supposition  of 
their  dependence  upon  each  other  is  calculated  to  excite  the  preju- 
dices of  the  public  against  both.  The  former  is  sustained  on  the 
ground  of  its  consistency  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  of 
its  origin  being  traced  to  the  assent  of  all  the  parties  to  the  original  compact, 
and  of  its  having  the  support  and  approbation  of  a  majority  of  the  people; 
on  which  account  it  is  at  least  entitled  to  a  fair  experiment." 

He  could  not  have  said  more  —  or  have  said  it  more 
emphatically  —  in  favor  of  the  system  of  protection.  "Its 
consistency  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  Constitution;" 
its  establishment  by  "the  assent  of  all"  the  States;  and  its 
approval  by  "a  majority  of  the  people,"  are  propositions 
so  fully  and  clearly  stated  as  to  show  that  he  did  not 
intend  to  practice  the  slightest  equivocation  with  regard 
to  them. 

But  he  returned  again  to  the  question  of  disposing  of 
the  surplus  revenue  —  which  necessarily  involved  the  con- 
tinuance of  protection  —  in  his  message  of  1830,  about  six 
months  after  his  veto  of  the  Maysville  road  bill.  After 
discussing  the  question  of  internal  improvements,  and 
pointing  out  what  appeared  to  him  to  be  the  difference 
between  appropriations  for  national  and  those  for  local 
objects,  he  said: 

"Thus  viewing  the  subject,  I  have  heretofore  felt  it  my  duty  to 


224  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

recommend  the  adoption  of  some  plan  for  the  distribution  of  the 
surplus  funds,  which  may  at  any  time  remain  in  the  Treasury  after 
the  national  debt  shall  have  been  paid,  among  the  States,  in  proportion 
to  the  number  of  their  representatives,  to  be  applied  by  them  to 
objects  of  internal  improvement." 

He  then  repeated  what  he  had  said  in  his  first  message 
with  reference  to  the  probable  future  adjustment  of  the 
tariff,  accompanying  it  with  the  remark  that  he  "had  no 
cause  to  change  that  opinion,  but  much  to  confirm  it." 
And,  in  order  that  the  policy  he  proposed  for  his  admin- 
istration should  be  well  and  distinctly  understood,  he 
devoted  a  portion  of  his  message  to  a  discussion  of  the 
tariff,  with  regard  to  both  the  constitutionality  and  expe- 
diency of  protection.  It  is  impossible  to  read  what  he 
said  without  being  convinced  of  his  sincerity,  and  without 
realizing  that  his  reasoning  is  conclusive.  He  said: 

"Among  the  numerous  causes  of  congratulation,  the  condition 
of  our  impost  revenue  deserves  special  mention,  inasmuch  as  it 
promises  the  means  of  extinguishing  the  public  debt  sooner  than 
was  anticipated,  and  furnishes  a  strong  illustration  of  the  practical 
effects  of  the  present  tariff  [that  of  1828]  upon  our  commercial  interests. 

"The  object  of  the  tariff  is  objected  to  by  some  as  unconstitu- 
tional; and  it  is  considered  by  almost  all  as  defective  in  many  of  its 
parts. 

"The  power  to  impose  duties  on  imports  originally  belonged  to 
the  several  States.  The  right  to  adjust  these  duties  with  a  view  to 
the  encouragement  of  domestic  branches  of  industry,  is  so  completely  identi- 
cal with  that  power,  that  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  the  existence  of  the 
one  without  the  other.  The  States  have  delegated  their  whole  author- 
ity over  imports  to  the  general  Government,  without  limitation  or  restric- 
tion, saving  the  very  inconsiderable  reservation  relating  to  the  inspec- 
tion laws.  This  authority  having  thus  entirely  passed  from  the  States. 
the  right  to  exercise  it  for  the  purpose  of  protection  does  not  exist  in 
them;  and  consequently,  if  it  is  not  possessed  by  the  general  Government, 
it  must  be  extinct.  Our  political  system  would  thus  present  the 


NUMBER    ENGAGED 

In  all   Gainful   Occupations,  and  the  Relative  Percentage 

in  each. 


TOTAL  LABORING-  POPULATION,  17,392,099. 


Agriculture, 
7,670,493  or  44  per  cent, 


Professional  and  Personal, 
4,074,238  or  23.5  per  cent. 


Manufacturing,  Mechanics  and 

Mining, 
3,837,112  or  22  per  cent. 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  225 

anomaly  of  a  people  stripped  of  the  right  to  foster  their  own  indus- 
try, and  to  counteract  the  most  selfish  and  destructive  policy  which 
might  be  adopted  by  foreign  nations.  This  surely  cannot  be  the  case; 
this  indispensable  power •,  thus  surrendered  by  the  States,  must  be  within 
the  scope  of  the  authority  on  the  subject  expressly  delegated  to  Congress. 

"In  this  conclusion,  I  am  confirmed  as  well  by  the  opinions  of 
Presidents  Washington,  Jefferson,  Madison  and  Monroe,  who  have 
each  repeatedly  recommended  the  exercise  of  this  right  under  the 
Constitution,  as  by  the  uniform  practice  of  Congress,  the  continued 
acquiescence  of  the  States,  and  the  general  understanding  of  the  peaplt" 

This  is  a  substantial  repetition  of  the  argument  made 
by  Mr.  Madison,  upon  the  question  of  the  constitutional 
power  of  Congress  to  protect  manufacturing  and  other 
industries,  differing  only  in  the  fact  that  it  is  more  extended. 
And  it  is  among  the  wonders  of  the  present  age  that  some 
modern  politicians  represent  these  distinguished  men  as 
having  entertained  opinions  directly  at  variance  with  their 
express  avowals ;  and  others  who  assume  to  know  far 
more  of  the  Constitution  and  the  rules  which  govern  its 
interpretation,  than  they  did.  General  Jackson  was  not 
what  the  world  calls  a  learned  man,  in  the  sense  of  having 
acquired  a  large  fund  of  information  from  a  long  course  of 
study.  The  faculties  of  his  mind  were  developed  and 
strengthened  by  constant,  contact  with  the  actual  realities 
of  life,  not  enervated  by  the  pursuit  after  visionary  theo- 
ries, which  men  of  genius  sometimes  follow  with  the  same 
enthusiasm  as  children  do  butterflies,  and  with  the  same 
practical  results.  He  had  no  leisure,  if  he  had  felt  inclined, 
to  pore  over  the  pages  prepared  by  closeted  students  and 
college  professors  with  a  view  to  construct  the  speculations 
pf  political  economy,  which  they  miscall  science,  as  the 
'5 


226  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

basis  for  the  sophistry  of  free  trade.  But  he  had  learned 
the  character  and  construction  of  the  Constitution  and 
Government  —  as  he  declared  in  his  letter  to  the  Governor 
of  Indiana — "in  the  times  and  from  the  sages  of  the 
Revolution,"  and  had  drawn  the  inspiration  of  patriotism 
from  their  example.  He,  moreover,  possessed  a  most 
exact  comprehension  of  the  use  and  meaning  of  language, 
and  never  failed,  in  anything  that  came  from  his  pen,  to 
convey  his  precise  meaning  and  intentions,  plainly  and 
without  disguise.  In  the  foregoing  extracts  from  his  mes- 
sages, he  did  so  with  such  perspicuity  and  emphasis,  as  to 
leave  no  ground  for  cavil  or  doubt  about  his  opinions  upon 
the  question  of  either  the  constitutionality  or  expediency 
of  the  policy  of  protection.  And  his  whole  argument 
shows  how  urgent  he  was  that  the  Government  should 
maintain  this  policy  in  whatsoever  tariff  legislation  should 
ensue.  He  realized,  of  course,  as  everybody  does,  the 
difficulty  of  adjusting  the  duties  upon  imports  so  as  to 
satisfy  conflicting  interests,  and  avoid  local  and  sectional 
prejudices.  As  to  the  law  then  existing,  he  regarded  its 
advantages  and  evils  as  both  overrated.  But  he  entirely 
repudiated  the  idea  of  abandoning  the  principle  of  pro- 
tection. On  the  contrary,  he  endeavored  to  excite  the 
patriotism  of  the  people  of  every  section,  in  behalf  of  their 
common  national  interests,  with  the  evident  desire  that 
the  question  should  rest  upon  national  grounds.  With 
this  view,  he  said: 

"While  the  chief  object  of  duties  should  be  revenue,  they  may 
be  so  adjusted  as  to  encourage  manufactures.     In  this  adjustment,  how- 


HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF.  227 

ever,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  be  guided  by  the  general 
good.  Objects  of  national  importance  alone  ought  to  be  protected;  of 
these,  the  productions  of  our  soil,  our  mines,  and  our  workshops, 
essential  to  national  defense,  occupy  the  first  rank.  Whatever 
other  species  of  domestic  industry,  having  the  importance  to  which 
I  have  referred,  may  be  expected  to  compete  with  foreign  labor  on 
equal  terms,  merit  the  same  attention  in  a  subordinate  degree." 

And  after  a  further  discussion,  intended  to  enforce  the 
necessity  of  "  adjusting  the  tariff  with  reference  to  its  pro- 
tective effect,"  he  continued: 

"  I  am  well  aware  that  this  is  a  subject  of  so  much  delicacy,  on 
account  of  the  delicate  interests  it  involves,  as  to  require  that  it 
should  be  touched  with  the  utmost  caution;  and  that  while  an 
abandonment  of  the  policy  in  which  it  originated  — a  policy  coeval  with 
our  Government,  and  pursued  through  successive  administrations 
—  is  neither  to  be  expected  nor  desired,  the  people  have  the  right  to 
demand,  and  have  demanded,  that  it  be  so  modified  as  to  correct 
abuses  and  obviate  injustice." 

He  again  called  attention  to  the  satisfactory  condition 
of  the  finances,  showing  that  the  balance  in  the  Treasury 
at  the  beginning  of  the  ensuing  year  would  be  about  the 
same  as  the  previous  year,  and  thus  that  the  surplus  con- 
tinued to  accumulate.  And  as  the  accumulation  would  be 
more  rapid  after  the  extinguishment  of  the  public  debt- 
which  time  was  rapidly  approaching  —  the  condition  of 
affairs  remained  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  his  first  message  : 
that  is,  most  favorable  for  a  strictly  revenue  tariff,  if  he 
had  entertained  any  purpose  whatsoever  of  recommending 
an  abandonment  of  the  protective  system.  But  he  had  no 
such  purpose.  On  the  other  hand,  he  did  not  intend  to 
let  even  the  inference  be  drawn  from  his  silence,  that  he 
desired  or  would  approve  of  any  such  abandonment, —  for, 


228  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

in  plain  words,  he  said  it  "  is  neither  to  be  expected  nor 
desired'' 

We  find,  therefore,  that  every  President,  during  the 
whole  period  from  the  beginning  of  the  Government 
under  the  Constitution  up  to  December,  1830 — Washing- 
ton, Adams,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  John  Quincy 
Adams,  and  Jackson  —  was  directly  and  explicitly  com- 
mitted to  the  support  of  the  policy  of  protection.  None 
of  the  light  which  some  modern  politicians  think  them- 
selves wise  enough  to  throw  upon  the  subject,  had  flashed 
upon  their  minds  !  They  were  so  unenlightened  as  to 
prefer  the  practical  policy  which  wise  statesmanship  had 
established  and  experience  sanctioned,  to  the  theories  of 
political  economists,  who  were  more  adept  in  the  art  of  so 
employing  words  as  to  make  "  the  worse  appear  the  better 
cause,"  than  in  the  science  of  government !  They,  there- 
fore, availed  themselves  of  every  proper  occasion  to  declare 
during  all  the  periods  referred  to,  that  the  Government 
had  no  higher  duty  to  discharge  than  to  give  just  protec- 
tion to  all  the  diversified  industrial  interests  of  the  people, 
so  as,  by  that  means,  to  develop  the  great  natural  resources 
of  the  country,  and  make  it  absolutely  independent  of  all 
foreign  countries,  as  well  materially  as  politically. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

SECTIONAL  CONTROVERSY  APPROACHING  — COTTON  INTEREST 
AROUSED  — FREE  TRADE  IN  THE  SOUTH— TARIFF  OF  1828 
DENOUNCED  — DEFENDED  BY  JACKSON  — HIS  EXULTATION  AT 
GENERAL  PROSPERITY— REVENUE  AND  PUBLIC  DEBT— SUR- 
PLUS TO  BE  DISTRIBUTED  AND  PROTECTION  MAINTAINED  — 
HIS  SPIRIT  OF  COMPROMISE  —  REVENUE  LIMITED  TO  WANTS 
OF  GOVERNMENT  AND  SURPLUS  AVOIDED  — WAR  UPON  HIS 
ADMINISTRATION —TARIFF  OF  1832  PASSED  — DUTIES  UPON 
PROTECTED  AND  NON-PROTECTED  ARTICLES  —  HORIZONTAL 
DUTIES  STEP  TOWARD  FREE  TRADE. 

PHE  country  was  now  approaching  a  time  when  it  was 
^  destined  to  realize  the  fierceness  and  danger  of  sec- 
tional controversy.  In  the  cotton-growing  States  the  advo- 
cates of  free  trade,  under  the  lead  of  the  politicians  of 
South  Carolina,  had  succeeded  in  forming  a  party,  com- 
posed of  most  excitable  materials,  in  opposition  to  the 
tariff.  They  characterized  the  law  of  1828  as  "the  bill  of 
abominations,"  and  insisted  that  if  the  measure  of  protec- 
tion which  it  contained  were  persevered  in,  it  would  reduce 
the  people  of  their  section  to  the  humiliating  condition  of 
"hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water"  at  the  feet  of  the 
Northern  manufactures.  Their  appeals  to  sectional  preju- 
dices were  not  only  earnest,  but  in  the  very  highest  degree 
inflammatory. 

General  Jackson,  however,  remained  undisturbed,  and 

met  the  question  with  his  ordinary  courage.     In  his  message 

229 


230  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

of  December,  1831,  he  congratulated  the  country  upon  its 
agricultural  and  manufacturing  prosperity,  and  manifestly 
intending  to  show  that  he  did  not  intend  to  become  a  party 
to  the  injudicious  war  against  the  latter  of  these  interests, 
he  referred  especially  to  manufactures  in  these  words : 

"Manufactures  have  been  established  in  which  the  funds  of  the 
capitalist  find  a  profitable  investment,  and  which  give  employment  and 
subsistence  to  a  numerous  and  increasing  body  of  industrious  and 
dexterous  mechanics." 

He  congratulated  the  country  upon  the  prosperity  of 
the  manufacturing  interests;  upon  the  rapid  construction 
of  works  of  internal  improvement,  by  which  the  wages  of 
labor  were  increased,  and  upon  the  general  evidences  of 
the  healthy  condition  of  commerce,  navigation  and  trade. 
All  this  was  justly  attributable  to  the  stimulus  given  to 
commerce  and  industry  by  the  protective  tariff  of  1828, 
then  in  force,  and  so  conspicuous  had  its  beneficial  effects 
become  by  that  time,  that  his  patriotic  enthusiasm  was 
enkindled  at  our  wonderful  development.  There  are  not, 
in  any  state  paper,  more  eloquent  words  than  those  by 
which,  in  this  message,  he  pointed  out  the  evidences  of 
our  national  greatness. 

"  If,  from  the  satisfactory  view  of  our  agriculture,  manufactures  and 
internal  improvements,  we  turn  to  the  state  of  our  navigation  and  trade 
with  foreign  nations  and  between  the  States,  we  shall  scarcely  find  less 
cause  for  gratulation.  A  beneficent  Providence  has  provided  for  their 
exercise  and  encouragement  an  extensive  coast,  indented  by  capacious 
bays,  noble  rivers,  inland  seas;  with  a  country  productive  of  every 
material  for  shipbuilding,  and  every  commodity  for  gainful  commerce, 
and  filled  with  a  population,  active,  intelligent,  well  informed,  and 
fearless  of  danger.  These  advantages  are  not  neglected,  and  an  impulse 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  231 

has  lately  been  given  to  commercial  enterprise  which  fills  our  shipyards 
with  new  constructions  and  encourages  all  the  arts  and  branches  of 
industry  connected  with  them,  crowds  the  wharves  of  our  cities  with 
vessels,  and  covers  the  most  distant  seas  with  our  canvas." 

With  the  realities  of  this  flattering  picture  of  national 
prosperity  directly  present  to  his  mind,  it  was  impossible 
for  him  to  feel  otherwise  than  exultant  at  the  results  pro- 
duced by  the  protective  policy  which  he  had  so  earnestly 
and  consistently  supported.  And,  therefore,  in  the  further 
enumeration  of  these  results  he  congratulated  the  country 
that  the  increase  of  trade  had  produced  "a  corresponding 
increase  of  revenue,  beyond  the  most  sanguine  anticipa- 
tions of  the  Treasury  Department"  In  this  he  furnished 
a  complete  answer  to  the  assertion,  often  made  by  the 
opponents  of  protection,  that  protective  duties  lessen  the 
revenue  by  cutting  off  importations.  The  facts  stated  by 
him  condemned  their  theory.  The  revenue  for  that  year, 
under  the  tariff  of  1828,  exceeded  the  ordinary  expenditures 
about  $13,000,000,  which  enabled  the  Government  to  pay 
over  $16,000,000  of  the  public  debt;  so  that  the  whole 
amount  of  the  debt  paid  between  March  4,  1829  —  when 
General  Jackson's  administration  commenced — and  that 
time,  exceeded  $40,000,000,  and  gave  satisfactory  assur- 
ance that  the  debt  would  be  entirely  extinguished  before 
his  term  of  office  expired.  Consequently,  he  was  more 
directly  confronted  than  he  had  before  been  by  the  ques- 
tion which  involved  the  disposition  of  the  surplus  revenue. 
Believing,  as  he  did,  that  it  would  be  bad  policy  to  permit 
-  it  to  accumulate  and  to  remain  undisposed  of  in  the 


232  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

Treasury,  he  again  called  the  especial  attention  of  Con- 
gress to  the  subject,  in  these  words : 

"  The  confidence  with  which  the  extinguishment  of  the  public  debt 
may  be  anticipated,  presents  an  opportunity  for  carrying  into  effect  more 
*uily  the  policy  in  relation  to  import  duties  which  has  been  recommended  in 
my  former  messages.  A  modification  of  the  tariff,  which  shall  produce  a 
reduction  of  our  revenue  to  the  wants  of  the  Government,  and  an  adjust- 
ment o^vthe  duties  on  imports  with  a  view  to  equal  justice  in  relation  to 
all  our  national  interests,  and  to  the  counteraction  of  foreign  policy,  so  far 
as  it  may  be  injurious  to  those  interests,  is  deemed  to  be  one  of  the 
principal  objects  which  demand  the  consideration  of  the  present 
Congress." 

Beyond  this,  his  reference  in  this  message  was  only  to 
the  necessity  and  justice  of  making  all  material  reduction 
of  duties  prospective,  whensoever  they  were  deemed  expe- 
dient, so  as  not  to  operate  injuriously  upon  merchants  and 
manufacturers.  He  suggested  the  necessity  of  relieving 
the  people  from  all  such  taxation  as  was  not  necessary  to 
the  support  of  the  Government.  That  he  intended,  in  the 
spirit  of  compromise,  to  deal  pacifically  with  those  in  South 
Carolina  who  were  disposed  to  disturb  the  quiet  of  his 
administration  and  endanger  the  peace  of  the  country,  is 
evident.  He  was,  manifestly,  ready  to  meet  them  at  a 
point  more  than  half  way,  and  to  abandon  the  idea  of  con- 
tinuing to  accumulate  a  surplus  in  the  Treasury  for  distri- 
bution, so  that  the  revenue  to  be  raised  should  be  regulated 
by  the  wants  of  the  Government.  But  he  was  not  willing 
to  abandon  the  principle  of  protection,  which  constituted 
the  only  means  of  "the  counteraction  of  foreign  policy" 
and  the  advancement  of  those  "  national  interests,"  in 
behalf  of  which  he  had  so  earnestly  spoken  in  another  part 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  233 

of  the  same  message.  But  his  efforts  in  the  direction  of 
compromise  were  unavailing,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
the  cotton-growing  interest  was  rapidly  advancing  towards 
the  policy  of  absolute  free  trade.  It  was  willing  to  employ 
the  disguise  of  a  revenue  tariff,  with  a  horizontal  scale  of 
ad  valorem  duties,  for  the  time  being,  but  with  this  ultimate 
end  in  view.  As  this  could  not  be  done  without  endanger- 
ing the  principle  of  protection — to  which  General  Jackson 
was  not  willing  to  concede — the  issue  was  distinctly  formed, 
and  the  war  upon  his  administration  and  upon  the  policy  of 
protection  was  immediately  inaugurated.  There  are  none 
so  ignorant  as  not  to  know  the  terrible  consequences  which 
have  followed  the  rejection  of  his  measures  of  pacification. 
It  took  but  little  time  after  the  meeting  of  Congress,  in 
December,  1831,  to  demonstrate  that  the  introduction  of  the 
tariff  discussion — which  was  unavoidable  under  the  existing 
condition  of  affairs  —  would  precipitate  an  open  and  palpa- 
ble issue  between  protection  and  free  trade.  But  it  was, 
nevertheless,  a  curious  fact — to  say  the  least  of  it — that 
the  most  violent  and  indiscreet  assailants  of  the  protective 
policy  were  found  among  those  who  had  contributed  to  the 
election  of  General  Jackson,  and  who,  on  that  account, 
seemed  to  consider  themselves  entitled  to  make  war  upon 
his  administration  with  extreme  vindictiveness.  The  con- 
test was  conducted  upon  both  sides,  with  great  ability,  and, 
upon  the  part  of  the  representatives  of  the  cotton-growing 
interests,  with  unexampled  virulence.  It  terminated,  how- 
ever, in  the  passage  of  the  tariff  law  of  1832 — which  was  a 
continuation  of  the  protective  policy — and  its  approval  by 


234  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

General  Jackson  very  much  to  the  discomfiture  of  his  adver- 
saries. A  correct  idea  of  the  character  of  this  fierce  strug- 
gle may  be  obtained  from  a  few  leading  facts,  which  show 
how  the  issue  between  the  opposing  parties  - —  the  friends 
and  opponents  of  protection  —  was  made  up.  It  was  both 
an  important  and  instructive  period  in  our  history. 

The  recommendation  of  the  President,  that  the  surplus 
revenue  be  distributed  among  the  States,  necessarily  in- 
volved the  whole  question  of  the  future  adjustment  of 
duties.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  be  unavailing  in  the 
future,  if  the  duties  were  reduced  to  a  simple  revenue 
standard ;  for,  in  that  event,  there  would  be  no  surplus  after 
the  payment  of  the  ordinaiy  expenses  of  Government.  In 
the  second  place,  if  the  duties  were  continued  primarily  for 
revenue  and  secondarily  for  protection  the  difficulties  were 
two-fold: — first,  the  selection  of  the  articles  to  be  placed 
upon  the  free  list ;  and  second,  the  degree  of  protection  to 
be  extended  by  duties  upon  other  importations.  Among 
the  supporters  of  protection  there  were  none  who  were 
ready  to  assent  to  a  horizontal  standard  of  duties;  which 
was  soon  developed  as  a  part  of  the  scheme  of  the  ene- 
mies of  protection,  who  considered  it  a  most  important 
step  in  the  direction  of  ultimate  free  trade.  Their  theory 
was  that  with  all  the  duties  at  the  same  fixed  ratio,  the 
principle  of  protection  would  thereby  be  abandoned  ;  and 
that,  if  the  ratio  could  be  fixed  so  low  as  not  to  interfere 
materially  with  the  importation  of  cotton  and  woolen  goods 
the  cotton-growers  could  exchange  their  raw  material  for 
these  articles  with  the  British  manufacturers,  at  a  larger 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  235 

profit  than  they  could  obtain  by  exchanging  with  American 
manufacturers.  In  other  words,  they  had  become,  by  this 
time,  thoroughly  indoctrinated  with  the  opinions  of  the 
English  free  traders,  and,  in  their  zeal  for  the  introduction 
of  an  entire  change  in  the  policy  of  the  Government  — 
after  nearly  half  a  century  of  undisturbed  practice — they 
persuaded  themselves  to  believe  that  a  deadly  animosity 
existed  between  the  Northern,  Central  and  Western  States 
and  the  cotton-growers  of  the  South,  which  could  only  be 
terminated  by  the  extinction  of  one  or  the  other  interest. 
The  destruction  of  the  former  and  the  triumph  of  the  latter 
was  the  object  they  endeavored  to  accomplish  by  a  revenue 
tariff  with  a  horizontal  scale  of  duties  upon  all  imported 
articles. 

Among  the  friends  of  protection  there  were  differences 
of  opinion  with  regard  to  two  propositions :  first,  whether 
the  duties  should  be  retained  on  the  unprotected  articles, 
and  increased  on  those  protected ;  and,  second,  whether 
the  duties  on  the  unprotected  articles  should  be  abolished 
or  reduced,  and  those  on  the  protected  articles  retained. 
Even  the  most  zealous  protectionists  were  not  disposed  to 
urge  the  adoption  of  the  first  of  these  propositions,  because 
of  the  determined  objection  to  it  on  the  part  of  the  enemies 
of  protection,  who  regarded  it  as  containing  every  possible 
form  of  evil.  They  did  not  desire  to  press  the  controversy 
to  an  extreme  point,  inasmuch  as  they  were  disposed  to  con- 
ciliate the  opposition — reciprocating  the  friendly  spirit  shown 
by  General  Jackson.  And,  besides,  they  could  foresee  that 
if  the  unprotected  articles  were  left  untouched,  and  the 


236  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

duties  upon  the  protected  class  increased,  the  measure 
might  possibly  become  prohibitory  in  its  effect,  and  thus  cut 
off  or  seriously  lessen  importations  and  destroy  competition 
in  our  home  markets.  The  general  sentiment,  therefore, 
favored  the  former  of  these  propositions  as  the  most  equi- 
table and  just,  because  as  Mr.  Clay  argued,  "  it  divides  the 
whole  subject  of  imports  according  to  its  nature";  that  is, 
it  would  reduce  or  abolish  the  duties  upon  articles  of  prime 
necessity  not  produced  in  the  United  States,  and  leave 
those  upon  the  other  articles  to  be  fixed  upon  a  basis  proper 
for  the  protection  of  manufactures.  It  was  intended,  by  the 
adoption  of  this  plan,  to  avoid  any  material  interference 
with  that  which  had  prevailed  from  the  beginning  of  the 
Government,  and,  at  the  same  time,  so  to  modify  the  prin- 
ciple of  protection  as  not  to  raise  revenue  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  creating  a  surplus  for  distribution,  but  to  limit 
the  amount,  as  nearly  as  could  be,  by  the  necessary  expen- 
ditures of  the  Government.  Protection  was  to  be  retained 
as  secondary  to  revenue,  yet  as  a  substantive  measure  of 
policy.  If  there  was  any  incidental  feature  attached  to  it, 
it  was  alone  in  the  sense  that  unless  revenue  were  raised 
there  would  be  no  protection,  and  not  in  the  sense  that  the 
constitutional  power  to  protect  was,  in  any  sense,  incidental 
to  the  power  to  raise  revenue. 

The  recommendation  of  General  Jackson,  as  embodied 
in  his  messages  of  1829  and  1830,  and  specially  referred  to 
in  that  of  1831,  as  we  have  already  seen,  amounted  to  this: 
that  protective  duties  be  persevered  in,  so  as  to  produce  an 
annual  surplus  over  and  above  the  amount  necessary  for 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  237 

the  supply  of  the  Government,  and  that  the  policy  should 
be  established  of  distributing  the  surplus  among  the  States, 
under  the  Constitution  as  it  now  stands,  or  by  an  amend- 
ment to  it  if  that  should  be  deemed  necessary.  But  the 
actual  recommendation  in  his  message  of  1831 — evidently 
originating  in  the  motives  already  explained — was  that  the 
revenue  be  reduced  "  to  the  wants  of  the  Government," 
leaving  very  properly  to  Congress  the  duty  of  fixing  the 
standard  by  which  to  estimate  them.  And,  consequently, 
the  issue  assumed  such  a  shape  as  to  present  the  question 
directly,  whether  or  no  the  duties  should  be  reduced  upon 
some  of  the  articles  of  prime  necessity  not  produced  in  the 
United  States — notably  upon  teas.  This  opened  the  whole 
field  of  inquiry  with  reference  to  both  revenue  and  pro- 
tection, and  the  contestants  marshaled  themselves  under 
their  respective  leaders — the  administration  of  General 
Jackson  upon  one  side,  the  cotton-growers  upon  the  other, 
or  such  of  them  as  had  then  become  converts  to  the  doctrine 
of  free  trade,  as  specially  conducive  to  their  interests. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

CONDITION  OF  THE  TREASURY  — DUTIES  ON  TEAS  — HAYNE  AT- 
TACKED PROTECTION  — OPPOSITION  TO  JACKSON'S  ADMINIS- 
TRATION BY  ADVOCATES  OF  FREE  TRADE— JACKSON  FIRM  — 
SECRETARY  OF  TREASURY  FAVORS  PROTECTION  AND  INCREASE 
OF  SALARIES  AND  EXPENSES  TO  AVOID  SURPLUS -NO  ABAN- 
DONMENT OF  PROTECTION  — PROCEEDS  OF  PUBLIC  LANDS  TO 
BE  WITHDRAWN  FROM  REVENUE  TO  AVOID  SURPLUS —BOUN- 
TIES—PROTECTION  SINCE  1789—  ITS  BENEFICIAL  EFFECTS. 

TN  order  to  appreciate  satisfactorily  the  proceedings  of 
1  Congress  and  the  policy  of  the  administration  with 
regard  to  the  tariff  and  the  principle  of  protection,  it  is 
necessary  to  understand  the  financial  condition  of  the 
Treasury. 

It  was  shown  by  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury — Mr.  Louis  McLane,  of  Maryland  —  that  the 
receipts  from  customs  for  the  year  1830  were  $21,237,- 
416.04,  and  that  the  balance  in  the  Treasury  at  the  end  of 
that  year  was  $6,014,539.75  ;  while  the  receipts  from  the 
same  source  for  the  year  1831  were  $17,354,291.58,  and 
the  balance  in  the  Treasury  at  the  end  of  that  year,  $3,047,- 
751.37.  Thus  the  receipts  from  customs  had  fallen  off 
$3,883,124.46,  and  the  balance  in  the  Treasury  had  been 
reduced  $2,966,788.38  in  one  year.  This  was  not  regarded 
as  indicating  an  unfavorable  condition  of  our  commerce, 
which  was,  indeed,  healthy  and  very  satisfactory.  But  it 

238 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  239 

furnished  the  Secretary  with  a  basis  upon  which  to  esti- 
mate the  receipts  from  customs  for  the  ensuing  year. 
These  he  estimated  at  $26,500,000,  which  was  $9,145,- 
708.42  more  than  the  receipts  for  the  year  1831,  and 
$5,262,583.96  more  than  those  of  1830.  The  public  debt, 
under  the  operations  of  the  sinking  fund  system  which  had 
been  established  under  Mr.  Monroe's  administration,  was 
gradually  disappearing  ;  and  it  was  believed  by  the  Treas- 
ury Department  that  it  would  be  reduced  to  the  nominal 
sum  of  a  little  over  $2,000,000  by  January  i,  1833,  and  be 
entirely  extinguished  soon  thereafter.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, the  estimate  of  increased  revenue  from  customs 
must  be  taken  as  indicating  the  purpose,  on  the  part  of 
the  administration,  of  retaining  the  duties  upon  the  unpro- 
tected articles  at  the  rate  fixed  by  the  existing  tariff,  and 
of  either  adopting  the  same  policy  with  reference  to  the 
protected  articles  or  of  increasing  the  duties  upon  them. 
The  President,  as  his  message  shows,  did  not  contemplate 
a  reduction  of  duties  upon  either  the  protected  or  unpro- 
tected articles.  But  if  he  had  left  the  subject  at  all  in 
doubt,  these  recommendations  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  the  course  adopted  by  him,  and  the  language  of 
his  report,  removed  it.  All  these  prove  that  he  was  as 
anxious  as  General  Jackson  to  preserve  the  principle  of 
protection. 

The  proposition  to  reduce  the  duties  on  teas — which 
belonged  to  the  class  of  unprotected  articles — was  referred, 
in  the  Senate,  to  the  Finance  Committee.  It  was  submitted 
by  them  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  his  opinion, 


240  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

and  he  reported  that  he  did  not  consider  the  reduction 
expedient,  because  teas  belonged  to  those  articles  which, 
as  he  said  "  will  always  be  a  source  of  revenue  " ;  that  is, 
they  can  always  be  relied  upon  for  producing  revenue, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  of  prime  necessity.  This  opinion  of 
the  Secretary  elicited  a  debate  in  the  Senate,  in  which 
Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Clay  both  advocated  a  reduction  of 
the  duties  on  teas,  and  Mr.  Smith,  of  Maryland,  on  behalf 
of  the  administration  and  the  Finance  Committee,  opposed 
it.  There  was,  however,  no  radical  disagreement  between 
them  with  reference  to  protection  ;  and  the  debate  did  not 
take  the  turn  of  opening  that  general  question  for  discus- 
sion, until  Mr.  Robert  Y.  Hayne,  of  South  Carolina,  as  the 
champion  of  the  cotton-growing  interest  and  of  free  trade, 
took  occasion  to  denounce,  in  the  severest  terms,  the  whole 
revenue  system,  and  to  mark  out  the  course  of  opposition 
to  protection,  even  in  its  most  modified  form.  He  employed 
the  following  language : 

"Against  a  system  so  unjust,  unequal,  and  oppressive,  the  tax- 
paying  people  of  the  United  States,  those  who  receive  no  portion  of  the 
bounties  of  the  protecting  system,  the  people  of  the  Southern  States, 
those  whom  he  in  part  represented  on  this  floor,  must  forever  protest. 
Let  not  any  gentleman  '  lay  the  flattering  unction  to  his  soul'  that  these 
people  would  be  satisfied  with  any  arrangement  of  the  tariff  which  shall 
not  go  to  the  full  length  of  bringing  down  the  duties  to  the  true  revenue 
standard,  the  raising  no  more  money  from  duties  than  may  be  necessary 
for  the  just  purposes  of  Government,  and  to  raise  this  amount  from  duties 
to  be  arranged  on  fair  and  equal  principles — a  reasonable  ad  valorem 
duty  on  all  articles  protected  and  unprotected — a  system  which  shall  be 
based  on  the  great  principle  of  equal  benefits  and  equal  burdens.  Such 
a  system,  and  such  only,  could  ever  reconcile  the  people  to  the  operation 
of  the  tariff,  or  quiet  the  discontents  which  had  sprung  out  of  the  exist- 
ing unjust  and  oppressive  system." 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  24! 

It  was  considered  a  somewhat  strange  assumption  of 
authority  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Hayne  in  undertaking  to  speak 
for  "  the  tax-paying  people  of  the  United  States,"  inasmuch 
as  outside  of  South  Carolina  there  was  scarcely  a  single 
murmur  of  complaint  against  the  protective  system.  It 
was  otherwise,  however,  when  he  referred  to  the  "discon- 
tents "  which  the  system  had  occasioned ;  it  being  well 
understood  that  he  referred  to  a  portion  of  his  own  con- 
stituents. He  had  the  right  to  speak  for  these ;  yet  when 
he  magnified  their  numbers  by  calling  them  "  the  people  of 
the  Southern  States,"  he  betrayed  his  object  as  completely 
as  if  he  had  openly  avowed  it,  which  was  to  unite  the  entire 
cotton-growing  interest  in  a  party  of  opposition  to  General 
Jackson's  administration,  against  the  system  of  protection, 
and  in  favor  of  free  trade,  under  color  of  a  horizontal 
revenue  tariff.  The  plan  of  procedure,  although  not  then 
fully  developed,  consisted  in  persuading  the  cotton-growers 
to  believe  that  their  special  and  peculiar  interests  would  be 
promoted  by  demanding  that  a  system  which  commenced 
with  the  Government  and  had  continued  uninterruptedly 
during  all  its  existence — by  means  of  which  the  resources 
of  the  country  had  been  wonderfully  developed,  its  com- 
merce enlarged,  its  industries  improved,  and  the  Treasury 
regularly  and  plentifully  supplied — should  be  supplanted 
by  one  entirely  new  and  untried.  This  new  system  was 
intended,  from  the  origin  of  these  movements,  to  have  far 
less  reference  to  the  wants  and  necessities  of  the  Govern- 
ment, than  to  the  local  interests  of  those  in  whose  behalf 
Mr.  Hayne  spoke  ;  in  other  words,  the  interests  of  the 


242  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

Government  of  the  Union  were  to  be  subordinated  to  their 
sectional  interests.  The  issue  was  made,  therefore,  not 
alone  with  the  protective  system,  but  with  the  avowed 
policy  of  General  Jackson  and  his  administration ;  and 
hence  the  controversy  was  conducted  on  the  part  of  the 
discontented  adversaries  of  the  administration  with  unusual 
violence.  Their  passions  became  terribly  aroused,  and 
they  could  not  lay  them  aside  long  enough  to  see — what 
everybody  else  saw — that  their  success,  if  accomplished, 
would  imperil  the  general  prosperity,  with  which  their  own 
was  closely  united.  Thus  influenced,  they  seemed  to  sup- 
pose that  so  formidable  an  adversary  as  the  President, 
backed,  as  he  was,  by  all  the  friends  of  protection,  could 
only  be  overcome  by  menace  and  denunciation.  But  all 
their  efforts  proved,  in  the  end,  unavailing.  The  President 
was  not  alarmed  at  their  threats,  and  the  ranks  of  the 
defenders  of  the  protective  system  remained,  for  the  time, 
unbroken. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  did  not  think  that 
Congress  would  be  likely  to  establish  a  system  by  which 
revenue  should  be  raised  from  customs  in  order  to  produce 
a  surplus  for  distribution  among  the  States  ;  nor,  in  his 
opinion,  was  it  desirable.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  he  was 
so  far  from  desiring  to  see  the  principle  of  protection  aban- 
doned, that  he  recommended  the  public  lands  to  be  dis- 
posed of  to  the  States  in  which  they  lay  at  a  fair  price,  and 
the  proceeds  apportioned  among  the  States,  so  as  to  cut 
off  the  supply  of  revenue  from  that  source.  This  method 
would  have  had,  at  that  time,  the  same  effect  upon  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  243 

revenue  to  be  raised  from  customs  as  the  distribution  of 
the  surplus  ;  for  as  the  receipts  from  lands  for  1832  were 
estimated  at  $3,000,000,  the  amount  to  be  raised  from  cus- 
toms would  have  remained  about  the  same.  In  so  far, 
therefore,  as  the  principle  of  protection  was  involved,  it 
made  no  difference  whether  the  surplus  was  distributed  or 
the  lands  disposed  of  to  the  States  and  the  proceeds  dis- 
tributed. And  so  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Mr. 
McLane,  understood  ;  as  is  evident  from  his  earnest  recom- 
mendation that  the  revenue  be  kept  up  to  the  amount 
covered  by  his  estimates.  Rather  than  reduce  the  duties, 
he  recommended  that  the  ordinary  expenditures  be  in- 
creased, for  the  various  objects  set  forth  in  his  report ; 
such  as  augmenting  the  naval  and  military  establishments  ; 
extending  the  armories ;  arming  the  militia  of  the  States  ; 
increasing  the  pay  and  emoluments  of  naval  officers,  and 
providing  them  with  nautical  instruction ;  enlarging  the 
navy  hospital  fund ;  strengthening  the  frontier  defenses  ; 
removing  obstructions  from  the  Western  rivers  ;  making 
accurate  and  complete  surveys  of  the  coast ;  and  improving 
the  coast  and  harbors.  In  addition  to  these  general 
expenditures,  he  also  recommended  increased  compensa- 
tion to  some  of  the  officers  of  the  customs,  and  to  our 
foreign  ministers  ;  and  additional  provision  for  pensions  to 
the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Revolution.  It  is  not 
material  whether  these  expenditures  were  right  and  proper 
in  themselves  or  not ;  but  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
urged  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  conclusively  proves 
that  he  was  opposed  to  any  reduction  of  the  revenue  from 


244  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

customs,  and,  consequently,  to  any  reduction  of  the  duties 
upon  either  the  protected  or  unprotected  articles.  While 
he  did  not  think  it  expedient  to  raise  a  larger  amount  of 
revenue  than  should  be  necessary  to  defray  the  expenses  of 
the  Government,  nevertheless  he  realized  the  necessity  of 
increasing  the  expenses,  rather  than  abandon  protection, 
considering,  as  he  said,  that  "  the  propriety  of  reasonably 
protecting  the  domestic  industry  is  fully  conceded."  He 
even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  a  system  of  bounties,  for  the 
benefit  of  labor  and  capital,  if  it  should  become  necessary 
"to  shield  them  from  the  injurious  regulations  of  foreign 
States,"  rather  than  levy  duties  with  view  to  a  surplus. 
Not  anticipating  any  such  contingency,  however,  he  pro- 
ceeded to  declare,  with  great  clearness,  the  necessity  of 
adhering  to  the  protective  policy  and  the  principles  upon 
which  he  regarded  it  as  resting.  He  said  : 

"  To  distribute  the  duties  [upon  imports]  in  such  a  manner,  as  far 
as  that  may  be  practicable,  as  to  encourage  and  protect  the  labor  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  from  the  advantages  of  superior  skill  and 
capital,  and  the  rival  preferences  of  foreign  countries  j  to  cherish  and  pre- 
serve those  manufactures  which  have  grown  up  under  our  own  legislation, 
which  contribute  to  the  national  wealth,  and  are  essential  to  our  inde- 
pendence and  safety,  to  the  defense  of  the  country,  and  the  supply  of  its 
necessary  wants,  and  to  the  general  prosperity,  is  considered  to  be  an 
indispensable  duty.  The  vast  amount  of  property  employed  in  the 
Northern,  Western,  and  middle  portion  of  the  Union,  upon  the  faith  of 
our  own  system  of  laws,  and  in  which  the  interests  of  every  branch  of  our 
industry  art  involved,  could  not  be  immediately  abandoned  without  the 
most  ruinous  consequences. 

"  The  various  opinions  by  which  the  people  of  the  United  States  are 
divided  upon  this  subject,  concern  the  peace  and  harmony  of  the 
country,  and  recommend  an  adjustment  on  practical  principles  rather 
than  with  reference  to  any  abstract  doctrines  of  political  economy. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  245 

"  The  proposed  action  of  Congress  will  not  be  directed  to  introduce 
or  countenance,  for  the  first  time,  the  adaptation  of  duties  for  revenue  to 
the  protection  of  American  labor  and  capital.  The  origin  of  that  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  the  Government ;  and  taking  root  in  the  act  of 'July ',  1789, 
it  has  since  increased  and  spread  over  our  whole  legislation,  has  quickened 
each  branch  of  industry,  and  affected  most  of  the  important  relations  of 
society^ 

And  thus  we  reach  a  point  in  the  history  of  General 
Jackson's  administration,  when  it  clearly  appears,  both 
from  his  own  declarations  in  his  messages  and  from  those 
of  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  that  it  was  fully  committed 
to  the  doctrine  of  protection.  And  it  is  equally  apparent 
that  whatsoever  efforts  had  then  been  made  to  obtain 
Congressional  legislation  adverse  to  that  doctrine,  had  cen- 
tered in  opposition  to  his  administration.  We  shall  see,  in 
the  sequel,  how  fiercely  the  controversy  was  carried  on 
upon  the  part  of  those  who  formed  this  combination,  and 
how  the  result  proved  that  "  whom  the  gods  seek  to  destroy 
they  first  make  mad." 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  — McDUFFIE  CHAIRMAN  COMMITTEE 
WAYS  AND  MEANS  — ADAMS  OF  COMMITTEE  OF  MANUFAC- 
TURES—THEIR REPORTS,  FORMER  AGAINST  PROTECTION,  THE 
LATTER  FOR  IT  — EFFORT  TO  UNITE  COTTON  SECTION  AGAINST 
JACKSON  — OBJECT  WAS  TO  DEFEAT  HIS  RE-ELECTION  — FREE 
TRADE  ARGUMENTS  — EXCITEMENT  PRODUCED  BY  TARIFF  OF 
1832  IN  SOUTHERN  SECTION— SECTIONAL  CONTEST  INAUGU- 
RATED. 

IT  is  not  necessary  to  the  purpose  of  the  present  inquiries 
to  trace  the  entire  course  of  legislation  which  resulted  in 
the  passage  of  the  tariff  law  of  1832,  in  response  to  the 
recommendations  of  the  administration.  That  purpose 
being  circumscribed  within  a  narrower  compass,  will  be 
fully  answered  by  explaining  the  grounds  of  opposition  to 
the  protective  system,  how  it  was  maintained,  and  the 
reasons  which  were  then  and  have  ever  since  been  ac- 
cepted in  its  justification. 

The  opposition  took  more  active  shape  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  than  in  the  Senate.  That  being  the  body 
within  which,  by  the  Constitution,  all  revenue  bills  must 
originate,  the  discussions  which  generally  attend  them  take 
a  very  wide  range.  It  is  important  to  us  now  that  we 
should  understand  them  to  the  extent  only  of  seeing  the 
grounds  upon  which  the  enemies  of  protection  planted 
themselves — attempting  no  further  detail  than  is  necessary 

246 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  247 

to  convey  a  general  idea  of  their  plans  and  policy.     Any- 
thing beyond  this  would  be  impracticable. 

Mr.  Andrew  Stevenson,  of  Virginia  —  a  supporter  of  the 
administration — was  elected  Speaker  of  the  House.  It  is 
to  be  supposed  that  in  the  organization  of  the  Committees 
he  had  no  desire  to  antagonize  the  President.  But,  howso- 
ever this  may  have  been,  he  placed  Mr.  George  McDuffie, 
of  South  Carolina — the  most  openly  avowed  and  formida- 
ble enemy  of  protection  in  the  House  —  at  the  head  of  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means.  This  position  entitled 
him,  at  that  time,  to  be  considered  the  leader  of  the  House, 
and  gave  him  a  degree  of  influence  beyond  that  possessed 
by  any  other  member.  How  this  was  brought  about  it  is 
difficult  now  to  understand,  and  any  conjecture  with  regard 
to  it  might  be  unjust.  It  is  enough  to  know  —  and  that  is  all 
we  can  now  know  —  that  when  the  Committee  was  formed 
at  the  commencement  of  the  session  there  had  not  been 
any  open  manifestation  of  the  purpose  to  attack  the  admin- 
istration with  reference  to  its  plan  for  raising  revenue,  or 
to  organize  a  sectional  party  against  protection  and  in  favor 
of  free  trade.  Whatsoever  had  occurred  indicating  any- 
thing of  that  sort  was  local  in  character,  and  seemed  to  be 
rather  the  vaporing  of  a  few  passionate  and  excitable  men 
in  a  single  State  than  the  settled  design  of  a  sufficient 
number  to  create  a  new  party.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed, 
therefore,  that  the  results  which  followed  were  then  antici- 
pated. The  Committee  was  composed,  besides  Mr. 
McDuffie,  of  Mr.  Verplank,  of  New  York ;  Mr.  Ingersoll, 
of  Connecticut ;  Mr.  Gilmore,  of  Pennsylvania  ;  Mr.  Alex- 


248  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

ander,  of  Virginia;  Mr.  Wilde,  of  Georgia;  and  Mr.  Gaither, 
of  Kentucky.  We  are  to  conclude,  of  course,  that  a  major- 
ity of  this  Committee  were  supporters  of  the  administration 
— according  to  the  invariable  custom.  And  for  this  reason, 
undoubtedly — with  a  view  to  enable  the  administration  to 
procure  such  measures  of  legislation  as  were  deemed 
necessary  to  carry  out  its  policy  —  that  part  of  the  Presi- 
dent's message  which,  related  to  measures  of  revenue  and 
taxation  was  referred  to  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means. 

The  Committee  on  Manufactures  was  organized  by  the 
appointment  of  Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams,  Chairman,  he 
having  been  elected  to  the  House  of  Representatives  after 
his  defeat  by  General  Jackson.  This  Committee  was  com- 
posed, besides  him,  of  Mr.  Condict,  of  New  Jersey ;  Mr. 
Findlay,  of  Ohio  ;  Mr.  Horn,  of  Pennsylvania  ;  Mr.  Dayan, 
of  New  York  ;  Mr.  Worthington,  of  Maryland ;  and  Mr. 
John  S.  Barbour,  of  Virginia.  And  to  it  was  referred  that 
part  of  the  President's  message  which  related  to  manufac- 
tures and  to  a  modification  of  the  tariff. 

There  is  no  reason  for  supposing  that  these  Committees 
were  not  fairly  organized.  On  the  contrary,  the  high  char- 
acter of  the  Speaker  forbids  any  such  suspicion.  vBut  it  is 
important  to  observe  with  reference  to  them  that,  whatso- 
ever jurisdiction  they  may  have  had  respectively  given 
them  by  the  Rules  of  the  House,  they  both  reported  upon 
and  discussed  the  whole  question  of  the  tariff  in  its  rela- 
tions to  revenue  and  protection.  Whether  this  jurisdiction, 
on  the  part  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  was  or 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  249 

was  not  assumed,  is  now  of  no  consequence.  The  fact 
with  which  we  have  to  deal  is  this  :  that,  although  organized 
in  the  political  interests  of  the  administration,  that  Com- 
mittee took  occasion  to  condemn,  with  unusual  harshness, 
the  doctrines  announced  by  General  Jackson  and  his  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  as  well  as  the  policy  of  protection  in 
all  its  aspects.  This  may  not  have  had  any  special  signifi- 
cance at  the  time,  but,  interpreted  by  events  which  have 
since  transpired,  it  serves  to  show  that  it  was  part  of  the 
plan — cautiously  adopted  but  not  openly  avowed — to  turn 
the  administration  from  its  settled  course,  if  possible,  and 
convert  it  into  an  engine  of  oppression  to  the  industrial 
interests  it  had  all  along  steadily  defended.  It  is  fortunate 
for  those  interests  that  General  Jackson  had  courage  enough 
to  follow  his  own  convictions,  and  that  he  belonged  to  a 
class  of  men  not  easily  intimidated. 

A  report  was  made  by  Mr.  McDuffie  in  the  name  and 
by  the  authority  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means, 
which  purported  to  have  been  assented  to  by  the  whole 
Committee,  or  at  least  by  a  majority.  It  was  ingenious, 
eloquent,  and  full  of  sophistry.  It  attacked  the  whole 
system  of  protection  in  the  most  earnest  and  vehement 
manner.  It  was  the  first  open  and  direct  attempt  ever 
made  by  authority  of  a  standing  Committee  of  Congress, 
to  give  countenance  to  the  organization  of  a  free  trade 
party  in  the  United  States  ;  a  result  which  its  author  mani- 
festly designed  with  a  view  to  accomplish  the  defeat  of  one 
of  the  leading  measures  of  the  administration,  and  thus,  if 
possible,  put  it  out  of  the  power  of  General  Jackson  to 


250  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

become  his  own  successor  at  the  ensuing  Presidential  elec- 
tion. The  step  was  taken  with  the  characteristic  intrepidity 
of  Mr.  McDuffte  and  his  coadjutors  ;  and  was  so  contrived 
as  to  obtain  either  the  express  or  implied  assent  of  the 
members  who  composed  a  majority  of  the  Committee,  and 
who,  without  any  seeming  consciousness  of  the  fact,  were 
plastic  enough  to  be  molded  to  the  will  of  their  Chairman, 
by  his  superior  and  commanding  ability.  If  they  had  not 
felt  themselves  dwarfed  in  his  presence,  it  is  scarcely  pos- 
sible they  would  have  submitted  to  the  humiliating  attitude 
in  which  the  report  placed  them,  of  attempting  to  create  a 
party  of  opposition  to  an  administration  of  which  they  were 
professed  supporters. 

The  Committee  recommended  the  abolition  of  specific 
and  the  substitution  of  ad  valorem  duties,  and  that  these  be 
fixed  at  the  same  rate  on  all  imported  merchandise.  This, 
it  was  insisted,  was  the  only  method  of  making  taxes  uni- 
form, as  the  Constitution  requires.  But  the  real  object  was 
to  get  rid  of  discriminating  and  protective  duties  by  means 
of  a  horizontal  tariff.  The  design  was,  with  these  out  of 
the  way,  to  carry  what  was  called  the  principle  of  equality 
a  few  steps  further,  so  as  to  bring  about  the  establishment 
of  the  proposition  that,  if  any  duties  at  all  were  to  be 
levied,  they  should  be  the  same  upon  both  American  and 
foreign  manufactures,  when  the  latter  were  made  from 
materials  produced  in  the  United  States  and  exchanged  for 
them.  The  inexplicable  theory  was  advanced  that  these 
foreign  manufactures  "are  equally  the  productions  of 
domestic  industry''  with  those  produced  in  this  country, 


HISTORY  OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  251 

notwithstanding  the  foreign  labor  which  enters  into  their 
value.  Upon  this  point  the  Committee,  in  apparent  sin- 
cerity, said : 

"  Imported  manufactures  are  the  productions  of  Southern  labor  and 
capital ;  domestic  manufactures  are  the  productions  of  Northern  labor 
and  capital ;  and  nothing  short  of  an  equal  exemption  of  both  from  taxa- 
tion, or  the  imposition  of  equal  duties  on  both,  can  secure  to  these  two  great 
rival  branches  of  domestic  industry  a  fair  and  equal  competition  in  the 
market." 

Every  thoughtful  mind  must  be  staggered  at  this.  To 
say  nothing  of  its  utterly  illogical  conclusions,  it  draws  no 
distinction  between  American  and  foreign  fabrics,  when  the 
latter  are  manufactured  out  of  raw  materials  produced  in 
this  country.  The  underlying  idea  was  that  British  cotton 
goods  manufactured  out  of  American  cotton  should  be 
imported  free  of  duty,  because  no  domestic  tax  is  imposed 
upon  the  same  kind  of  goods  of  American  manufacture;  or 
if  they  shall  be  required  to  pay  import  duties,  that  a  domestic 
tax  of  like  amount  shall  be  imposed,  as  a  direct  charge, 
upon  cotton  goods  manufactured  in  the  United  States  ! 
Such  a  proposition  calls  for  no  argument,  in  either  of  its 
aspects.  And  it  is  worthy  of  present  consideration  only 
because  it  explains  the  object  sought  to  be  accomplished  by 
the  advocates  of  free  trade  when,  under  the  guardianship  of 
one  of  their  greatest  leaders,  they  proposed  to  reverse  the 
whole  practice  of  the  Government  by  uprooting  the  princi- 
ple which  gives  preference  to  American  over  foreign  labor, 
and  places  them  both  upon  the  same  footing.  In  further 
enforcement  of  this  same  theory,  the  Committee  also  say : 

"  There  cannot  be  a  more  palpable  and  delusive  error  than  the  vulgar 
notion  that  imported  manufactures,  which  have  been  purchased  by  the 


252  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

agricultural  staples  of  this  country,  are  foreign  productions.  They  are  as 
strictly  and  exclusively  the  productions  of  domestic  industry  as  if  they 
were  manufactured  in  the  United  States." 

Under  the  influence  of  some  strange  hallucination, 
this  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  reached  the  conclusion 
that  it  was  "vulgar"  to  reason  about  American  labor  as  all 
the  Presidents  from  Washington  to  Jackson  had  done  ;  and, 
having  thus  established  their  premise,  they  had  no  difficulty 
in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  foreign  markets  were  the 
"  natural  markets"  for  the  cotton-growing  States,  and  that 
it  was  "  unjust  and  unnatural  to  obstruct  or  impede  the  free 
intercourse  of  the  Southern  planters  with  their  natural  markets 
abroad."  But  the  Committee  were  not  satisfied  with  indulg- 
ing in  these  illusive  speculations.  Keeping  in  view  the 
necessity  of  giving  strength  to  the  free  trade  party,  in  order 
to  defeat  the  policy  of  General  Jackson  and  his  administra- 
tion and  thus  destroy  the  principle  of  protection,  they  deemed 
it  expedient  to  arouse  the  Southern  mind  into  a  flame  of 
passionate  excitement,  and  to  incite  the  Southern  people 
into  collision  with  the  settled  policy  of  the  Government, 
and,  if  their  end  could  be  accomplished  in  no  other  way, 
with  the  Government  itself.  This  is  what  they  said  : 

"  It  would  be  worse  than  voluntary  blindness  in  those  to  whom  the 
rights,  the  interests,  and  the  .destinies  of  the  Southern  people,  are,  in  an 
especial  manner,  committed,  not  to  perceive  and  give  warning  of  the 
inevitable  doom  that  awaits  them  if  that  protecting  policy  which  impover- 
ishes and  destroys  one  branch  of  industry  to  enrich  and  sustain  another 
be  not  utterly  and  absolutely  abandoned.  This  Congress  should  adopt  no 
half-way  measures,  no  temporary  expedients,  but '  reform  it  altogether.'' ' 

There  was  apparent  madness  in  this  studied  effort  to 
stir  up  sectional  strife  upon  a  question  about  which  there 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  253 

had  been  such  entire  unanimity  among  all  the  Presidents  — 
but  two  of  them,  out  of  seven,  were  from  the  North — but 
there  was  method  in  it.  The  Committee  appealed  to  the 
Western  States  to  unite  with  the  Southern  in  opposition  to 
protection,  by  attempting  to  prove  that,  as  the  latter  pur- 
chased live  stock  from  the  former,  they  would  need  greatly 
increased  quantities  if  they  could  succeed  in  overthrowing 
American  manufactures  and  increasing  their  own  profits  by 
exchanging  their  cotton  for  foreign  fabrics  manufactured  by 
labor  paid  for  at  pauper  rates.  No  other  feelings  were 
addressed  than  such  as  were  sectional  and  mercenary,  and 
these  the  Committee  endeavored  to  arouse  in  behalf  of 
foreign  and  against  American  manufactures ;  as  if  the 
Nation  itself  had  no  interest  whatsoever  in  a  policy  it  had 
maintained  from  its  birth,  and  under  the  influence  of  which 
it  had  developed  into  one  of  the  foremost  powers  of  the 
world. 

It  may  seem  strange  to  many  of  the  present  day  that 
the  administration  of  General  Jackson  had  to  rely  upon 
the  Committee  on  Manufactures,  with  John  Quincy  Adams 
at  its  head,  for  a  defense  of  its  policy  against  this  violent 
attack  made  upon  it  by  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. 
Nevertheless,  such  was  the  fact.  The  Committee  on  Manu- 
factures also  made  a  report,  through  Mr.  Adams,  which 
professedly  had  the  approval  of  all  its  members.  It  did  not 
pretend  to  answer  in  detail  all  the  arguments  employed  and 
assertions  made  by  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means, 
but  it  exposed  their  sophistries  completely,  and  vindicated 
the  policy  of  the  administration  in  its  support  of  protection. 


254  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

It  was  calm  and  deliberate — making  no  appeal  to  passion 
or  to  sectional  prejudices.  On  the  contrary,  it  exhibited 
a  willingness  to  make  some  concessions  to  free-trade  preju- 
dices by  removing  the  system  of  graduated  minimums,  to 
which  special  objection  had  been  made  in  the  South,  by  the 
admission  of  coarse  wools  free  of  duty,  and  by  some  re- 
duction of  the  duties  upon  articles  manufactured  from  them. 
And,  in  an  unanswerable  argument,  it  demonstrated  the 
necessity  of  building  up  and  sustaining  our  own  manu- 
factures, as  one  of  the  essential  means  of  increasing  and 
maintaining  our  national  greatness.  In  this  respect  Mr. 
Adams  displayed  power  and  eloquence  of  language  pecu- 
liarly his  own ;  yet,  at  the  same  time,  he  was  compelled  to 
repeat  arguments  long  familiar  to  the  country ;  for,  in  fact, 
the  policy  of  protection  had  been  so  vindicated  by  Wash- 
ington, Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  and  by  Jackson  him- 
self, that  his  task  was  well  performed  by  following  in  their 
footsteps. 

It  is  most  instructive  to  consider  now  the  relation  which 
these  reports  respectively  bear  to  the  history  of  the  times 
to  which  we  are  here  referring.  Mr.  McDuffie,  a  professed 
supporter  of  General  Jackson,  in  one  of  them — backed  by 
the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means — assailed  the  policy  of 
the  administration,  and  avowed  the  determination  to  excite 
the  South  to  madness  with  a  view  to  defeat  it ;  Mr.  John 
Quincy  Adams,  who  had  been  defeated  for  the  Presidency 
by  General  Jackson,  in  the  other — backed  by  the  Committee 
on  Manufactures — defended  the  policy  of  the  administration 
in  earnest  and  eloquent  words,  and  rebuked  the  effort  to 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  255 

stir  up  strife  between  the  sections,  by  a  calm  and  fitting 
appeal  to  the  patriotism  of  the  Nation.  The  one  was  an 
instance  of  the  misguided  zeal  of  a  great  man  who  was  more 
partisan  than  patriot ;  the  other,  an  honest  effort  of  one  still 
greater^  who  was  more  patriot  than  partisan. 

The  administration  was  sustained.  The  pending  tariff 
bill  passed  the  House  of  Representatives  by  a  vote  of  132 
yea&rte>  60  nays — more  than  two  to  one — and  the  Senate 
by  32  yeas  to  16  nays — just  two  to  one.  It  became  the 
tariff  law  of  1832  by  the  approval  of  General  Jackson,  while 
he  was  again  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  as  his  own 
successor.  And  even  those  who  do  not  personally  remem- 
ber that  contest — between  him  and  Mr.  Clay — will  infer 
from  this  fact,  the  conspicuous  part  which  so  important  a 
measure  must  have  borne  in  it,  especially  among  that 
portion  of  the  Southern  people  who  had  allowed  their  pas- 
sions to  be  inflamed  by  eloquence  they  seemed  powerless 
to  resist — which  fired  their  hearts  but  dethroned  their 
reason. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832  —  CALHOUN  HEADED  PARTY 
AGAINST  JACKSON  — VAN  BUREN  NOMINATED  FOR  VICE- 
PRESIDENCY—PARTY  ORGANIZED  AGAINST  PROTECTION  AND 
AGAINST  JACKSON  — FAVORED  HORIZONTAL  TARIFF— JACKSON 
UNTERRIFIED  — SOUTH  CAROLINA  REFUSED  TO  VOTE  FOR 
HIM  — PASSED  NULLIFICATION  ORDINANCE  — FORMED  MILI- 
TARY ORGANIZATIONS  — THREATS  AGAINST  THE  UNION  — 
THEIR  FORMIDABLE  CHARACTER. 

T^HE  year  1832  was  marked  by  many  events  which  occupy 
important  and  conspicuous  places  in  our  political  his- 
tory. General  Jackson  and  Mr.  Clay  were  opposing  can- 
didates for  the  Presidency.  The  former  was  nominated  by 
common  consent,  without  the  intervention  of  a  national 
convention,  but  as  Mr.  Calhoun,  who  was  then  Vice-Presi- 
dent,  had  become  dissatisfied  with  the  administration,  and- 
his  supporters  in  South  Carolina  had  organized  resistance 
to  the  tariff  policy  of  the  Government,  which  General  Jack- 
son approved,  it  became  necessary  to  select  another  candi- 
date for  that  office.  For  that  purpose  a  national  convention 
was  assembled,  and  Mr.  Martin  Van  Buren,  of  New  York, 
was  nominated.  It  would  not  be  strictly  correct  to  say  that 
this  nomination  was  made  with  special  reference  to  the  tariff 
although  he  had  voted  for  both  the  tariff  laws  of  1824 
and  1828,  and  was  understood  as  maintaining  the  same 
views  of  the  policy  of  protection  as  General  Jackson  had 

256 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  257 

frequently  expressed  both  before  and  after  his  election. 
But  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  opposition  to  him  was, 
to  some  extent,  on  that  account;  and  mainly  because 
he  was  committed  to  that  mode  of  interpreting  the  Consti- 
tution which  establishes  the  power  of  Congress  to  protect 
manufactures  and  other  branches  of  national  industry. 
Those  unfriendly  to  him  voted  for  Mr.  Philip  P.  Barbour,  of 
Virginia,  whose  opinions  with  reference  to  a  strict  construc- 
tion of  the  Constitution — the  exercise  of  implied  powers 
by  Congress,  and  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States — were, 
it  was  believed,  more  in  harmony  with  their  own.  These 
theories  were  then  taking  root  in  the  minds  of  the  cotton- 
planters  of  the  South,  and  the  purpose  of  this  movement 
doubtless  was  so  tp  influence  the  Presidential  canvass  as  to 
ultimately  bring  about  the  formation  of  a  new  party  of  strict 
constructionists,  in  order  to  increase  the  powers  of  the 
States,  limit  those  of  the  National  Government,  and,  in  the 
end,  abolish  the  principle  of  protection  and  establish  free 
trade.  That  there  was  some  foreshadowing  of  this  design, 
seems  to  be  established  by  the  fact  that  the  only  votes  cast 
for  Mr.  Barbour  were  from  the  States  of  North  Carolina, 
Virginia,  Maryland,  South  Carolina  and  Alabama  ;  in  all  of 
which  there  soon  existed  organizations  in  opposition  to  the 
protective  policy.  And,  besides,  it  was  understood  at  the 
time  that,  if  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  agree  upon  a 
"  platform  of  principles,"  the  anti-tariff  members  of  the  con- 
vention would  demand  a  declaration  favoring  their  views, 
or,  failing  in  that,  would  withdraw.  The  attempt,  however, 

does  not  seem  to  have  been  made  ;  or,  if  it  was,  it  led  to  no 
'7 


258  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

practical  result.  The  reason  was — as  all  the  leading  inci- 
dents tend  to  prove— %that  it  was  deemed  expedient  to 
leave  matters  in  such  a  condition  as  to  secure  a  large  sup- 
port to  General  Jackson  and  Mr.  Van  Buren  from  the 
enemies  of  the  tariff  in  the  South,  and  thus  assure  their 
election  ;  because  it  was  well  understood  that  their  uniform 
support  of  protection  would  reconcile  its  friends  in  the  tariff 
States  to  both  of  them.  It  was  a  game  of  political  chess 
most  skillfully  played.  In  order  that  the  players  might  win, 
without  danger  of  a  check-mate,  a  "  platform  "  was  dis- 
pensed with,  and  the  following  resolution  adopted  as  a 
substitute : 

"  Resolved,  That  it  be  recommended  to  the  several  delegations  in 
this  convention,  in  place  of  a  general  address  from  this  body  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  to  make  such  explanations,  by  address, 
report,  or  otherwise,  to  their  respective  constituents,  of  the  object,  pro- 
ceedings and  result  of  this  meeting,  as  they  may  deem  expedient" 

General  Jackson  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  conven- 
tion, nor  had  it  anything  to  do  with  him.  As  he  was 
already  a  candidate,  without  its  agency,  its  whole  duty  con- 
sisted in  the  selection  of  a  candidate  for  the  Vice-Presi- 
dency. And  when  it  is  considered  that,  among  all  the 
public  functionaries  in  this  country,  there  is  not  one  who 
has  less  to  do  officially  with  the  management  of  public 
affairs  than  the  Vice-President,  it  should  excite  no  special 
surprise  that  the  members  of  this  convention  were  left  to 
do  and  say  whatsoever  they  might  "deem  expedient"  to 
secure  his  election.  As  for  General  Jackson,  his  claims 
were  based  upon  his  public  services  and  unquestioned 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  259 

integrity.  He  had  voted  for  the  tariff  of  1824,  had  admin- 
istered that  of  1828,  and,  as  President,  had  approved  that 
of  1832.  His  letters  to  Dr.  Coleman  and  the  Governor  of 
Indiana  were  before  the  country.  In  these  and  in  his 
messages  he  had  advocated  the  system  of  protection  in  apt 
and  earnest  language,  having  expressly  avowed  his  deter- 
mination to  stand  by  the  policy  adopted  under  the  admin- 
istration of  Washington,  and  maintained  during  those  of 
Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Monroe.  This  was  "  platform " 
enough  for  him.  It  was  different  with  Mr.  Van  Buren  as  a 
candidate  for  the  Vice-Presidency.  It  was  deemed  ex- 
pedient in  his  case  that  the  field  of  operations  should  be 
widened  out  sufficiently  to  furnish  standing  room  for  both 
the  friends  and  enemies  of  protection  —  for  the  tariff  men 
of  the  manufacturing  sections  and  the  anti-tariff  men  among 
the  cotton-planters.  Hence,  the  resolution  adopted  left 
the  former  to  vote  under  the  assurance  that  protection  had 
a  steady  and  consistent  supporter  in  General  Jackson  ;  and 
the  latter  to  decide  whether  they  would  announce  and  vote 
for  a  competing  candidate  favorable  to  their  own  peculiar 
views,  or  continue  to  co-operate  with  those  with  whom  they 
had  been  acting,  with  the  hope  of  being  able,  in  the  end,  to 
accomplish  their  object  in  that  mode.  They  decided  upon 
the  latter  course  ;  and,  consequently,  the  electoral  votes  of 
all  the  cotton-growing  States  were  cast  for  General  Jackson 
and  Mr.  Van  Buren,  except  that  of  South  Carolina ;  which 
State,  under  the  leadership  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  Mr.  Hayne, 
and  Mr.  McDuffie,  refused  to  support  General  Jackson, 
and  voted  for  Mr.  John  Floyd,  of  Virginia,  as  the  proper 


260  HISTORY  OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

exponent  of  their  distinctive  opinions.  The  only  avowed 
ground  of  this  opposition  to  General  Jackson  was  the  con- 
sistent and  persevering  support  he  had  given  to  the  system 
of  protection,  both  before  and  after  his  election. 

This  opposition  led  to  a  course  of  procedure  in  South 
Carolina,  far  exceeding  in  violence  that  in  any  other  State, 
having  been  carried,  indeed,  almost  to  the  extremity  of 
open  resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment. A  theory  of  the  Constitution  was  announced,  which 
denied  to  the  Government  the  rightful  power  to  do  many 
things  it  had  been  in  the  constant  habit  of  doing  during  all 
its  existence,  and,  more  especially,  to  extend  any  protection 
whatsoever  to  the  labor  and  industry  of  the  country.  It 
was  claimed  that  Congress  could  not  properly  exercise  any 
implied  powers,  but  only  such  as  were  expressly  conferred 
upon  it  by  the  Constitution,  strictly  interpreted ;  and  that 
all  powers  except  the  latter,  were  reserved  by  the  States  to 
themselves,  as  separate  sovereignties.  Among  these  re- 
served powers — as  it  was  insisted — was  the  right  on  the 
part  of  a  State  to  decide  for  itself  what  laws  of  the  United 
States  it  would  obey,  and  what  laws  it  would  not  obey ;  in 
other  words,  to  determine  for  itself  when  the  national  laws 
were  or  were  not  constitutional,  and,  when  they  were 
found  not  to  be  so,  to  pronounce  them  inoperative,  null 
and  void.  The  sole  object  of  asserting  this  doctrine  at 
that  time  was  to  defeat  the  policy  of  the  administration 
in  executing  the  existing  tariff  laws,  and  to  substitute  free 
trade  for  protection. 

Acting  upon  this  theory,  and  with  these  objects  in  view, 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  26 1 

a  State  convention  was  assembled  in  South  Carolina  which 
passed  an  ordinance  declaring  that  the  tariff  laws  of  1828 
and  1832  were  unconstitutional,  and,  therefore,  null  and 
void;  and  put  the  State  in  the  attitude  of  open  resistance 
to  them.*  They  ordained  that  these  laws  were  not  binding 
upon  the  citizens  of  that  State  ;  that  it  should  be  consid- 
ered unlawful  for  any  of  the  authorities  of  the  State,  or  of 
the  United  States,  to  enforce  the  payment  of  duties  under 
them  within  the  limits  of  South  Carolina ;  that  no  appeal 
should  be  allowed  from  the  courts  of  the  State  to  those  of 
the  United  States  in  cases  involving  their  validity  ;  that  any 
person  attempting  such  appeal  should  be  held  guilty  of  a 
contempt  of  court ;  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Legis- 
lature of  the  State  to  pass  such  laws  as  should  become 
necessary  to  give  full  effect  to  all  these  provisions.  The 

*  How  far  the  mass  of  the  people  of  South  Carolina  were  responsible  for  or 
approved  of  these  and  other  proceedings  hostile  to  the  Union,  may  be  inferred  from  the 
constitutional  organization  of  the  State.  What  is  elsewhere  called  the  popular  branch 
of  the  Legislature  —  the  House  of  Representatives  —  was  a  slave  oligarchy,  each  mem- 
ber being  required  to  own  "  five  hundred  acres  of  land  and  ten  negroes,"  or  land  of  the 
value  of  ^"150  sterling,  clear  of  debt.  Senators  were  to  possess  ^300  sterling,  clear  of 
debt;  and  the  Governor  and  Lieutenant-Governor  each  ^1,500  sterling,  clear  of  debt. 
Those  who  had  resided  in  an  election  district  six  months  were  entitled  to  vote  in  that 
district,  but  the  owner  of  fifty  acres  of  land  could  vote  in  as  many  districts  as  he  owned 
that  much  land  in,  provided  he  had  lived  two  years  in  the  State,  and  could  reach  the 
several  districts  before  the  polls  were  closed.  In  several  days'  voting  one  such  man 
could  easily  manage  to  cast  several  votes. 

The  State  government  of  South  Carolina  was,  in  a  large  degree,  removed  from  and 
independent  of  the  mass  of  the  people ;  which,  in  some  measure,  accounts  for  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  politicians  managed  its  affairs.  The  latter  might  not  have  had  the  power 
to  do  many  things  they  have  done,  if  the  present  Constitution  of  the  State  had  existed 
from  the  beginning  of  its  history.  As  it  has  been,  however,  they  have  consulted  their 
own  and  not  the  will  of  the  people  —  have  bargained  away  the  electoral  vote  of  the  State 
— and  have  placed  themselves  in  the  van  of  all  those  measures  which,  beginning  in  nulli- 
fication culminated  in  secession,  and  subordinated  the  interests  of  the  people  to  their  own 
ambitious  ends. 


262  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

ordinance,  moreover,  declared  that  the  people  of  the  State 
would  maintain  its  provisions  at  every  hazard  ;  that  they 
would  regard  any  act  of  Congress  to  abolish  or  close  the 
ports  of  the  State,  or  to  obstruct  the  ingress  or  egress  of 
vessels,  or  to  enforce  the  tariff  laws,  except  through  the 
courts  of  the  State,  "as  inconsistent  with  the  longer  con- 
tinuance of  South  Carolina  in  the  Union  "  ;  and  that  there- 
after the  people  of  the  State  would  "hold  themselves 
absolved  from  all  further  obligation  to  maintain  or  preserve 
their  political  connection  with  the  people  of  the  other 
States,"  and  would  organize  a  separate  government,  as  a 
sovereign  and  independent  State. 

This  ordinance  was  passed  in  November,  1832 — as  a 
protest  against  the  election  of  General  Jackson  for  the  sec- 
ond term.  During  the  same  month  the  Legislature  of  South 
Carolina  assembled,  with  the  express  purpose  of  providing 
such  measures  as  were  considered  necessary  in  the  existing 
emergency.  The  Governor,  in  his  message,  portrayed,  in 
eloquent  terms,  the  long  suffering  of  the  State  and  the 
patient  forbearance  of  its  people.  He  declared  himself 
unwilling  even  to  "  argue  "  the  propriety  of  the  course 
adopted  by  the  State,  but  considered  it  the  duty  of  the  Leg- 
islature to  pass  all  such  laws  as  were  necessary  to  carry  the 
ordinance  into  effect,  inasmuch  as  the  State,  falling  back 
upon  its  reserved  rights,  had  appealed  to  its  ulterior  sov- 
ereignty. In  responding  to  his  recommendations  the  Legis- 
lature acted  with  the  utmost  promptitude.  An  act  was 
passed  to  carry  into  effect  the  nullifying  ordinance.  It  pro- 
vided that  where  a  United  States  Collector  of  Customs 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  263 

seized  goods  for  non-payment  of  duties,  they  might  be 
recovered  by  an  action  of  replevin,  and  the  Collector  be 
imprisoned  if  he  concealed  or  refused  to  deliver  them  ;  that 
any  person  arrested  or  imprisoned  upon  a  judgment  or 
decree  obtained  in  a  United  States  court,  for  duties,  should 
have  the  benefit  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  and  an  action 
for  damages  ;  that  any  jailer  who  received  a  person  com- 
mitted for  the  non-payment  of  duties,  or  any  person  who 
hired  his  house  to  be  used  as  such  jail,  should  be  fined  and 
imprisoned  ;  and  that  any  person  who  paid  duties  to  a  Col- 
lector should  be  permitted  to  recover  them  back  in  the 
courts  of  the  State.  Another  act  was  passed  to  the  effect 
that  if  the  Government  of  the  United  States  undertook  to 
coerce  the  State  into  obedience  to  the  tariff  laws  of  1828 
and  1832,  which  had  been  pronounced  null  and  void  by  the 
ordinance,  it  should  be  resisted  by  the  military  power  of  the 
State ;  and  that  in  case  of  any  overt  act  of  coercion,  or 
intention  to  commit  the  same,  by  the  authorities  of  the 
United  States,  the  Governor  was  authorized  to  organize  a 
volunteer  army  for  resistance,  and  to  call  forth  the  militia. 
And  all  citizens  were  required  to  take  an  oath  of  allegiance 
to  the  State,  and  were  absolved  from  their  allegiance  to  the 
United  States. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  penetrate  the  motives  of  individ- 
uals, when  acting  singly  and  alone,  than  it  is  those  of  mul- 
titudes of  men  who  act  in  combination,  especially  when 
brought  into  the  presence  of  the  results  achieved  by  them. 
In  the  matters  we  are  now  considering  it  is  plainly  manifest 
that  the  advocates  of  the  English  policy  of  free  trade  were 


Of  rue 

TJNIVEBSIT* 

..,*. 


264  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

resolutely  determined  to  inaugurate  that  policy  in  this 
country,  no  matter  what  disastrous  consequences  might 
befall  manufacturing  industry  and  all  the  interests  dependent 
upon  it.  Although  their  numbers  were  yet  inconsiderable, 
their  leaders  were  men  of  eminent  ability,  distinguished 
alike  for  all  the  excellencies  of  private  character  and  con- 
spicuous public  service.  They  were  trained  statesmen  and 
possessed,  in  the  highest  degree,  the  capacity  which  fitted 
them  for  governing  others.  They  had,  besides,  the  courage 
to  follow  out  their  convictions  to  the  end,  and  a  fervor  of 
enthusiasm  which  imparted  to  their  eloquence  an  extraor- 
dinary power.  Thus  they  obtained  an  influence  in  public 
affairs  which  they  employed  most  energetically,  without 
pausing  long  enough  to  calculate  the  fatal  consequences 
even  to  themselves.  Their  mistakes  followed  each  other  in 
rapid  succession — each  one  demonstrating  their  blinded 
infatuation  and  folly.  That  which  now  concerns  us  most  is 
their  effort  to  destroy  the  system  of  protection,  by  war  upon 
General  Jackson's  administration.  How  that  war  resulted, 
and  how  he  maintained  the  integrity  of  the  national  au- 
thority, and  vindicated  his  own  claim  to  the  public  confi- 
dence, we  shall  soon  see,  in  the  events  which  followed  the 
attempt  on  the  part  of  South  Carolina  to  establish  free 
trade  or  break  up  the  Union. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

JACKSON  RE-AFFIRMS  THE  PROPRIETY  OF  PROTECTION  —  OPPOSED 
NULLIFICATION  — HIS  PROCLAMATION  AND  MESSAGE  — HIS 
CONCILIATORY  SPIRIT  — PROTECTION  MUST  BE  PRESERVED  - 
REVENUE  TO  BE  REGULATED  BY  WANTS  OF  GOVERNMENT  — 
CONCILIATION  SCORNFULLY  REJECTED. 

HPHE  purpose  of  the  nullification  proceedings  in  South 
Carolina  was  boldly  and  courageously  avowed.  It  was 
to  expel  the  authority  of  the  United  States  from  that  State, 
and  to  prevent  the  collection  of  a  single  dollar  of  national 
revenue  in  any  of  its  ports.  It  assumed,  as  the  starting 
point,  that  the  administration  would  prove  imbecile,  and 
that  it  only  required  the  exhibition  of  determined  will  to 
bring  it  into  contempt.  General  Jackson  fully  compre- 
hended the  situation  when  he  said  : 

i, "  The  whole  revenue  system  of  the  United  States,  in  South  Carolina, 
is  obstructed  and  overthrown ;  and  the  Government  is  absolutely  pro- 
hibited from  collecting  any  part  of  the  public  revenue  within  the  limits 
of  that  State.  Henceforth  not  only  the  citizens  of  South  Carolina  and 
of  the  United  States,  but  the  subjects  of  foreign  States  may  import  any 
description  or  quantity  of  merchandise  into  the  ports  of  South  Carolina, 
without  the  payment  of  any  duty  whatsoever. ' ' 

The  nullification  ordinance  which  brought  about  this 
anomalous  condition  of  affairs  was  passed  almost  imme- 
diately after  the  Presidential  election  of  1832.  Whether  it 

would  have  been  passed  had  the  result  been  otherwise  than 

265 


266  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

it  was,  it  would  be  only  guess-work  to  say  now.  But,  how- 
ever this  may  have  been,  it  is  entirely  proper  to  consider  it, 
as  heretofore  remarked,  in  the  nature  of  a  protest  against 
the  election  of  General  Jackson,  for  whom  the  State  of 
South  Carolina  had  refused  to  vote  in  a  manner  as  marked 
and  offensive  as  possible.  It  is  not  probable  that  this  view 
of  it  influenced  the  official  conduct  of  General  Jackson, 
who,  finding  in  the  ordinance  and  subsequent  legislation  the 
announcement  of  the  intention  to  nullify  an  important  and 
necessary  law  of  the  United  States  and  to  disrupt  the 
Union  by  secession,  felt  it  his  duty  to  assert,  without  equiv- 
ocation, and  to  maintain  the  national  authority.  Accord- 
ingly, he  issued  his  proclamation  of  December  10,  1832, 
wherein  he  counseled  the  people  of  South  Carolina  against 
the  consequences  of  their  folly,  and  made  a  strong  and 
earnest  appeal  to  them  in  behalf  of  the  Union.  This  doc- 
ument was  preceded,  a  few  days  only,  by  his  message  of 
December  4,  1832  ;  and  the  two,  taken  together,  display  a 
spirit  of  liberality,  conciliation,  and  forbearance  most  cred- 
itable to  his  patriotism  ;  but  not  exhibiting  the  slightest 
abatement  of  his  attachment  to  the  Union  or  of  the  deter- 
mination to  preserve  it  unbroken  by  enforcing  the  tariff 
laws.  In  the  message  he  referred  to  the  fact  that  $5 8,000,- 
ooo  of  the  public  debt  would  be  paid  within  the  period  of 
four  years,  and  that  it  was  so  near  final  extinguishment  as 
to  justify  a  reduction  of  the  revenue  "  to  a  considerable 
extent,"  so  as  to  bring  it  down  to  the  measure  of  true 
economy  and  remove  as  many  of  the  burdens  which  had 
caused  complaint  as  possible.  His  opinions  and  motives 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  267 

were  fully  explained.  While  he  was  willing,  patriotically, 
to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  allay  the  excitement  which 
threatened  such  disastrous  consequences  to  the  country  as 
would  undoubtedly  follow  the  triumph  of  nullification  and 
free  trade-— for  they  had  become  inseparable — yet  it  was 
impossible  for  him  not  to  realize  that  he  was  the  President 
of  the  Union  and  not  of  a  section,  and  that  the  alternative 
presented  by  South  Carolina  of  "a  repeal  of  all  the  acts  for 
raising  revenue,"  would  leave  the  Government — as  he  ex- 
pressed it —  "  without  the  means  of  support."  And  it  was 
equally  impossible  for  him,  consistently  with  his  official  duty 
and  repeatedly  avowed  opinions,  to  consent  to  an  aban- 
donment of  a  policy  which  all  his  predecessors  had  sanc- 
tioned and  which  almost  the  entire  Nation  had  approved. 
He  thus  explained  himself  in  his  message  : 

"  Long  and  patient  reflection  has  strengthened  the  opinions  I  have 
heretofore  expressed  to  Congress  on  this  subject.  The  soundest  maxims 
of  public  policy,  and  the  principles  upon  which  our  republican  institu- 
tions are  founded,  recommend  a  proper  adaptation  of  the  revenue  to  the 
expenditure,  and  they  also  require  that  the  expenditure  shall  be  limited 
to  what,  by  an  economical  administration,  shall  be  consistent  with  the 
simplicity  of  the  Government,  and  necessary  to  an  efficient  public  ser- 
vice. In  effecting  this  adjustment  it  is  due,  in  justice  to  the  interests  of 
the  different  States,  and  even  to  the  preservation  of  the  Union  itself,  that 
\)dQ  protection  afforded  by  existing  laws  to  any  branches  of  the  national 
industry  should  not  exceed  what  may  be  necessary  to  counteract  the 
regulations  of  foreign  nations,  and  to  secure  a  supply  of  those  articles  of 
manufacture  essential  to  the  national  independence  and  safety  in  time  of 
war." 

Herein  he  made  some  concession,  but  he  did  it  from 
patriotic  motives.  Instead  of  continuing  to  insist  that  the 
principle  of  protection  should  not  be  relaxed,  although  an 


268  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

annual  surplus  should  be  left  in  the  Treasury  for  distribu- 
tion among  the  States,  he  held  out  "the  olive  branch"  to 
the  malcontents  of  the  South,  with  the  assurance  that  he 
would  unite  with  them  in  so  adjusting  the  duties  that  the 
amount  of  revenue  to  be  raised  should  not  exceed  the 
expenses  of  the  Government,  economically  administered. 
And  as  explanatory  of  his  purpose  in  this  respect,  he  pro- 
ceeded to  state  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  duties  might  be 
gradually  diminished  where  the  protection  granted  by  them 
exceeds  what  is  indispensably  requisite  to  that  end  ;  and 
the  whole  scheme  of  duties  be  brought  to  the  revenue 
standard,  so  soon  as  it  could  be  done  without  prejudice  to 
"the  large  capital  invested  in  establishments  of  domestic 
mdustry."  He  did  not  hesitate  to  declare,  however,  that 
he  considered  "  manufactures  adequate  to  the  supply  of 
our  domestic  consumption,"  as  so  beneficial  to  the  country 
that  there  could  be  "no  American  citizen  who  would  not 
for  a  while  be  willing  to  pay  a  higher  duty  for  them," 
rather  than  see  them  destroyed.  He  expressed  also  the 
belief  that  there  were  very  few  statesmen  who  desired 
"a  tariff  of  high  duties,  designed  for  perpetual  protection"; 
that  is,  for  protection  without  any  regard  to  revenue.  The 
most  that  was  asked,  in  his  opinion,  was  "  temporary  and 
generally  incidental  protection,"  which,  it  was  insisted, 
would  reduce  "the  price  by  domestic  competition  below  that 
of  the  foreign  article  "  /  a  proposition  in  flat  contradiction 
to  the  assertion  made  by  anti-tariff  men,  that  the  domestic 
manufacturer  invariably  increases  his  prices  upon  all  his 
fabrics  to  the  extent  of  the  duty  upon  foreign  fabrics.  He 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  269 

admitted  that  there  were  some  evils  attending  the  system 
of  levying  duties  which  might  possibly  counterbalance  some 
of  the  advantages  ;  evidently  intending  to  call  the  attention 
of  Congress  to  the  necessity  of  diligently  inquiring  whether 
such  evils  as  were  found  to  exist  could  not  be  removed,  so 
as  to  pacify  the  discontented,  and  put  an  end  to  the  exist- 
ing sectional  jealousies  which  were  "  dangerous  to  the 
stability  of  the  Union."  He  gave  no  sanction  whatsoever 
to  horizontal  duties. 

By  everything  he  said  he  exhibited  a  disposition  to 
conciliate  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  taking  care  to  do 
nothing  inconsistent  with  his  own  official  dignity  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  whole  Union.  He  could  not,  of  course,  consent 
to  an  abrogation  of  all  duties  upon  imports,  because  that 
wou4d  result  in  direct  taxation,  as  the  only  means  of  raising 
revenue.  Yet  he  was  ready,  in  a  conciliatory  spirit,  to 
abandon  the  idea  of  raising  a  surplus  for  distribution,  and 
confine  the  revenue  to  an  amount  necessary  for  an  econom- 
ical support  of  the  Government.  He  was  disposed  to  con- 
sider revenue  as  the  primary  object  of  duties,  and  protection 
as  secondary,  but,  nevertheless,  as  necessary  and  indis- 
pensable. Consequently,  he  thus  discussed  the  practical 
question  : 

"What  then  is  to  be  done?  Large  interests  have  grown  up  under 
the  implied  pledge  of  our  national  legislation,  which  it  would  seem  a 
violation  of  public  faith  suddenly  to  abandon.  Nothing  could  justify  it 
but  the  public  safety,  which  is  the  supreme  law.  But  those  who  have 
vested  their  capital  in  manufacturing  establishments  cannot  expect  that 
the  people  will  continue  permanently  to  pay  high  taxes  for  their  benefit, 
when  the  money  is  not  required  for  any  legitimate  purpose  in  the  admin- 
istration of  the  Government.  Is  it  not  enough  that  the  high  duties  have 


270  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

been  paid  as  long  as  the  money  arising  from  them  could  be  applied  to 
the  common  benefit,  in  the  extinguishment  of  the  public  debt  ? 

"  Those  who  take  an  enlarged  view  of  the  condition  of  our  country 
must  be  satisfied  that  the  policy  of  protection  must  be  ultimately  limited 
to  those  articles  of  domestic  manufacture  which  are 'indispensable  to  our 
safety  in  time  of  war.  Within  this  scope,  on  a  reasonable  scale,  it  is 
recommended  by  every  consideration  of  patriotism  and  duty,  which  will 
doubtless  always  secure  to  it  a  liberal  and  efficient  support.  But  beyond 
this  object  we  have  already  seen  the  operation  of  the  system  productive 
of  discontent.  In  some  sections  of  the  republic,  its  influence  is  depre- 
cated as  tending  to  concentrate  wealth  into  a  few  hands,  and  as  creating 
those  germs  of  dependence  and  vice  which  in  other  countries  have  char- 
acterized the  existence  of  monopolies,  and  proved  so  destructive  of 
liberty  and  the  general  good.  A  large  portion  of  the  people  in  one  sec- 
tion of  the  republic  declares  it  not  only  inexpedient  on  these  grounds, 
but  as  disturbing  the  equal  relations  of  property  by  legislation,  and 
therefore  unconstitutional  and  unjust. 

"  Doubtless  these  effects  are,  in  a  great  degree,  exaggerated,  and 
may  be  ascribed  to  a  mistaken  view  of  the  considerations  which  led  to 
the  adoption  of  the  tariff  system ;  but  they  are  nevertheless  important  in 
enabling  us  to  review  the  subject  with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  all  its 
bearings  upon  the  great  interests  of  the  republic,  and  with  a  determina- 
tion to  dispose  of  it  so  that  none  can  with  justice  complain." 

This  was  an  exhibition  of  commendable  frankness  ;  and 
was  manifestly,  as  already  remarked,  a  concession  to  the 
spirit  of  discontent  which  then  existed.  While  he  con- 
sidered the  main  objections  to  the  system  of  protection  as 
exaggerated,  yet  he  esteemed  them  of  importance  enough 
to  be  carefully  considered  by  Congress  in  any  subsequent 
adjustment  of  duties  that  might  be  made.  His  entire  argu- 
ment is  opposed  to  free  trade.  Manufacturers  who  have 
erected  establishments,  at  large  cost,  are  entitled  to  rely 
upon  the  good  faith  of  the  Government — pledged  by 
repeated  acts  of  national  legislation  —  for  a  proper  and  just 
protection  of  their  interests.  But  they  ought  not  to  expect 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  271 

that  duties  shall  be  levied  for  their  special  benefit,  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  money  when  it  is  not  needed  for 
the  expenses  of  the  Government.  When  it  is  observed  that 
he  was  considering  the  question  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
public  debt  was  about  to  be  extinguished,  and  that  no 
increase  of  duties  was  necessary  on  that  account,  it  may 
readily  be  inferred  that,  if  such  had  not  been  the  case,  he 
might  have  consented  to  such  an  increase.  Whether  he 
would  have  done  so  or  not,  however,  he  sufficiently  shows 
that  he  considered  it  the  duty  of  Congress  to  preserve  the 
principle  of  protection,  leaving  the  amount  of  duties  to  be 
considered,  whensoever  Congressional  action  was  required, 
as  a  question  of  expediency  only.  The  amount  of  revenue 
to  be  raised  was  to  be  regulated  by  the  wants  of  the 
Government — and  that  was  the  main  point  upon  which  he 
was  insisting.  Therefore,  whatsoever  modification  of  his 
former  opinions  he  deemed  it  proper  to  make,  should  be 
considered  as  having  been  rendered  necessary  by  the 
changed  posture  of  public  affairs  and  the  agitated  condition 
of  the  country.  His  position  may  be  thus  summed  up  : 
that,  in  order  to  regulate  the  amount  of  revenue  by  the 
actual  expenditures  and  not  by  the  mere  benefit  to  manu- 
facturers, he  recognized  the  necessity  of  somewhat  reduc- 
ing the  duties  upon  the  protected  articles  ;  leaving  them  to 
be  increased  or  lowered  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
public  service  and  the  necessities  of  domestic  trade  and 
industry.  As  the  Government  could  not  be  conducted, 
even  after  the  extinguishment  of  the  public  debt,  without 
revenue  derived  from  duties  upon  imports,  or  by  direct 


272  HISTORY  OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

taxation — which  was  utterly  impracticable — he  had  a  right 
to  expect  that  his  patriotic  concessions  would  reconcile  those 
who  had  gone  to  the  extent  of  bidding  defiance  to  the 
national  authority.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  he 
was  disappointed.  Even  his  suggestion  with  reference  to 
incidental  protection — to  which  reference  will  be  made 
hereafter — was  spurned  by  them,  because  it  stopped  short 
of  their  ultimatum,  which  was  free  trade.  To  the  accom- 
plishment of  this,  by  the  absolute  repeal  of  all  tariff  laws 
and  the  total  destruction  of  the  principle  of  protection,  they 
bent  all  their  energies. 


AVERAGE  YEARLY  WAGES 

OF  THE 

ARTISAN    CLASSES. 


TRADES.        NO 


AVERAGE  TOTAL 

YEARLY  WAGES.     YEARLY  WAGES. 


9,411,328 
4,447,349 
4,845,413 
65,982,133 
24,562,077 
12,198,053 


Hosiery  and  Knit  Goods 

Cotton  Good§ j 

Men's  Clothing.... 

Woolen  Goods — 
Mixed  Textiles— _ 

Tobacco,  Cigars  and 
Cigarettes 

Paper 

Book  Bind'g  and  Blank 
Book,  Making-  __ 

G.lass_  _  i 

Boots  and  Shoes 


Hats  and  Caps 

Leather  Tanning- _ 

Agricultural,  Jjnplejn't 

?rs,  Railroad  and 
reet,^ , 

Carriages  and  Wago 

Hardware-, 

Furniture^ 

Bread  and  Bakery 
Products 1 

Cutlery  and  Edge  Tools 
Leather  Currying 

Foundries  and  Machine 
Shops 

Carpentry 

Malt  Liquors 

Marble  and  Stone 

Jewel  ry_ 

Printing  and  Pub. 

Musical  Instruments 


$6,701,475 
45,014,419 
45,940,353 
25,836,292 
13,316,753 
18,464,562 
.  8,525,355 
3,927,349 
9,144,100 
50,995,144 

6.635,522 

9,204,243 
15,359,610 

5,507,753 
J8,9SS,615 

.6,846,913 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

JACKSON  STANDS  BY  HIS  PROCLAMATION  —  PROTECTION  CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL—MOTIVES CAN  NOT  VITIATE  A  LAW  — NOR  INE- 
QUALITY—GOVERNOR OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA  ISSUES  A  PROC- 
LAMATION—HE DENOUNCES  JACKSON  —  SPECIAL  MESSAGE  OF 
JACKSON— WILLING  TO  REDUCE  REVENUE,  BUT  NOT  TO 
ABANDON  PROTECTION. 

'"THE  generous  and  conciliatory  tone  exhibited  by  Gen- 
*  eral  Jackson  in  his  message  of  December  4,  failed  to 
arouse  any  reciprocating  sentiments  among  those  who 
managed  the  affairs  of  South  Carolina.  It  seemed  rather 
to  make  them  more  violent  and  inflammatory.  Their  con- 
duct bore  the  appearance  of  being  incited  by  the  belief  that 
they  had  intimidated  the  President,  and  that  his  liberality 
was  the  consequence  of  fear  more  than  of  patriotism.  It 
needed  the  Proclamation  to  dispel  this  illusion  ;  and  its 
eloquent  and  burning  words  not  only  accomplished  that 
object,  but  went  home  directly  to  the  heart  of  every  lover 
of  the  Union,  whether  in  the  North  or  the  South.  It  vindi- 
cated the  integrity  of  the  National  Government  so  thor- 
oughly and  completely  as  to  take  its  place  at  once  among 
the  ablest  State  papers  in  the  public  archives. 

Among  the  causes  of  objection  to  the  tariff  laws,  the 
Proclamation  sets  forth  the  following  •  that  "  although  they 
purport  to  be  laws  for  raising  revenue,  they  were  in  reality 

intended  for  the  protection  of  manufactures,  which  purpose 
iS  273 


274  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

it    [the   nullifying    ordinance]    asserts   to    be   unconstitu- 
tional." 

It  took  General  Jackson  but  few  words  to  dispose  of 
this  objection ;  and  his  conclusive  argument  upon  the 
point  has  lost  none  of  its  force  by  time  —  it  being  as  appli- 
cable now  as  it  then  was,  to  this  frequently  reiterated  com- 
plaint. As  he  understood  it,  the  power  of  Congress  to  lay 
and  collect  duties  on  imports  was  conceded  by  it,  but  the 
constitutionality  of  laws  passed  for  that  purpose  were 
called  in  question  because  of  the  "motives"  of  those  who 
passed  them.  He  said  : 

f '  However  apparent  this  purpose  may  b«  in  the  present  case,  noth- 
ing can  be  more  dangerous  than  to  admit  the  position  that  an  unconsti- 
tutional purpose,  entertained  by  the  members  who  assent  to  a  law  enacted 
under  a  constitutional  power,  shall  make  that  law  void  ;  for  how  is  that 
purpose  to  be  ascertained  ?  Who  is  to  make  the  scrutiny  ?  How  often 
may  bad  purposes  be  falsely  imputed  ?  In  how  many  cases  are  they  con- 
cealed by  false  professions  ?  In  how  many  is  no  declaration  of  motive 
made  ?  Admit  this  doctrine,  and  you  give  to  the  States  an  unconstitu- 
tional right  to  decide,  and  every  law  may  be  annulled  under  this 
pretext." 

The  assertion  that  the  tariff  laws  operated  unequally — 
an  assertion  often  repeated  now — was  disposed  of  with  the 
same  ease  and  clearness.  In  his  opinion  this  objection 
might  be  made  against  "  every  law  that  has  been  or  can  be 
passed,"  because  "  the  wisdom  of  man  has  not  yet  contrived 
a  system  of  taxation  that  would  operate  with  perfect  equal- 
ity ";  and  "  if  the  unequal  operation  of  a  law  makes  it  un- 
constitutional, and  if  all  laws  of  that  description  may  be 
abrogated  by  any  State  for  that  cause,  then  indeed  is  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  275 

Federal  Constitution  unworthy  of  the  slightest  effort  for  its 
preservation." 

The  ordinance  of  nullification  urged  as  an  additional 
objection  to  the  tariff  laws,  that  it  was  proposed  to  raise  by 
them  more  money  than  the  necessities  of  the  Government 
required ;  and  that,  when  thus  raised,  it  would  be  unconsti- 
tutionally disposed  of  by  unauthorized' Congressional  appro- 
priations. With  what  exactitude  is  the  same  complaint 
made  in  our  own  time  !  General  Jackson  made  to  it  this 
conclusive  reply :  first,  that  "  the  Constitution  has  given 
expressly  to  Congress  the  right  of  raising  revenue,  and  of 
determining  the  sum  the  public  exigency  may  require"; 
and,  second,  that  although  this  discretionary  power  may  be 
abused,  yet  it  "must  exist  somewhere  ";  and  the  same  may 
be  said  of  other  powers  granted  to  Congress.  The  objec- 
tion was  shown  to  be  wholly  frivolous. 

The  arguments  of  General  Jackson  covered  the  whole 
ground  of  the  ordinance  and  laws  of  South  Carolina.  They 
swept  away  all  the  fallacies  and  sophistry  of  the  advocates 
of  free  trade,  and  placed  both  the  constitutionality  and 
expediency  of  our  protective  tariff  laws  upon  a  firm  and 
solid  foundation.  Affirming  and  maintaining  both,  he 
grappled  with  nullification  and  secession  so  vigorously  as 
to  commend  himself  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  as 
the  courageous  defender  of  the  Union  ;  and  his  Proclama- 
tion will  always  remain  memorable  as  a  clear,  eloquent  and 
patriotic  exposition  of  the  true  relation  between  the  United 
States  and  the  separate  States. 

Neither  the  friendly  tone  of  the  message  nor  the  unan- 


276  HISTORY  OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

swerable  arguments  of  the  Proclamation  had  the  effect  to 
allay  the  spirit  of  discontent  among  the  advocates  of  free 
trade  in  South  Carolina.  A  counter-proclamation  was 
issued  by  the  Governor  of  that  State,  openly  defying  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  ;  and  a  rendezvous  for  the 
enlistment  of  State  troops  was  opened.  The  menace  of 
making  war  upon  the  Union  was  upon  the  eve  of  being 
carried  into  practical  execution  ;  and  everything  betokened 
an  actual  collision  of  arms.  The  appeal  and  remonstrance 
of  the  President  were  alike  unavailing;  it  did  not  seem 
possible  to  arrest  the  storm,  or  even  to  abate  its  fury.  As 
the  discontents  were  resolved  to  be  satisfied  with  nothing 
less  than  an  abrogation  of  the  tariff  laws  and  the  entire 
destruction  of  the  principle  of  protection — and  as  the 
President's  clemency  and  forbearance  had  been  madly 
repelled — there  was  nothing  left  for  him  but  to  discharge 
his  official  duty  by  seeing  that  the  existing  laws  were  exe- 
cuted. He  was  willing  to  see  them  so  changed,  by  neces- 
sary amendments,  as  to  remove  whatsoever  just  causes  of 
complaint  should  be  found  to  exist ;  but  the  attempt  to 
resist  them  by  armed  force  he  regarded  as  treason.  That 
was  a  crime  against  the  Constitution,  for  which  the  law  fur- 
nished no  peaceful  remedy.  Yet,  he  did  not  act  rashly. 
Every  step  was  taken  with  the  utmost  caution  and  delibera- 
tion. He  had  too  much  real  courage  to  desire  the  shedding 
of  blood,  and  deplored  the  necessity  which  would  require 
him  to  maintain  the  Union  by  force.  Consequently,  on 
January  16,  1833,  he  communicated  to  Congress  a  special 
message,  calling  again  the  attention  of  that  body  to  the 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  277 

condition  of  the  country.  In  it  he  stated  that  he  had 
indulged  the  hope  that  his  message  of  December  4,  and  his 
Proclamation  —  by  frankly  explaining  his  sentiments,  and 
the  nature  of  the  duties  the  crisis  devolved  upon  him — 
would  have  induced  the  authorities  of  South  Carolina  "to 
retrace  their  steps."  Not  having  realized  this  expectation, 
however,  his  remaining  duty  consisted  in  showing — as  he 
did  show — that  the  misrule  and  oppression  complained  of 
as  produced  by  the  tariff  laws,  existed  more  in  the  heated 
and  inflamed  imagination  of  their  opponents  than  in  fact. 
He  considered  the  occasion  as  requiring  him  to  speak  of 
these  laws  as  follows  : 

"  The  long  sanction  they  have  received  from  the  proper  authorities, 
and  from  the  people,  not  less  than  the  unexampled  growth  and  increas- 
ing prosperity  of  so  many  millions  of  freemen,  attest  that  no  such 
oppression  as  would  justify  or  even  palliate  such  a  resort  [nullification 
and  secession]  can  be  justly  imputed  to  the  present  policy  or  past  meas- 
ures of  the  Federal  Government.  The  same  mode  of  collecting  duties, 
and  for  the  same  general  objects,  which  began  with  the  foundation  of  the 
Government,  and  which  has  conducted  this  country  through  its  subse- 
quent steps  to  its  present  enviable  condition  of  happiness  and  renown, 
has  not  been  changed.  Taxation  and  representation — the  great  prin- 
ciples of  the  American  Revolution — have  continually  gone  hand  in  hand ; 
and  at  all  times  and  in  every  instance,  no  tax  has  been  imposed  with- 
out their  participation,  and  in  some  instances  which  have  been  com- 
plai  ned  of,  with  the  express  assent  of  a  part  of  the  representatives  of 
South  Carolina  in  the  councils  of  the  Government.  Up  to  the  present 
period,  no  revenue  has  been  raised  beyond  the  necessary  wants  of  the 
country  and  the  authorized  expenditures  of  the  Government.  And  as 
soon  as  the  burden  of  the  public  debt  is  removed,  those  charged  with  the 
administration  have  promptly  recommended  a  corresponding  reduction 
of  the  revenue." 

It  requires  but  little  reflection  to  perceive  the  method 
of  reasoning  by  which  these  conclusions  were  arrived  at. 


278  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

The  great  and  controlling  question  was  the  amount  of 
revenue  to  be  raised.  General  Jackson  had  previously 
signified  his  willingness  to  see  a  surplus  produced  for  dis- 
tribution ;  but  his  mind  was  undergoing,  or  had  already 
undergone,  some  change  upon  this  subject.  The  "  log- 
rolling" system  which  prevailed  of  making  up  bills  for 
internal  improvements  to  advance  the  political  fortunes  of 
individuals  rather  than  the  public  welfare,  had  evidently 
alarmed  him  with  the  apprehension  that,  unless  it  were 
arrested,  the  old  public  debt  would  not  long  be  paid  before 
a  new  one  was  created.  And,  besides,  he  may  have  sup- 
posed he  could  foresee  that  if  extravagant  appropriations 
were  continued  by  means  of  this  policy,  it  might,  by  possi- 
bility, be  seized  upon  as  a  pretext  for  extending  protecting 
duties  so  far  as  to  make  them  almost,  if  not  entirely,  pro- 
hibitory, and  thus  require  the  deficiency  of  revenue  to  be 
made  up  by  placing  a  portion  of  the  burden  upon  the  un- 
protected articles,  from  which  they  were  then  exempt.  By 
this,  or  some  kindred  method  of  reasoning,  he  reached  the 
conclusion  that  it  would  be  a  safer  and  better  course  to 
regulate  the  amount  of  revenue  by  the  actual  wants  of  the 
Government,  inasmuch  as  the  extinguishment  of  the  public 
debt  would  remove  that  cause  of  expenditure.  There  were 
difficulties,  of  course,  in  fixing  with  precision  the  annual 
standard  of  expenditures — as  there  always  have  been  and 
always  will  be.  At  that  time  they  were  steadily  increasing, 
made  necessary  in  some  measure  by  the  rapid  growth  of 
the  country.  Along  with  the  other  matters  contained  in 
the  message,  this  fact  was  also  communicated  to  Congress, 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  279 

in  order  that  the  discretion,  rightfully  confided  to  that  body, 
should  be  properly  exercised  in  deciding  upon  the  amount 
of  revenue  to  be  raised.  The  gross  expenditures  for  1831 
were  $30,038,446.12,  including  $14,806,629.48  paid  on 
account  of  the  public  debt.  Those  of  1832  were  $34,356,- 
698.06,  including  $17,067,747.79  of  the  public  debt.  The 
balance  in  the  Treasury  at  the  close  of  the  latter  year  was 
reduced  to  $2,01 1,777.55.  While  this  sum  was  not  suffi- 
ciently large  to  justify  a  distribution  among  the  States,  and 
while  General  Jackson  had  been  made  to  doubt  the  pro- 
priety of  establishing  a  permanent  system  for  that  purpose, 
it  was  evident  that  he  was  not  then  inclined  to  recommend 
any  considerable  diminution  of  duties  and  a  consequent 
corresponding  decrease  in  the  revenue.  As  already  stated, 
he  was  willing  to  see  the  tariff  modified  in  a  spirit  of  com- 
promise, so  as  to  accommodate  the  existing  disagreements 
as  far  as  possible,  without  an  abandonment  of  the  principle 
of  protection  ;  but  did  not  think  it  prudent  to  cut  off  the 
resources  of  the  Government  so  largely  as  to  change  the 
existing  surplus  into  a  deficiency.  Consequently,  we  do 
not  find  him  recommending  any  important  reduction  of 
duties,  but  contenting  himself  with  counseling  Congress 
not  to  inaugurate  a  system  of  unnecessary  and  extravagant 
expenditures.  This  continued  to  be  his  main  object,  not  a 
word  having  been  employed  by  him  indicating  a  desire  to 
see  the  principle  of  protection  abandoned. 

The  whole  question  with  reference  to  the  tariff  laws, 
and  the  regulation  of  duties,  was  thus  placed  before  Con- 
gress. The  President  had  done  all  in  his  power  and  left  to 


280  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

the  representatives  of  the  people,  where  it  properly  be- 
longed, the  exercise  of  the  legislative  power  in  providing 
some  satisfactory  plan  of  adjustment.  The  difficulties  did 
not  seem  to  be  diminishing,  as  the  cotton-planters  of  South 
Carolina  still  declared  that  there  was  but  one  basis  of 
reconciliation  —  that  is,  the  absolute  destruction  of  the 
whole  system  of  levying  duties  —  but  he  wisely  invoked  the 
spirit  of  moderation,  and  submitted  the  whole  matter  to 
Congress.  Why  these  South  Carolina  growers  of  cotton 
demanded  this,  and  how  they  expected  their  peculiar  inter- 
est to  be  promoted  by  free  trade,  we  shall  see  hereafter. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  his  report  for  that 
year,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  reduction  of  the  public 
debt  and  the  unusually  large  importations  for  the  years 
1831  and  1832,  would  justify  some  reduction  in  the  reve- 
nue. The  amount  of  reduction  suggested  by  him  was 
$6,000,000,  to  take  effect  prospectively  after  the  year  1833. 
As  the  estimated  receipts  from  customs  for  the  year  was 
placed  at  $21,000,000,  this  left  $15,000,000  to  be  raised  by 
duties,  which,  with  the  amounts  received  from  the  public 
lands  and  other  sources,  would  leave  the  amount  necessary 
for  the  current  expenses  and  a  surplus  of  about  $6,000,000 
for  distribution,  or  to  be  held  for  contingencies.  The 
Secretary  expressed  the  further  opinion  that  while  the 
main  purpose  of  taxation  under  the  Constitution  was  to 
pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the  common  defense  and 
general  welfare,  yet  "this  power  may  and  ought  to  be 
directly  exerted  to  counteract  foreign  legislation  injurious 
to  our  own  enterprise,  and  incidentally  to  protect  our 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  28 1 

own  industry,  more  especially  those  branches  'necessary  to 
preserve  within  ourselves  the  means  of  national  defense 
and  independence/ '  Like  the  President,  he  entertained 
no  desire  to  see  the  principle  of  protection  abandoned  ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  plainly  stated  that  he  did  not,  and 
that  the  diminution  of  duties  proposed  by  him  would  not, 
in  his  opinion,  have  that  effect.  He  said  : 

"In  the  reduction  then  recommended,  the  necessity  of  adapting  the 
proposed  changes  to  the  safety  of  existing  establishments  [manufactures] 
raised  up  under  the  auspices  of  past  legislation,  and  deeply  involving  the 
interests  of  large  portions  of  the  Union,  was  distinctly  recognized,  and  it 
is  still  deemed  to  be  not  less  imperious  in  the  further  changes  which  may 
be  considered  expedient.'* 

He  also  said : 

"To  aid  American  enterprise  in  every  branch  of  labor,  and,  by  sea- 
sonable encouragement,  to  foster  and  preserve  within  ourselves  the 
means  of  national  defense  and  independence,  led  to  the  protective  system 
in  the  infancy  of  the  Government.  To  counteract  the  policy  and  rivalry 
of  foreign  nations,  and  to  prevent  their  prejudicial  influence  upon  Ameri- 
can industry;  to  indemnify  the  latter  against  the  superior  skill  and 
capital,  and  cheapness  of  labor  in  older  and  more  experienced  countries, 
and  to  succor  American  capital,  which  the  events  of  the  late  war  [with 
Great  Britain]  had  devoted  to  manufacturing  employments,  recom- 
mended an  occasional  extension  of  that  policy  which  has  been  liberally 
enjoyed  by  the  manufacturing  classes  since  the  act  of  the  4th  of  July, 
1789." 

It  will  be  perceived,  therefore,  that  the  modified  system 
of  duties  recommended  by  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  did  not  involve  the  abrogation  of  the  pro- 
tective principle.  In  the  minds  of  both,  the  same  causes 
which  led  to  its  introduction  in  1789  and  had  induced  its 
continuance  ever  since  —  in  the  laws  of  1816,  1824,  1828, 


282  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

and  1832,  and  the  amendments  made  to  them,  from  time  to 
time — still  existed,  requiring  it  to  be  preserved.  It  was  as 
necessary  as  it  had  ever  been  to  foster  our  industry,  to  pre- 
serve our  independence,  to  develop  our  resources,  to  coun- 
teract the  policy  of  foreign  nations,  to  enable  American 
industry  to  procure  indemnity  against  the  cheap  labor  of 
Europe,  and  to  succor  American  capital.  And  realizing 
all  this,  they  both  united  in  the  desire  to  see  a  system  which 
had  conferred  so  many  benefits,  saved  from  destruction. 
In  their  opinion  the  reduction  of  duties  recommended  by 
them  might  be  made  without  endangering  the  protective 
principle. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

FORCE  BILL  PASSED  —  SOUTH  CAROLINA  LEGISLATURE  ATTACKED 
JACKSON  —  PASSED  SECESSION  RESOLUTIONS—  BILL  TO  MOD- 
IFY THE  TARIFF—  COMPROMISE  ACT  OF  1833  PASSED  —  ITS 
PRINCIPLES  —  DUTIES  REDUCED  TO  HORIZONTAL  STANDARD 
IN  1842  —  RECEIPTS  FROM  CUSTOMS  EXCEEDED  EXPENDI- 
TURES—NO FURTHER  REDUCTION  IN  1834—  RECEIPTS  AND 
EXPENDITURES  FOR  SEVERAL  YEARS  —  PAYMENT  OF  PUBLIC 
DEBT—  JACKSON  CHANGED  HIS  OPINION  ABOUT  SURPLUS  — 
HIS  FAREWELL  ADDRESS—  PROTECTION  PRESERVED—  WAR 
UPON  HIS  POLICY  CONTINUED—  THREATS  OF  GOVERNOR 
McDUFFIE—  HE  ADVOCATES  FREE  TRADE. 


real  condition  of  affairs  brought  about  by  the 
*  attempt  of  South  Carolina  to  nullify  the  tariff  laws  of 
1828  and  1832  cannot  be  fully  portrayed  without  a  dis- 
cussion which  would,  in  some  degree,  excite  the  rancor  of 
party  spirit.  This  is,  in  no  sense,  desirable.  It  would  tend 
to  revive  passions  which  have  since  spent  their  force  in 
consequences  which  everybody  ought  to  deplore,  and  which 
should  remain  in  oblivion,  or  if  remembered  at  all,  only  to 
be  avoided  in  the  future.  The  present  inquiries  have  no 
connection  with  them,  and  if,  in  spite  of  every  caution,  they 
will  obtrude  upon  our  reflections,  we  should  be  careful 
not  to  allow  them  to  create  anew  any  sentiment  of  hostility 
to  the  common  interests  of  the  whole  Union.  Never- 
theless, there  are  some  facts  belonging  to  those  times, 
without  which  we  can  neither  understand  the  tariff  legis- 

283 


284  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

lation  of  1833,  nor  the  purposes  which  Congress  intended 
to  be  carried  out  by  means  of  it. 

The  refusal  of  South  Carolina  to  suspend  operations 
under  her  nullifying  ordinance  and  the  acts  of  her  Legis- 
lature rendered  national  legislation  necessary,  with  ref- 
erence to  enforcing  the  collection  of  duties  in  the  ports  of 
that  State.  What  was  known  as  "  The  Force  Bill"  was 
introduced  for  that  purpose,  and  was  immediately  accepted 
as  an  administration  measure.  This  having  been  done  in 
response  to  the  Proclamation  and  the  special  message  of 
the  President,  made  the  issue  sharp  and  direct  —  so  much 
so  that,  for  a  time,  reconciliation  seemed  impossible.  The 
spirit  of  conciliation  which  the  President  had  invoked  was 
spurned  with  indignation  by  the  leading  advocates  of  nul- 
lification and  free  trade.  After  the  Proclamation,  the  Leg- 
islature of  South  Carolina  adopted  several  resolutions 
severely  denunciatory  of  General  Jackson,  and  declaring 
that  the  State  would  maintain  its  position  at  all  hazards. 
They  charged  him,  directly  and  as  offensively  as  possiBe, 
with  an  unconstitutional  and  arrogant  effort  to  utterly 
destroy  liberty,  by  the  establishment  of  a  consolidated  gov- 
ernment, with  all  its  powers  concentrated  in  the  President ; 
with  having  exhibited  ''personal  feelings  and  retaliations 
towards  the  State  of  South  Carolina"  [because  she  had 
refused  to  vote  for  him  for  the  presidency?]  ;  with  having 
asserted  doctrines  subversive  of  the  rights  of  the  States, 
which,  if  submitted  to,  would  lead  to  a  monarchy  ;  and  with 
having  excited  their  indignation  to  such  a  degree  that  the 
State  was  prepared  to  "repel  force  by  force,"  and  "main- 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  285 

tain  its  liberty  at  all  hazards."  They  asserted  the  right  of 
secession,  and  the  primary  and  paramount  allegiance  due  to 
the  State  by  all  its  citizens,  in  these  words : 

"Resolved,  That  each  State  of  this  Union  has  the  right,  whenever  it 
may  deem  such  course  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  its  liberty,  or 
vital  interest,  to  secede  peaceably  from  the  Union ;  and  that  there  is  no 
constitutional  power  in  the  General  Government,  much  less  in  the  Ex- 
ecutive Department  of  that  Government,  to  retain  by  force  such  State  in 
the  Union. 

"Resolved,  That  the  primary  and  paramount  allegiance  of  the  citi- 
zens of  this  State,  native  or  adopted,  is  of  right  due  to  this  State." 

The  severe  and  impassioned  attack  upon  General  Jack- 
son, personally  and  officially,  and  upon  his  administration, 
did  not,  in  the  least,  disturb  his  composure.  He  was  too 
strong  in  the  integrity  of  his  purpose  to  suffer  discomfiture. 
But  when  the  foregoing  resolutions  were  communicated  to 
the  public  the  most  intense  excitement  was  produced.  In- 
dicating as  they  did — interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  Ordi- 
nance and  Acts  of  the  Legislature — a  determination  either 
to  destroy  the  tariff  or  break  up  the  Union,  unless  it  could 
be  held  together  by  force,  they  led  to  angry  and  threaten- 
ing discussions,  in  and  out  of  Congress.  This  tended  to 
increase  the  general  alarm,  and  to  show  that,  unless  some 
plan  should  be  adopted  to  heal  the  breach  so  unwisely  and 
unpatriotically  made,  and  which  was  widening  every  day, 
the  country  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being  plunged  into 
a  civil  war.  Patriotic  appeals  for  the  Union,  however  elo- 
quent, seemed  mere  idle  declamation,  while  such  hot  and 
embittered  passions  were  raging. 

The  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  in  the  House  of 


286  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

Representatives,  in  order  to  meet  the  exigency,  reported  a 
bill  somewhat  modifying  the  tariff  law  of  1832.  It  provided 
for  a  revenue  of  $15,000,000  a  year,  as  recommended  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  This,  with  $2,500,000,  the 
estimated  annual  proceeds  of  the  public  lands,  was  sup- 
posed to  be  sufficient  to  carry  on  the  Government,  if  ad- 
ministered upon  proper  principles  of  economy,  as  the  public 
debt  was  then  nearly  all  paid.  The  bill  was  so  arranged  as 
to  make  it  conform  with  the  law  of  1816,  and  a  supple- 
mentary law  of  1818,  in  relation  to  the  unprotected  arti- 
cles, in  order  that  the  free  list  could  be  increased  from  time 
to  time  as  the  necessities  of  the  Treasury  might  require. 
But  as  it  regarded  the  protected  articles  they  were  pro- 
vided for' upon  the  same  principle  as  that  embodied  in  the 
laws  of  1816  and  1824  ;  the  duties,  however,  being  reduced 
to  correspond  with  the  proposed  reduction  of  revenue. 
But  it  was  not  intended  to  sacrifice  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion by  this  reduction  of  duties,  nor  to  produce  a  horizontal 
standard.  The  duties  on  silks  were  raised  ;  and  teas,  which 
had  been  made  free  by  the  act  of  1832,  had  a  duty  of 
twenty  per  cent  levied  upon  them,  in  order  to  provide 
against  a  possible  decline  in  the  revenue  from  other  arti- 
cles. The  entire  plan  of  the  law  of  1816  was  arranged,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  for  "  the  preservation,  during 
a  violent  transition  from  war  to  peace,  of  the  numerous 
manufactures  that  had  grown  up  under  the  double  duties, 
and  the  practical  prohibition  of  the  embargo,  the  non-inter- 
course, and  the  war  with  Great  Britain  "  ;  and  as,  in  their 
opinion,  also,  the  increase  of  manufactures  between  1816 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  287 

and  1824,  had  been  invited  by  the  protection  afforded  by 
that  law,  and  new  investments  of  capital  had  been  made 
under  it,  it  was  not  considered  expedient  to  abandon  them 
by  a  surrender  of  the  protective  policy. 

This  was  an  administration  measure — prepared  in  the 
kindly  spirit  which  General  Jackson  had  exhibited.  But  it 
was  a  long  way  from  free  trade ;  and,  therefore,  did  not 
satisfy  the  representatives  of  South  Carolina,  and  the  few 
other  opponents  of  protection,  who  were  then  beginning  to 
range  themselves  under  their  lead.  They  intended  that  the 
issue  should  involve  the  absolute  destruction  of  all  tariff 
laws,  without  compromise  or  modification  ;  an  entire  abroga- 
tion of  the  mode  of  collecting  revenue  which  had  constantly 
prevailed  from  the  beginning  of  the  Government.  Nothing 
besides  free  trade  would  pacify  them.  Consequently,  it 
was  evident  that  unless  something  were  done  by  way  of 
concession,  the  most  disastrous  consequences  were  threat- 
ened. But  it  is  unnecessary  now  to  trace  this  fierce  con- 
troversy through  its  various  stages,  inasmuch  as  it  would 
only  show  the  pertinacity  and  ability  with  which  the  con- 
testants maintained  their  respective  theories.  It  is  not 
required  by  any  present  purpose  to  go  beyond  the  fact  that, 
in  the  end,  patriotic  concessions  were  made  by  the  friends 
of  protection  in  order  to  perpetuate  the  peace  of  the  Union, 
and  that  the  result  was  the  passage  of  the  Compromise  Act 
of  1833. 

That  act  was  simple  in  its  provisions,  and  looked,  for 
the  first  time  in  our  history,  to  an  ultimate  horizontal  rate 
of  duties,  at  twenty  per  cent  ad  valorem,  upon  all  the  pro- 


288  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

tected  articles,  after  the  year  1842.  Where  the  duties  then 
exceeded  that,  one-tenth  of  the  excess  was  to  be  deducted 
at  the  end  of  the  year  1835  >  one-tenth  at  the  end  of  1837  ; 
one-tenth  at  the  end  of  1839  ;  one-half  of  the  residue  from 
and  after  the  end  of  1841  ;  and  from  and  after  June  31, 
1842,  the  remaining  half. 

Mr.  Clay  was  the  author  of  this  bill  and  presented  it, 
not  because  it  fully  expressed  his  own  views,  but  because 
he  considered  it  the  best  that  could  be  done  under  existing 
circumstances,  to  pacify  the  country.  He  preferred  that  to 
any  personal  triumph,  and  urged  the  adoption  of  the  meas- 
ure in  that  spirit  alone.  It  encountered  opposition  from 
some  of  the  leading  friends  of  protection,  notably  Mr. 
Webster,  upon  the  ground  that  it  endangered  the  existence 
of  that  principle,  and  went  too  far  in  the  direction  of  free 
trade.  But  Mr.  Clay  defended  himself  against  this  imputa- 
tion, by  saying,  with  reference  to  protection,  that  "  he  had 
cherished  this  system  as  a  favorite  child,  and  he  still  clung 
to  it,  and  should  still  cling  to  it.'*  Then  explaining  that  his 
only  motive  was  to  preserve  the  Union  and  thereby  to 
arrest  the  course  of  those  whose  hands  were  "  uplifted  to 
destroy  the  system"  [of  protection],  he  continued  : 

"  He  felt  himself  pained  exceedingly  in  being  obliged  to  separate  on 
the  question  from  valued  friends,  especially  from  his  friend  from  Massa- 
chusetts [Mr.  Webster],  whom  he  had  always  respected,  and  whom  he 
still  respected.  He  then  replied  to  the  argument  founded  on  the  idea 
that  the  protective  principle  had  been  abandoned  by  this  bill.  He  ad- 
mitted that  protection  had  been  better  secured  by  former  bills,  but  there 
was  no  surrender  by  this.  He  considered  revenue  as  the  first  object,  and 
protection  as  the  second.  As  to  the  reduction  of  the  revenue,  he  was  of 
opinion  that  there  was  an  error  in  the  calculation  of  gentlemen.  He 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  289 

thought  that  in  the  article  of  silks  alone  there  would  be  a  considerable 
reduction.  The  protection  to  the  mechanic  arts  was  only  reduced,  by 
the  whole  operation  of  the  bill,  to  twenty-six  per  cent;  and  he  did  not 
know  that  there  would  be  any  just  ground  of  complaint,  as  some  of  the 
mechanic  arts  now  enjoy  only  twenty-five  per  cent.  *  *  *  *  He 
would  say,  save  the  country — save  the  Union  —  and  save  the  American 
system." 

The  success  of  all  tariff  laws,  in  so  far  as  revenue  is 
concerned,  necessarily  depends  upon  the  extent  of  importa- 
tions. The  customs  receipts  of  one  year  can  only  furnish  a 
rule  by  which  an  approximate  estimate  for  the  next  may  be 
made.  Calculated  upon  the  basis  of  the  importations  of 
1831  and  1832,  it  was  supposed,  at  the  passage  of  the  law 
of  1833,  that  it  would  supply  revenue  enough,  at  least,  for 
the  year  1834,  and,  possibly,  for  the  whole  period  up  to 
1842,  when  the  whole  duties  would  be  reduced  to  twenty 
per  cent.  At  most,  however,  it  was  an  experiment,  the 
effect  of  which  had  to  be  thereafter  determined. 

The  customs  receipts  were  derived  from  the  duties  levied 
by  the  law  of  1832,  until  after  the  close  of  the  year  1835, 
when  the  first  ten  per  cent  of  the  excess  over  twenty  was 
to  be  Deducted.  Thus  the  law  of  1832  continued  practi- 
cally to  operate  until  the  last  year  of  General  Jackson's 
administration.  In  his  message  of  December  3,  1833,  he 
stated  the  revenue  from  customs  for  that  year  to  be  more 
than  $28,000,000,  while  the  net  expenditures  did  not  amount 
to  quite  $23,000,000.  This,  however,  could  not  be  taken 
as  an  indication  of  the  amount  of  revenue  that  could  be 
relied  on  for  the  ensuing  year,  as  the  importations  would 
necessarily  fluctuate  somewhat.  Besides,  the  shortened 
19 


2QO  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

credits  on  revenue  bonds,  and  the  cash  duties  on  woolens, 
caused  considerable  sums  to  be  paid,  which  otherwise  would 
not  have  reached  the  Treasury  until  a  subsequent  year.  In 
consequence,  it  was  considered  reasonably  evident  that  the 
receipts  for  the  year  1834  would  be  less  than  those  of  the 
previous  year;  and  it  was  estimated  that  the  reduction 
wrould  continue,  in  consequence  of  diminished  duties,  so 
that  there  would  be  barely  enough  revenue  for  the  next 
year  to  pay  the  small  balance  of  the  public  debt  and  the 
ordinary  expenses  of  the  Government.  Therefore,  the  Presi- 
dent declined  to  recommend  any  further  reduction  of  duties, 
preferring  to  let  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833  have  a  fair 
trial.  He  said: 

"  I  cannot,  therefore,  recommend  to  you  any  alteration  in  the 
present  rate  of  duties.  The  rate,  as  now  fixed  by  law,  on  the  various 
articles,  was  adopted  at  the  last  session  of  Congress,  as  a  matter  of  com- 
promise, with  unusual  unanimity,  and,  unless  it  is  found  to  produce  more 
than  the  necessities  of  the  Government  call  for,  there  would  seem  to  be 
no  reason,  at  this  time,  to  justify  a  change." 

He  considered  that  the  times  constituted  "a  new  era" 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Government,  and  that  Congress  should 
abstain  from  all  appropriations  of  money  not  absolutely 
required  by  the  public  interests,  so  that,  after  the  last  of 
the  public  debt  should  be  paid  —  the  time  for  which  was 
rapidly  approaching  —  the  utmost  economy  should  be  prac- 
ticed to  bring  down  the  expenditures  to  the  lowest  standard. 
That  object  was,  in  his  estimation,  of  primary  consideration, 
not  merely  because  it  was  necessary  and  desirable  in  itself, 
but  because  of  the  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  amount 
of  revenue  to  be  expected  under  the  operation  of  the  new 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF  29 1 

law  of  1833,  after  the  reduction  of  duties  should  begin. 
It  was  easy  to  foresee  that  an  extravagant  expendi- 
ture and  a  diminishing  revenue  would  begin  the  crea- 
tion of  a  new  debt  immediately  after  the  payment  of  the 
old  one. 

The  balance  in  the  Treasury  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1833  was  $11,702,905.31,  which  put  it  in  the  power  of  the 
Government  to  pass  through  the  next  year  without  diffi- 
culty, even  if  the  accruing  revenue  should  fall  short.  The 
President  did  not,  in  his  message  of  1834,  state  the  receipts 
from  customs,  but,  from  all  sources,  the  revenue  was 
$20,624,777,  which,  added  to  the  above  balance,  made 
$32,327,623,  as  the  total  amount  available  for  the  year. 
The  total  expenditures  were  estimated  at  $25,591,390,  in- 
cluding the  payment  on  the  public  debt,  which  it  was  sup- 
posed would,  by  January  i,  1835,  reduce  the  balance  in  the 
Treasury  to  $6,736,232,  including  a  balance  of  $1,150,000 
which  was  not  available.  The  net  ordinary  expenditures 
for  the  year  were  $18,425,417.25,  which  was  $4,288,337.86 
less  than  the  previous  year.  But,  in  point  of  fact,  the  reve- 
nue from  customs  fell  off  considerably.  In  1833  it  was 
$29,032,528.91,  whereas  in  1834  it  was  only  $16,214,957.45, 
a  falling  off  of  $12,817,561.46  in  one  year.  And  thus  it 
appears  that  the  receipts  from  customs  were  not  sufficient 
to  pay  the  net  ordinary  expenses  of  1833  J  an<3,  but  for  the 
balance  in  the  Treasury  and  the  receipts  from  other  sources, 
including  $3,967,682.55  from  the  public  lands,  there  would 
have  been  a  deficiency  and  no  means  of  paying  any  part  of 
the  public  debt.  At  all  events,  it  was  beginning  to  become 


292  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

apparent  that,  if  the  Government  had,  in  the  future,  no 
other  resource  than  the  revenue  from  customs,  the  receipts 
from  public  lands,  and  the  small  internal  revenue  then 
provided  for,  the  time  might  arrive,  in  a  few  years  —  as,  in 
fact,  it  did — when  it  would  be  greatly  embarrassed,  unless 
the  expenditures  were  reduced  greatly  below  what  they 
had  hitherto  been.  The  President  seemed  convinced  of 
this,  as  may  be  inferred  from  the  earnestness  with  which  he 
dwelt  upon  the  necessity  of  the  most  rigid  economy. 

The  net  ordinary  expenditures  for  the  year  1835  were 
reduced  to  $17,514,950.28,  and  the  revenue  from  customs 
increased  to  $19,391,310.50.  But  the  enormous  receipts 
from  public  lands — being  $14,757,600.75  —  swelled  the 
gross  receipts  to  an  amount  greater  than  they  had  ever 
been  since  the  war  with  Great  Britain.  And  thus  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  receipts  from  customs  for  that  year  somewhat 
exceeded  the  net  expenses.  In  the  message  of  that  year 
the  President  communicated  the  fact  that  the  public  debt 
had  been  extinguished,  and  accompanied  the  announcement 
with  the  statement  that  the  estimates  for  the  year  were 
about  $24,000,000  ;  which,  in  his  opinion,  could  be  provided 
for  by  existing  laws,  with  a  probability  that  there  would  be 
a  surplus  of  about  $i  1,000,000  at  the  end  of  the  year,  "to 
be  applied  to  any  new  object  which  Congress  may  desig- 
nate, or  to  the  more  rapid  execution  of  the  works  in  prog- 
ress." He  also  thought  that  the  receipts  for  1836  would 
exceed,  by  $20,000,000,  those  of  1835.  Under  these  flat- 
tering and  favorable  circumstances,  he  declined  to  recom- 
mend any  change  in  the  tariff,  although  he  considered  it 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  293 

probable  that,  by  1842,  there  would  be  "a  very  considerable 
deduction" — a  prediction  fully  verified. 

In  the  year  1836  —  the  last  of  General  Jackson's  ad- 
ministration —  the  receipts  from  customs  increased  to 
$23,409,940.53,  and  those  from  the  public  lands  to  the  un- 
precedented amount  of  $24,877,179.86.  The  net  ordinary 
expenditures  for  the  year  were  also  increased  to  $30,868,- 
164.04.  But  for  the  receipts  from  the  public  lands - 
occasioned  by  the  rapid  settlement  of  the  West  and  North- 
west—  that  is,  if  the  Government  had  been  compelled  to 
rely  alone  upon  customs,  there  would  have  been  a  deficiency 
at  the  end  of  the  year.  As  it  was,  however,  there  was  a 
surplus  at  the  end  of  the  year  of  $46,708,436,  which,  of 
course,  included  the  previous  balances  brought  forward 
from  year  to  year.  This  large  surplus  was  produced 
almost  exclusively  by  the  sales  of  the  public  lands,  as  in 
two  years — 1835  and  1836 — there  was  received  into  the 
Treasury  from  that  source  alone  the  enormous  amount  of 
$39,634,780.61.  A  continuance  of  this  state  of  things 
could  not,  of  course,  be  expected,  and,  therefore,  it  was 
evident  that  the  Government  could  not  safely  rely  upon  any 
other  permanent  means  of  support  than  the  revenue  from 
customs.  And,  in  order  that  this  resource  might  not  be  cut 
off,  the  President  again  declined  to  recommend  a  reduction 
of  the  duties. 

General  Jackson  thought  that  the  favorable  condition  of 
affairs  at  the  close  of  his  administration  justified  the  belief 
"  that  there  will  continue  to  be  a  surplus  beyond  the  wants 
of  the  Government"  Of  course,  this  belief  was  based,  in 


294  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

some  degree,  upon  the  prospective  receipts  from  the  sale 
of  public  lands.  But,  in  whatsoever  way  the  surplus  should 
be  produced,  he  frankly  stated  that  his  mind  had  undergone 
a  change  with  reference  to  the  propriety  of  a  general 
policy,  to  be  established  for  the  purpose  of  producing  it,  in 
order  for  distribution  among  the  States.  Upon  this  subject 
he  said: 

"  Without  desiring  to  conceal  that  the  experience  and  observation 
of  the  last  two  years  have  operated  a  partial  change  in  my  views  upon 
this  interesting  subject,  it  is  nevertheless  regretted  that  the  suggestions 
made  by  me  in  my  annual  messages  of  1829  and  1830  have  been  greatly 
misunderstood." 

Alluding  also  to  his  former  suggestion  that  the  Consti- 
tution be  amended  so  as  to  allow  the  surplus  to  be  dis- 
tributed for  internal  improvements,  he  continued  : 

"  As  already  intimated,  my  views  have  undergone  a  change  so  far  as 
to  be  convinced  that  no  alteration  of  the  Constitution  in  this  respect  is 
wise  or  expedient." 

Under  all  the  circumstances,  therefore,  which  attended 
the  close  of  his  administration,  General  Jackson  felt  himself 
justified  in  congratulating  the  country  upon  the  condition 
of  the  public  finances  ;  and  in  admonishing  Congress  to 
make  such  appropriations  only  as  were  absolutely  necessary 
for  the  public  service.  He  found  the  revenue  sufficient  for 
the  support  of  the  Government,  when  he  became  President, 
and  left  it  in  the  same  condition  at  the  end  of  his  term  of 
service.  He  was  elected  as  the  friend  of  protection  and 
continued  so  to  the  end — leaving  the  principle  still  existing 
and  in  operation,  although  somewhat  endangered  by  the 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  295 

"  Compromise  Act  "  of  1833.  In  his  "  Farewell  Address," 
he  cautioned  the  country  against  levying  excessive  duties 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  raising  money  for  unconstitutional 
purposes.  But  neither  there  nor  elsewhere  did  he  express 
any  desire  to  see  the  principle  of  protection  abandoned, 
where  the  duties  were  levied  for  the  amount  of  revenue 
demanded  by  the  public  service.  Nor  did  he  do  a  single 
thing  or  utter  a  single  word  in  the  least  degree  favoring 
free  trade.  On  the  contrary,  all  that  he  did  and  said, 
exhibited  his  opposition  to  free  trade  and  an  earnest  desire 
to  see  the  principle  of  protection  preserved. 

But  as  his  administration  approached  its  close,  the 
friends  of  free  trade — who  still  supported  their  theory  by 
threats  of  nullification  —  became  more  consolidated  in  their 
struggle  for  success.  They  were  not  disposed  to  yield, 
manifestly  hoping  that  after  his  retirement  they  would  have 
to  deal  with  those  more  easily  alarmed  by  their  violence 
and  vindictiveness.  Their  sole  object  was  free  trade,  which 
they  resolutely  determined  to  obtain ;  peaceably  if  they  could, 
but  if  not,  by  a  disruption  of  the  Union,  notwithstanding 
General  Jackson's  equally  resolute  determination  that  they 
should  not.  There  was  not  the  slightest  effort  at  conceal- 
ment or  evasion  in  the  avowal  of  this  purpose  ;  and  it  was 
announced  in  such  a  way  as  to  assure  all  aspiring  politi- 
cians that  whosoever  expected  thereafter  to  obtain  the  sup- 
port of  the  defenders  of  free  trade  and  nullification,  must 
prepare  to  accept  its  dictation  with  humiliating  obedience. 
Mr  McDuffie,  being  elected  Governor  of  South  Carolina, 
availed  himself  of  the  occasion  of  his  inaugural  address  to 


296  HISTORY  OP  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

declare,  in  the  face  of  General  Jackson's  repeated  declara- 
tions to  the  contrary,  and  in  flagrant  resistance  to  the  doc* 
trines  of  his  Proclamation  that  "  the  entire  legislation  of 
Congress,"  with  reference  to  the  tariff,  "has  been  a  war 
of  communities  against  communities,  carried  on  by  making 
unjust  and  unconstitutional  laws,  instead  of  fighting  hazard- 
ous and  bloody  battles."  And  in  order  to  stir  the  smold- 
ering embers  of  passion  into  a  flame — notwithstanding  the 
professed  acceptance  of  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833 — he 
endeavored  to  create  in  the  cotton-growing  section  the 
belief  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  North  and  the  South  to 
remain  together  in  harmony,  and  that  their  interests  were  so 
distinct  and  hostile  that  separation  was  not  only  inevit- 
able but  desirable.  It  did  not  appear  possible  to  him  that 
the  South  could  longer  submit  quietly  to  the  tyranny  and 
oppression  of  the  Union.  He  thus  expressed  himself  : 

"  However  they  may  be  amalgamated  in  the  crucible  of  an  executive 
proclamation  or  of  speculative  theory,  history  bears  testimony  that  the 
States  are,  in  point  of  fact,  distinct  and  separate  communities,  mutually 
independent  of  each  other,  and  each  possessing  the  inherent  and  unde- 
rived  attribute  of  sovereignty.  Not  only  are  they  separated  geographic- 
ally, and  by  a  distinct  and  independent  political  organization,  but  they 
are  still  more  practically  separated  by  the  diversity  of  their  staple  produc- 
tions, creating  a  direct  and  irreconcilable  conflict  of  interest  between  the 
exporting  and  the  manufacturing  States,  as  decided  as  ever  existed  between 
any  two  independent  nations,  ancient  or  modern.  It  is,  for  example,  the 
undoubted  interest,  as  it  is  the  sacred  right  of  the  planting  States,  to 
exchange  their  staples  for  the  manufactures  of  Europe,  free  from  every 
obstruction  or  incumbrance. ' ' 

Then  charging  that  the  National  Government  had 
"already  passed  through  the  first  stages  of  its  progress 
to  military  despotism/'  in  the  policy  of  General  Jackson's 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  297 

administration  —  he  made  his  attack  upon  that  policy  more 
specific  and  emphatic,  in  these  words: 

"Such,  gentlemen,  is  the  true  practical  character  of  a  Government, 
the  Chief  Magistrate  of  which  has  solemnly  and  officially  denied  that  the 
States  are  sovereign,  and  attempted  to  dissipate  their  sovereignty  as  he 
would  disperse  an  unlawful  assembly — by  the  potent  energy  of  a  Procla- 
mation." 

Thus  the  free  trade  party  appealed  from  the  legislation 
of  Congress  and  the  Proclamation  of  General  Jackson,  to 
what  they  chose  to  call  a  higher  tribunal — the  sovereign 
right  of  the  States  to  humiliate  the  National  Government 
by  the  nullification  of  its  laws.  And  Governor  McDuffie, 
in  arguing  that  appeal  as  the  leading  champion  of  the  cause, 
boldly  laid  down  the  proposition  that  whosoever,  in  South 
Carolina,  should  be  found  in  arms  against  the  State,  aiding 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  tariff  laws  of  the  Union,  within  its 
borders,  and  after  the  State  had  taken  steps  to  nullify  them, 
"would  be  guilty  of  treason"  against  the  State! 

The  importance  of  this  vehement  resistance  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  Government  and  the  administration  of  General 
Jackson,  will  become  apparent  hereafter,  when  further  steps 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  movement  towards  free  trade  are 
brought  into  view.  Then  the  most  intelligent  and  thought- 
ful minds  of  the  present  day  will  find  much  food  for  reflec- 
tion in  inquiring  how  the  nullifying  influences  which  were 
thus  employed  to  resist  the  Union  became,  in  the  end,  so 
absolutely  controlling  in  national  affairs  as  to  secure  the 
election  of  a  free  trade  President,  in  the  person  of  Mr.  Polk, 
thereby  obtaining  possession  of  the  Government,  dictating 
its  policy,  and  procuring  the  passage  of  the  tariff  laws  of 


298  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

1846  and  1857,  by  means  of  which  the  revenue  became 
insufficient  to  carry  on  the  Government,  and  the  Treasury 
became  almost  bankrupt.  How  such  an  appeal  from  the 
policy  of  General  Jackson  was  made  thus  successful,  will, 
perhaps,  remain  forever  one  of  those  political  mysteries 
which  cannot  be  unraveled.  Our  present  concern  is  with 
the  fruits  it  produced,  not  with  the  methods  employed  by 
the  chief  actors,  who,  whatever  else  we  may  think  or  say  of 
them,  command  our  respect  on  account  of  the  wonderful 
ability  they  displayed.  They  managed  men  as  the  skilled 
equestrian  does  his  horse. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

COMPROMISE  ACT  OF  1833  A  PEACE  MEASURE— IT  IMPERILED 
PROTECTION  — FAILED  AS  A  REVENUE  MEASURE  — VAN  BUREN 
PRESIDENT  IN  1837  — BUSINESS  DERANGED  — REVENUE  DE- 
CLINING—EXTRA SESSION  OF  CONGRESS  —  EXPENDITURES 
EXCEED  RECEIFfS  —  VAN  BUREN  LOOKED  TO  COTTON  FOR 
RELIEF— HIS  MISTAKE  — HE  ENCOURAGED  FREE  TRADE  — 
HE  RECEIVED  THE  VOTE  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA  — CONDI- 
TION OF  TREASURY— VAN  BUREN's  MISTAKES  DEFEATED 
HIM  IN  1840. 

'"THE  compromise  tariff  of  1833  was  intended  by  Mr. 
*  Clay,  its  author,  by  its  supporters  in  Congress,  and  by 
General  Jackson,  who  approved  it,  as  a  peace  measure — 
an  offering  upon  the  altar  of  the  Union,  which  was  seriously 
threatened  by  the  sectionalism  incited  by  the  cotton- 
growers  of  South  Carolina  and  their  sympathizers  in  other 
parts  of  the  South.  Looked  at  in  this  sense,  its  passage 
may  be  considered  as  a  concession  to  the  advocates  of  free 
trade  that  their  intentions  were  honest  enough  to  entitle 
them  to  conciliatory  treatment,  notwithstanding  their  at- 
tempt to  nullify  the  tariff  laws  of  1828  and  1832,  and  their 
inflammatory  threats  to  secede  from  the  Union  and  destroy 
it.  This  admits  as  much  as  can  be  rightfully  conceded  to 
such  mad  and  dangerous  fanaticism  ;  and  all  are  not  ready 
to  go  even  this  far,  when  the  calamities  which  their  teach- 
ings have  brought  upon  the  whole  country  and  their  own 

section,  are  taken  into  view.      At  all  events,  the  adoption 

299 


3OO  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

of  the  measure  was  placed  upon  that  ground  by  its  sup- 
porters at  the  time  the  act  was  passed ;  and  upon  that 
ground  alone  can  it  now  find  justification.  While,  as  Mr. 
Clay  remarked,  it  was  not  designed  to  abandon,  and,  in 
point  of  fact,  did  not  entirely  abandon  the  principle  of  pro- 
tection, yet  it  undoubtedly  placed  it  in  serious  peril.  This, 
of  course,  was  not  foreseen,  but  it  was  demonstrated  by  the 
results  which  soon  followed — as  effect  follows  cause.  That 
it  was  a  failure  as  a  revenue  measure,  is  beyond  question. 
The  proof  upon  this  subject  is  sufficient  to  show  that,  if  its 
principles  were  made  permanent,  the  Government  would 
be  left  without  the  necessary  means  of  support,  no  matter 
what  degree  of  economy  might  be  practiced. 

The  effects  of  this  unwise  legislation  were  not  sensibly 
felt  during  General  Jackson's  administration.  They  were 
certainly  not  anticipated  by  him  — any  more  than  by  Mr. 
Clay  and  those  advocates  of  protection  who  acted  with  him 
— or  he  would  not  have  approved  the  act  of  June  23,  1836, 
which  deposited  with  the  States  nearly  $40,000,000  of  sur- 
plus revenue.  The  administration  of  Mr.  Van  Buren  was, 
however,  compelled  to  encounter  them  very  soon  after  its 
commencement.  By  that  time  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment had  forced  the  banks  to  a  suspension  of  specie  pay- 
ments, which  locked  up  in  their  vaults  large  sums  of  the 
public  money  which  had  been  deposited  with  them  by  the 
Government  —  the  revenues  from  both  customs  and  the 
public  lands  had  fallen  off  materially,  and  the  deranged 
condition  of  our  domestic  and  foreign  commerce  had  in- 
flicted serious  injury  upon  all  business  pursuits. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  30 1 

Mr.  Van  Buren  entered  upon  the  Presidency  March  4, 
1837,  and  found  himself  constrained,  by  the  foregoing  con- 
siderations, to  convene  Congress  in  extra  session  in  Sep- 
tember of  that  year  —  the  exigency  being  so  great  that  he 
could  not  await  the  meeting  of  the  regular  session  in 
December.  His  object  was  to  have  Congress  provide  some 
measure  of  relief  for  the  general  financial  embarrassment 
which  pervaded  all  sections  of  the  country,  and  reached, 
directly  or  indirectly,  every  class  of  business  ;  besides  low- 
ering the  wages  of  labor  almost  down  to  a  standard  which 
threatened  skilled  and  unskilled  laborers  with  starvation. 
In  his  special  message  to  Congress  he  endeavored  to 
account  for  this  ruinous  condition  of  affairs  by  assigning  it 
alone  to  the  action  of  the  banks  in  suspending  the  payment 
of  specie  for  their  circulation.  It  is  manifest  now,  however, 
that  in  this  his  vision  was  too  much  contracted  by  the 
necessities  he  had  allowed  to  grow  up  around  his  admin- 
istration, either  from  his  own  misguided  judgment  or  the 
evil  counsel  of  others  whom  he  trusted  too  far.  He  failed 
to  see,  or,  if  he  saw,  failed  to  understand  fully,  the  effects 
properly  attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  under  General  Jackson's  administration,  had  per- 
mitted the  "pet  banks"  to  base  an  increase  of  circulation 
upon  the  deposits  of  the  public  money,  so  that  activity 
should  be  given  to  business  by  an  exorbitant  increase  of 
currency.  But,  most  of  all,  he  failed  to  realize  the  con- 
sequences which  followed  the  great  revulsion  in  manu- 
facturing operations,  induced  by  the  threatened  withdrawal 
of  the  Government  protection,  immediately  following  the 


302  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

measures  which  had  excited  undue  speculation  and  over- 
trading all  over  the  country.  Seemingly  unwilling  or 
unable  to  understand  the  legitimate  fruits  of  the  policy 
which  had  led  to  these  results,  and  yet  conscious  of  the 
impossibility,  because  of  his  unfortunate  surroundings,  of 
furnishing  relief  by  any  executive  measures,  he  found  him- 
self compelled  to  declare  that  "all  communities  are  apt 
to  look  to  Government  for  too  much  ! "  This  doleful  utter- 
ance was  equivalent  to  saying  that  although  the  people  of 
the  United  States  have  entrusted  to  the  National  Gov- 
ernment the  exclusive  management  of  national  affairs,  yet, 
when  these  become  so  embarrassed  as  to  inflict  injury  upon 
domestic  industry,  they  should  seek  relief  from  some  other 
source — either  from  State  legislation,  or  from  themselves 
— without  the  aid  of  any  national  legislation  whatsoever. 
But  there  were  aspects  of  the  existing  state  of  affairs, 
which  Mr.  Van  Buren  could  not  fail  to  observe,  especially 
the  fact  that  the  revenues  were  rapidly  declining.  The 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  his  report  in  December,  1836 
—  the  last  year  of  General  Jackson's  administration  —  had 
estimated  that  the  current  receipts  in  the  Treasury  would 
fall  short  of  the  expenditures  for  that  year  about  $3,000,000. 
As  this  declension  was  steadily  continuing,  Mr.  Van  Buren, 
in  his  message,  declared  it  to  be  then  demonstrated  "  that 
the  difference  will  be  much  greater" — how  much  he  did 
not  estimate.  He,  very  properly,  attributed  this  to  the 
general  pecuniary  embarrassments,  which  had  occasioned 
the  decrease  in  the  revenue  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  en- 
deavored to  throw  the  responsibility  upon  Congress,  on 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  303 

account  of  appropriations  which  exceeded,  nearly  $6,000,- 
ooo,  the  estimates  of  the  Treasury  Department.  And  he 
could  see  no  other  remedy  than  to  withhold  the  balance 
due  to  the  States  under  the  Distribution  Act,  which  then  ex- 
ceeded $9,000,000.  This  he  considered  preferable  to  either 
an  increase  of  taxation — which  he  greatly  feared — or  rais- 
ing money  by  a  public  loan. 

It  has  been  shown,  by  subsequent  events,  that  the 
questions  then  pending  were  of  greater  magnitude  than 
Mr.  Van  Buren  then  supposed  ;  and,  therefore,  that  he  did 
not  fully  comprehend  the  true  import  of  the  combined  in- 
fluences which  had  produced  a  declining  revenue  and  the 
consequent  embarrassed  condition  of  the  Treasury.  He 
dreaded  the  effect  of  "increased  taxation  "  upon  his  admin- 
istration— apparently  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  the 
pecuniary  embarrassment  of  the  Government  was  mainly 
attributable  to  the  decline  of  customs  duties  below  the 
proper  point  of  protection,  which  had  paralyzed  manufact- 
uring enterprise,  diminished  the  value  of  labor,  lessened 
the  demand  for  agricultural  products,  and  occasioned  a  fall- 
ing off  of  both  exports  and  imports.  It  may  have  been 
that  he  closed  his  eyes  to  these  considerations  on  account 
of  the  belief  that  the  Compromise  Tariff  Act  of  1833  was 
irrevocable,  as  the  advocates  of  free  trade  insisted,  or,  he 
may  have  supposed  that  its  provisions  could  not  be  inter- 
fered with  until  the  effect  of  a  horizontal  scale  of  duties  was 
satisfactorily  tested  by  trial.  In  whatsoever  way  he  may 
have  reasoned,  he  failed  to  trace  the  financial  difficulty  to  its 
real  source,  or  to  account  for  the  falling  off  of  the  revenue. 


304  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

If  he  had  not  suffered  himself  to  be  misled,  he  would 
have  seen  that  the  declining  scale  of  duties  under  the  act 
of  1833,  by  impairing  the  operations  of  manufacturers  and 
lessening  the  wages  of  labor,  had  rendered  the  existing  de- 
rangement of  business  inevitable.  He  would  then  have 
been  able  to  grapple  with  the  difficulty,  instead  of  being 
alarmed  by  it. 

Failing,  however,  to  learn  executive  wisdom  by  the 
"  logic  of  events,"  Mr.  Van  Buren  consoled  himself  with 
the  reflection,  that,  as  "  the  difficulties  and  distresses  of  the 
times"  had  arisen,  "in  a  great  degree,  from  the  trans- 
actions of  foreign  and  domestic  commerce,"  they  had 
"chiefly  fallen"  upon  the  country  while  our  "great  agri- 
cultural interest  has,  in  many  parts  of  the  country,  suffered 
comparatively  little."  By  this  he  did  not  mean  the  general 
agricultural  interest,  but  that  special  form  which  existed  in 
the  cotton-growing  sections  ;  for  he  proceeded  to  say  that 
"  the  proceeds  of  our  great  staple  [cotton]  will  soon 
furnish  the  means  of  liquidating  debts  at  home  and  abroad, 
and  contribute  equally  to  the  revival  of  commercial  activity 
and  the  restoration  of  commercial  credit."  Here  he  fell 
into  the  additional  error  of  ignoring  the  important  fact  that 
our  other  great  agricultural  staples  are  of  equal  conse- 
quence, and  contribute  as  essentially  to  provide  the  means 
of  public  prosperity  as  the  single  article  of  cotton,  notwith- 
standing its  immense  value  and  importance.  Therefore, 
when  he  exhibited  a  disposition  to  place  the  latter  at  the 
head  of  our  agricultural  interests,  and  to  assign  to  it  the 
chief — almost  the  entire  —  agency  in  furnishing  financial 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  305 

relief,  he  caused  his  fidelity  to  the  principle  of  protection  to 
be  suspected,  and  an  apprehension  in  the  Northern,  Middle 
and  Western  States,  that  he  cherished  the  ulterior  purpose 
of  putting  his  administration  in  the  power  and  under  the 
direction  of  the  free-trade  faction  of  the  South,  who  were 
then  preparing  to  accomplish  their  ends  through  the  agency 
of  a  tariff  for  revenue  alone.  His  administration  dragged 
along  so  heavily,  and  the  difficulties  he  encountered  grew  so 
rapidly  upon  him,  that  he  found  it  impossible  to  eradicate 
this  impression,  and  the  result  of  the  presidential  election 
in  1840  evidenced  that,  by  that  time,  it  had  ripened  into  a 
settled  conviction.  He  then  received  the  electoral  vote  of 
South  Carolina,  which  had  been  contemptuously  withheld 
from  General  Jackson  in  1832,  and  from  himself  in  1836,* 
while  of  the  Northern,  Middle  and  Western  States  he 
received  the  votes  of  only  two — .New  Hampshire  and 
Illinois — and  these  only  by  an  aggregate  majority  of  about 
8,000  popular  votes — and  only  sixty  electoral  votes  in  all, 
out  of  two  hundred  and  ninety-four.  The  supporters  of 

*  When  the  Legislature  of  South  Carolina  cast  the  electoral  vote  of  that  State  for 
Mr.  Van  Buren,  no  steps  had  been  taken  towards  receding  from  opposition  to  the  policy 
of  General  Jackson's  administration,  or  from  the  doctrine  of  nullification.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  Constitution  had  been  amended  so  as  to  make  allegiance  to  the  State  para- 
mount to  that  to  the  Union.  The  original  Constitution  provided  that  all  State  officers 
should  swear  to  "  preserve,  protect  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  State  and  of  the 
United  States."  But  in  1834,  after  General  Jackson's  Proclamation,  and  after  the  Com- 
promise Act  of  1833  had  been  passed,  the  Constitution  was  amended  so  as  to  prepare 
for  future  contingencies,  whensoever  it  should  become  necessary  to  revive  the  attempt  to 
nullify  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  By  this  amendment  all  officers  were  required  to 
swear  that  they  would  "  be  faithful,  and  true  allegiance  bear  to  the  State  of  South  Caro- 
lina," in  addition  to  what  the  old  Constitution  required.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that 
the  nullifiers  of  that  State  voted  for  Van  Buren  in  1840,  or  for  Polk  in  1844,  unless  they 
believed  that  the  cause  of  free  trade  would  be  promoted  thereby. 

2O 


306  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

free  trade  had  been  able,  thus  far,  to  make  but  little  serious 
impression  upon  the  Southern  mind,  outside  of  South 
Carolina,  but  they  were  not  discouraged.  They  seem  to 
have  foreseen  events  that  afterwards  transpired,  and  were 
wise  enough  to  know  that  if  they  could  succeed  in  fanning 
the  flame  of  discord  between  the  sections,  they  might,  by 
that  means,  so  divide  the  North,  Center  and  West  as  to 
secure  the  final  triumph  of  free  trade.  There  have  been 
few  periods  in  our  history  when  operations  of  this  kind 
could  be  carried  on  with  fairer  prospects  of  success  than 
under  Mr.  Van  Buren's  administration.  His  utter  inca- 
pacity to  "tread  in  the  footsteps  of  his  immediate  prede- 
cessor," and  his  indecision  with  regard  to  measures  of 
relief,  made  him  an  easy  victim  to  the  wiles  of  those  who 
had  entered  upon  a  violent  crusade  against  protection. 
We,  accordingly,  find  him  the  first  President,  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Government,  whose  messages  have  omitted 
to  enforce  the  necessity  of  protecting  industry.  And  it  is 
easy  now  to  see,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  that  his 
mistaken  policy  of  avoiding  measures  which  had  been 
shown,  by  past  experience,  to  be  necessary  to  the  public 
prosperity,  not  only  led  to  the  overthrow  of  his  adminis- 
tration, but  to  other  consequences  which  ought  to  stand 
as  a  perpetual  warning  against  sectionalism.  Everything 
he  said  and  did  satisfied  the  country  that  he  did  not  assign 
its  financial  embarrassments  to  the  true  cause,  and  that 
therefore  he  was  incompetent  to  conduct  the  Government 
through  such  a  crisis.  The  American  people  have  always 
shown  themselves  competent  —  by  both  reason  and  instinct 


HISTORY  OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  307 

—  to  judge  correctly  of  public  questions;  and  if  they  do 
sometimes  unintentionally  err,  are  sure,  in  the  end,  to  get 
right  again. 

The  supposition  that  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833  had 
necessarily  to  stand  until  all  the  duties  reached  a  horizontal 
scale  of  twenty  per  cent,  whatsoever  the  consequences  to 
the  Treasury,  was  a  fatal  mistake  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Van 
Buren's  administration.  Like  all  public  statutes,  it  was 
subject  to  change,  modification  or  repeal,  when  the  public 
welfare  demanded  it.  It  was  called  a  "compromise"  because 
it  was  a  concession  to  those  who  were  threatening  the  peace 
of  the  Union.  But  no  authority  existed  anywhere  to  attach 
to  it  the  character  of  inviolability.  One  Congress  cannot 
bind  another  upon  the  subject  matter  to  which  its  provisions 
related.  Under  our  form  of  institutions  public  laws  exist 
only  so  long  as  it  is  the  will  of  the  people  they  shall  do  so. 
It  is  true,  that  the  duties  fixed  by  this  act,  were  to  continue 
upon  a  declining  scale  until  they  reached  a  minimum,  on 
June  30,  1842.  And  there  were  other  features  which  were, 
by  its  terms,  to  remain  in  force  after  that  time;  such  as  the 
abolition  of  credits  at  the  custom  houses  and  the  collection 
of  duties  in  cash ;  the  limit  of  the  revenue  to  the  amount 
required  by  an  economical  administration  of  the  Govern- 
ment; and  the  principle  of  home  valuation.  But  none  of 
these  provisions,  although  right  and  proper,  were  irrevo- 
cable, any  more  than  were  the  rates  of  duties.  Congress 
had  full  authority  to  alter  or  repeal  the  entire  law.  In  this 
respect  it  was  like  all  other  laws.  The  friends  of  free  trade 
talked  about  the  sacredness  of  the  "compromise/*  and 


308  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

declared  that  they  should  regard  it  as  an  act  of  bad  faith, 
on  the  part  of  the  Government,  if  any  of  its  provisions  were 
violated.  They  made  all  sorts  of  threats  about  what  might 
be  expected  if  the  law  were  not  adhered  to ;  and  Mr.  Van 
Buren,  wanting  the  courage  of  General  Jackson,  committed 
the  serious  blunder  of  assenting  to  their  demands  and  shap- 
ing the  policy  of  his  administration  in  obedience  to  them. 
It  caused  him  to  carry  a  load,  under  the  weight  of  which  he 
staggered  along  for  lour  years,  with  financial  difficulties 
accumulating  at  every  step ;  with  the  revenue  falling  short 
of  the  expenditures ;  with  a  resort  to  the  expedient  of  issu- 
ing Treasury  notes  to  carry  on  the  Government — until,  at 
the  close  of  his  single  term,  he  left  the  Treasury  empty — 
approaching  bankruptcy  more  nearly  and  rapidly  than  ever 
before.  Whereas,  if  he  had  so  comprehended  the  real  con- 
dition of  affairs,  as  to  have  seen — what  must  have  been  after- 
wards apparent  to  him — that  the  existing  financial  troubles 
were  rightfully  attributable,  not  alone  to  the  conduct  of  the 
banks  and  their  suspension  of  specie  payments,  but  to  the 
derangement  of  all  the  industries  of  the  country,  occasioned 
by  the  threatened  withdrawal  of  protection  under  the  "com- 
promise" tariff,  he  might  have  occupied  in  history  a  far  dif- 
ferent position  than  that  now  assigned  to  him. 

During  the  last  year  of  General  Jackson's  administration, 
the  receipts  in  the  Treasury,  from  all  sources,  amounted  to 
$47,691,898;  and  on  January  i,  1837 — only  about  sixty 
days  before  Mr.  Van  Buren  took  the  Presidential  office — 
the  balance  was  $45,968,523.  During  the  first  year  of  the 
latter' s  administration,  the  receipts,  from  all  sources,  were 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  309 

$23,499,98 1  ;  and  if  the  foregoing  balance  had  been  actual 
and  not  merely  nominal,  he  could  have  gone  through  the 
year  without  difficulty.  The  results,  as  shown  by  the  books 
of  the  Treasury,  were  misleading ;  and  he  tried  hard 
to  arrange  the  figures  so  as  to  make  them  promise  as 
favorably  as  possible.  The  stubborn  fact  was  that  the 
balance  on  January  i,  1837,  and  the  receipts  of  the  current 
year,  made  the  aggregate  sum  of  $69,468,504 ;  and  it 
required  some  ciphering,  as  well  as  ingenuity,  to  show  why 
the  Government  could  not  get  along  with  so  large  a  balance. 
The  explanation  was  that  it  would  require  $35,282,361  to 
cover  appropriations  made  by  Congress,  for  which  he  was 
not  disposed  that  the  administration  should  be  held  respon- 
sible. Nevertheless,  it  was  a  public  expenditure  and  had 
to  be  provided  for  out  of  the  general  balance,  but  would 
still  leave,  on  January  i,  1838,  an  estimated  balance  of 
$34,187,143.  He  explained  this  as  merely  nominal,  and 
therefore  not  available ;  in  other  words,  that  the  balance 
struck  upon  the  Treasury  books  did  not  indicate  the  actual 
means  of  carrying  the  Government  through  the  year.  It 
was  made  up,  by  the  amount  of  surplus  revenue  deposited 
with  the  States,  by  the  Act  of  June  23,  1836,  and  the  amount 
due  from  the  deposit  banks  ;  neither  of  which  could  be 
made  available,  inasmuch  as  the  States  had  not  the  least 
intention  of  paying  back  what  they  had  received,  and  the 
banks  were  unable.  As  these  amounts  aggregated  $33,- 
101,645,  there  was  left  only  $1,085,498  as  the  sum  actually 
available  for  the  expenses  of  the  year.  Consequently,  the 
best  that  Mr.  Van  Buren  could  do  was  to  close  his  eyes  to 


3IO  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  true  sources  of  embarrassment,  both  to  the  country  and 
the  Government,  and  to  suggest  that  the  administration 
might  get  through  the  year  if,  in  addition  to  the  ordinary 
receipts,  Congress  would  authorize  $4, 500,000  of  Treasury 
notes  to  be  issued — a  simple  form  of  borrowing  that  much 
money.  And  in  his  perplexity  he  was  forced  to  declare 
that,  in  consequence  of  the  "  unexpected  fluctuations  to 
which  the  revenue  is  subjected,  it  is  not  possible  to  com- 
pute the  receipts  beforehand  with  great  certainty";  thus 
conceding  the  rapid  decline  in  the  receipts  from  customs, 
and  the  uncertainty  of  relying  upon  the  Compromise  Act  of 
*833,  which  was  then  in  force,  and  under  which  the  duties 
had  begun  to  go  down  to%the  horizontal  standard. 

Why  these  " unexpected  fluctuations"  in  the  revenue 
from  customs,  to  which  Mr.  Van  Buren  alluded  ?  Mani- 
festly, because  manufacturing  enterprise  had  been  checked 
by  the  threatening  attitude  of  the  Government,  under  the 
Act  of  1833  ;  which  materially  lessened  our  home  markets, 
rendered  all  values  uncertain,  left  labor  without  proper 
reward,  the  products  of  agriculture  rotting  in  barns  of  the 
producers,  and  importations  declining.  Certainly,  the  fact 
that  only  $1,085,498,  out  of  so  large  a  nominal  balance,  was 
actually  available  for  the  year  1838,  made  a  bad  showing; 
especially  as  the  imports  from  which  revenue  had  to  be 
raised  had  decreased  from  $176,579,154  in  1836  to  $130,- 
472,803  in  1837  ;  and  were  still  further  declining  and  did 
actually  decline  in  1838  to  $95,970,288;  showing  a  total 
declension  of  $80,608,866  in  two  years.  As  these  conse- 
quences were  produced  by  causes  other  than  those  which 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  31 1 

Mr.  Van  Buren  was  willing  to  concede — because  he  was 
held  so  tightly  in  the  grasp  of  those  who  persuaded  him 
that  cotton  would  become  the  chief  factor  in  affording  relief 
— he,  either  from  an  infatuation  difficult  to  understand,  or  a 
want  of  the  firmness  displayed  by  General  Jackson,  in  deal- 
ing with  the  same  men,  found  himself  at  every  step  sink- 
ing deeper  and  deeper  into  trouble. 

The  fiscal  affairs  of  the  Government  grew  worse  and 
worse  every  year.  The  available  balance  in  the  Treasury 
on  January  i,  1839,  was  only  $2,765,342,  exceeding  that 
of  the  former  year  only  $679,744.  The  receipts  from  all 
sources,  including  public  lands,  was  $20,615,598.  Treas- 
ury notes,  amounting  in  principal  and  interest  to  about 
$8,000,000,  were  issued,  and  $2,254,871  were  received  for 
the  sale  of  bonds  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  This 
made  the  whole  available  means  for  the  year  $33,635,811. 
The  expenditures  were  $39,455,438,  or  $5,819,627  more 
than  the  receipts.  It  was  consequently  impossible  to  get 
along  without  issuing  Treasury  notes  and  retaining  the 
balance  of  over  $9,000,000,  which  had  been  deposited  with 
the  States.  The  policy  of  Mr.  Van  Buren,  therefore, 
tended  to  increase  rather  than  diminish  the  embarrassment. 
And  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  he  became  insensible  to 
this  himself,  when  he  was  compelled  to  admit,  as  he  did  in 
his  third  message,  that  "  independent  of  the  redemption  of 
the  public  debt  and  trusts,  the  gross  expenditures  of  seven- 
teen and  eighteen  millions  in  1834  and  1835,  had  swelled  to 
$29,00x3,000  in  1836,  and  the  appropriations  for  1837,  made 
previous  to  the  4th  of  March,  caused  the  expenditures  to 


312  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

rise  to  the  very  large  amount  of  $33,000,000"  —  thus 
showing  that  the  expenditures  were  increasing  while  the 
revenue  was  diminishing. 

It  is  not  intended  by  these  references  to  arraign  the 
administration  of  Mr.  Van  Buren  on  the  score  of  extrava- 
gance in  the  expenditures.  The  purpose  in  referring  to 
them  is  entirely  different — that  is,  to  show  how  fatal  was 
his  mistake,  in  attempting  to  carry  on  the  Government 
when  the  expenditures  were  in  excess  of  the  revenue,  with- 
out realizing  that  it  was  his  duty  to  maintain  the  principle  of 
protection,  to  which  everyone  of  his  predecessors  had 
given  the  most  solemn  sanction,  rather  than  heed  the  de- 
mands of  those  who  were  striving  to  force  the  Government 
to  adopt  the  heresy  of  free  trade,  at  the  expense  of  the 
revenue  as  well  as  all  home  industries.  "  An  ounce  of  pre- 
vention is  worth  a  pound  of  cure  ";  and  but  for  the  unfor- 
tunate complications  which  he  allowed  to  environ  him,  he 
might  have  applied  a  preventive  in  time  to  save  the  Treas- 
ury from  impending  bankruptcy  and  his  own  administration 
from  the  doom  which,  in  the  end,  befell  it.  As  it  was,  he 
ended  his  official  life  with  a  mere  general  reference  to  the 
"  great  and  protracted  reduction  of  the  revenue,"  and 
turned  the  Government  over  to  his  successor  with  no  more 
money  in  the  Treasury  than  could  be  counted  in  a  few 
hours.  On  January  i,  1840,  there  was  on  hand  only 
$  i,  500,000,  which  was  considerably  diminished  by  the 
beginning  of  the  new  administration,  March  4,  1841  ;  so 
that,  at  that  time,  the  operations  of  the  Government  were 
hedged  about  by  rapidly  increasing  financial  difficulties. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  313 

The  Treasury  was  never  before,  in  all  the  history  of  the 
Government,  in  so  embarrassed  a  condition.  Even  after 
the  lapse  of  more  than  forty  years,  it  is  still  a  cause  of 
wonder  that  it  was  allowed  to  drift  into  it,  without  any  ap- 
parent effort  at  relief,  and  from  the  single  motive  of  enab- 
ling the  producers  of  cotton  to  bring  about  free  trade  with 
the  manufacturers  of  British  goods,  and,  by  that  means,  to 
imperil  the  agricultural,  manufacturing,  and  mechanical 
industries  of  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

INCIDENTAL  PROTECTION  —  WHAT  IT  MEANS  — DOES  NOT  ABAN- 
DON DISCRIMINATING  DUTIES  — PROTECTION  INCIDENTAL  TO 
THE  COMMERCIAL,  NOT  THE  REVENUE  POWER— EACH  IS 
SUBSTANTIVE  — REVENUE  TARIFF  GIVES  NO  PROTECTION  — 
POWER  TO  PROTECT  DISTINCT  FROM  REVENUE  POWER— 
IF  REVENUE  TARIFF  COULD  PROTECT,  IT  WOULD  BE  ACCI- 
DENTAL, NOT  INCIDENTAL. 

DEFORE  proceeding  with  further  details  in  reference  to 
*^  the  effects  of  the  tariff  law  of  1833  upon  the  revenue, 
and  upon  the  principle  of  protection,  it  is  deemed  necessary 
to  inquire  what  is  meant  by  "  incidental  protection  "; — an 
expression  which,  if  not  properly  understood,  is  misleading. 
It  has  been  the  fruitful  source  of  much  false  reasoning. 

The  first  reference  to  "incidental  protection,"  was  by 
General  Jackson,  in  his  message  of  1832.  Before  that  time 
the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  protect  manufact- 
ures had  been  considered,  by  himself  and  all  his  predeces- 
sors, as  substantive  and  independent  —  not  as  incident  to 
the  revenue  power,  but  to  the  power  to  regulate  commerce. 
Not  only  had  Mr.  Madison  so  declared  in  his  speeches  in 
Congress,  but  he  had  repeated  it  in  his  messages.  Both 
Mr.  Jefferson  and  Mr.  Monroe  asserted  the  same  doctrine 
as  emphatically  as  he  did.  But  neither  of  them  was  more 
emphatic  than  General  Jackson,  who  adopted  the  views  of 
Mr.  Madison  almost  exactly.  Whosoever  shall  scrutinize  his 


HISTORY  OF  THE    PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  315 

language,  as  already  quoted,  will  readily  observe  this.  The 
fact  is,  Mr.  Madison's  argument  was  so  clear  and  compre- 
hensive, that  nothing  more  was  left  to  be  said  upon  the 
subject. 

The  principle  was  this  :  That  the  States  originally  pos- 
sessed the  power  to  regulate  their  own  commerce — each 
for  itself —  by  protection  to  their  own  manufactures  ;  but 
that,  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  had  conferred 
this  power  upon  Congress,  as  distinct  and  separate  from 
the  power  to  raise  revenue  by  duties,  therefore,  Congress 
had  power  to  protect  manufactures  or  it  had  been  annihi- 
lated and  did  not  exist  at  all — the  States  having  surren- 
dered it.  And  General  Jackson  had  gone  so  far  as  to  make 
the  question  perfectly  clear,  by  an  argument  which  cannot 
be  overthrown,  that,  no  matter  what  the  intention  of  Con- 
gress may  be  in  the  adoption  of  protective  measures,  that 
cannot  enter  into  the  question  of  constitutionality,  inas- 
much as  the  constitutional  power  to  protect  is  so  well 
established  that  it  must  be  considered  as  existing  independ- 
ently of  the  motives  which  influence  its  exercise.  Mani- 
festly, when  he  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  to  Congress  that 
protective  duties  should  be  continued,  although  it  would 
produce  a  surplus  in  the  Treasury,  above  the  expenditures, 
the  idea  of  incidental  protection  had  not  been  suggested  to 
his  mind ;  any  more  than,  under  like  circumstances,  it 
had  been  suggested  to  the  mind  of  Mr.  Jefferson. 

It  is  fair  and  just  to  the  memory  of  General  Jackson, 
therefore,  to  say  that  his  views,  with  reference  to  "incidental 
protection,"  were  expressed  with  the  hope  that  they  would 


316  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

remove  the  prejudices  of  those  who  had  threatened  the 
peace  of  the  Union,  because,  as  they  insisted,  the  friends  of 
protection  demanded  the  exercise  of  the  power,  for  its  own 
sake,  and  without  any  regard  to  the  amount  of  revenue  to 
be  raised.  A  perusal  of  his  messages  will  show,  satisfac- 
torily to  any  careful  investigator,  that  he  did  not  intend  an 
abandonment  of  specific  and  discriminating  duties.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  intended  that  these  should  be  maintained,  so 
that,  in  raising  any  given  amount  of  revenue,  the  duties 
should  be  graduated,  in  order  to  avoid  any  excess ;  and  yet, 
at  the  same  time,  should  discriminate  in  favor  of  encourag- 
ing manufactures,  according  to  the  circumstances  existing 
with  regard  to  each  article  needing  protection.  He  patriot- 
ically gave  up  his  theory  of  raising  revenue  so  as  to  create 
a  surplus  for  distribution,  and  fully  recognized  the  obliga- 
tion of  regulating  the  amount  to  be  raised  solely  by  the 
necessary  demands  of  the  Government.  His  purpose  was 
to  let  the  whole  question  of  revenue  turn  upon  the  expen- 
ditures ;  and  these  were  to  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  standard 
consistent  with  the  wants  of  the  Government.  When 
these  were  estimated,  and  it  became  necessary  to  regulate 
the  duties,  then  they  should  be  so  regulated  as  to  discrimi- 
nate in  favor  of  protection,  by  graduating  them  according 
to  the  relation  borne  by  them  to  manufacturing  industry. 
Revenue  was  considered  by  him  to  be  the  primary  object, 
and  protection  secondary;  each,  however — being  distinct 
and  substantive  in  its  character  and  nature — was  provided 
for  by  a  separate  grant  of  power  in  the  Constitution.  These 
being  his  convictions,  often  expressed,  he  could  not  possibly 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  317 

have  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that  the  commercial  power 
of  protection  was,  in  any  degree  whatsoever,  incidental  to 
the  revenue  power  to  lay  and  collect  duties  and  imports. 
The  mind  cannot  conceive  of  any  proces  of  reasoning  by 
which  such  a  power  as  that  "to  regulate  commerce" — which 
affects  trade,  industry,  business  generally — is  to  be  held 
dependent  upon  the  exercise  of  the  power  so  distinct  as 
that  for  raising  revenue.  If  commerce  had  to  be  regulated 
only  when  revenue  was  needed,  then,  in  case  of  there  being 
no  revenue,  it  would  be  abandoned.  The  framers  of  the 
Constitution  did  not  intend  this.  Therefore,  they  made  the 
grant  of  commercial  power  entirely  distinct  from  that  of  the 
revenue  power.  General  Jackson  so  understood  it,  and 
there  is  nothing  in  the  reasoning  of  any  of  his  messages,  or 
in  his  first  use  of  the  expression  "incidental  protection,'* 
contradictory  to  this.  These  words  are  first  used  by  him  fol- 
lowing a  paragraph  in  his  message  of  1832,  wherein  he  had 
argued  to  show  that  it  was  the  duty  of  Congress  to  give 
protection  to  manufactures  to  whatsoever  extent  should  "be 
necessary  to  counteract  the  regulations  of  foreign  nations, 
and  to  secure  a  supply  of  those  articles  of  manufacture 
essential  to  the  national  independence  and  safety  in  time  of 
war."*  This,  he  considered  an  independent  obligation,  to 
be  discharged  without  any  reference  to  revenue  whatsoever. 
"It  is,"  says  he,  "essential  to  the  national  independence 
and  safety,"  and  that,  not  revenue,  justifies  protection. 
Following  the  language  just  quoted,  he  says : 

"That  manufactures   adequate   to    the    supply   of  our    domestic 
consumption  would,  in  the  abstract,  be  beneficial  to  our  country,  there 

*  Ante  Chap,  xxviii.,  p.  267. 


318  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

is  no  reason  to  doubt ;  and  to  effect  their  establishment  there  is,  perhaps, 
no  American  citizen  who  would  not,  for  awhile,  be  willing  to  pay  a 
higher  price  for  them.  But  for  this  purpose,  it  is  presumed  that  a  tariff 
of  high  duties,  designed  for  perpetual  protection,  has  entered  into  the 
minds  of  but  few  of  our  statesmen.  The  most  they  have  anticipated  is 
a  temporary,  and  generally,  incidental  protection,  which  they  maintain 
has  the  effect  to  reduce  the  price  by  domestic  competition  below  that  of 
the  foreign  article.  Experience,  however,  our  best  guide  on  this  as  on 
other  subjects,  makes  it  doubtful  whether  the  advantages  of  this  system 
are  not  counterbalanced  by  many  evils,  and  whether  it  does  not  tend  to 
beget,  in  the  minds  of  a  large  portion  of  our  countrymen,  a  spirit  of 
discontent  and  jealousy  dangerous  to  the  stability  of  the  Union." 

There  is  no  allusion  here  to  the  question  of  revenue,  or 
to  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  lay  and  collect 
duties.  The  language  refers  to  a  single  subject —  "  a  tariff 
of  high  duties."  After  expressing  the  opinion  that  manu- 
factures are  beneficial,  he  says  that  such  duties  as  are  "  de- 
signed for  perpetual  protection"  —  that  is,  are  made  high 
for  that  purpose  alone — are  defended  by  only  a  "few  of 
our  statesmen."  Then,  referring  to  those  who  defend  these 
high  duties,  he  says,  the  "most"  of  them  only  anticipate 
"a  temporary  and  generally  incidental  protection  "/  show- 
ing thereby  that  his  reference  to  that  subject  was  not  with 
the  design  to  express  any  opinion  of  his  own  as  to  what 
"  incidental  protection "  is,  but  to  show  the  mode  of  rea- 
soning adopted  by  those  who  advocated  a  high  tariff.  It  is 
manifest,  therefore,  that  he  intended  to  express  the  opinion 
that  high  duties  should  not  be  laid  solely  for  protection,  and 
without  any  regard  to  the  amount  of  money  to  be  raised. 
That  system  he  considered  of  doubtful  policy,  because  it 
created  "a  spirit  of  discontent  and  jealousy." 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  319 

If  what  he  said  in  this  and  other  messages  be  taken 
together — and  this  is  the  most  appropriate  mode  of  ascer- 
taining what  he  meant — his  reasoning  will  appear  perfectly 
logical.  It  amounts  to  this,  that  the  authority  to  raise  reve- 
nue is  provided  for  in  the  Constitution  by  express  grant 
of  power,  and  that  to  regulate  commerce  by  another — each 
being  distinct  from  the  other,  because  they  relate  to  differ- 
ent subjects.  The  first  is  granted  for  the  support  of  the 
Government,  the  second  for  trade  and  intercourse.  Neither 
of  these  powers  is  incident  to  the  other,  and,  therefore,  if 
the  power  to  protect  is  incident  to  the  power  to  regulate 
commerce — as  it  undoubtedly  is — it  cannot  be  also  an 
incident  to  the  revenue  power.  Revenue  may  be  raised 
from  customs  without  regard  to  commerce,  domestic  or 
foreign  ;  as,  for  example,  it  may  be  done  by  duties  upon  tea, 
coffee,  and  other  imported  articles  that  do  not  enter  into 
manufactures  ;  or,  it  may  be  raised  by  duties  laid  with  a 
view  to  regulate  commerce,  by  protecting  manufacturing 
and  other  branches  of  industry ;  in  which  case  the  duties 
are  imposed  upon  articles  entering  into  manufactures. 
Each  method  is  independent  of  the  other,  and,  consequently, 
each  is  provided  for  by  a  separate  and  distinct  grant  of 
power  to  Congress.  Hence,  if  General  Jackson  intended 
to  express  himself  as  approving  only  "incidental  protec- 
tion " — which  meaning  is  not  conveyed  by  his  language  — 
he  did  not  undertake  to  define  wherein  it  would  differ  from 
such  protection  as  had  been  given  by  the  system  he  had 
approved.  The  plain  fact  is  that  he  expressed  no  opinion 
about  "  incidental  protection,"  and  only  mentioned  it  as 


320  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

contended  for  by  others,  but  not  as  expressing  his  own 
views.  His  theory  was  plainly  expressed  and  well  under- 
stood. It  was  this:  that,  in  enacting  a  tariff  law,  the 
whole  amount  of  revenue  to  be  raised  should  be  regulated 
by  the  wants  of  the  Government,  economically  administered 
— that  this  should  be  the  primary  and  controlling  consider- 
ation— and  that  specific  duties,  discriminating  for  protection, 
should  be  so  graduated  as  not  to  produce  an  excess  of  reve- 
nue beyond  this  demand.  He  did  not  say,  or  intimate,  at 
any  time,  that  he  considered  the  power  to  provide  for  pro- 
tective duties  as  incidental  merely  to  the  power  to  raise 
revenue.  On  the  other  hand,  whenever  he  referred  to  the 
necessity  of  protecting  domestic  industry,  he  conveyed  no 
other  idea  than  that  he  considered  the  power  to  do  so  as 
distinct  and  independent.  It  had  always  been  so  consid- 
ered. In  the  first  Congress  the  two  powers  were  exercised 
in  the  same  bill,  and  the  practice  has  ever  since  prevailed. 
And  as  all  tariff  laws  are  primarily  for  revenue,  the  exercise 
of  the  power  to  protect  may  be  considered  as  incidental  to 
the  exercise  of  the  power  to  raise  revenue  ;  that  is,  when  it 
becomes  necessary  to  raise  money  for  the  support  of  the 
Government  by  the  employment  of  the  revenue  power,  it 
becomes  an  incidental  but  imperative  necessity  to  employ 
the  commercial  power  with  a  view  to  protection.  The 
proposition  may  be  otherwise  stated :  When  there  is  no 
revenue  to  be  raised,  there  will  be  no  protection  —  if  such 
a  state  of  affairs  could  occur — but  when  there  is  revenue 
to  be  raised,  then  there  shall  be  protection  also.  In  this 
view  one  power  is  not,  in  the  least  degree,  incidental  to  the 


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HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  321 

other,  but  the  exercise  of  one  may  be  incidental  to  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  other.  General  Jackson  evidently  meant  to 
express  his  opposition  to  a  law  solely  for  protection,  but,  at 
the  same  time,  he  distinctly  favored  the  introduction  of  the 
principle  of  protection  in  a  revenue  law,  therein  following 
the  example  set  by  the  first  Congress,  under  Mr.  Madison's 
lead.  If  he  did  not  mean  this,  his  ideas  were  confused, 
which  is  not  probable,  inasmuch  as  he  always  understood 
his  own  purposes  thoroughly  and  expressed  them  both 
plainly  and  emphatically. 

We  should  not  overlook  the  fact  that,  at  the  date  of  the 
message  in  which  he  alluded  to  "  incidental  protection,"  the 
tariff  law  of  1832  was  in  force,  as  amendatory  of  the  laws 
of  1824  and  1828,  and  that  the  principle  of  protection  was 
well  established.  It  was  so  much  so  that  it  was  the  immedi- 
ate cause  of  the  excitement  in  South  Carolina.  What 
General  Jackson  said,  therefore,  about  "  incidental  protec- 
tion," must  be  construed  in  the  light  of  the  facts  that  the 
existing  system  had  been  established  at  the  foundation  of 
the  Government,  and  that  protective  duties  had  been  in- 
creased from  time  to  time  as  the  necessities  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  interests  of  domestic  industry  had  required. 
In  order  that  he  might  not  be  misunderstood  he  had  just 
declared — in  the  paragraph  directly  preceding  that  in 
which  he  speaks  of  "  incidental  protection  " — that  "  long 
and  patient  reflection  "  had  strengthened  the  opinions  he 
had  formerly  expressed  upon  the  subject.*  By  this  refer- 
ence, he  undoubtedly  intended  to  refer  Congress  to  what 

*  See  Ante  Chap,  xxviii.,  p.  267.  2l 


322  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

he  had  previously  said  about  the  principles  involved  in  lay- 
ing duties,  and  to  advise  that  they  be  adhered  to.  He  had 
recommended  in  his  first  message,  in  1829,  that  "the  gen- 
eral rule  to  be  applied  in  graduating  the  duties  upon  arti- 
cles of  foreign  growth  or  manufacture,  is  that  which  will 
place  our  own  in  fair  competition  with  those  of  other 
countries"  —meaning  thereby,  as  plainly  as  language  will 
allow,  that  such  duties  should  be  specific  and  discriminating 
to  the  extent  necessary  for  the  protection  of  our  own 
manufactures  against  the  competition  of  those  imported 
from  abroad.  And  in  his  second  message,  in  1830,  he  had 
argued  to  show  that  there  is  "  no  necessary  connection  " 
between  "the  encouragement  of  domestic  manufactures" 
and  "the  system  of  appropriations,"  because  "  the  former 
is  siistained  on  the  ground  of  its  consistency  with  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  of  its  origin  being  traced  to 
the  assent  of  all  the  parties  to  the  original  compact,  and  of 
its  having  the  support  and  approbation  of  a  majority  of  the 
people." 

To  say  then  —  as  is  often  said  —  that  General  Jackson 
meant  by  "  incidental  protection  "  to  convey  the  idea  that 
duties  should  be  laid  for  revenue  alone,  and  not  also  for  the 
protection  of  home  industry,  is  a  manifest  perversion  of 
his  language.  He  said  nothing  to  which  this  meaning  can 
be  properly  attached.  He  had  approved  the  protective 
tariff  act  of  the  same  year,  and  it  cannot  be  fairly  supposed 
that  the  idea  had  entered  his  mind  that  it  would  be  proper 
to  abandon  the  principle  embodied  in  that  act,  as  well  as 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  323 

all  previous  tariff  laws — for  one  of  which  he  had  voted  when 
a  member  of  the  Senate — and  to  the  support  and  preser- 
vation of  which  he  was  specially  pledged  during  the  Presi- 
dential contest  which  resulted  in  his  election.  He  looked 
at  the  question  in  its  national  aspects,  and  condemned  all 
efforts  to  narrow  it  into  a  controversy  between  the  sections, 
or  to  excite  jealousies  between  those  who  were  engaged  in 
the  various  industrial  pursuits  upon  which  the  prosperity 
and  wealth  of  the  country  depended.  No  such  thing  as  a 
horizontal  or  uniform  standard  of  duties  had  ever  then  been 
tried  or  proposed,  and  nothing  was  further  from  his  pur- 
pose than  to  suggest  the  introduction  of  such  a  plan.  If 
he  had  intended  this  he  would  have  said  so  without  equivo- 
cation, for  he  was  not  accustomed  to  concealment.  So  far, 
however,  from  entertaining  any  such  opinion,  he  recom- 
mended the  very  reverse.  And  besides,  he  perfectly  un- 
derstood that,  by  a  horizontal  scale  of  ad  valorem  duties, 
protection  would  be  accidental  rather  than  incidental — 
that  is,  that  it  would  be  legislation  with  no  view  whatsoever 
"to  counteract  the  regulations  of  foreign  nations,"  or  to 
supply  us  with  "  those  articles  of  manufacture,  essential  to 
the  national  independence  and  safety  in  time  of  war "  — 
both  of  which  were  objects  for  which  he  considered  it  as 
much  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  provide  as  it  was  to 
raise  revenue  for  its  own  support.  He  had  voted  against 
all  measures  of  this  kind  in  the  Senate,  and  had  protested 
against  them  in  his  previous  messages.  Therefore,  the 
accusation  made  against  him,  that  he  meant  the  reverse  of 
what  he  said — that  he  meant  a  tariff  for  revenue  only  when 


324  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

he  expressly  recommended  that  duties  should  be  laid  for 
both  revenue  and  protection — amounts  to  a  charge  of  in- 
sincerity he  does  not  merit. 

General  Jackson  never,  at  any  time,  indicated  a  desire 
to  see  the  Government  taken  away  from  the  beaten  track 
of  policy  it  had  constantly  pursued.  On  the  contrary,  he 
was  disposed  to  sanction  such  measures  as  were  shown  to 
be  wise  and  prudent  by  experience.  There  were  certain 
important  facts  to  which  he  could  not  shut  his  eyes.  The 
bill  introduced  into  the  first  Congress  by  Mr.  Madison  was 
originally  a  revenue  measure  exclusively,  and  intended  to 
be  temporary  in  its  operations.  The  public  treasury  was 
empty.  The  country  was  poor,  in  the  sense  of  being 
undeveloped,  and  there  were  no  wealthy  classes  of  society  ; 
while  the  bulk  of  the  people  were  in  straitened  circum- 
stances. The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  with  the  approval 
of  the  President,  had  taken  the  responsibility  of  pledging 
the  public  faith  for  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  and  Mr. 
Madison's  bill  was  intended  as  a  ratification  of  this  pledge, 
by  providing  the  means  of  payment,  as  well  as  the  amount 
necessary  to  carry  on  the  Government.  It,  consequently, 
invoked  the  exercise  of  the  revenue  power  only.  But  Mr. 
Fitzimons'  proposition  to  amend  the  bill  went  beyond  this 
and  called  for  the  exercise  of  the  commercial  power  also, 
independent  of  the  revenue  power.  It  has  been  already 
observed  that  he  made  this  avowal  at  the  time,  and  that 
Mr.  Madison  assented  to  it  without  hesitation.  If,  there- 
fore, Mr.  Madison's  bill  had  passed  without  amendment,  it 
would  not  have  contained  the  principle  of  protection,  and 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  325 

the  discussion  shows  that  it  was  so  understood  at  the  time. 
The  idea  that  " incidental  protection"  was  contained  in  a 
law  designed  for  revenue  only — as  a  consequence  neces- 
sary to  mere  revenue  duties — had  not  then  been  conceived. 
It  was  not  entertained  by  Mr.  Madison  or  Mr.  Fitzimons, 
or  by  a  single  member  of  either  the  Senate  or  House  of 
Representatives,  so  far  as  can  now  be  ascertained.  So  far 
from  that  being  the  case,  the  two  principles  were  recognized 
by  all  as  separate  and  distinct.  And  being  so  it  became 
necessary  to  amend  the  bill  in  order  to  introduce  into  it  the 
principle  of  protection,  for  the  reason  assigned  by  Mr. 
Madison  and  others,  that  it  was  the  only  mode  of  giving 
suitable  encouragement  to  home  industry — thereby  devel- 
oping domestic  commerce  and  making  us  independent  of 
foreign  countries,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war. 

This  example  proves  that  the  universal  understanding, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Government  under  the  Consti- 
tution, was  that  it  is  not  the  necessary  effect  of  a  tariff  law, 
intended  alone  for  revenue  and  with  a  horizontal  standard 
of  duties,  that  it  will  afford  the  necessary  protection  to 
industry,  either  directly  or  incidentally.  It  may  or  may  not 
protect,  in  an  insignificant  degree,  under  some  possible 
circumstances.  But  even  in  such  cases,  it  would  be  acci- 
dental. Whereas,  with  reference  to  the  bulk  of  articles  of 
foreign  manufacture  which  come  into  competition  with  our 
own  in  the  home  market,  a  mere  revenue  duty  would  not 
afford  sufficient  protection,  and  if  it  furnished  any,  it  would 
be  almost  imperceptible  —  mere  mockery. 

It  is   because  of  this  that  the  argument  in  favor  of 


326  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

"incidental  protection"  has  been  so  long  used  by  the  advo- 
cates of  free  trade,  with  the  hope,  doubtless,  that  if  they 
could  bring  about  the  adoption  of  the  policy  of  a  tariff  for 
revenue  alone,  with  a  horizontal  standard  of  ad  valorem 
duties,  it  would,  in  the  end,  lead  to  free  trade,  and  the  substi- 
tution in  our  markets  of  British  for  American  manufactures. 
Many  who  approve  the  principle  of  protection  have  been 
disposed  to  accept  this  argument  as  possessing  some  force 

-having  been  misled  by  the  sophistry  with  which  all  vis- 
ionary free  traders  are  abundantly  supplied.  A  little  reflec- 
tion, however,  based  upon  past  experience  and  a  proper 
understanding  of  the  operations  of  a  tariff  law,  ought  to 
convince  them  of  the  error  into  which  they  have  fallen 

—  perhaps  unintentionally.  There  is  no  public  question  so 
little  understood,  or  so  difficult  of  explanation.  Those  who 
do  understand  it  can  easily  see  how  entirely  incompetent 
a  purely  revenue  tariff  would  always  prove  for  the  pur- 
poses of  protection.  They  have  no  difficulty  in  seeing  that 
the  construction  now  placed  by  some  politicians  upon  what 
General  Jackson  said  about  "incidental  protection"  is  not 
what  he  intended.  If  it  were,  he  would  have  emphasized 
his  opinion  by  recommending  such  a  tariff.  Certainly, 
nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  he  did  not  contemplate  an 
abandonment  of  protection.  So  far  from  that,  he  consid- 
ered it  as  a  permanently  established  principle  of  national 
policy,  and  manifestly  classed  himself  among  its  firm  sup- 
porters. Nevertheless,  his  language  was  unfortunate  —  not 
because  of  any  special  difficulty  in  its  being  understood  if 
carefully  examined,  but  because  it  has  been  so  perverted  as 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  327 

to  make  him  appear  the  opponent  of  a  measure  he  always 
favored,  and  to  which  he  was  pledged  before  his  election, 
which  had  become  one  of  the  prominent  measures  of  his 
administration,  and  which  he  had  expressly  recommended. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

COMPROMISE  ACT  OF  1833  AN  EXPERIMENT— IT  FAILED  — PRO- 
DUCED GENERAL  EMBARRASSMENT— HARRISON  ELECTED 
PRESIDENT  IN  1840— TYLER  ACTING  PRESIDENT— EXTRA 
SESSION  OF  CONGRESS  —  REVENUE  DECLINING— TREASUR\ 
EMBARRASSED  — EFFECT  OF  DUTIES— TARIFFS  OF  1828  AND 
1833  COMPARED— TYLER  ON  DISCRIMINATING  DUTIES— ADDI- 
TIONAL DUTIES  NECESSARY. 

TT  has  been  stated  that  the  tariff  of  1833  was  an  experi- 
'•  ment.  No  similar  measure  had  been  previously  tried ; 
and,  consequently,  its  effect  and  character  had  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  subsequent  developments.  Hence,  it  did  not 
provide  for  the  immediate  introduction  of  a  horizontal 
standard  of  duties,  but  for  their  gradual  reduction  until 
they  should  reach  the  minimum  point  of  twenty  per  cent 
in  nine  years,  that  is,  by  1842.  This  delay  was  a  wise  pre- 
caution, as  nobody  professed  wisdom  enough  to  foretell  the 
result.  The  supporters  of  the  measure  were  composed  of 
two  classes — the  advocates  of  free  trade,  who  hoped  to 
strengthen  their  cause  by  the  temporary  expedient  of  a 
tariff  for  revenue  only,  and  those  friends  of  protection 
who  were  willing  to  concede  something,  in  the  spirit  of 
compromise,  to  such  of  the  enemies  of  protection  as  were 
combined  to  destroy  the  Union.  General  Jackson  and 
Mr.  Clay  both  belonged  to  this  latter  class;  and  Mr. 
Webster  stood  at  the  head  of  those  who  resisted  the 

328 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  329 

measure,  not  alone  upon  the  ground  that  it  would  weaken 
and,  possibly,  in  the  end,  destroy  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion, but  because,  under  the  operations  of  the  law,  the 
Government  would  be  embarrassed  by  too  great  reduction 
of  the  revenue.  The  consequences  which  followed,  proved 
that  the  supporters  of  the  measure  were  mistaken,  and 
its  opponents  right — the  predictions  of  the  latter  having 
been  fully  verified.  Notwithstanding  the  liberal  conces- 
sions made  by  it,  and  the  conciliatory  spirit  in  which  it 
originated,  it  was  entirely  fruitless,  in  so  far  as  it  influ- 
enced the  existing  disaffection.  In  every  aspect  it  proved 
a  failure. 

By  the  time  of  the  Presidential  election  of  1840,  it 
had  become  evident  that  the  country  could  not  recover 
from  the  financial  difficulty  which  had  existed  during  Mr. 
Van  Buren's  administration,  without  a  change  in  the  tariff 
policy.  This  conviction  became  so  general  that  General 
Harrison  was  elected  President  over  Mr.  Van  Buren  by  a 
majority  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-four  electoral  votes, 
and  was  inaugurated  March  4,  1841.  He  found  his  adminis- 
tration immediately  confronted  by  the  fact  that  the  Treasury 
was  so  depleted  as  seriously  to  threaten  the  credit  of  the 
Government.  Under  the  circumstances  it  became  his  first 
duty  to  convene  Congress  in  extra  session,  in  order  that 
the  means  of  relief  could  be  provided.  He  designated 
May  31,  1841,  as  the  time  of  meeting,  as  the  condition 
of  the  Treasury  required  that  something  should  be  done 
upon  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year,  which  had  been  then 
fixed  on  the  3oth  of  June.  The  necessity  increased  every 


33°  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

day,  in  consequence  of  constant  decline  of  the  revenue, 
occasioned  by  the  rapid  approach  of  the  time  when  the 
duties  would  become  fixed  at  the  horizontal  standard  pro- 
vided for  by  the  Compromise  Act.  There  was  even 
danger  that  the  operations  of  the  Government  would  be 
entirely  suspended  for  the  want  of  means  to  carry  them 
on.  There  had  never  been  a  time  before  when  the  folly 
of  introducing  experimental  measures  of  policy  was  more 
apparent. 

The  death  of  General  Harrison,  before  the  meeting  of 
Congress,  devolved  upon  Mr.  John  Tyler  the  duty  of  ad- 
ministering the  Government  as  Vice-President  and  acting 
President.  He  had  to  enter  upon  this  duty  under  the  most 
embarrassing  circumstances.  While  he  was  not  classed 
with  either  the  friends  of  protection  or  of  free  trade,  he 
occupied  a  sort  of  "  half-way  house  "  between  them,  which 
induced  him  to  regard  his  administration  as,  in  some  way, 
required  to  adhere  as  closely  as  possible  to  the  policy  em- 
bodied in  the  act  of  1833.  And  this  led  him  into  the  error 
of  supposing  that  act  to  be  in  the  nature  of  an  agreement, 
or  compact,  between  the  friends  of  protection  and  free 
trade,  which  should  be  adhered  to  without  change,  at  least 
until  1842,  and,  as  to  its  general  features,  beyond  that 
period. 

The  first  palpable  fact  that  arrested  Mr.  Tyler's  atten- 
tion was  that  "  the  fiscal  means,  present  and  accruing,  are 
insufficient  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  Government  for  the 
current  year,"  an  admission  which  he  must  have  felt  some 
degree  of  mortification  at  being  compelled  to  make.  The 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  33! 

balance  in  the  Treasury  on  March  4,  of  that  year,  was 
only  $860,000,  including  $215,000  of  bullion  in  the  process 
of  coining  at  the  mint.  This  left  only  the  sum  of  $645,000 
subject  to  draft  for  the  payment  of  the  ordinary  expenses. 
In  addition  to  this,  however,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
had  authority  to  issue  $5,413,000  of  Treasury  notes,  which 
made  the  available  means  $6,058,000,  less  $5,280,000  of 
Treasury  notes  redeemable  within  that  year,  and  the 
amount  of  other  liabilities  which  had  accrued  under  Mr. 
Van  Buren's  administration.  Thus,  the  available  resources 
of  the  Treasury  were  practically  exhausted,  and  the  accru- 
ing revenue  was  burdened  with  a  constantly  increasing 
debt.  The  financial  condition  of  the  Treasury  was  abso- 
lutely deplorable.  The  revenue  was  diminishing  and  the 
debt  increasing  daily  ;  and  the  only  possible  resort  seemed 
to  be  to  issue  Treasury  notes  to  pay  other  outstanding 
notes  of  the  same  kind — that  is,  to  borrow  money  with 
which  to  pay  borrowed  money.  Consequently,  Mr.  Tyler 
was  compelled  to  declare,  in  his  first  message  to  Congress, 
at  the  extra  session — after  enumerating  the  demands  upon 
the  current  year — that  the  anticipated  means  were  "greatly 
inadequate" 

Some  idea  of  the  manner  in  which  this  condition  of  the 
Treasury  was  produced,  may  be  conveyed  by  a  brief  state- 
ment, showing  the  comparative  effect  upon  the  revenue,  of 
the  tariff  of  1828,  which  was  protective,  and  that  of  1833. 
For  the  six  years  from  1828  to  1833,  both  inclusive,  the 
aggregate  amount  of  revenue  from  customs  was  $149,531,- 
888.86,  or  an  annual  average  of  $24,921,981.48.  For  the 


332  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

six  years  immediately  following,  from  1834  to  1840,  both 
inclusive,  the  aggregate  amount  from  the  same  source  was 
$122,981,726.24,  or  an  annual  average  of  $20,498,621.04. 
The  decrease  for  the  six  latter  years,  as  compared  with  the 
former  six,  was  $26,550,162.60  —  the  annual  average  de- 
crease being  $4,423,360.44.  The  gross  expenditures  for 
the  four  years  from  1837  to  1840,  both  inclusive  —  the 
period  of  Mr.  Van  Buren's  administration  —  were  $142,- 
661,945.46,  which  exceeded  by  $19,679,219.22,  the  aggre- 
gate revenue  from  customs  for  the  entire  last  six  years 
above  alluded  to.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that,  if  it  had 
not  been  for  the  revenue  derived  from  the  sale  of  public 
lands,  and  from  miscellaneous  sources,  and  from  loans,  the 
Treasury  would  inevitably  have  reached  the  condition  of 
entire  bankruptcy.  During  the  last  four  years  named  — 
that  is,  from  1837  to  1840  —  the  receipts  from  loans  and 
Treasury  notes  were  $25,156,633.50  —  from  public  lands 
$21,280,577.21  — and  from  miscellaneous  sources  $16,958,- 
845.18 — making  an  aggregate  during  Mr.  Van  Buren's 
administration  of  $63,396,055.92.  These  facts,  therefore, 
make  it  perfectly  apparent  that,  during  the  period  named, 
it  would  have  been  utterly  impossible  to  carry  on  the  Gov- 
ernment by  the  revenues  derived  from  customs,  or,  in 
other  words,  under  the  operations  of  a  tariff  for  revenue 
only. 

The  effect  produced  upon  the  revenue  by  a  decrease  of 
duties  is  easily  made  apparent.  The  receipts  from  customs 
for  the  year  1839  were  $23,137,924.81.  In  that  year  three- 
tenths  of  the  excess  of  duties  above  twenty  per  cent  were 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  333 

taken  off,  under  the  act  of  1833  —  leaving  only  two  more 
reductions  to  bring  the  duties  down  to  the  horizontal  stand- 
ard of  twenty  per  cent.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
revenue  from  customs  ran  down  in  1840  to  $13,499,502.17, 
—  a  decrease  of  $9,638,422.64,  in  one  year.  The  revenue 
for  the  next  year,  1841,  from  the  same  source,  was  $14,- 
487,216.74,  which  exceeded  that  for  1840,  $987,714.57,  but 
was  $8,650,708.07  less  than  that  for  1839.  Hence,  with 
this  declining  revenue,  and  the  large  decrease  in  the  re- 
ceipts from  public  lands  since  1835  and  1836 — occasioned 
by  the  general  derangement  of  business  —  and  with  steadily 
increasing  expenses,  Mr.  Tyler's  administration  was  re- 
quired, at  the  outset,  to  deal  with  the  difficult  and  embar- 
rassing question  of  contriving  means  for  relieving  an  almost 
impoverished  Treasury.  This  cannot  be  made  more  clear 
in  any  other  way  than  by  the  following,  published  in  1 846, 
by  Mr.  Horace  Greeley.  He  said  : 

"  That  we  had  recently  what  is  termed  a  revenue  tariff — that  is,  a 
tariff  adjusted  without  reference  to  protection,  but  with  a  view  to  revenue 
only — is  a  fact  of  ample  notoriety.  Under  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833, 
the  duties  previously  levied  were  reduced  by  one-tenth  annually  of  the 
excess  over  twenty  per  cent,  down  to  1842,  when  no  duty  higher  than 
twenty  per  cent  remained.  For  the  two  or  three  years  preceding,  the 
duties  exacted  had  approximated  very  nearly  to  the  supposed  revenue 
standard.  Yet,  never  in  time  of  peace  was  the  revenue  so  enormously 
deficient.  Mr.  Van  Buren  became  President  in  1837,  when  the  reduc- 
tion of  duties  had  been  nearly  half  effected,  and  closed  his  term  in  1841, 
when  it  had  been  nearly  completed.  During  these  four  years,  the  actual 
expenditures  of  the  Government  exceeded  the  actual  income  by  more 
than  thirty  millions  of  dollars. 

After  a  statement  of  the  means  made  available  by  Mr. 
Van  Buren,  otherwise  than  by  the  receipts  from  customs, 


334  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

and  another,  that  the  Government  ran  behind  in  Mr.  Van 
Buren's  four  years  $30,000,000,  he  continued  : 

"The  revenue  had  fallen  off  from  over  thirty  millions  per  annum, 
during  General  Jackson's  last  term,  to  less  than  twenty  millions  under 
Mr.  Van  Buren,  and  the  actual  receipts  of  1841  and  1842  —  the  two  years 
of  most  strictly  revenue  duties — were  less  than  fifteen  millions  per 
annum.  So  notoriously  inadequate  was  the  income  afforded  by  this 
revenue  tariff,  that  one  of  the  last  acts  of  the  retiring  Van  Buren  Con- 
gress of  1837,  was  an  act  authorizing  the  issuing  of  an  additional  five 
millions  of  Treasury  notes,  to  enable  the  new  administration  to  struggle 
on  until  the  regular  meeting  of  the  next  Congress,  in  December  of  that 
same  year." 

Such  palpable  and  undeniable  facts  as  these  furnish  a 
far  better  basis  for  correct  opinion  than  any  mere  assertion, 
however  plausibly  maintained.  They  indubitably  establish 
the  proposition  that  at  the  close  of  Mr.  Van  Buren's  admin- 
istration, it  had  been  clearly  demonstrated  that  under  the 
Compromise  Act  of  1833  it  would  be  impossible  to  raise 
revenue  enough  to  carry  on  the  Government ;  in  other 
words,  that  it  was  an  absolute  failure  as  a  revenue  measure. 

Yet  Mr.  Tyler  did  not  at  first  think  it  advisable  to  alter 
the  law  of  1833.  Besides  being  under  the  influence  of 
some  mental  proclivities,  which  few  understood,  he  reasoned 
himself  into  the  belief  that,  as  but  a  single  year  remained 
to  complete  the  reduction  of  duties,  it  would  be  well  to  let 
it  stand  unaltered  until  then,  in  order,  perhaps,  that  the 
experiment  might  be  completely  tried.  Besides,  he  thought 
it  contained  provisions,  which,  if  "brought  actively  in  aid  of 
the  manufacturing  interests  of  the  Union,"  might  produce 
beneficial  results.  He  entered  into  no  explanation  to  show 
how  such  results  would  be  likely  to  ensue,  but  expressed 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  335 

his  approval  of  "a  system  of  discriminating  duties,  imposed 
for  purposes  of  revenue."  What  he  meant  by  this  we  can 
only  arrive  at  inferentially,  inasmuch  as  his  opinions  upon 
the  subject  were,  manifestly,  not  thoroughly  matured.  If 
he  meant  duties  discriminating"  in  favor  of  manufactures, 
with  a  view  to  their  protection  against  foreign  rivalry,  but 
imposed  so  as  to  raise  money  for  revenue  and  not  distribu- 
tion, his  idea  was  the  same  as  that  expressed  frequently  by 
General  Jackson,  after  he  had  changed  his  mind  with  refer- 
ence to  the  propriety  of  producing  a  surplus.  It  is  prob- 
able, however,  that  he  did  not  mean  this,  inasmuch  as  in  a 
subsequent  message — hereafter  to  be  noticed — he  spoke 
of  discriminating  for  revenue,  and  seemed  to  intimate  that, 
in  his  opinion,  "  incidental  protection  "  consisted  in  that. 
Very  little  knowledge  of  the  operation  and  effect  of  duties 
is  required  to  understand  how  misleading  such  an  opinion 
is.  The  entire  practice  of  the  Government  has  shown  that 
discriminating  duties  are  simply  and  only  such  as  are  made 
so  for  the  purpose  of  protection,  and  are  neither  duties  laid 
for  revenue  alone,  nor  incidental  to  them.  They  derive 
their  name  from  the  fact  of  being  protective.  The  question 
of  revenue  serves  to  indicate  the  amount  to  be  raised,  and 
when  the  power  to  raise  revenue  is  invoked,  then  it  follows, 
incidentally,  perhaps,  that  the  power  to  protect  shall  be 
invoked  also.  If  there  is  any  such  thing  as  "  incidental 
protection,"  containing  even  as  much  substance  as  a  shadow, 
it  may  be  this — it  cannot  be  anything  more. 

In  his  first  annual  message,  in  December,   1841,  Mr. 
Tyler  intimated  that  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833  should 


336  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

be  recognized  as  being  entitled  to  somewhat  of  the  same 
sanction  as  the  Government  itself,  inasmuch  as,  like  the 
Government,  it  resulted  from  the  reconciliation  of  "jarring 
and  discordant  opinions."  And  yet — although  there  is 
some  trouble  in  ascertaining  his  precise  meaning — it  is 
evident  that  he  attached  more  importance  to  that  feature 
which  provided  for  home  valuation,  and  some  others  of  its 
general  features,  than  to  the  provision  for  a  horizontal 
standard  of  duties.  He  must  have  understood  that  the 
inevitable  tendency  of  such  a  standard  would  be  not  merely 
to  cause  a  still  greater  decrease  of  revenue,  but  to  inflict 
additional  injury  upon  all  domestic  industries.  Conse- 
quently, he  considered  it  his  duty  to  say  to  Congress  that 
"in  imposing  duties,  however,  for  the  purposes  of  revenue, 
a  right  to  discriminate  as  to  the  articles  on  whi^K  the  duty 
shall  be  laid,  as  well  as  the  amount,  necessarily  and  most 
properly  existed."  Why  discriminate  except  for  protec- 
tion ?  It  is  not  necessary  for  revenue ;  for  if  that  be  the 
only  object  a  horizontal  standard  is  sufficient.  He  must 
have  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that  duties  discriminating 
for  protection  were  equally  constitutional  and  proper  with 
those  laid  for  revenue  ;  for  he  immediately  said :  "So  also 
the  Government  may  be  justified  in  so  discriminating,  by 
reference  to  other  considerations  of  domestic  policy  con- 
nected with  our  manufactures."  In  this,  he  undoubtedly 
meant  that  duties  for  revenue  and  those  for  protection  were 
distinct  things,  and  that  both  might  be  constitutionally  and 
properly  imposed — the  former  as  necessary  for  the  support 
of  the  Government,  the  latter  as  the  means  of  advancing 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  337 

the  industrial  interests  of  the  country.  He  said  enough  to 
show  that  he  considered  each  as  dependent  upon  a  separate 
and  independent  grant  of  power. 

But  whatsoever  opinions  Mr.  Tyler  may  have  enter- 
tained at  the  date  of  his  message  in  1841,  he  was  soon 
forced  to  realize — in  a  far  greater  degree  than  he  had  prob- 
ably anticipated — the  impossibility  of  supplying  the  Treas- 
ury with  the  necessary  amount  of  revenue,  under  the 
system  of  decreasing  duties,  provided  for  by  the  Compro- 
mise Act  of  1833.  On  March  8,  1842 — only  three  month* 
after  the  date  of  that  message — he  found  himself  compelled 
to  address  to  Congress  a  special  message,  in  which  he  said : 

"  The  diminution  in  the  revenue  arising  from  the  great  diminution  of 
duties  under  what  is  called  the  Compromise  Act,  necessarily  involves  the 
Treasury  in  embarrassments,  which  have  been  for  some  years  palliated 
by  the  temporary  expedient  of  issuing  Treasury  notes  —  an  expedient 
which,  affording  no  permanent  relief,  has  imposed  upon  Congress,  from 
time  to  time,  the  necessity  of  replacing  the  old  by  new  issues." 

With  the  financial  affairs  of  the  Government  in  this 
condition,  he  could  not  avoid  calling  the  attention  of  Con- 
gress to  "  the  contemplated  revision  of  the  tariff  of  duties/' 
in  order  "to  a  relief  of  the  Treasury  from  those  constantly- 
recurring  embarrassments."  It  had  become  evident  to  him 
—  as  it  was  to  the  public  generally — that  this  condition  of 
affairs  could  not  continue  without  bringing  the  Government 
into  positive  disgrace,  as  it  was  impossible  to  carry  it  on 
by  means  of  borrowed  money  alone,  when  the  revenue 
was  so  steadily  decreasing  as  to  render  it  impossible  to 
discharge  the  public  indebtedness.  These  two  proposi- 
tions, then,  may  be  considered  well  established :  First,  that 

22 


338  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

the  Compromise  Act  of  1833,  as  a  tariff  for  revenue  only, 
was  an  absolute  failure  ;  second,  that  very  few  public 
measures,  in  this  country,  have  been  demanded  by  more 
imperative  necessity  than  that  which  dictated  the  tariff  law 
of  1842.  And  when  it  is  considered  that  the  injurious  con- 
sequences of  a  system  of  declining"  duties,  and  the  near 
approach  of  a  horizontal  standard  was  so  thoroughly  dem- 
onstrated, it  must  continue  to  excite  surprise  that  such 
strenuous  and  unremitting  efforts  were  subsequently  made 
to  return  to  a  system  of  revenue  duties  alone,  without 
regard  to  protection,  and  to  a  repeal  of  the  tariff  law  of 
1842,  after  the  proof  of  its  advantages  had  been  satis- 
factorily exhibited. 

The  embarrassments  which  Mr.  Tyler's  administration 
had  to  encounter  increased  every  day,  and  became  so 
threatening  to  the  public  faith  and  credit  that  he  was 
obliged  to  supplement  his  special  message  by  another,  of 
March  25,  1842 — in  less  than  three  weeks — again  invoking 
the  action  of  Congress.  In  this  message,  he  said: 

"Notwithstanding  the  urgency  with  which  I  have,  on  more  than 
one  occasion,  felt  it  my  duty  to  press  upon  Congress  the  necessity  of 
providing  the  Government  with  the  means  of  discharging  its  debts,  and 
maintaining  inviolate  the  public  faith,  the  increasing  embarrassments  of 
the  Treasury  impose  upon  me  the  obligation  of  again  inviting  your  most 
serious  attention  to  the  condition  of  the  finances." 

The  urgency  which  dictated  such  earnestness  of  lan- 
guage as  this  must  have  been  very  great,  and  the  fact  that 
it  was  so  furnishes  the  most  complete  evidence  of  the  ineffi- 
ciency of  a  tariff  for  revenue  only.  The  country  was  in 
perfect  peace,  with  no  large  war  debt  to  provide  for,  and 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  339 

with  nothing  to  swell  the  Government  expenditures  beyond 
the  ordinary  standard,  and  yet  it  was  demonstrated  beyond 
a  doubt  that  the  Compromise  Act  was  insufficient  even  for 
that  purpose.  That  act  was  the  first  trial  of  such  an  exper- 
iment— the  first  step  towards  a  tariff  for  revenue  only — 
the  first  attempt  to  depart  from  the  protective  system, 
established  under  Washington  and  maintained  by  all  his 
successors.  And  its  failure  was  not  only  so  well  attested 
as  to  leave  it  with  but  few  defenders,  but  to  satisfy  the 
public  that  a  purely  revenue  tariff  could  not  supply 
Government  with  the  necessary  amount  of  money. 
the  entire  excess  over  20  per  cent  of  duties  had  not,  at 
the  time  referred  to,  been  taken  off;  but  as  that  would 
occur  within  a  few  months,  there  was  no  difficulty  in  fore- 
seeing that  there  would  be  no  improvement  during  the 
year;  while,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  perfectly  apparent  to 
all  who  observed  the  financial  condition  of  the  Treasury 
that  it  would  grow  worse  all  the  time. 

Why  there  should  have  been  any  opposition  to  a  change 
in  this  condition  of  affairs,  must  seem  now  to  have  been 
one  of  those  unfathomable  things  which  no  scrutiny  can 
penetrate.  The  events  to  be  enumerated  hereafter  may 
throw  some  light  upon  this  subject. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV, 

TYLER  IN  FAVOR  OF  COMPROMISE  ACT—  BUT  FOUND  ADDI- 
TIONAL DUTIES  NECESSARY—  HIS  IDEA  OF  INCIDENTAL 
PROTECTION  —  VETOED  TARIFF  OF  1842  —  PASSED  OVER  HIS 
VETO—  GROUNDS  OF  THE  VETO—  TARIFF  OF  1842  AN  ABSO- 
LUTE NECESSITY. 


T^HE  motives  which  influenced  Mr.  Tyler  to  desire  that 
*  the  Compromise  Act  should  stand  as  long  as  possible, 
are  of  no  present  consequence.  An  understanding  of  the 
effects  produced  upon  the  revenue,  by  the  operations  of  the 
act  itself,  is  of  far  more  importance  than  any  inquiry  into 
the  political  tendencies  of  his  administration  could  be. 
Fortunately,  this  understanding  may  be  reached  by  a  care- 
ful investigation  of  the  recorded  evidence. 

In  his  annual  report  to  Congress,  in  December,  1841, 
his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  estimated  that,  after  exhaust- 
ing all  the  probable  resources  of  the  year,  a  deficit  of  about 
$  1  4,  000,000  would  exist.  He,  accordingly,  recommended 
that  the  difficulty  be  bridged  over  by  issuing  Treasury 
notes,  and  by  extending  the  time  for  negotiating  the  loan 
authorized  by  Congress  at  the  extra  session.  Mr.  Tyler 
approved  the  views  of  the  Secretary,  and  regarded  the  ex- 
isting evil  so  grave  as  to  require  a  vigorous  and  decisive 
remedy,  realizing,  as  he  said,  that  "  no  slight  palliatives  or 
occasional  expedients  will  give  the  country  the  relief  it 

needs."    Notwithstanding  his  partiality  for  the  Compromise 

340 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  341 

Act,  he  was  constrained  to  say  that  he  considered  the  true 
remedy  to  be  "to  lay  additional  duties  on  imports,  in  order 
to  meet  the  ordinary  current  expenses  of  the  Government." 
He,  in  all  probability,  would  not  have  done  this  if  he  had 
not  learned  from  experience  that  it  would  be  impossible  to 
carry  on  the  Government,  and  maintain  its  credit,  under  the 
system  of  low  horizontal  duties  provided  for  by  the  Com- 
promise Act.  Nevertheless,  his  ideas  upon  the  subject 
were  somewhat  confused,  probably  because  he  felt  disposed 
to  carry  conciliation  to  the  utmost  limit,  in  order  to  quiet 
any  disturbance  likely  to  be  incited  by  the  supporters  of 
free  trade.  The  latter  had  accustomed  themselves  to  the 
threat  of  dissolving  the  Union,  and  had  weakened  their 
attachment  to  the  National  Government  by  the  persistent 
habit  of  assailing  it ;  and  Mr.  Tyler  probably  felt,  as  Gen- 
eral Jackson  did,  that  there  was  a  possibility  of  re-awaken- 
ing a  sentiment  of  patriotic  duty  in  their  minds  by  friendly 
concessions.  Manifestly,  however,  his  main  trouble  arose 
out  of  the  difficulty  of  finding  some  point  of  reconciliation 
upon  which  he  could  rely,  and,  at  the  same  time,  go  to  the 
extent  of  providing  increased  revenue,  which  was  a  matter 
of  absolute  necessity.  In  the  evident  confusion  of  his 
mind,  he  adopted  inapt  language  to  express  his  meaning. 
He  said : 

"In  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discrimination,  having  reference  to 
revenue,  but  at  the  same  time,  affording  incidental  protection  to  manu- 
facturing industry,  it  seems  equally  probable  that  duties  on  some  articles 
of  importation  will  have  to  be  advanced  above  twenty  per  cent." 

It  is  hard  to  tell  exactly  what  this  means.  It,  however, 
contains  one  proposition  about  which  there  can  be  no  mis- 


342  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

take  —  that  is,  the  necessity  for  an  increase  of  duties  above 
twenty  per  cent.  This  could  not  be  done,  of  course,  with- 
out a  departure  from  the  provisions  of  the  Compromise 
Act,  and,  therefore,  Mr.  Tyler  gave  a  reluctant  consent  to 
that.  Yet,  even  when  thus  forced  by  necessity  to  recom- 
mend an  "  increase  of  duties,'*  he  seemed  inclined  to  make 
revenue,  not  merely  the  controlling,  but  only  consideration. 
We  are  left  to  infer  from  his  language  that  he  was  simply 
endeavoring  to  find  some  sort  of  shelter  behind  the  sugges- 
tion of  General  Jackson  with  reference  to  "  incidental  pro- 
tection," without  having  fully  appreciated  its  force  and 
meaning.  He  speaks  of  "  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discrimi- 
nation, having  reference  to  revenue,"  but  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  General  Jackson  to  have  involved  him- 
self in  that  absurdity.  It  is  impossible  for  revenue  duties 
to  discriminate — they  relate  to  matters  wholly  distinct. 
When  duties  relate  to  revenue  they  involve  nothing  else 
—  when  they  discriminate  it  is  for  protection.  This,  in 
fact,  constitutes  the  central  feature  in  the  whole  controversy 
between  a  protective  and  revenue  tariff;  and,  by  an  exami- 
nation of  what  General  Jackson  and  all  his  predecessors  in 
the  Presidency  have  said  upon  that  subject,  it  will  be  found 
that  he  and  they  so  understood.  But  Mr.  Tyler  seemed  to 
entertain,  at  the  time  this  sentence  was  penned,  the  mis- 
taken idea  that  when  duties  are  laid  with  "  reference  to 
revenue  "  alone,  they  are  also  discriminating —  "  necessarily 
affording  incidental  protection  to  manufacturing  industry." 
His  error  consisted  in  the  attempt  to  give  an  equivalent 
meaning  to  terms  not  susceptible  of  it — for  as  revenue 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  343 

under  such  a  tariff  would  be  the  only  object,  the  duties 
would  not  be,  in  any  sense,  discriminating.  Consequently, 
it  could  not  be  either  directly  or  incidentally  protective. 
There  must  be  some  relation  between  the  substantive  thing 
and  that  which  is  incident  to  it;  but  nothing  of  that  kind 
grows  out  of  the  relation  between  revenue  and  protection. 
We  have  seen  that  General  Jackson  did  not  intend  to  con- 
vey any  such  idea  when  he  alluded  to  the  opinions  of  others 
with  reference  to  "  incidental  protection. "  And  Mr.  Tyler 
—  driven  forward  by  a  necessity  he  could  not  control  — 
must  have  been  subsequently  convinced  of  his  own  misuse 
of  terms  —  for,  in  his  veto  of  the  first  tariff  bill  passed  in 
1842 — when,  recognizing  the  necessity  of  exceeding  the 
twenty  per  cent,  fixed  by  the  Compromise  Act — he  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  "that  Congress  may,  above  as  well  as 
below  that  rate,  so  discriminate  as  to  give  incidental  protec- 
tion to  manufacturing  industry."  This  is  very  different 
from  discrimination  for  revenue  alone,  as  he  had  formerly 
expressed  it,  inasmuch  as  it  is  neither  more  nor  less  than 
discrimination  for  protection.  He  erroneously  calls  it  "  in- 
cidental protection'' — which  is  impossible,  for  the  reason 
that,  according  to  his  own  theory,  protection  is  direct,  being 
made  so  by  the  fact  of  discrimination.  Hence,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  "incidental  protection"  by  means  of  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  manufacturing  industry.  It  involves 
the  principle  of  protection  precisely  as  it  would  be  involved 
where  it  alone  was  the  object  —  the  difference  being  only 
in  degree ;  that  is,  the  extent  to  which  the  duties  shall  be 
carried. 


344  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

The  first  tariff  bill  passed  in  1842  was  vetoed  by  Mr. 
Tyler,  not  because  it  contained  the  principle  of  discrimi- 
nation in  favor  of  protection,  but — as  all  his  reasoning 
shows — because  it  did  not  suspend  the  distribution  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands,  which  had  been  pro- 
vided for  by  an  act  passed  in  September,  1841,  at  the 
extra  session  of  Congress.  While,  in  one  breath,  he 
recommended  an  increase  of  duties,  in  the  next,  he  indi- 
cated a  desire  to  cling  to  the  Compromise  Act,  which  he 
professed  to  regard  as  a  solemn  covenant,  not  to  be  vio- 
lated, insisting  that  all  the  land  fund  should  be  absorbed 
by  the  Treasury  for  ordinary  expenses,  so  as  to  keep  the 
duties  down  as  low  as  possible,  notwithstanding  the  pos- 
sible weakening  of  the  principle  of  protection.  Evidently, 
his  mind  was  somewhat  unsettled  by  the  desire  to  "blow 
hot  and  cold"  with  the  same  breath;  that  is,  to  conciliate 
both  the  friends  of  protection  and  of  free  trade,  the  lat- 
ter of  whom  continued  their  attitude  of  hostility  to  the 
Government  unless  permitted  to  dictate  its  policy.  His 
reasoning  was  not  only  wrong,  but  it  involved  him  in 
the  contradiction  of  himself.  And,  consequently,  as  he 
failed  to  influence  the  action  of  Congress,  the  tariff  law 
of  1842  was  passed,  over  his  second  veto,  by  the  consti- 
tutional majority. 

The  grounds  of  this  second  veto  were  substantially 
like  those  of  the  first,  but  more  amplified.  He  continued 
to  concede  the  necessity  for  an  increase  of  duties,  but 
adhered  to  his  former  position,  that,  while  the  Act  of 
1833  authorized  them  to  exceed  twenty  per  cent  when 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  345 

the  condition  of  the  Treasury  demanded  it,  yet,  that  the 
distribution  of  the  public  land  fund  should  cease  in  order 
to  keep  the  duties  down  to  the  lowest  point.  With  re- 
gard to  the  protection  of  manufactures  his  language  was 
more  intelligible  than  it  had  previously  been,  as  he  seemed 
by  that  time  to  have  become  convinced  that  discriminat- 
ing duties  were  not  revenue  duties,  but  necessarily  pro- 
tective. Referring  to  his  recommendation  for  their  in- 
crease, therefore,  he  defined  his  meaning  to  be  that  they 
should  be  imposed  "for  the  two-fold  object  of  affording 
ample  revenue  for  the  Government,  and  incidental  pro- 
tection to  the  various  branches  of  domestic  industry." 
Here  he  recognized,  as  General  Jackson  had  done,  that 
some  duties  should  be  laid  for  revenue,  and  that  others 
should  discriminate  for  protection  —  each  constituting  a 
class  by  itself,  and  each  accomplishing  its  own  objects. 
And  thus  his  ultimate  theory — which  he  reached  by  gradual 
steps  —  culminated  in  the  idea  that  Congress  was  as  much 
bound  to  legislate  for  protection  as  for  revenue.  As 
he  considered  these  objects  as  "two-fold" — that  is,  sepa- 
rate and  distinct  from  each  other — he  must  be  taken  to 
have  reached,  at  last,  the  same  conclusion  General  Jack- 
son did,  that  the  powers  of  Congress  were  "two-fold," 
being  derived  from  separate  and  distinct  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  —  one  from  the  revenue  and  the  other 
from  the  commercial  clause.  Whatsoever  may  have  been 
his  actual  convictions  upon  the  subject,  it  is  sufficient  now 
to  note  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  his  first  and  second 
veto)  the  Tariff  Act  of  1842  was  passed,  and  revived  the 


34-6  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TA.RIFF. 

principle  of  protection,  which  had  been,  to  say  the  least, 
seriously  endangered  by  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833. 
It  re-introduced  discrimination  in  favor  of  protecting  do- 
mestic industry,  therein  differing  from  a  horizontal  tariff, 
which  makes  no  discrimination.  And  this  is  the  point  of 
practical  difference  between  the  two  systems. 

It  is  not  easy  to  see,  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing  facts, 
how  the  passage  of  the  tariff  law  of  1842  could  have  been 
rightfully  avoided,  since  they  demonstrate,  with  positive 
certainty,  that  the  necessaiy  revenue  to  carry  on  the  Gov- 
ernment could  not  have  been  otherwise  raised  without 
resort  to  direct  taxation.  Such  lessons  of  experience  as  we 
learn  from  the  history  of  those  times  are  worth  far  more,  in 
the  practical  administration  of  public  affairs,  than  whole 
volumes  of  speculations  by  ingenious  theorists,  howsoever 
interesting  and  instructive  they  may  be  made  by  sophistical 
reasoning.  They  are  as  instructive  now  as  they  were  then, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  a  fair  and  reasonable  conclusion  that  what 
has  once  occurred  will,  under  like  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions, occur  again  ;  and  it  would  indicate  a  far  less 
degree  of  sagacity  and  common  sense  than  the  people  of 
the  United  States  have  the  reputation  of  possessing  if  they 
should,  after  the  experience  they  have  had,  suffer  them- 
selves to  be  hereafter  persuaded  into  the  repetition  of  a 
policy  so  fraught  with  evil  as  a  merely  revenue  tariff  then 
was,  and  has  always  been — as  additional  demonstrations 
will  show. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

TARIFF  OF  1842  FOR  REVENUE  AND  PROTECTION  — HOME  VALU- 
ATION—CASH PAYMENTS— REVIVAL  OF  BUSINESS— IMPROVED 
CONDITION  OF  THK  TREASURY— EFFECT  UPON  REVENUE- 
PRESIDENTIAL  CONTEST  OF  1844—  POLK  AND  CLAY— PROTEC- 
TION A  DIRECT  ISSUE  — CLAY  FOR  IT— POLK  EQUIVOCAL— 
SUPPORTED  BY  FREE  TRADERS  IN  THE  SOUTH,  BY  PROTEC- 
TIONISTS IN  THE  NORTH  — HIS  CIRCULAR  IN  TENNESSEE  — 
HIS  LETTER  TO  KANE  —  CANVASS  IN  PENNSYLVANIA— "  HIS- 
TORY OF  THE  POLK  ADMINISTRATION  "  —  POLK  ELECTED  BY 
PROTECTION  VOTES— PROCURED  BY  FRAUD. 

HTHE  tariff  of  1842  was  of  the  "  two-fold "  character 
•*•  spoken  of  by  Mr.  Tyler ;  that  is,  the  duties  laid  by  it 
were  for  both  revenue  and  protection.  They  were 
increased  for  both  these  objects,  to  such  a  degree  as  each 
required.  The  free  list  was  made  as  large  as  the  neces- 
sities of  the  Treasury  would  allow ;  but  beyond  it  the 
principle  of  discriminating  by  specific  duties,  in  favor  of 
protecting  all  branches  of  domestic  industry,  was  distinctly 
recognized.  Its  opponents  denounced  it  as  a  protective 
tariff — an  accusation  entirely  true  in  the  sense  here  stated. 
But  it  was  also  a  revenue  tariff,  in  that  it  provided  for 
revenue  as  well  as  for  protection.  It  did  not  provide  for 
either  alone,  but  for  both.  And  in  both  it  proved  a  success. 
It  was  in  marked  contrast  with  the  Compromise  Act  of 
1833.  Although  it  repealed  that  act,  it  retained  some  of 

347 


348  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

its  wholesome  provisions  ;  for  example,  home  valuation  and 
payment  of  duties  in  cash. 

A  tariff  for  protection  alone  has  never  been  advocated 
by  any  considerable  number  ;  and  the  accusation  that  such 
a  measure  has  been  seriously  contemplated,  at  any  time,  is 
undeserved  and  unjust.  It  is  one  of  the  common  pretenses 
behind  which  the  fallacy  of  free  trade  is  disguised.  It  does 
not  appear  that  a  single  supporter  of  the  tariff  of  1842,  in 
either  branch  of  Congress,  advocated  or  desired  that  it 
should  provide  for  protection  only,  or  for  protection  at  the 
expense  of  revenue,  or  for  protection  to  the  extent  of  pro- 
hibiting the  importation  of  any  necessary  articles  from  for- 
eign countries  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  true  that  the 
principles  of  the  act,  as  regarded  revenue  and  protection, 
conformed  precisely  to  those  established  by  the  first  Con- 
gress, and  adhered  to  in  all  our  tariff  laws  until  1833.  If 
the  duties  had  not  been  increased  by  it  as  they  were,  and 
made  discriminating  and  specific,  the  embarrassed  condition 
of  the  Treasury  would  undoubtedly  have  continued.  Such  a 
fact  as  this — perfectly  apparent  to  all  who  make  the  inves- 
tigation— is  worth  far  more  in  the  practical  management 
of  public  affairs  than  a  volume  of  the  most  learned  disserta- 
tions upon  the  abstract  principles  of  political  economy. 
Experience  is  the  safest  guide,  to  nations  as  well  as  indi- 
viduals. 

The  beneficial  effects  of  the  tariff  of  1842  were  almost 
immediately  manifested.      The  business  of  the  country— 
which  had  been  previously  paralyzed — was  wonderfully  re- 
vived.     Confidence  was   restored,   and  all  the  industries 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  349 

of  the  country  were  correspondingly  improved.  But  in 
nothing  was  this  improvement  more  marked  than  in  the 
relief  it  gave  to  the  public  treasury.  Up  to  June  30,  1843 
-the  close  of  the  fiscal  year — the  receipts  from  customs 
were  $25,234,752.67,  as  against  $14,487,216.74  for  the  pre- 
vious year,  under  the  Compromise  Act — making  a  differ- 
ence of  $10,747,535.93,  or  over  75  per  cent  in  one 
year,  in  favor  of  the  tariff  of  1842.  In  1844  the  receipts 
from  the  same  source  were  $26,183,570.94;  in  1845, 
$27,328,112.70;  and  in  1846 — when  a  new  tariff  law  was 
passed — $26,712,667.87.  If  we  compare  the  four  years  of 
Mr.  Van  Buren's  administration,  under  the  Compromise 
Act,  with  the  four  years  immediately  following  the  passage 
of  the  act  of  1842,  it  will  be  seen  that,  during  the  first  pe- 
riod, there  was  a  steady  decrease  of  revenue,  while,  during 
the  second  period,  there  was  a  steady  increase.  This 
method  of  comparison  fixes  the  relative  value  of  the  two 
systems,  showing  one  to  be  injurious  to  the  revenue,  the 
other  beneficial.  The  aggregate  amount  received  during 
the  four  years  first  named  was  $63,967,517.73,  and  during 
the  last  four  years  $105,459,104.18,  showing  a  difference  in 
favor  of  the  latter  of  $41,491,586.45,  or  over  60  per  cent. 
Contrasted,  therefore,  as  revenue  measures,  the  preference 
must  be  given,  by  all  thoughtful  people,  to  the  tariff  of 
1842,  with  its  protective  features.  And  the  comparison 
here  made  is  solely  with  reference  to  this  point. 

The  political  result  which  followed  the  passage  of  the 
tariff  of  1842,  was  a  more  distinct  and  direct  issue  than  had 
existed  before,  between  the  friends  of  protection  upon  one 


350  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

side,  and  the  advocates  of  a  tariff  for  revenue  only,  tending 
ultimately  to  free  trade,  upon  the  other.  The  field  of  con- 
troversy became  expanded  to  its  utmost  limit,  so  that  the 
whole  subject  of  the  tariff,  in  all  its  relations  and  bearings, 
underwent  a  thorough  and  exhaustive  investigation.  But 
in  so  far  as  the  controversy  had  relation  to  political 
parties,  any  inquiry  into  it  would  be  fruitless  of  good 
results.  Besides,  the  matters  under  present  investigation 
are  too  important  to  be  discussed  in  a  partisan  or  factious 
spirit. 

Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  James  K.  Polk,  of  Tennessee,  were 
the  rival  candidates  for  the  Presidency  in  1844,  and  one  of 
the  prominent  questions  involved  in  the  contest  was  the 
relation  which  each  bore  to  the  question  of  the  tariff  and 
the  doctrine  of  protection.  The  fierce  opposition  of  those 
who  advocated  a  strictly  revenue  tariff  to  the  principle  of 
protection  in  the  tariff  of  1842,  made  this  unavoidable. 
The  controversy  was  exceedingly  animated,  and  resulted, 
as  will  presently  appear,  in  showing  that  a  majority  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  indorsed  the  principle  of  pro- 
tection, and  were  opposed  to  a  tariff  for  revenue  only. 
This  will  be  recollected  by  many  who  took  part  in  it,  and 
may  be  easily  ascertained  by  such  as  take  the  pains  to 
analyze  the  result. 

Mr.  Clay  was  recognized,  on  all  hands,  as  the  supporter 
of  protection.  He  had  given  occasion,  by  his  introduction 
and  support  of  the  Compromise  Act,  to  the  suspicion, 
among  the  friends  of  protection,  of  being  inclined  to  concede 
too  much  to  the  free  trade  theory.  But  the  experience 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  351 

of  the  country  under  that  act  led  him  to  re-affirm,  without 
equivocation,  the  principles  he  had  previously  advo- 
cated with  earnestness  and  ability.  He  did  not  understand 
himself  as  having  surrendered  any  of  those  principles — 
for  when  the  act  of  1833  was  passed  he  declared  that  he 
did  not  think  the  principle  of  protection  would  be  endan- 
gered by  it.  In  order,  however,  that  he  should  not  be  mis- 
understood, he  made  an  emphatic  declaration  of  his  opin- 
ion. In  a  speech  delivered  at  Raleigh,  North  Carolina, 
during  the  canvass,  he  said : 

"Let  the  amount  which  is  requisite  for  an  economical  adminis- 
tration of  the  Government,  when  we  are  not  engaged  in  a  war,  be  raised 
exclusively  on  foreign  imports;  and  in  adjusting  a  tariff  for  that  pur- 
pose, let  such  discrimination  be  made  as  will  foster  and  encourage  our 
domestic  manufactures.  All  parties  ought  to  be  satisfied  with  a  tariff 
for  revenue,  and  discrimination  for  protection. ' ' 

Mr.  Polk  was  understood  to  occupy  different  ground. 
As  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  he  had 
opposed  and  voted  against  the  tariff  of  1828  ;  thereby  sep- 
arating from  General  Jackson,  who,  as  a  Senator  from  the 
same  State,  had  voted  for  the  tariff  of  1824.  But  he  had 
voted  for  that  of  1832  because,  as  he  said,  he  considered  it 
to  contain  some  important  modifications  of  the  existing  law  ; 
and  because  also — as  may  be  justly  inferred — -it  was  in 
accordance  with  the  policy  of  General  Jackson's  administra- 
tion, of  which  he  was  an  earnest  supporter.  He  had  also, 
when  a  candidate  for  Governor  of  Tennessee,  in  1843, 
addressed  a  circular  letter  to  the  people  of  that  State, 
wherein  he  took  strong  and  decisive  grounds  in  favor  of  the 


35  2  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

repeal  of  the  Tariff  Act  of  1842.     In  that  letter  he  expressed 
himself  in  the  following  language  : 

"I  have  steadily,  during  the  period  I  was  a  representative  in  Con- 
gress, been  opposed  to  a  protective  policy  ',  as  my  recorded  votes  and  pub- 
lished speeches  prove.  Since  I  retired  from  Congress  I  had  held  the 
same  opinions.  In  the  present  canvass  for  Governor  I  have  avowed  my 
opposition  to  the  Tariff  Act  of  the  late  Whig  Congress,  as  being  highly 
protective  in  its  character,  and  not  designed  by  its  authors  as  a  revenue 
measure.  I  had  avowed  my  opinion  in  my  public  speeches,  that  the 
interests  of  the  country  —  and  especially  of  the  producing  and  exporting 
States  —  required  its  repeal,  and  the  restoration  of  the  Compromise  Act  of 


This  advocacy  of  a  repeal  of  the  tariff  of  1842,  after  it 
had  furnished  abundant  revenue  and  revived  business  ;  and 
the  restoration  of  the  Compromise  Act,  after  it  had  almost 
bankrupted  the  Government,  and  seriously  paralyzed  all 
branches  of  trade  and  industry,  made  that  period  one  of 
the  most  curious  —  as  it  became,  in  the  end,  one  of  the 
most  instructive  —  in  our  political  history.  Why  should  a 
beneficial  measure  be  destroyed  and  an  injurious  one  be 
revived  ?  There  is  but  one  answer  :  the  sectional  interests 
of  the  cotton-planting  States  required  it,  and  in  this  contest 
for  Governor  of  Tennessee  Mr.  Polk  made  himself  the 
of  that  cause.  He  was  professedly  the 


friend  of  General  Jackson,  but  with  regard  to  the  respective 
systems  of  protection  and  free  trade,  he  agreed  with  the 
enemies  of  his  administration,  who  completely  controlled 
the  combinations  which  resulted  in  his  nomination  for  the 
Presidency  in  1844,  over  Mr.  Van  Buren,  General  Cass, 
Colonel  R.  M.  Johnson,  and  Mr.  Buchanan  —  the  latter  of 
whom,  coming  from  the  tariff  State  of  Pennsylvania, 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  353 

received  only  29  out  of  266  votes.  And  the  conspicuous 
manner  in  which  they  placed  themselves  in  the  front,  would 
undoubtedly  have  excited  the  apprehension,  on  the  part  of 
the  real  friends  of  General  Jackson's  administration,  of  their 
intention  to  revive  the  theory  of  free  trade  and  nullification 
he  had  so  successfully  suppressed,  had  not  the  Presidential 
canvass  been  so  directed  as  to  cover  up  the  real  motive. 
This  was  accomplished  by  asserting  title  "  to  the  whole  of 
Oregon,"  and  the  obligation  to  annex  Texas,  and  by  dis- 
guising the  theory  of  free  trade  under  the  general  objection 
of  fostering  one  branch  of  industry  to  the  detriment  of 
another,  and  of  cherishing  the  interests  of  one  portion  of 
the  country  to  the  injury  of  another  portion.  * 


*  Col.  Benton  gives  an  account  of  the  "  intrigue  "  by  which  Mr.  Polk  was  nomi- 
nated, and  says  it  was  "  one  of  the  most  elaborate,  complex,  and  daring  ever  prac- 
ticed in  an  intelligent  country."  South  Carolina  was  not  represented  in  the  convention, 
but  it  was  necessary  to  obtain  her  electoral  vote  in  order  to  succeed.  This  was  done  by 
a  bargain  which,  Col.  Benton  says,  was  made  by  Mr.  Polk  himself  with  a  gentleman 
from  South  Carolina — a  friend  of  Mr.  Calhoun — who  visited  him  for  that  purpose.  The 
proposition  to  Mr.  Polk  was  that  if  he  would  agree  that  Mr.  Francis  P.  Blair  should  not 
be  retained  as  the  editor  of  the  party  organ  at  Washington  City,  he  should  have  the  elec- 
toral vote  of  South  Carolina,  inasmuch  as  Mr.  Blair  was  inexorably  opposed  to  nullifica- 
tion, and  a  strong  supporter  of  General  Jackson's  policy.  Mr.  Polk  agreed  to  this  and 
the  contract  was  carried  out  after  his  election  by  getting  rid  of  Mr.  Blair  and  putting 
Mr.  Ritchie,  of  the  Richmond  (Virginia)  Enquirer,  in  his  place.  Col.  Benton  then 
shows  that  "  Polk  and  Texas  "  became  the  watchword  in  the  South,  and  that  underlying 
it  the  old  nullification  and  disunion  sentiment  still  existed.  He  gives  an  account  of  a 
meeting  at  Ashley,  in  South  Carolina,  in  May,  1844,  at  which  resolutions  were  adopted 
declaring  that  if  Texas  were  not  annexed,  the  Union  should  be  at  once  dissolved,  and 
that  the  Southern  States  should  be  called  into  convention  for  that  purpose.  He  shows 
also,  that  an  attempt  was  made  to  call  a  general  meeting  at  Nashville,  Tennessee,  to 
ratify  this  threat  of  disunion,  with  the  view,  as  that  was  the  home  of  General  Jackson,  to 
secure  his  influence.  But  the  people  of  Tennessee,  with  the  approval  of  General  Jackscin, 
undoubtedly,  condemned  the  movement,  and  held  a  meeting  at  Nashville,  protesting 
against  "  the  desecration  of  the  soil  of  Tennessee,  by  any  act  of  men  holding  within  its 
borders  a  convention  for  any  such  object."  Failing  to  obtain,  in  this  indirect  mode, 

23 


354  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

The  nomination  of  Mr.  Polk  under  these  auspices 
aroused  suspicion  among  the  friends  of  protection  in  the 
manufacturing  and  agricultural  States — outside  the  cotton- 
growing  section.  In  Pennsylvania,  among  the  most  promi- 
nent of  these  had  been  the  original  and  firm  friends  of  Gen- 
eral Jackson,  who  had  supported  him  against  Mr.  John 
Quincy  Adams  in  1828,  upon  the  express  ground  that  he 
was  in  favor  of  protection  and  the  American  system,  while 
Mr.  Adams  was  in  favor  of  free  trade.  They  could  not 
consistently  vote  for  Mr.  Polk,  nor  expect  their  State  to  do 
so,  unless  it  were  made  to  appear  that  his  opinions,  when 
a  candidate  for  Governor  in  1843,  were  not  his  opinions  in 
1 844,  as  a  candidate  for  President,  but  that  he  had  become 
a  friend  of  protection  and  of  the  tariff  of  1842.  Whether 
the  Jesuit  motto,  that  "the  end  justifies  the  means,"  was 
considered  worthy  of  direct  avowal  or  not,  it  became  the 
governing  principle  in  a  most  unscrupulous  scheme  of  politi- 
cal maneuvering. 

A  letter  was  written  by  John  K.  Kane,  Esq.,  of  Phila- 
delphia, to  Mr.  Polk,  dated  May  10,  1844.  As  this  letter 
does  not  appear  in  any  of  the  political  histories  of  that 
time,  its  precise  contents  are  unknown.  They  can  only  be 
inferred  from  the  references  of  Mr.  Polk  to  them  in  his 


the  indorsement  of  their  motto  of  "  Texas  or  Disunion,"  by  General  Jackson,  the  scheme 
was  thereafter  prosecuted  more  secretly  and  adroitly.  It,  however,  succeeded.  Mr. 
Polk  received  the  electoral  vote  of  South  Carolina,  was  supported  by  the  nullifiers  and 
disunionists,  and  was,  therefore,  indebted  to  the  enemies  of  General  Jackson  and  his 
administration  for  his  election.  The  whole  scheme  is  fully  exposed  by  Col.  Benton  in 
detail,  and  makes  a  chapter  unlike  any  other  in  our  history.  See  "  Thirty  years  in  the 
United  Slates  Senate?  by  Thomas  H.  Benton.  Vol.  II,  Chap.  CXXXVI,  p.  591,  etc., 
etc.  See  also  "  Three  Decades  of  Federal  Legislation?  by  S.  S.  Cox,  p.  47. 


HISTORY  OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  355 

reply.  Whatsoever  they  were,  he  waited  until  June  19 — 
more  than  five  weeks — before  preparing  his  answer.  This 
gave  abundant  time  for  concert  and  reflection  —  for  the  dis- 
covery of  some  plan  to  steer  between  protection  and  free 
trade,  without  friction  with  either- -as  Ulysses  had  passed 
between  Scylla  and  Charybdis,  without  striking  on  either 
side.  A  few  extracts  from  it  will  abundantly  show  how  this 
was  done.  He  said : 

"I  am  in  favor  of  a  tariff  for  revenue,  such  a  one  as  will  yield  a 
sufficient  amount  to  the  Treasury  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  Govern- 
ment, economically  administered.  In  adjusting  the  details  of  a  revenue 
tariff,  I  have  heretofore  sanctioned  such  moderate  duties  as  would  pro- 
duce the  amount  of  revenue  needed,  and  at  the  same  time  afford  reason- 
able incidental  protection  to  our  home  industry.  I  am  opposed  to  a 
tariff  for  protection  merely,  and  not  for  revenue.  Acting  upon  these 
general  principles,  it  is  well  known  that  I  gave  my  support  to  the  policy 
of  General  Jackson  on  this  subject." 

Then,  he  proceeded  to  state  that,  although  he  had 
voted  against  the  tariff  of  1828,  he  had  voted  for  that  of 
1832,  and  for  another  bill  of  the  same  year  which  had 
been  superseded  by  that  of  1833,  for  which  last  he  also 
voted;  and,  with  an  evident  desire  to  take  shelter  under 
the  mantle  of  General  Jackson,  he  continued : 

"In  my  judgment,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  extend,  as 
far  as  it  may  be  practicable  to  do  so,  by  its  revenue  laws  and  all  other 
means  within  its  power,  fair  and  just  protection  to  all  the  great  interests 
of  the  whole  Union,  embracing  agriculture,  manufactures  and  the  me- 
chanic arts,  commerce  and  navigation." 

The  process  of  incubation  deemed  necessary  to  produce 
this  extraordinary  letter  covered  a  period  of  about  forty 
days — a  length  of  time  quite  sufficient  for  the  most  careful 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

deliberation,  and  for  conference  with  reference  to  what  was 
necessary  to  say  and  how  to  say  it.  Nevertheless,  it  is  so 
transparent  that  it  does  not  require  much  or  very  keen 
penetration  to  see  through  it.  Two  objects  were  to  be 
accomplished  by  it :  First,  and  chiefly,  the  free  trade  advo- 
cates of  the  cotton  section  had  to  be  pacified  and  held 
intact;  second,  the  protection  supporters  of  General  Jack- 
son in  Pennsylvania  had  to  be  brought  to  the  belief  that  the 
tariff  of  1842  would  not  be  disturbed  in  the  event  of  Mr. 
Folk's  election,  any  more  than  it  would  be  if  Mr.  Clay  were 
elected.  These  two  objects  were  in  direct  and  positive 
conflict,  but  that  does  not  seem  to  have  stood  in  the  way. 
Why  should  it,  when  the  Presidential  office,  as  the  means 
of  making  free  trade  a  success,  was  the  stake  to  be  played 
for  ?  Those  who  planned  and  directed  the  nomination  of 
Mr.  Polk  were  satisfied  with  his  vote  against  the  tariff  of 
1828,  and  his  circular  letter  in  1843  to  the  people  of  Ten- 
nessee. They  were  wise  and  sagacious  men,  with  the 
courage  necessary  to  pursue  their  convictions,  and  with  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  springs  and  motives  of  human 
conduct.  They  needed  no  other  light  to  be  thrown  upon 
this  circular  letter  than  that  derived  from  the  knowledge 
of  Mr.  Polk's  previous  co-operation  and  affiliation  with 
them,  and  were  content  to  leave  the  protectionists  of  Penn- 
sylvania to  whatsoever  method  of  manipulation  would  be 
most  likely  to  "throw  dust  in  their  eyes."  Therefore,  the 
latter  were  told  that  he  was  "  opposed  to  a  tariff  for  pro- 
tection merely"  ;  to  which,  of  course,  there  could  be  no 
objection,  because  neither  Mr.  Clay  nor  any  of  his  friends 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  357 

advocated  such  a  tariff.  They  were  told  also  that  he  sup- 
ported "the  policy  of  General  Jackson  on  this  subject,"  in 
which  general  statement  there  was  a  double  purpose — first, 
to  shelter  himself  under  the  mantle  of  the  "old  hero,"  and 
second,  to  leave  it  to  be  proved  by  argument  addressed  to 
public  assemblages  of  the  people,  that  General  Jackson 
had  always  supported  a  protective  tariff.  This  was  not 
difficult  to  do,  and  it  was  done  with  the  skill  and  ingenuity 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  end  designed.  General  Jack- 
son's letters  to  Dr.  Coleman  and  to  the  Governor  of  Indi- 
ana— his  frequent  and  earnest  advocacy  of  protection  in 
his  messages,  his  opposition  to  nullification  and  free  trade 
and  their  suppression  in  South  Carolina,  and  his  vote  for 
the  high  protective  tariff  of  1828 — furnished  ample  ma- 
terial for  effective  use  in  sections  where  protection  was 
popular,  especially  in  Pennsylvania.  And  to  guard  against 
the  possible  insufficiency  of  these  —  inasmuch  as  they 
related  to  General  Jackson  and  not  to  Mr.  Polk — the  last 
clause  in  the  letter  was  made  broad  and  full  enough  to 
include  both  the  constitutionality  and  expediency  of  pro- 
tection. It  was  sufficient  to  base  upon  it  the  promise  of 
"just  and  fair  protection  " — and  who  should  demand  more 
than  that? 

No  letter  ever  written  by  a  Presidential  candidate  in  this 
country — nor,  indeed,  by  a  candidate  for  any  office — has 
been  followed  by  so  long  a  train  of  injurious  consequences 
as  this.  It  was  intended  to  bring  about  a  revolution  in  the 
policy  of  the  Government,  which  had  almost  universal 
sanction,  and  to  substitute  for  it  mere  experiment,  which 


358  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

had  not  the  indorsement  of  a  single  administration  and 
was  actively  and  successfully  resisted  by  General  Jackson  ; 
an  experiment  based  upon  the  single  idea — concealed  but 
not  expressed — that  the  cotton-growing  section  was 
entitled  to  the  aid  and  patronage  of  the  Government  in  a 
greater  degree  than  all  the  other  sections  combined. 
Therefore,  not  a  word  was  repeated  from  the  circular  letter 
to  the  people  of  Tennessee, 'written  only  the  year  before, 
wherein  he  had  taken  pains  to  be  emphatic  in  declaring 
that  he  was  "  opposed  to  a  protective  policy,"  and  that  the 
interests  of  the  country  required  the  repeal  of  the  tariff  of 
1842,  and  the  restoration  of  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833. 
If  he  had  done  this,  the  voters  of  Pennsylvania  could  have 
understood  his  purposes.  Even  as  it  was  they  could  have 
discovered,  if  they  had  practiced  their  ordinary  sagacity, 
that  there  was  something  in  disguise — concealed  beneath 
the  surface.  They  might  then  have  suspected — what  they 
afterwards  learned  from  experience — that  the  kind  of 
"incidental  protection  "  held  out  to  them  was  only  that 
which  was  incidental  to  the  triumph  of  free  trade — which 
meant  nothing  whatsoever  for  the  protection  of  their  manu- 
factures,* but  everything  for  the  protection  of  cotton.  In 
view  of  what  subsequently  transpired  under  Mr.  Folk's 
administration,  and  the  consequences  which  followed  his 
election,  those  who  so  cunningly  conceived  this  mischievous 
plotting  for  sectional  supremacy,  assumed  a  painful  respon- 
sibility. It  is,  even  after  the  lapse  of  so  many  years,  a 
heavy  tax  upon  the  patience  of  the  most  liberal  minded,  to 
speak  of  it  with  respectful  courtesy.  Not  all  of  those  who 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  359 

gave  it  "  aid  and  comfort "  have  withheld  their  condemnation. 
One  of  Mr.  Folk's  confidential  friends  has  written  and 
published  a  "History  of  the  Polk  Administration''  since 
its  close.*  Besides  having  been  a  gentleman  of  ability 
and  candor,  the  author  of  this  work  was  one  of  the  Polk 
candidates  for  elector  in  1844,  in  Tennessee,  and  had 
thorough  personal  knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
Presidential  canvass  was  conducted.  Independent  of  the 
well  known  kindliness  of  his  nature,  there  were  reasons 
why  he  should  withhold  any  harshness  of  language  upon 
the  subject,  unless  constrained  to  do  otherwise  by  impe- 
rious necessity.  What  he  has  said  was  written  with  be- 
coming delicacy  of  expression  —  yet  he  has  left  to  be 
implied  even  more  than  he  deemed  it  expedient  to  avow. 
Alluding  to  the  Presidential  campaign,  as  conducted  in 
Tennessee  by  himself  and  others,  in  favor  of  Mr.  Polk, 
he  says:  "Mr.  Polk  was  thoroughly  committed  to  the 
policy  of  a  revenue  tariff,"  which  he  and  all  other  advo- 
cates of  free  trade  understood  to  be  inflexible  opposition 
to  protection.  Then,  referring  to  the  foregoing  Kane 
letter,  he  characterizes  the  course  of  Mr.  Polk  as  having 
been  "by  no  means  free  from  censure."  And  he  adds — in 
order  to  show  the  course  which  the  canvass  took — that  in 
Pennsylvania  it  was  insisted  by  the  supporters  of  Mr.  Polk 
"that  the  two  candidates  occupied  the  same  platform  upon 
the  tariff  question  "  ;  that  is,  that  Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  Polk 
were  alike  in  favor  of  protection  !  But  well  knowing  that 

*By  the  Hon.  Lucien  B.  Chase,  a  member  of  the  29th  and  3Oth  Congresses  —  Jhe 
former  being  the  last  two  years  of  Mr.  Folk's  administration. 


360  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE 

he  would  contribute  nothing  to  the  "truth  of  history  "  by 
leaving  this  statement  unexplained,  he  felt  constrained  to 
state  that  the  canvass  in  Tennessee,  at  the  home  of  Mr. 
Polk,  assumed  a  very  different  aspect  —  undoubtedly  — 
although  he  does  not  expressly  say  so  —  with  Mr.  Folk's 
approval.  He  represents  his  opponent  on  the  Clay  elec- 
toral ticket  as  freely  conceding  that  Mr.  Clay  was  in  favor 
of  discriminating  duties  for  the  protection  of  home  industry; 
but  as  insisting,  at  the  same  time,  that  "the  language  of 
the  Kane  letter  "  proved  Mr.  Polk  to  be  as  much  a  protec- 
tionist as  Mr.  Clay,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  made  in  the 
cotton-growing  section  to  represent  him  as  opposed  to  pro- 
tection. This  argument  was  employed  in  Tennessee  to 
fasten  the  charge  of  duplicity  upon  Mr.  Polk ;  but  precisely 
the  same  argument  was  made  by  his  friends  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, to  prove  his  devotion  to  the  principle  of  protection. 
But  this  author  shows  that  it  did  not  suit  the  purposes  of 
Mr.  Polk  and  his  free  trade  friends,  to  concede  this  in 
Tennessee.  The  reason  is  plain;  that  State  was  on  the 
border  of  the  cotton-belt  and  might,  by  possibility,  by 
means  of  appeals  to  State  pride,  be  carried  over  to  the  side 
of  the  sectional  policy  which  Mr.  Polk's  nomination  was  in- 
tended to  advance.  Everything  was  made  to  bend  to  that 
purpose.  The  people  there  were  enthused  by  eloquent 
dissertations  upon  the  beauties  and  advantages  of  free 
trade ;  while  in  Pennsylvania  and  the  manufacturing  regions, 
the  zealous  supporters  of  Mr.  Polk  appealed,  with  like 
eloquence,  to  the  Kane  letter,  and  the  example  and  teach- 
ings of  General  Jackson,  to  prove  that  free  trade  was  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  361 

rankest  political  heresy,  and  that  protection  alone  could 
save  the  country  from  bankruptcy  and  ruin.  Alluding  to 
this  discreditable  and  dangerous  condition  of  things,  the 
author  of  this  "History"  says: 

"If  the  principles  which  Mr.  Polk  really  entertained  were  misun- 
derstood, owing  to  the  phraseology  of  his  Kane  letter,  he  was  not  him- 
self altogether  blameless  for  the  error  which  was  committed  by  his  sup- 
porters. It  is  not  to  be  disguised  that  the  English  language  was  of 
sufficient  scope  and  flexibility  to  enable  him  to  define  his  opinions  with 
more  clearness  and  greater  precision.  If  he  had  stated  that  he  was  in 
favor  of  a  tariff  discriminating  alone  in  favor  of  revenue,  there  would  have 
beenjao  misconception  of  his  views.  Or,  if  he  had  expressed  his  pref- 
erence for  such  discriminating  duties  as  would  produce  the  amount  of 
revenue  needed  —  protection  flowing  as  a  necessary  incident  therefrom, 
every  man  of  ordinary  understanding  would  have  comprehended  his 
meaning.  The  voters  in  the  North  were  deceived  by  the  use  of  language 
which  had  the  effect  of  obscuring,  instead  of  more  clearly  defining  his 
position.  The  assertion  that  he  had  sanctioned  such  moderate  discrimi- 
nating duties  as  would  produce  the  amount  of  revenue  needed,  was  the 
statement  of  a  fact  which  the  record  confirms ;  and  there  he  ought  to 
have  stopped,  because  every  one  understands  that  protection  flows  as  a 
necessary  incident  from  a  revenue  tariff.  The  statement  that  he  was 
opposed  to  a  tariff  for  protection  merely,  and  not  for  revenue,  should 
have  been  transposed,  by  asserting  that  he  was  in  favor  of  a  tariff  for 
revenue  merely,  which  would  have  indorsed  the  principles  he  had  always 
entertained,  and  which  he  subsequently  enforced  with  his  characteristic 
ability  and  energy." 

This  statement,  made  by  one  of  Mr.  Folk's  trusted  and 
confidential  friends,  must  carry  conviction  to  every  mind, 
that  he  and  his  friends  in  Tennessee  understood,  perfectly, 
the  persistent  misrepresentations  made  in  his  behalf  in 
Pennsylvania  and  throughout  the  North,  based  upon  the 
misleading  language  of  his  Kane  letter.  As  to  those  mis- 
representations, they  have  never  been  ds*«p4,  Jjrt~  rather 

^WC^-  n*I^SL 

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362  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

boasted  of  as  evidence  of  great  tact  and  cunning,  as  if  to 
deceive  and  mislead  voters  enough  to  change  the  result  of 
a  Presidential  election  were  a  thing  which  reflects  credit, 
instead  of  shame,  upon  the  perpetrators.  Some  years 
after,  when  the  matter  was  referred  to  in  Congress,  a  repre- 
sentative from  Pennsylvania,  who  had  participated  in  the 
canvass  of  1844,  as  one  of  Mr.  Polk's  defenders,  made 
this  concession,  when  speaking  of  Mr.  Polk  and  Mr.  Clay : 
"  We  therefore  insisted  that  the  one  was  as  good  a  tariff 
man  as  the  other  " ;  that  is,  that  they  stood  precisely  alike 
upon  the  question  of  protection. 

In  1846  —  after  the  election  of  Mr.  Polk  —  it  was 
asserted  in  the  Senate  by  Mr.  Webster  that,  during  the 
Presidential  campaign,  he  saw  means  resorted  to  which 
were  designed  to  mislead  the  confiding  voters  of  Pennsyl- 
vania upon  the  tariff  question.  Mr.  Reverdy  Johnson,  of 
Maryland,  affirmed  the  same  thing  by  saying: 

"I  will  here  add  my  testimony  to  the  same  effect.  I  have  been 
myself  witness  once,  if  not  oftener,  to  the  same  disgraceful  exhibition. 
On  my  way  to  address  a  mass  meeting  at  Lancaster,  in  that  State 
[Pennsylvania],  I  stopped  at  the  town  of  Columbia,  and  went  into  what 
I  was  told  was  a  Democratic  tavern.  On  the  wall  of  the  bar  room  I  saw 
a  handbill  on  which  was  printed,  in  large  capitals :  '  The  tariff  act  of  '42, 
to  be  preserved  only  by  electing  James  K.  Polk,  ' ' ' 

Mr.  Dallas,  who  was  elected  Vice-President  on  the  same 
ticket  with  Mr.  Polk,  and  who  was  then  presiding  over  the 
Senate,  had  always  been  a  professed  friend  of  protection. 
Being  stung  to  the  quick  by  this  remark  from  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  members  of  that  body,  he  hastily 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  363 

replied  :  "I  never  saw  the  hand  bill."    To  this  Mr.  Johnson 
immediately  retorted  as  follows: 

"If  you  never  saw  that  one,  sir,  you  must  have  seen  several  very 
like  it  during  the  canvass.  This  handbill  proclaimed  to  those  whom 
some  of  our  friends  on  the  other  side  are  fond  of  speaking  of  as  *  the 
hardfisted  Democracy  of  the  country,'  that  there  would  be  a  meeting  in 
Columbia  a  few  days  afterwards,  and  urging  them  to  come  out  in  their 
strength  to  hear  the  best  men  of  the  Democracy  explain  the  Democratic 
tariff  of  '42,  to  hear  that  tariff  vindicated  from  the  mouths  of  men  on 
whose  integrity  they  could  rely — men  who  were  incapable  of  deception. 
Among  those  '  best  men '  was,  if  I  remember  right,  the  present  Secretary 
of  State  [Mr.  Buchanan].  He  was  one  of  those  who  was  to  demonstrate 
to  the  confiding  Democracy  of  Pennsylvania  that  the  tariff  of  '42  was  a 
Democratic  measure,  that  the  Whigs  had  attempted  to  defeat  it,  but  could 
not,  and  who  called  upon  them  to  elect  James  K.  Polk,  that  they  might 
insure  the  continuance  of  the  tariff  of  '42,  without  the  alteration  of 
a  letter." 

Mr.  Johnson  did  not  stop  at  this.  In  order  to  express 
more  emphatically  his  indignation  at  what  he  had  himself 
seen,  and  to  make  his  language  more  direct  and  pointed,  he 
continued : 

"  Now,  I  do  not  say  that  any  honest  man  was  engaged  in  such  de- 
ception, and  I  have  only  mentioned  these  facts  to  show  that  the  people 
were  deceived  —  grossly,  shamelessly,  degradingly  deceived, —  and  I 
hazard  the  assertion  that  no  delegate  from  Pennsylvania  will  deny  that  if, 
with  the  candor  and  manliness  which  became  him,  Mr.  Polk  had  written 
to  Pennsylvania,  avowing  that  should  he  become  President  of  the  United 
States,  the  tariff  of  '42  should  not  be  suffered  to  stand  a  single  session 
of  Congress,  he  would  to  this  hour,  have  remained  James  K.  Polk.  *  * 
*  *  In  the  entire  history  of  our  party  struggles  —  in  all  the  agitations 
of  the  political  elements  —  in  all  our  conflicts  for  power,  during  every 
former  period  of  the  Government  —  never  has  there  existed  such  abso- 
lute, open  and  vile  deception,  as  has  been  practiced  by  the  Democratic 
leaders  and  politicians  on  confiding  Pennsylvania." 

These  references  would  have  been  made  more  willingly 
if  they  had  omitted  any  allusions  to  party,  for  no  desire  to 


364  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

excite  party  feeling  or  prejudice  is  entertained.  But  the 
allusions  are  found  so  interwoven  with  the  facts  to  which 
Mr.  Johnson  bears  personal  testimony,  and  the  opinions  he 
expressed  with  regard  to  them,  that  they  are  used  in  the 
form  in  which  they  are  found,  as  important  in  the  explana- 
tion of  the  matter  under  review.  By  these,  and  the  facts  pre- 
viously stated,  it  is  shown,  beyond  any  possible  ground  for 
doubt,  that  Mr.  Polk  was  supported  in  his  own  State  and 
throughout  the  cotton  section,  as  the  friend  of  a  tariff  for 
revenue  only,  looking  in  the  end  to  free  trade,  and  leaving 
domestic  industry  to  be  protected  or  not  according  to 
"incidental"  or  accidental  circumstances;  while  he  was 
supported  in  the  manufacturing  sections,  especially  in 
Pennsylvania,  as  the  friend  of  protection  to  the  same 
extent  as  Mr.  Clay,  his  only  competitor.  With  these 
facts  indisputably  settled,  we  are  enabled  to  see  that, 
as  he  could  not  have  been  elected  without  the  votes 
of  a  large  number  of  the  friends  of  protection  in  the 
North,  those  who,  belonging  to  this  class,  voted  for  him 
in  Pennsylvania,  were  deceived  and  misled  by  his  Kane 
letter.  His  election  was,  therefore,  procured  by  fraud 
— that  being  the  aptest  and  most  fitting  word  in  our 
language  to  express  it.  All  candid  men,  familiar  with  the 
facts,  have  admitted  it  since  then.  The  whole  popular  vote 
of  that  year  was  2,698,611.  Of  these,  Mr.  Polk  received 
1,337,243,  Mr.  Clay  1,299,068,  and  J.  G.  Birney  62,300. 
The  plurality  of  Mr.  Polk,  therefore,  was  only  38,175.* 

*  If  the  votes  given  to  Mr.  Birney  had  been  given  to  Mr.  Clay,  he  would  have  had 
a  popular  majority  of  24,125.  He  would  have  received  the  electoral  vote  of  New  York 
and  been  elected. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  365 

Now,  it  is  evident  that  if  the  protective  tariff  votes  given  to 
him  in  Pennsylvania  and  other  Northern  States,  had  either 
been  withheld  from  him  or  given  to  Mr.  Clay,  he  would 
have  been  defeated  and  Mr.  Clay  elected.  But  the  decep- 
tion practiced  by  the  Kane  letter  produced  the  result  in- 
tended to  be  accomplished  by  it ;  and  it  would  require  an 
immense  volume  to  point  out  in  detail  the  consequences 
that  have  followed  it,  as  naturally  as  effects  ever  follow 
their  causes. 

This  brief  review  justifies  the  assertion  that,  at  the  time 
of  the  Presidential  election  in  1844,  a  majority  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States  were  in  favor  of  the  principle  of  pro- 
tection as  embodied  in  the  tariff  of  1842.  The  manner  in 
which  their  will  was  defeated  and  utterly  disregarded — in 
palpable  violation  of  that  principle  of  our  institutions  upon 
which  the  right  of  self-government  must  rest — is  now  so 
clearly  established  by  conceded  facts,  that  even  those  born 
since  then  can,  with  a  little  investigation,  fully  understand 
it.  How  far  Mr.  Polk's  administration  acted  in  conflict  with 
and  violated  this  popular  sentiment,  we  shall  see  as  our 
inquiries  progress.  And  when  those  not  already  familiar 
with  the  consequences  of  this  violation  come  to  realize  how 
serious  they  have  been,  they  will  wonder  how  it  was  possi- 
ble that  such  things  could  be  accomplished  in  the  name  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States ;  and  they  will  wonder 
still  more  how  it  was  that,  after  nullification  and  free  trade 
had  been  so  overwhelmingly  crushed  by  the  vigorous  patriot- 
ism of  General  Jackson,  they  could  become  so  soon  revived 
under  auspices  which  promised  a  final  triumph. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

FOLK'S  ADMINISTRATION  — ISSUE  BETWEEN  REVENUE  TARIFF  AND 
PROTECTION— AD  VALOREM  DUTIES  AND  DUTIES  DISCRIMINAT- 
ING FOR  PROTECTION  — FOLK'S  FIRST  MESSAGE  — NO  DISCRIMI- 
NATION EXCEPT  BELOW  THE  REVENUE  STANDARD  — FREE 
TRADE  INTEREST  IN  ASCENDANT— ADMINISTRATION  DEVOTED 
TO  THE  COTTON -GROWING  INTERESTS  —  REPORT  OF  THE 
SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY— OPPOSED  TO  PROTECTION - 
TARIFF  FOR  REVENUE  ONLY— NO  DISCRIMINATION  FOR  PRO- 
TECTION. 

'"THE  election  of  Mr.  Polk  to  the  Presidency  took  the 
country — including  his  own  supporters  —  by  surprise. 
The  most  that  could  be  claimed  for  him  was  that  he  occu- 
pied a  respectable  position  among  public  men  of  the  second 
class.  Nobody  placed  him  in  the  ranks  among  eminent 
statesmen.  His  nomination  over  such  competitors  as  Mr. 
Van  Buren,  General  Cass  and  Mr.  Buchanan,  after  a  stormy 
session  of  three  days,  indicated  that  a  resolute  and  cour- 
ageous minority  could  triumph  over  a  discordant  and  de- 
moralized majority,  by  combined  and  persistent  action.  He 
was  not  the  choice  of  a  majority  of  the  convention  which 
nominated  him,  and  did  not  get  a  single  vote  until  after 
seven  ballots  had  been  taken,  and  only  44  out  of  266  votes 
upon  the  eighth  ballot.  Mr.  Van  Buren  was  the  choice  of 
a  majority  of  30,  having  received  146  out  of  262  votes  upon 
the  first  ballot.  What  was  called  the  compromise  which 

366 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  367 

caused  his  selection,  was  a  necessity,  created  by  the  persist- 
ency with  which  those  who  had  made  war  upon  General 
Jackson,  on  account  of  his  support  of  protection,  asserted 
and  maintained  the  right  to  defeat  every  candidate  who  was 
not  in  full  sympathy  with  themselves.  They  understood 
Mr.  Polk,  and  he  was  their  man.  His  circular  letter  to  the 
people  of  Tennessee,  the  year  before,  had  given  them  all 
the  assurance  they  desired,  that  if  they,  through  him,  could 
get  control  of  the  Government,  the  old  and  popular  system 
of  protection  might  be  broken  down,  and  the  cotton  interest 
be  made  paramount  to  all  the  other  interests  in  the  country, 
by  means,  first,  of  a  tariff  for  revenue  only,  and  then 
through  free  trade,  according  to  the  programme  dictated 
by  the  nullifiers  and  secessionists  of  South  Carolina  a  few 
years  before.  The  scheme  was  sagaciously  contrived,  and, 
in  view  of  the  result  achieved  by  it,  deserves  to  be  classed 
among  those  movements  in  public  affairs  which  stamp  the 
managers  of  them  with  the  character  of  intellectual  supe- 
riority. It  was  intended  as  a  revolution,  and  the  events 
which  followed  it,  under  Mr.  Folk's  administration,  show 
how,  in  the  end,  it  was  skillfully  made  so.  It  might,  with 
propriety,  be  called  a  coup  de  main  in  American  politics. 

As  the  consequence  of  Mr.  Folk's  election,  the  issue 
between  the  rival  principles  of  protection  and  free  trade 
was  made,  immediately  and  sharply.  It  was  precisely  the 
same  as  that  made  and  decided  under  General  Jackson's 
administration,  with  this  single  exception,  that  protection 
was  to  be  destroyed  within  the  Union  and  by  Congressional 
legislation,  instead  of  by  nullification  and  a  dissolution  of 


368  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  Union.  The  attack  was  made  upon  the  tariff  of  1842, 
as  that  of  the  nullifiers  had  been  made  upon  those  of  1828 
and  1832.  The  principles  remained  the  same  —  the  tactics 
only  were  changed.  On  the  part  of  the  opponents  of  pro- 
tection it  was  alleged  that  duties  should  be  laid  for  revenue 
only,  and,  therefore,  should  be  at  a  uniform  rate  and  ad 
valorem.  On  the  part  of  its  friends  it  was  insisted  that  this 
would  be  a  step  in  advance  towards  free  trade,  and  that,  in 
order  to  preserve  the  principle  of  protection,  the  duties 
ought  to  be  specific,  and  so  varied,  according  to  circum- 
stances, as  to  discriminate  in  favor  of  domestic  industry,  as 
had  been  invariably  the  case  from  the  beginning  of  the 
Government  up  to  1833.  The  old  issue  was  distinctly  made 
over  again. 

Some  of  the  friends  of  protection,  by  way  of  concession, 
and  in  the  same  spirit  which  led  to  the  compromise  of  1833, 
did  not  object  that  a  full  trial  should  be  given  to  the  princi- 
ple of  ad  valorem  duties,  as  it  had  been  made  part  of  that 
compromise.  They  were  willing  that  a  thorough  experi- 
ment might  be  made  to  ascertain  whether,  with  that  principle 
maintained,  there  would  be  sufficient  guarantee  against 
frauds ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  they  demanded,  if  it  were 
retained,  that  it  should  only  be  in  connection  with  that  of 
home  valuation,  as  that  would  furnish  the  only  safe  and  re- 
liable method  of  arriving  at  the  true  value  of  importations. 
They  did  not  consider  the  amount  to  be  assessed  of  as 
much  importance  as  the  form  of  assessment,  and  regarded 
the  Compromise  Act  of  1833  as  justifying  higher  duties 
than  twenty  per  cent,  if  the  necessities  of  the  Treasury 


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HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  369 

required  it.  Entertaining  these  views,  they  insisted  that 
the  tariff  of  1842  had  been,  and  continued  to  be,  a  positive 
necessity  ;  not  only  because  of  the  failure  of  that  of  1833 
to  provide  a  sufficiency  of  revenue  to  supply  th*  wants  of 
the  Treasury,  but  because  a  healthy  revival  of  business,  in 
every  department  of  industry  and  trade,  had  followed  its 
passage.  They  expressly  denied  the  propriety  of  fixing 
twenty  per  cent  as  a  revenue  standard,  and  asserted  the 
belief  that,  at  that  uniform  rate,  duties  would  not  yield  the 
necessary  amount  of  revenue. 

Mr.  Polk  did  not  hesitate.  His  Cabinet,  then  consisting 
of  only  six,  was  constructed  with  half  its  members  from  the 
North  and  half  from  the  South ;  the  Treasury  Department, 
which  deals  with  the  questions  of  revenue  and  finance, 
having  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  distinguished  sup- 
porter of  free  trade.  The  House  of  Representatives  was 
organized  under  the  same  influences  that  produced  his 
nomination ;  and,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
country,  there  existed  a  well-grounded  hope  of  success  in 
the  war  upon  the  principle  of  protection.  Cotton  had  be- 
come king  at  last ;  and  the  special  champions  of  that 
interest  who  had  made  it  so,  had  reached  such  positions  of 
authority  as  enabled  them  to  dictate  political  results.  The 
men  who  had  retired  to  the  rear  in  the  great  nullification 
contest  with  General  Jackson,  had  again  come  forward  and 
taken  positions  in  the  front  rank.  They  were  no  longer 
subalterns,  but  commanders ;  consequently,  the  mask  which 
had  been  so  successfully  worn  in  the  Presidential  contest, 
being  no  longer  of  use,  was  promptly  withdrawn,  and  the 
H 


37O  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

purpose  to  repeal  the  tariff  of  1842,  was  emphatically 
announced.  As  a  step  toward  that  end,  Mr.  Polk,  in  his 
first  message,  said : 

"The  attention  of  Congress  is  invited  to  the  importance  of  making 
suitable  modifications  and  reductions  of  the  rate  of  duty  imposed  by  our 
present  tariff  laws.  The  object  of  imposing  duties  on  imports  should  be 
to  raise  revenue  to  pay  the  necessary  expenses  of  Government.  Congress 
may,  undoubtedly,  discriminate  in  arranging  the  rates  of  duty  on  different 
articles  ;* but  the  discrimination  should  be  within  the  revenue  standard, 
and  be  made  with  a  view  to  raise  money  for  the  support  of  the 
Government." 

This  language  is  plain.  It  directly  contradicts  the  Kane 
letter,  which  influenced  the  Presidential  election  in  his  favor. 
It  accords  precisely  with  the  circular  letter  issued  in  Ten- 
nessee in  1843,  which  was  carefully  kept  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  people  of  the  manufacturing  States,  especially 
those  of  Pennsylvania.  His  proposition  was  to  reduce  the 
duties  fixed  in  the  law  of  1842,  and  substitute  others,  to  be 
laid  with  reference  to  revenue  only — that  a  uniform  revenue 
standard  should  be  fixed — and  that  if  there  should  be  any 
discrimination  at  all,  it  should  be  within  the  revenue 
standard  ;  that  is,  below  it.  He  did  not  recommend  that 
there  should  be  any  discrimination  whatsoever,  but  merely 
conceded  that  Congress  had  the  power  to  make  it.  But  if 
made,  he  insisted  it  should  not  be  for  protection.  That 
was  to  be  left  to  the  bare  possibilities  which  might  follow  a 
strictly  revenue  tariff,  or  from  duties  below  the  revenue 
standard.  This  theory — never  before  announced  by  any 
President,  but  expressly  repudiated  by  every  one  —  he 
endeavored  to  maintain  by  a  style  of  argument  not  com- 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  371 

monly  found  in  Presidential  messages,  but  which  bears 
more  the  appearance  of  an  advocate's  defense  than  of  a 
State  paper.  It  betokens  a  consciousness  of  endeavoring 
to  re-introduce  an  exploded  and  repudiated  measure  of 
public  policy — something  that  needed  to  be  defended, 
because  it  was  intended  as  the  substitution  of  a  measure 
which  had  already  bankrupted  the  Treasury,  for  one  that 
had  always  produced  abundant  revenue.  No  special 
criticism  of  his  argument,  however,  is  intended ;  but,  as  it 
was  accepted  by  the  opponents  of  protection  as  the  em- 
bodiment of  their  doctrine,  it  deserves  to  be  carefully 
scrutinized,  to  the  extent  of  ascertaining  his  and  their 
actual  meaning. 

He  recommended  that  Congress  should  fix  "  a  revenue 
standard,  the  maximum  of  which  shall  not  be  exceeded  in 
the  rates  of  duty  imposed" — that  is,  if  the  protection  of  any 
article  should  require  a  duty  higher  than  that,  it  should  go 
unprotected.  In  his  opinion,  but  a  single  object  should  be 
kept  in  view,  which  was,  "  to  raise  money  for  the  support  of 
Government."  He  argued  to  prove  that  even  "  one  per 
cent"  of  duty  would  " afford  protection  or  advantage  to 
the  amount  of  one  per  cent  to  the  home  manufacturer  "  — 
incidentally — and  that  this  incidental  protection  would  be 
increased  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  duties.  To  pre- 
vent the  possibility  of  any  duty  being  laid  with  a  view  to 
protection,  he  proposed  that  the  duties  should  be  fixed  at 
"the  precise  point"  where  "the  revenue  is  greatest,"  and 
should  not  be  permitted  to  exceed  that  maximum,  inas- 
much as  they  should  all  be  laid  "  for  the  bona  fide 


372  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

purpose  of  collecting  money  for  the  support  of  the  Gov- 
ernment," and  for  nothing  else.  If  they  were  carried 
"  higher  than  that  point,"  he  considered  them  as  lev- 
ied <:  for  protection  merely  and  not  for  revenue "  ;  in 
which  event  he  thought  —  very  strangely  and  against 
all  experience  —  the  revenue  might  be  diminished,  and, 
possibly,  destroyed.  He  did  not  think  it  the  duty  of 
Congress  to  fix  all  the  duties  as  high  as  the  revenue 
standard,  as  that  "  would,  probably,  produce  a  much  larger 
revenue  than  the  economical  administration  of  the  Govern- 
ment would  require."  Consequently,  he  did  not  regard 
"a  horizontal  rate  "  obligatory.  But  if  the  duties  were  laid 
at  varying  rates,  he  considered  it  obligatory  that  there 
should  be  no  discrimination  except  "  below  the  maximum 
of  the  revenue  standard,"  none  whatsoever  above  it.  And 
in  order  that  the  revenue  standard  should  be  fixed  at  the 
least  possible  rate  of  duty,  he  regarded  it  as  necessary  that 
"  the  proceeds  of  sales  of  public  lands  "  should  be  continued 
as  part  of  the  revenue  for  ordinary  expenses,  cautiously 
guarding  against  the  possibility  of  there  being  anything 
done  for  protection.  With  the  Kane  letter  in  his  mind,  he 
probably  deemed  it  necessary  to  show  to  those  with  whom 
he  was  then  co-operating,  that  his  interpretation  of  it  was 
very  different  from  that  which  had  secured  to  him  the  elect- 
oral vote  of  Pennsylvania,  and  his  election  to  the  Presidency, 
in  order  to  assure  them  that  his  administration  would  con- 
tribute, as  far  as  possible,  to  the  results  they  had  so  long 
and  anxiously  struggled  for.  He  had  said  in  that  letter 
that  he  was  opposed  to  a  tariff  for  "protection  merely' — to 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  373 

which  very  few  if  any,  objected — and  it  had  become  neces- 
sary to  explain  what  his  real  meaning  was.  Therefore,  he 
availed  himself  of  the  message  to  express  positive  opposi- 
tion to  any  form  of  direct  protection,  or  any  that  did  not 
arise  out  of  the  lowest  possible  revenue  duties.  He  called 
it  "the  incidental  protection  which  a  just  system  of  revenue 
duties  may  afford." 

The  Kane  letter  contained  this  positive  assertion :  "  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  extend,  as  far  as  it  may 
be  practicable  to  do  so,  by  its  revenue  laws  and  all  other 
means  in  its  power,  just  and  fair  protection,  etc!'  *  The 
message  not  only  does  not  assert  this,  but  denies  the 
existence  of  any  such  duty,  by  insisting  that  no  duties 
whatsoever  shall  be  laid  for  protection,  or  for  any  other 
purpose  than  revenue.  Even  the  mockery  of  discrimina- 
tion below  the  revenue  standard  is  to  be  made,  if  made  at 
all,  for  revenue  only.  He  did  not  desire  to  see  even  the 
semblance  of  protection,  unless  it  should  flow  by  chance 
from  revenue  duties.  Money  to  carry  on  the  Government, 
and  to  maintain  an  immense  army  of  office-holders,  was 
everything  with  him — the  vast  material  interests  of  the 
Nation,  nothing. 

Mr.  Polk  was  undoubtedly  sincere  in  the  expression  of 
these  views.  They  were  in  consonance  with  all  that  he  had 
previously  said,  except  in  the  Kane  letter,  and  that  had 
answered  the  end  designed  to  be  accomplished  by  it.  It 
had  made  him  President,  and  given  to  him  and  his  allies 
from  the  cotton-growing  section,  the  power  so  to  mold 

*Ante,  chap,  xxxv  ,  p.  355. 


374  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  policy  of  the  Government  as  to  defy  the  real  sentiment 
of  the  country.  No  President  had  ever  before  reached  that 
high  position  by  like  means.  No  merely  sectional  triumph 
had  ever  been  previously  obtained.  His,  therefore,  was  the 
first  sectional  administration — representing,  as  it  undoubt- 
edly did,  the  idea  that  the  cotton-growing  States  were 
oppressed  by  the  combined  action  of  the  other  sections  of 
the  Union,  in  extending  protection  to  manufactures  and 
other  national  industries.  Hence,  the  doctrines  of  his  mes- 
sage— in  direct  opposition  to  those  of  General  Jackson's 
administration  —  conformed  to  the  policy  of  those  who 
caused  his  nomination  as  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency  ; 
and  hence,  also,  his  own  administration  was  so  organized 
as  to  become,  from  the  beginning,  entirely  responsive  to 
their  views.  His  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Postmaster- 
General,  and  Attorney-General — the  only  three  Cabinet 
officers  whose  duties  pertained  to  internal  and  domestic 
policy* — were  all  conspicuous  for  their  sectional  senti- 
ments. Two  out  of  the  three  were,  with  himself,  from  the 
cotton  section.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury — Mr. 
Robert  I.  Walker,  of  Mississippi — was  more  distinguished 
for  ability  than  the  President  himself.  He  was  classed 
among  the  extreme  advocates  of  free  trade  ;  consequently, 
when  he  entered  upon  a  defense  of  the  policy  of  the  admin- 
istration, in  his  official  report,  he  displayed  great  acuteness 
of  reasoning.  He  possessed  all  the  courage  necessary  for 
the  occasion  ;  and,  as  he,  and  those  whose  special  interests 
he  represented,  saw  evidences  of  the  ultimate  triumph  of 

*The  office  of  Secretary  of  the  Interior  was  afterwards  created. 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  375 

their  free  trade  theory,  they  resolved  upon  striking  as 
severe  blows  at  the  manufacturing  prosperity  of  the  North 
and  Northwest,  as  was  necessary  to  that  end.  He  was, 
therefore,  somewhat  more  specific  and  methodical  than  the 
President,  in  announcing  the  principles  upon  which  the 
policy  of  the  administration  rested.  He  stated  them  as 
follows : 

"  i  st.  That  no  more  money  should  be  collected  than  is  necessary 
for  the  wants  of  the  Government,  economically  administered. 

"  2d.  That  no  duty  be  imposed  on  any  article  above  the  lowest  rate 
which  will  yield  the  largest  amount  of  revenue. 

"  3d.  That,  below  such  rate,  discrimination  may  be  made,  descend- 
ing in  the  scale  of  duties ;  or,  for  imperative  reasons,  the  article  may  be 
placed  in  the  list  of  those  free  from  all  duty. 

"4th.  That  the  maximum  revenue  duty  should  be  imposed  on 
luxuries. 

"5th.  That  all  minimums,  all  specific  duties,  should  be  abolished, 
and  ad  valorem  duties  substituted  in  their  place,  care  being  taken  to  guard 
against  fraudulent  invoices  and  under-valuation,  and  to  assess  the  duty 
upon  the  actual  market  value. 

"  6th.  That  the  duties  should  be  so  imposed  as  to  operate  as  equally 
as  possible  throughout  the  Union,  discriminating  neither  for  nor  against 
any  class  or  section." 

The  report  wherein  these  principles  are  announced  was 
specially  approved  by  the  friends  of  the  administration.  It 
was  called  a  report  "against  the  protective  policy,"  and  was 
so  considered  by  the  whole  country.  Together  with  the 
President's  message,  it  made  an  issue  easily  understood. 
It  was  this:  Whether  duties  should  be  laid  for  revenue 
only,  without  any  discrimination  whatsoever  for  protection, 
and  with  the  ultimate  view  of  free  trade,  or  for  revenue 
with  discrimination  in  favor  of  protection — that  is,  for  both 


376  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

revenue  and  protection.  The  former  proposition  involved 
opposition  to  our  whole  system  of  tariff  legislation — the 
latter  conformed  to  it,  and  had,  as  we  have  seen,  the  express 
approval  of  every  preceding  administration. 

Both  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
fell  into  the  same  error  as  Mr.  Tyler,  by  supposing  that 
revenue  duties  and  discriminating  duties  belonged  to  the 
same  class.  If  they  had  thoroughly  examined  previous 
tariff  legislation  they  would  have  seen  otherwise.  They 
were  probably  both  misled  by  misinterpreting  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase,  "  incidental  protection,"  as  used  by  General 
Jackson.  His  understanding  of  discriminating  duties — 
often  expressed — was  that  they  were  protective,  but  not 
to  be  laid  so  as  to  produce  a  surplus  of  revenue.  He  con- 
sidered them  specific,  and  never  proposed  that  they  should 
be  abolished.  Nor  did  he  ever  recommend  discrimination 
below  a  revenue  standard. 

It  cannot  be  maintained — as  stated  by  Mr.  Polk — that 
any  merely  nominal  revenue  duties  will  furnish  some  protec- 
tion. If  such  were  the  case  at  all  it  would  be  shadowy  and 
unsubstantial,  and  could  not  be  attended  by  any  practical 
or  beneficial  results.  The  object  of  protection — as  defined 
by  all  previous  Presidents,  and  especially  by  General  Jack- 
son—  is  to  prevent  the  manufactured  fabrics  of  other 
countries  from  driving  our  own  from  our  home  markets. 
If  the  duties  are  made  merely  nominal  and  for  revenue 
alone,  the  amounts  collected  would,  of  course,  go  into  the 
Treasury7 ;  but  it  would  afford  no  protection  to  home  man- 
ufactures or  industry.  On  the  contrary,  they  would  be 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  377 

destroyed,  and,  by  putting  an  end  to  all  competition,  foreign 
manufacturers  would  be  enabled  to  control  our  markets, 
regulate  prices,  and  impose  upon  us  just  such  kinds  and 
quality  of  fabrics  as  they  could  export  at  the  largest  profit. 
It  is  easy,  therefore,  to  see  that  we  can  have  no  home 
markets  without  protection,  and,  in  order  to  make  it  effect- 
ive, it  must  be  something  more  than  nominal.  If  to  supply 
ourselves  with  the  productions  of  our  own  labor  and 
industry  —  especially  with  those  things  which  are  necessary 
in  time  of  war — is  an  object  worthy  of  consideration,  then 
it  is  clear  that  the  measure  of  protection  is  that  which  shall 
accomplish  it.  Any  other  measure  than  that  would  neces- 
sarily be  ineffectual.  All  accept  the  idea  of  a  revenue 
standard,  which  should  be  fixed  with  reference  to  the 
amount  necessary  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  Government, 
and  based  upon  the  estimated  value  of  importations.  This 
is  easily  done,  and  in  laying  duties  with  a  view  to  revenue 
only,  it  is  all  there  is  to  do.  But,  in  the  universal  practice 
of  the  Government,  previous  to  Mr.  Folk's  administration, 
it  has  always  been  considered  that  there  is  also  a  protective 
standard  —  varying,  of  course,  with  each  article  according 
to  circumstances,  and,  therefore,  not  uniform  but  specific 
and  discriminating.  One  article  may  require  higher  duties 
than  another,  and,  consequently,  if  it  is  to  be  protected,  the 
duties  should  be  laid  accordingly.  To  ascertain  the  true 
rate,  so  that  the  amount  of  protection  required  shall  be 
given,  without  making  the  duty  prohibitory,  involves  the 
exercise  of  judgment  and  discretion.  But  when  the  proper 
result  is  reached,  then  it  becomes  the  protective  standard, 


378  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

in  so  far  as  it  regards  the  particular  article  to  be  protected. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  discrimination  —  which,  therefore, 
applies  to  protection  and  not  to  revenue.  For,  if  there 
were  no  necessity  for  protection,  the  necessary  amount  of 
revenue  might  be  obtained  by  a  system  of  uniform  ad 
valorem  duties,  and  the  only  question  with  reference  to  it 
would  be  the  proper  graduation  of  the  duties  by  the  neces- 
sities of  the  Treasury.  There  would  then  be  a  mere  reve- 
nue standard,  but  no  discrimination. 

Neither  Mr.  Polk  nor  Mr.  Walker  attached  to  discrimi- 
nation the  meaning  here  stated.  They  recognized  it  as 
within  the  discretion  of  Congress,  but  by  recommending 
that,  if  made,  it  should  be  "  within  the  revenue  standard," 
and  with  the  sole  view  of  raising  revenue,  they  indicated  a 
wish  so  to  weaken,  if  not  to  destroy,  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion, that  it  could  avail  nothing  to  those  engaged  in  domes- 
tic industries.  According  to  their  theory,  if  there  should  be 
any  necessity  to  discriminate  for  protection  at  all,  it  should 
be  done  by  discriminating  below,  and  under  no  circum- 
stances above  the  revenue  standard,  that  is,  in  "  the  descend- 
ing scale."  Not  only,  therefore,  did  they  make  protection 
entirely  subordinate  to  revenue,  but  absolutely  denied  it,  in 
all  cases  where  it  could  only  be  afforded  by  duties  higher 
than  the  revenue  standard,  or  in  the  ascending  scale.  To 
illustrate :  If  the  revenue  standard  were  fixed  at  twenty  per 
cent,  as  it  was  prospectively  by  the  Compromise  Act  of 
1833,  and  it  should  be  ascertained  that  any  given  article 
required  a  duty  of  twenty-five  per  cent,  in  order  to  protect 
some  particular  home  industry,  it  would,  according  to  their 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  379 

theory,  have  to  be  left  unprotected,  for  the  reason  that,  if 
there  should  be  any  discrimination  whatsoever,  it  must  be 
"  within  the  revenue  standard."  This  is  discrimination 
against  protection  and  against  domestic  industry,  but  in 
favor  of  foreign  over  home  productions.  It  invites  the 
importation  of  the  former  to  take  the  place  of  the  latter  in 
our  home  markets.  It  recognizes  the  Government  as 
formed  for  no  other  or  higher  purpose  than  to  raise  money 
and  expend  it — as  being  obliged  to  conduct  its  affairs  with 
reference  only  to  the  preservation  of  its  own  administra- 
tive machinery,  and  ignores  entirely  the  various  industrial 
pursuits  by  means  of  which  our  natural  resources  have 
been  wonderfully  developed,  and  without  which  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  have  obtained  our  present  posi- 
tion in  the  front  rank  among  the  nations. 

Nothing  like  these  propositions  which  came  from 
Mr.  Folk's  administration,  ever  emanated  from  any  former 
President.  They  involved  the  abrogation  of  principles 
which  had  been  hitherto  recognized  and  well  established 
under  all  previous  administrations  ;  and  the  substitution  for 
them  of  experimental  measures  which  had  never  been  tried 
by  our  own  or  any  other  commercial  country  in  the  world. 
No  practical  statesman  had  ever  suggested  or  defended 
them  ;  and  there  is  abundant  proof  in  our  history  to  show 
that  they  would  have  found  no  patrons  in  the  United  States 
but  for  the  falsely  supposed  antagonism  between  the  inter- 
ests of  the  manufacturing  and  cotton-growing  States. 
The  administration,  however,  being  fully  committed  to 
them  ;  and  Mr.  Polk  being  held  firmly  in  the  grasp  of  men 


380  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

far  superior  to  himself,  did  not  stop  at  half-way  measures, 
but  endeavored,  through  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to 
pluck  up  the  whole  system  of  protection  by  the  roots,  and 
leave  everything  that  pertained  to  the  development  and 
internal  prosperity  of  the  country  to  take  care  of  itself,  and 
the  laboring  masses  of  the  people  to  take  care  of  them-, 
selves.  Whatsoever  else  may  be  said  of  the  administra- 
tion, it  had  the  merit  of  making  this  issue  plain,  palpable, 
and  emphatic. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY  ADVOCATES  FREE  TRADE— THINKS 
NUMBER  OF  FARMERS  SHOULD  BE  INCREASED —DISCARDS 
JACKSON'S  OPINION— FOLK'S  ADMINISTRATION  CONTROLLED 
BY  FREE  TRADE  AND  NULLIFYING  INFLUENCES —THEORY 
THAT  LOW  PRICE  BREADSTUFFS  MAKE  HIGH  PRICES  FOR 
COTTON— FREE  TRADE  INJURIOUS  TO  AGRICULTURE— TARIFF 
OF  1846  PASSED  AND  THAT  OF  1842  REPEALED. 

1V[O  man  understood  better  than  the  Secretary  of  the 
^  Treasury,  Mr.  Walker,  that  to  assure  reasonable 
prospects  of  success  to  any  new  and  untried  measure  of 
policy,  its  supporters  were  obliged  to  furnish  some  reasons 
— at  least  plausible — upon  which  its  defense  could  be 
rested.  Therefore,  he  devoted  himself,  in  his  report,  with 
great  assiduity  and  ability,  to  the  construction  of  an  argu- 
ment to  show  that  the  duties  which  had  been  levied  for 
protection  under  the  old  and  popular  tariff  laws,  imposed 
too  much  restriction  upon  commerce,  and  violated  the 
sound  principles  of  political  economy,  because  they  stood 
in  the  way  of  the  establishment  of  free  trade.  He  could 
not  shut  his  eyes  to  the  fact  that  protection  had  been 
beneficial  to  the  manufacturing  interests,  and  that  they 
had  reached  a  high  state  of  prosperity  by  means  of  it. 
But  he  did  not  regard  that  as  furnishing  any  good  reason 
why  thes.e  interests  should  not  be  thereafter  neglected, 
or  even  destroyed;  because,  in  his  opinion,  protective 

381 


382  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

duties  operated  unequally  upon  the  sections  —  that  is, 
although  manufactures  benefited  those  sections  where  they 
existed,  they  were  injurious  to  those  sections  where  they 
did  not  exist.  He  did  not  seem  to  have  any  struggle 
in  his  own  mind  with  regard  to  the  preference  he  desired 
the  Government  to  show  to  the  latter  over  the  former  sec- 
tions; and,  without  equivocation,  committed  himself  and 
the  administration  to  the  theory  of  an  exclusively  revenue 
tariff,  with  the  view  of  laying  the  foundation  for  ultimate 
free  trade.  It  did  not  seem  to  occur  to  him  that  the 
destruction  of  so  important  an  interest  as  that  of  manu- 
factures— from  which  so  much  general  prosperity  had  been 
derived — would  be  bad  and  ruinous  policy  on  the  part  of 
the  Government.  On  the  contrary,  he  exhibited  something 
like  infatuation  at  the  idea  that,  by  prostrating  the  interest 
of  one  section,  that  of  another  would  be  thereby  advanced. 
In  his  mind,  the  controversy  was  entirely  sectional ;  and  he 
— following  the  example  of  the  President — did  not  hesitate 
to  approve  and  recommend  a  policy  which  placed  the  ad- 
ministration upon  the  side  of  the  cotton-growing  section, 
and  against  all  the  other  sections  of  the  Union. 

He  was  too  wise  not  to  know  that  it  was  necessary  to  go 
to  the  bottom  of  the  question,  so  as  to  upturn,  if  possible, 
the  foundation  upon  which  the  protective  system  had  rested 
from  the  beginning  of  the  Government.  Consequently,  we 
find  him  uttering  sentiments  which  deserve  the  closest  scru- 
tiny, as  follows: 

"We  have  more  fertile  lands  than  any  other  nation,  can  raise  a 
greater  variety  of  products,  and,  it  may  be  said,  could  feed  and  clothe 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  383 

the  people  of  nearly  all  the  world.  Agriculture  is  our  chief  employment. 
It  is  best  adapted  to  our  situation.  We  can  raise  a  larger  surplus  of  agri- 
cultural products,  and  a  greater  variety,  than  almost  any  other  nation, 
and  at  cheaper  rates.  Remove,  then,  from  agriculture,  all  our  restric- 
tions, and  by  its  own  unfettered  power  it  will  break  down  all  foreign 
restrictions,  and  ours  being  removed,  would  feed  the  hungry  and  clothe 
the  poor  of  our  fellow-men,  through  all  the  densely  peopled  nations  of 
the  world." 

In  the  pursuit  of  these  general  ideas,  Mr.  Walker 
labored  to  demonstrate  that  the  restrictions  to  which  he 
refers — that  is,  tariff  duties — have  depressed  our  agri- 
culture by  imposing  burdens  upon  it.  Then,  with  this 
proposition  established  to  his  own  satisfaction,  he  hastened 
to  the  conclusion  that,  by  removing  these  restrictive  duties 
by  establishing  free  trade,  agriculture  would  become  unfet- 
tered, and  we  could  turn  our  attention  to  the  cultivation  of 
our  vast  tracts  of  public  lands,  and  feed  and  clothe  the 
world  with  our  surplus  products.  He  thought  we  should 
certainly  accomplish  this,  because  we  would  be  able  to  fur- 
nish these  products  "at  cheaper  rates  "  than  they  could  be 
procured  elsewhere ;  that  is,  be  enabled,  on  account  of  their 
low  prices,  to  force  them  into  foreign  markets,  and  "break 
down  all  foreign  restrictions."  His  meaning  was  plainly 
this:  That  if  we  should  take  off  our  tariff  duties  entirely  and 
thereby  remove  all  restrictions  upon  commerce — abandon 
our  manufactures  —  turn  our  attention  more  extensively  to 
agriculture,  and  thus  establish  free  trade,  we  should  be  able 
to  force  other  governments  to  free  trade  also,  because  of 
the  fact  that  we  should  flood  their  markets  with  our  agri- 
cultural products  " at  cheaper  rates"  than  they  could  pro- 
duce them  for  themselves. 


384  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

His  conclusion  as  to  the  cheapness  of  our  agricultural 
products,  under  the  state  of  case  made  by  him,  is  entirely 
accurate.  Any  man  with  capacity  enough  to  reason  at  all, 
can  understand,  and  will  concede  the  proposition  that,  if 
we  were  all  farmers  and  all  produced  a  surplus  of  agricul- 
tural products,  the  prices  would  necessarily  be  cheapened 
for  the  want  of  buyers.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  than  this. 
And  yet,  that  is  precisely  the  condition  of  things  which  Mr. 
Folk's  administration — by  the  aid  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  who  was  chosen  for  the  purpose — desired  to 
bring  about  by  the  action  of  Congress.  It  is  what  was 
expected  would  be  accomplished  by  free  trade — "  unfet- 
tered" commerce — and  what  it  would  undoubtedly  accom- 
plish in  this  country,  if  ever  established. 

This  same  question  was  thoroughly  discussed  under 
Washington's  administration  —  when  the  great  men  of  that 
time  were  engaged  in  laying  the  foundations  of  a  national 
policy  —  and  the  opponents  of  manufacturing  and  mechani- 
cal industry  were  completely  silenced  by  the  unanswerable 
arguments  of  Mr.  Hamilton,  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
and  by  the  prompt  response  of  Congress  and  the  country. 
The  original  argument  —  that  from  which  Mr.  Walker  drew 
his  inspiration  —  was  revived  during  General  Jackson's 
candidacy,  and  he  exposed  its  fallacy  in  his  letter  to  Dr. 
Coleman.  Condensing  the  arguments  of  Mr.  Hamilton 
into  a  brief  compass,  he  there  pointed  out  the  difference 
between  home  and  foreign  markets,  and  declared  the 
former  to  be  absolutely  necessary  to  keep  us  from  becom- 
ing "  subject  to  the  policy  of  the  British  merchants."  In 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  385 

order  to  enforce  his  views,  he  pointed  out  the  fact  that  we 
then  had  no  foreign  markets  for  our  products  "  except  for 
cotton"  and  no  home  markets  upon  which  we  could  rely. 
Then  he  asked  this  pertinent  and  most  significant  question  : 
"  Does  not  this  clearly  prove,  where  there  is  no  market 
either  at  home  or  abroad,  that  there  is  too  much  labor  em- 
ployed in  agriculture,  and  that  the  channels  for  labor  should 
be  multiplied?"  He  not  only  asked,  but  answered  this 
question  himself,  in  words  so  full  of  meaning  that  they  can 
not  be  too  frequently  repeated.  He  said  : 

"Draw  from  agriculture  this  superabundant  labor,  employ  it  in 
mechanism  and  manufactures,  thereby  creating  a  home  market  for  your 
breadstuff's,  and  distributing  labor  to  the  most  profitable  account ;  and 
benefits  to  the  country  will  result.  Take  from  agriculture  in  the  United 
States  600,000  men,  women  and  children,  and  you  will  at  once  give 
a  home  market  for  more  breadstuffs  than  all  Europe  now  furnishes  us 
with." 

Let  a  comparison  be  made  between  these  practical  and 
sensible  thoughts,  and  the  false  reasoning  of  Mr.  Walker, 
and  it  will  at  once  be  seen  what  mischievous  and  ruinous 
results  would  follow  the  adoption  of  the  latter.  General 
Jackson  reasoned  like  a  statesman  who  had  at  heart  the 
welfare  of  the  entire  nation  ;  Mr.  Walker,  like  a  politician, 
desirous  to  win  a  sectional  triumph,  by  substituting  specu- 
lative theories  for  a  system  of  measures  sanctioned  by 
more  than  half  a  century  of  experience — by  pulling  down 
what  it  had  required  many  years  to  build  up.  Yet,  directly 
in  the  face  of  all  this  experience,  and  of  this  clear  and 
sagacious  admonition  of  General  Jackson,  the  administration 
25 


386  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

of  Mr.  Polk  employed  all  its  influence  in  behalf  of  an 
experimental  scheme,  designed  to  reverse  the  existing 
condition  of  affairs,  by  adding  to,  instead  of  taking  from, 
our  agricultural  labor,  in  order  to  cheapen  its  products  and 
thereby,  'through  the  instrumentality  of  free  trade,  to 
benefit  foreign  instead  of  creating  home  markets.  The 
professed  object  was  to  induce  England  to  repeal  her  corn 
laws,  and  allow  the  entrance  of  our  breadstuffs  in  her 
ports,  so  that,  in  the  absence  of  home  markets,  we  could 
sell  our  surplus  produce  in  that  country.  There  was  per- 
fect accord  in  sentiment  between  the  administration  and 
English  statesmen.  The  latter  were  satisfied  that  if  our 
manufactories  were  destroyed,  we  would  be  compelled  to 
buy  English  goods,  at  English  prices,  and  for  the  benefit  of 
English  labor  and  capital.  They  could  understand  that,  as 
all  our  industry — or  the  great  bulk. of  it — would  then  be 
concentrated  in  agricultural  pursuits,  our  surplus  would  be 
so  enormous  as  necessarily  to  reduce  the  prices.  And  they 
knew  also,  that,  even  after  it  was  thus  reduced  in  price  in 
this  country,  it  would  have  to  be  still  further  reduced  when 
it  reached  their  markets,  so  as  to  compete  with  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  Baltic  and  other  parts  of  Europe,  where 
laborers  are  kept  in  the  condition  of  paupers  by  low  wages. 
It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  that  the  policy  of  the 
administration  found  strong  support  in  England,  inasmuch 
as  its  permanent  establishment  would  promise  the  most 
effective  means  that  could  be  devised  of  making  us  and  all 
our  interests  completely  dependent  upon  that  country. 
The  wonder  is  that  a  policy,  prescribed  for  us  by  the 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  387 

sagacious  and  experienced  statesmen  of  England,  should 
have  found  such  official  indorsement  among  our  own 
people. 

Why  did  it  receive  this  indorsement  ?  General  Jack- 
son furnished  the  key  to  the  solution  of  this  problem  in  his 
Coleman  letter,  when  he  explained  that  we  had  no  foreign 
markets  for  our  surplus,  "  except  for  cotton''  This  import- 
ant staple  had  increased  so  much  in  magnitude  as  to 
demand  the  continued  fostering  care  of  the  Government, 
and  had  then  become  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  factors 
in  the  politics  of  the  country.  At  the  time  of  Mr.  Folk's 
administration  the  effort  to  make  it  more  so  than  ever — 
which  effort  had  been  defeated  under  General  Jackson's 
administration — was  revived.  Congress  was  asked  to 
legislate  so  as  to  increase  and  keep  up  its  price,  no  matter 
how  much  the  prices  of  breadstuffs  and  other  agricultural 
products  declined.  It  was  claimed  for  it  that,  being  the 
greatest  and  most  important  interest  in  the  country,  it  had 
the  right  to  demand  special  favor — not  by  direct  and 
affirmative  legislation,  but  by  withholding  protection  from 
other  branches  of  industry,  upon  the  ground  of  a  rivalry 
between  it  and  them.  It  required  free  trade  to  accomplish 
this,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  as  the  official  organ 
of  the  administration  and  the  special  champion  of  its  inter- 
est, directed  all  his  energies  and  influence  to  that  end. 
Under  the  pretense  that  all  the  other  interests  of  the 
country — agricultural,  manufacturing,  mechanical  and  com- 
mercial— had  prospered  at  the  expense  of  those  engaged 
in  producing  cotton,  he  was  able  to  combine  a  very 


388  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

considerable  portion  of  these  in  opposition  to  all  other 
interests  ;  and  they,  as  exultant  as  he,  congratulated  them- 
selves that,  for  the  first  time,  they  had  the  administration  to 
back  them. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is  entitled  to  credit  for 
his  frankness,  displayed  in  a  few  words,  whereby  he 
explained  why  he  was  so  earnest  in  his  support  of  free 
trade,  or  of  discrimination  "  within  the  revenue  standard," 
which  he  considered  an  important  step  in  that  direction. 
He  said  :  "  While  breadstuffs  rise  with  a  bad  harvest  in 
England,  cotton  almost  invariably  falls"  The  idea  here 
expressed  is  this  :  that  when  the  English  manufacturer  has 
to  pay  high  prices  for  breadstuffs,  or — what  is  the  same 
thing  in  effect — when  the  English  laborer  has  to  do  so,  he 
had  to  pay  increased  wages  for  labor  ;  which  compelled 
him  to  pay  low  prices  for  cotton  in  order  to  keep  up  his 
profits  ;  whereas,  when  breadstuffs  were  cheap  he  could 
afford  to  pay  high  prices  for  cotton.  And  this  explains  the 
reason  why  the  advocates  of  a  tariff  for  revenue  only,  or  a 
free  trade  tariff — with  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  at  their  head — insisted  that  our  manufacturers 
should  all  become  agriculturists,  by  cultivating  our  broad 
tracts  of  vacant  land,  so  as  to  reduce  the  price  of  all  our 
surplus  products,  except  cotton.  And  thus  the  whole  con- 
troversy between  the  friends  of  protection  and  those  of  a 
tariff  for  revenue  only,  was  brought  within  the  compass  of 
a  nutshell. 

The  matter  may  be  easily  comprehended.  The  wages 
of  labor  in  England  are  kept  down  to  the  lowest  rates,  that 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  389 

the  profits  of  English  manufacturers  may  be  increased. 
This  cannot  be  done  without  also  keeping  down  the  cost 
of  subsistence,  by  cheapening  the  prices  of  breadstuff's 
Hence,  British  statesmen  and  manufacturers  advocate  free 
trade  for  the  United  States,  so  as  to  destroy  the  home  mar- 
kets for  our  agricultural  productions,  in  order  that  they 
can  regulate  and  cheapen  their  prices  in  English  markets, 
and  also  monopolize  the  American  trade  in  manufactured 
fabrics ;  and,  as  the  surest  means  of  accomplishing  this, 
they  persuaded  American  growers  of  cotton  to  believe  that, 
by  adopting  their  theory,  better  prices  for  their  cotton 
would  be  secured.  From  the  standpoint  of  English  interests 
this  may  be  regarded  as  a  proper  thing  to  do.  But  from 
that  of  American  interests,  it  could  not  be  otherwise  than 
prejudicial  to  the  public  welfare  that  an  important  section 
of  this  country  should  co-operate  with  English  strategists, 
in  order  to  secure  to  the  latter  the  power  to  cheapen  the 
agricultural  productions  of  another  section,  although  they 
might  thereby  obtain  temporary  profit.  It  had  somewhat 
the  appearance  of  attaching  a  pecuniary  value  to  patriotism, 
and  measuring  it  by  dollars  and  cents. 

There  were  other  reasons  for  desiring  that  preference 
should  be  given  to  the  cotton-growing  over  the  agricultural 
and  manufacturing  interests,  which  were  well  understood 
by  the  representatives  of  the  former.  It  was  unquestion- 
ably clear  to  them  that  if,  by  the  policy  of  free  trade,  the 
prices  of  our  agricultural  products  would  be  reduced,  the 
English  manufacturers  could  not  only  afford  to  pay  higher 
prices  for  cotton,  but  would  be  able  to  furnish  cotton  fabrics 


3QO  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

at  reduced  prices  for  the  time  being ;  that  is,  until  Ameri- 
can manufactures  were  destroyed  and  all  competition  re- 
moved. To  them,  therefore,  it  seemed  proper  that  the 
prices  of  everything  produced  in  this  country  should  be 
reduced,  except  cotton,  which,  along  with  the  profits  of 
the  English  manufacturers,  should  be  increased.  Conse- 
quently, the  argument  culminated  in  the  idea  that  the 
interests  of  the  cotton-growing  section  demanded  that  the 
prices  of  our  agricultural  products  should  be  reduced,  in 
order  to  increase  the  price  of  cotton  and  lower  the  prices 
of  cotton  fabrics,  according  to  the  low  standard  of  wages  in 
England. 

There  could  be  no  greater  fallacy  than  this.  There  is 
no  necessary  antagonism  between  the  American  manu- 
facturer and  the  American  cotton-grower.  Protection  to 
the  former,  in  a  just  degree,  is  as  beneficial  to  one  as  to 
the  other,  in  a  pecuniary  point  of  view.  In  the  first  place, 
it  provides  a  steady  and  sure  home  market  for  the  raw 
material,  at  fair  prices.  In  the  second  place,  it  furnishes 
better  manufactured  fabrics  than  are  imported  from  abroad. 
If  these  were  the  only  considerations,  they  alone  are  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  such  fluctuations  in  the  price  of  cotton  as 
often  occasion  great  embarrassment  to  the  planter.  But 
there  are  others  also.  The  raw  cotton  would  reach  the 
manufacturer  without  duty,  so  that  when  sold  at  the  market 
price,  the  profits  would  all  go  into  the  pockets  of  the  pro- 
ducer— less  only  the  cost  of  handling  and  comparatively 
short  transportation.  This  would  invite  additional  manufac- 
turers in  all  parts  of  the  country — the  nearer  to  the  cotton- 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  39! 

grower  the  better — and  create  increasing  competition, 
which  would  reduce  the  price  of  the  manufactured  fabric, 
and  tend  to  regulate  and  keep  at  a  fair  rate  that,  of  the 
raw  material.  And,  besides,  by  creating  a  dependence  of 
each  upon  the  other,  it  would  give  such  stability  to  both  as 
to  secure  to  them  permanent  future  advantages.  Each 
would  thus  secure  a  home  market,  and  the  demand  for 
the  raw  material,  in  the  home  market,  would  continue  to 
increase  in  proportion  to  the  supply,  so  that  if  more  fabrics 
were  manufactured  than  should  be  required  for  home  con- 
sumption, they  would  find  sale  by  exportation  to  other 
countries,  all  the  risks  and  hazards  of  which  would  have  to 
be  borne  by  the  manufacturers.  And  still  further,  the 
recognition,  upon  the  part  of  the  manufacturer  and  the 
cotton-grower,  of  this  identity  of  interest,  would  constitute 
a  perpetual  bond  of  union  between  the  people  of  the  sev- 
eral sections  of  the  country,  binding  them  together  in  that 
fraternal  concord  which  ought  never  to  have  been  sus- 
pended, and  which  nothing  hereafter  should  weaken. 

How  much  more  preferable  it  is  that  all  the  sections  of 
our  common  country  should  harmonize  thus  together,  and 
enjoy  this  mutuality  of  interests,  than  that  either  should 
become,  in  the  least  degree,  dependent  upon  foreign  influ- 
ences for  its  prosperity.  Everybody  at  all  familiar  with  the 
history  and  policy  of  England  understands  that,  if  that 
country  could  succeed  in  destroying  our  manufactures,  it 
would  not  stop  short  of  an  entire  control  of  our  markets  ; 
and  that  the  certain  result  would  be  that  the  English  manu- 
facturers would  buy  our  raw  materials  and  sell  us  their 


3Q2  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

fabrics,  at  just  what  prices  they  pleased.  Whatsoever  com- 
petition would  then  exist  would  be  in  England,  under  the 
control  of  combinations  formed  with  reference  to  the  inter- 
ests of  that  country  and  not  of  ours  ;  and  thus,  the  injury 
inflicted  upon  us  would  be  felt  in  all  parts  of  the  Union. 

Free  trade,  therefore,  would  not  only  prove  hurtful  to 
all  sections  of  the  United  States,  in  a  commercial  point  of 
view,  but  by  creating  discord  between  them,  it  would 
become  the  enemy  of  the  Union.  If  the  attempt  to  intro- 
duce it  had  not  engendered  antagonisms  which  ought 
never  to  have  existed,  our  late  civil  war  would  have  been 
avoided,  and  the  cotton-growing  States  would  not  have 
been  compelled  to  reap  its  bitter  fruits.  All  parts  of  the 
country  should  learn  wisdom  from  these  sad  experiences, 
and  shun  them  in  the  future  as  we  do  the  desolating 
pestilence. 

Notwithstanding  all  these  considerations,  the  adminis- 
tration of  Mr.  Polk  triumphed,  by  securing  the  passage  of 
the  Tariff  Act  of  1846,  which  repealed  that  of  1842.  It 
passed  the  House  of  Representatives  by  a  vote  of  114  to 
95.  The  Senate  was  equally  divided — 27  for  and  27 
against  it — but  it  was  passed  by  the  casting  vote  of  Vice- 
President  Dallas,  who  was  unable  to  resist  the  pressure 
brought  to  bear  upon  him,  but  who  lost  his  popularity  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  never  was  able,  during  his  life,  to  regain 
it.  When  the  consequences  of  this  measure  are  fully 
understood,  it  will  be  seen  how  unwise  it  was  —  how  it  em- 
barrassed the  Treasury,  imperiled  the  credit  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  inflicted  .injury  upon  the  entire  Union. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII. 

TARIFF  OF  1846  REDUCED  DUTIES  TO  INCREASE  REVENUE—  THAT 
OF  1842  PREFERABLE  FOR  THAT  PURPOSE  —  COMPARISON  OF 
RECEIPTS  FROM  CUSTOMS—  EXPENDITURES  —  PUBLIC  DEBT 
INCREASED—  TARIFF  OF  1842  WOULD  HAVE  PAID  DEBT  AND 
LEFT  SURPLUS—  COTTON  DECLINED  IN  PRICE  INSTEAD  OF 
ADVANCING—  CAUSES  OF  INCREASE  OF  IMPORTS—  TARIFF  OF 
1846  UNWISE—  FAILURE  AS  A  REVENUE  MEASURE  —  FA  LSE 
PREDICTIONS  OF  ITS  FRIENDS. 


T^HE  tariff  of  1846  was  intended  to  put  an  end  to  protec- 
*  tion  —  to  entirely  annihilate  a  policy  which  had  been 
approved  by  our  best  and  wisest  statesmen,  and  by  an 
immense  majority  of  the  people.  It  was  not  designed  that 
the  work  of  destruction  should  be  accomplished  by  a  single 
blow,  for  fear  of  recoil  ;  but  that  free  trade  should  be  grad- 
ually approached  through  the  pretense  of  a  tariff  for  revenue 
only.  As  such  this  act  was  supported  and  passed,  and 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  arguments  made  in  its  defense 
—  including  what  was  said  by  the  President,  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  and  its  supporters  in  Congress  —  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say,  that  no  such  ruinous  and  destructive 
policy  was  ever  put  in  operation  in  all  the  history  of  the 
country.  Everything  that  transpired  tended  to  show  what 
its  ultimate  purpose  was,  and  that  the  course  of  its  advo 
cates  towards  actual  free  trade,  was  only  arrested  by  fear 
of  the  popular  indignation  in  the  agricultural  and  manu- 
facturing sections.  It  was  deeply  regretted  that  this 

393 


\ 


394  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

desired  object  could  not  be  immediately  accomplished. 
Prophecies  of  the  advantages  of  free  trade  were  abundant 
—  furnishing  ample  scope  to  the  genius  and  eloquence  of 
its  advocates.  The  author  of  the  "  History  of  the  Polk 
Administration  " — heretofore  mentioned — when  speaking 
of  the  act,  says  : 

"  In  every  aspect  in  which  the  policy  of  free  trade,  as  illustrated  by 
the  tariff  of  1846,  can  be  viewed,  it  commends  itself  to  the  favorable 
consideration  of  the  American  people.  It  is  incontestably  true  that 
trade  between  nations,  to  be  extensive,  must  be  beneficial  to  both.  A 
fair  exchange  of  the  productions  of  one  for  the  other,  can  alone  produce 
that  result." 

The  act — as  its  title  imports  —  reduced  the  duties,  the 
avowed  pretense  being  that  thereby  the  revenue  would  be 
increased.  Whatsoever  of  discrimination  it  contained  was 
intended  for  revenue  only,  and  against  all  kinds  of  domestic 
industry,  especially  manufactures.  Upon  the  bulk  of  the 
articles  upon  which  protective  duties  were  laid  by  the  tariff 
of  1842,  they  were  reduced  to  thirty,  twenty-five,  twenty, 
fifteen,  and  ten  per  cent.  It  provided  for  twenty  per  cent 
ad  valorem  upon  all  articles  not  enumerated  in  the  several 
schedules  ;  and  this — it  may  be  fairly  supposed — was  con- 
sidered to  be  the  revenue  standard.  Where  any  duties 
went  above  this  standard — say  to  twenty-five  per  cent  — 
it  must  be  understood  to  have  been  a  reluctant  concession 
to  some  of  the  friends  of  protection — a  sort  of  "  tub  thrown 
to  the  whale  " — but  not  in  consonance  with  the  wishes  of 
the  administration,  which  had  expressly  denied  the  right  to 
discriminate  above  the  revenue  standard,  if  at  all.  There- 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  395 

fore,  it  is  proper  to  say  that  the  object  of  the  act  was 
opposition  to  protection — which  it  was  designed  to  destroy. 
But  as  the  special  defense  of  it  rested  upon  the  ground  that 
it  was  a  revenue  measure  exclusively,  and,  in  that  respect, 
preferable  to  the  tariff  of  1842,  it  is  necessary  to  compare 
the  operations  of  the  two  acts,  with  regard  to  revenue,  in 
order  to  decide  between  them. 

The  aggregate  amount  of  revenue  from  customs  during 
the  four  years  of  the  operation  of  the  tariff  of  1 842  was 
$97,109,411,  collected  upon  $309, 178, 151  of  dutiable  articles 
— the  average  rate  being  thirty-three  per  cent.  That  re- 
ceived for  the  same  length  of  time — the  first  four  years — 
under  the  tariff  of  1846,  was  $123,920,411,  collected  upon 
$517,963,037  of  dutiable  articles — at  the  average  rate  of 
twenty-four  and  one-half  per  cent.  Thus  it  appears  that, 
during  the  last  four  years,  under  the  tariff  of  1846,  the 
dutiable  goods  exceeded  those  of  the  four  former  years, 
under  the  tariff  of  1842,  $108,784,886.  Yet  the  revenue  of 
the  four  years  under  the  tariff  of  1846  exceeded  that  of 
the  previous  four  only  $26,820,969  ;  whereas,  if  the  in- 
creased dutiable  articles  upon  which  this  was  produced  had 
been  subject  to  the  duties  fixed  by  the  tariff  of  1842,  they 
would  have  produced  $170,927,712  of  revenue,  or  $47,- 
006,301  more  than  was  actually  received  under  the  tariff 
of  1846. 

This  comparison  is  confined  to  two  equal  periods,  and 
could  not  be  carried  further,  because  the  tariff  of  1842 
stood  only  four  years.  Yet  it  is  sufficient  to  show  that,  as 
regarded  revenue,  the  tariff  of  1842  was  preferable  to  that 


396  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

of  1 846.     And  this  preference  is  more  apparent  when  the 
expenditures  are  considered. 

The  ordinary  expenditures  for  the  four  years  of  the 
tariff  of  1842  were,  in  the  aggregate,  $80,220,444,  and  the 
receipts  from  customs  for  the  same  period  being  $97,109,- 
411,  left  an  excess  of  the  receipts  over  the  expenditures  of 
$16,888,967,  which  constituted  a  surplus  in  the  Treasury, 
applicable  to  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  and  the 
redemption  of  the  outstanding  Treasury  notes  which  the 
Government  had  been  compelled  to  issue  during  Mr.  Van 
Buren's  administration,  when  the  revenue  also  fell  short, 
as  we  have  heretofore  seen,  under  the  Compromise  Act  of 
1833.  The  expenditures  of  the  first  four  years  of  the  tariff 
of  1846  were,  in  the  aggregate  $176,128,555,  and  the  re- 
ceipts from  customs,  for  the  same  period,  bein^  $123,920,- 
411,  left  the  expenditures  $52,108,144,  in  excess  of  the 
revenue,  to  be  added  to  the  public  debt.  Thus,  while  a 
larger  aggregate  amount  of  revenue  reached  the  Treasury, 
under  the  tariff  of  1846,  than  under  that  of  1842,  during 
the  years  named — on  account  of  the  increase  of  dutiable 
articles — yet  the  foregoing  facts  demonstrate  that,  consid- 
ered with  reference  to  the  necessity  of  raising  a  sufficiency 
of  revenue  to  carry  on  the  Government,  the  act  of  1842, 
with  protection,  was  a  better  revenue  measure  than  that 
of  1846,  without  protection.  The  former  left  a  surplus  in 
the  Treasury  and  helped  to  pay  the  public  debt ;  the  latter 
created  a  deficiency  and  added  to  the  public  debt.  Can 
demonstration  be  clearer  than  this?  If  it  needed  to  be 
made  plainer  it  can  be  done  by  reference  to  the  condition 


HISTORY  OF  THE    PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  397 

of  the  public  debt  during  each  of  the  aforesaid  periods  of 
four  years.  In  1843,  the  first  year  of  the  operation  of 
the  tariff  of  1842,  the  public  debt  was  $32,742,922  ;  where- 
as, in  1846,  the  last  year  of  its  operation,  it  had  been 
reduced  to  $15,550,202 — that  is,  $17,192,720  of  the  debt 
had  been  paid.  In  1847,  the  first  year  of  the  operation 
of  the  tariff  of  1846,  the  public  debt  was  increased  to 
$38,826,534,  or  $23,276,332  in  one  year;  and  in  1850- 
the  last  of  the  four  years  embraced  in  this  comparison  - 
it  had  increased  to  $63,452,773,  or  $47,902,571  in  the  four 
years ! 

The  superiority  of  the  tariff  of  1842  over  that  of  1846, 
as  a  revenue  measure,  is  thus  incontestably  shown.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  make  proof  more  conclusive  and  satis- 
factory to'  fair-minded  people. 

And  yet,  if  there  are  any  who  still  doubt,  after  a  careful 
consideration  of  the  above  facts,  confirmatory  and  cumula- 
tive evidence  will  be  found  by  extending  the  comparison 
somewhat  further.  The  tariff  of  1846  remained  unchanged 
until  1857,  and  was,  consequently,  in  operation  for  eleven 
years.  During  these  eleven  years  the  aggregate  amount 
of  revenue  received  from  customs  was  $523,957,872,  while 
the  expenditures  for  the  same  period  were  $545,748,777. 
Thus  the  expenditures  for  these  eleven  years  exceeded  the 
revenue  $21,790,805.  This,  of  course,  caused  an  increase 
of  the  public  debt,  so  that  by  the  next  year,  1858,  it 
amounted  to  $44,911,881.03,  and  by  1859  to  $58,496,837.- 
88,  under  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration  and  under  a  law 
passed  by  those  who  boasted  of  it  as  a  measure  for  revenue 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

only — that  is,  under  a  law  which  produced  almost  every 
other  result  than  that  for  which  it  was  expressly  intended 
The  aggregate  of  the  dutiable  articles  upon  which  this 
revenue  was  raised,  during  these  eleven  years,  was  $2,- 
173,428,818.  If,  therefore,  instead  of  being  levied,  as  they 
were,  under  a  tariff  professedly  for  revenue  alone,  the 
duties  had  been  regulated  by  the  protective  tariff  of  1842, 
there  would  have  been  received  from  customs,  during  the 
eleven  years,  $717,431,509,  or  $193,474,637  more  than 
was  received  under  the  tariff  of  1846.  This  would  have 
produced  revenue  enough  to  carry  on  the  Government  and 
pay  the  entire  Mexican  war  debt;  and  instead  of  there 
being  a  public  debt  of  $28,699,831  — as  there  was  in  1857, 
the  last  year  of  the  tariff  of  1 846  —  there  would  have  been 
a  surplus  to  be  expended  for  rivers  and  harbors,  the  build- 
ing of  a  suitable  navy,  putting  the  country  in  a  condition 
to  be  prepared  for  war,  and  such  other  improvements  of  a 
national  character,  in  every  section  of  the  Union,  as  might 
have  been  deemed  expedient  and  proper, 

In  view  of  what  has  since  transpired,  under  the  lead  of 
those  who  brought  the  country  into  this  condition,  by  the 
pursuit  of  their  visionary  theories  of  free  trade  and  a  tariff 
for  revenue  only,  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  have  been 
suspected  of  having  foreseen  that  the  ultimate  end  they 
contemplated  —  the  inauguration  of  civil  war — would  be 
more  favored  by  an  empty  than  by  a  full  Treasury.  If,  as 
their  conduct  seemed  to  indicate,  true  patriotism  consisted 
in  devotion  to  one  particular  section  of  the  country  and 
antagonism  to  all  other  sections,  then  they  are  liable  to  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  399 

imputation  of  having  considered  it  patriotic  to  weaken  the 
authority  and  destroy  the  credit  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment, so  as  to  lessen  its  means  of  defense  against  attack 
whensoever  it  should  be  deemed  advisable  to  make  it. 
Certainly,  no  more  effective  means  of  embarrassment  could 
have  been  contrived  than  the  financial  derangement  of 
the  Treasury — which  result  was  most  effectually  accom- 
plished. 

The  amount  of  revenue  from  customs  depends — as 
everybody  understands — upon  imports.  These  are  deter- 
mined by  the  demand  for  foreign  articles,  which  arises  out 
of  the  prosperity  and  interests  of  domestic  commerce. 
When  the  country  is  prosperous  and  money  plenty,  the 
demand  for  foreign  productions  is  increased  ;  when  other- 
wise, it  is  diminished.  It  so  happened  that  during  1847 
— the  first  year  of  the  tariff  of  1846  —  the  imports  were 
increased,  because  the  exports  were.  We  bought  more 
because  we  sold  more — a  condition  of  things  which  seems 
to  be  the  result  of  an  inflexible  law.  The  failure  of  the  crops 
in  Europe  created  an  unusual  demand  for  our  breadstuffs 
and  other  surplus  productions,  and  as  our  crops  were  good 
we  had  no  difficulty  in  supplying  it.  The  exportation  of 
our  agricultural  products  increased  because  of  this  failure, 
and  good  prices  were  obtained.  This  enabled  us  to 
increase  our  importations,  and — what  was  of  far  more  im- 
portance— to  pay  for  what  we  bought.  The  friends  of  the 
tariff  of  1846  enjoyed  temporary  exultation  at  this,  but 
seemed,  at  the  same  time,  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  the 
law  had  failed  to  accomplish  the  chief  object  designed  by  it 


4OO  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

—  that  is,  improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  cotton-grow- 
ing section.  The  effect  there  was  the  very  reverse  of  what 
was  intended  and  predicted  ;  for,  while  the  exportation  and 
prices  of  agricultural  and  manufacturing  products  were  in- 
creased  by  the  European  demand,  both  the  exportation 
and  price  of  cotton  declined,  for  the  want  of  the  same  de- 
mandJ  The  number  of  bales  of  cotton  fell  from  2,072,000 
in  1*^45  —  the  last  year  of  the  protective  tariff  of  1842 — to 
1,241,000  in  1847  —  the  first  year  of  the  revenue  tariff  of 

1846  ;  and  the  price,  within  the  same  period,  fell  from  $35 
per  bale  in   1845  to  fr°m  $26  to  $2%  m  l%47-     The  de- 
creased exportation  having  been  831,000  bales,  the  loss 
to  cotton-growers — at  an  average  of  $27  per  bale — was 
$29,085,000,    estimating   the   price    as    it    was   in    1845  J 
and  the   absolute   loss,   at  the   price   paid  in    1847,    was 
$2  2, 43 7,000.     Even  if  the  exportation  had  been  as  great  in 

1847  as  it  was  in   1845,   tne  l°ss  m  consequence  of  the 
decrease  in  price  would  have  been  $6,648,000. 

The  increase  of  imports  in  1847  'ls  easily  accounted  for; 
and  if  fully  comprehended  by  the  intelligent  and  thinking 
people  of  the  cotton-growing  section,  they  would  undoubt- 
edly see  that  they  have  already  suffered  sufficiently  by  their 
advocacy  of  the  false  theory  of  free  trade,  and  would  pause 
and  seriously  reflect  before  going  further  in  that  direction. 
Considering  how  competent  they  are,  upon  general  ques- 
tions, to  distinguish  between  the  true  and  the  false,  and  the 
quickness  and  accuracy  of  their  perceptions,  it  is  surprising 
that  they  have  not  already  realized  the  immense  sacrifices 
they  have  made  in  the  pursuit  of  visionary  schemes  of 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  40 1 

policy,  while  their  brethren  of  the  Northern,  Central  and 
Western  sections  of  the  Union  have  secured  a  steady  in- 
crease of  prosperity  by  discarding  illusive  theories  and 
profiting  by  the  practical  measures  which  "  the  fathers  " 
established  for  the  full  development  of  all  the  sections. 
They  have  been  misled  by  the  generous  and  unsuspecting 
confidence  they  have  bestowed  upon  ambitious  advisers, 
and  if  they  could  be  induced  to  make  appeal  to  their  own 
good  sense,  they  would  soon  witness  such  a  development 
of  their  local  resources  as  would  remove  all  possible  cause 
of  jealousy  at  the  prosperity  of  other  sections. 

The  additional  imports  for  the  year  1847  were  attribut- 
able to  the  increased  prosperity  of  the  agricultural  and 
manufacturing  sections  of  the  country.*  As  the  facts  just 
stated  show,  the  cotton-growing  section  did  not  contribute 
toward  it.  Notwithstanding  the  decrease  of  duties  under 
the  tariff  of  1846,  that  section  was  subjected  to  a  severe 
financial  pressure,  which  many  now  living  will  remember. 
It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  this  reduction  of  duties  was 
not  attended  by  the  results  predicted,  especially  as  it 
regarded  their  influence  upon  the  price  of  cotton.  Conse- 
quently, the  special  friends  of  that  interest  learned — or 
ought  to  have  learned  —  that  the  English  market  is  far 
more  uncertain  and  unreliable  than  an  established  home 
market,  because  it  is  subject  to  variations  occasioned  by  the 


*  Although  cotton-growing  is  a  branch  of  agriculture  in  a  general  sense,  it  has 
been  deemed  most  advisable  to  treat  the  agricultural  section  as  that  from  which  the 
agricultural  surplus  is  consumed  or  exported  in  the  form  of  breadstuff's. 

26 


4O2  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

shifting  condition  of  European  affairs,  and  the  success  or 
failure  of  European  and  Asiatic  crops. 

It  was  not  difficult  to  see,  at  the  time  the  tariff  of  1846 
was  passed,  that  the  rate  of  duties  fixed  by  it  would  not 
produce  the  amount  of  revenue  demanded  by  the  wants  of 
the  Government,  without  an  unprofitable  increase  of  im- 
portations—  that  is,  unless,  by  undue  stimulation  of  our 
trade,  we  bought  more  largely  from  foreign  nations  than 
we  had  ever  done  when  our  trade  was  in  a  healthy  con- 
dition. But  when  the  effort  was  made  by  the  opponents  of 
the  measure  to  demonstrate  this,  it  scarcely  attracted  a 
passing  notice.  Such  was  the  intensity  of  the  prevailing 
passion  among  the  supporters  of  the  administration  that  all 
argument,  no  matter  how  unanswerable,  was  wasted  upon 
them.  The  imports,  exclusive  of  coin  and  bullion,  for  the 
year  1845,  amounted  to  $113,184,322,  with  the  same 
amount  of  importations  estimated  for  1847,  and  with  the 
duties  assessed  at  the  rates  fixed  in  the  act  of  1846,  there 
would  have  been  $28,296,080  of  revenue  to  supply  the 
Treasury  for  that  year.  Yet,  this  plain  and  simple  proposi- 
tion— a  mere  matter  of  figures — was  so  disregarded,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  intense  anxiety  to  reduce  the  duties,  that 
the  revenue  raised  for  1847  ^  $4*783,196  short  of  the 
expenditures,  notwithstanding  the  increase  of  imports  occa- 
sioned by  the  general  prosperity.  The  serious  defect  in 
the  mode  of  reasoning  adopted  by  the  friends  of  the  tariff 
of  1846  was  this:  that  they  considered  their  ends  answered 
by  inviting  increased  importations  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
raising  revenue,  without  giving  due  consideration  to  our 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  403 

ability  to  increase  our  exports  —  in  other  words,  they 
stimulated  purchases  of  foreign  goods  without  giving 
proper  concern  to  our  ability  to  pay  for  them.  The  effect 
upon  the  revenue  would  have  been  the  same,  whether  pay- 
ment for  imports  had  been  made  in  specie,  breadstuffs  or 
cotton.  But  it  did  not  require  much  wisdom  to  foretell 
that  financial  embarrassment  would  ensue  if  we  had  not 
breadstuffs  and  cotton  enough  for  exportation  to  keep  the 
balance  of  trade  from  being  too  largely  against  us.  Now, 
as  the  exports  of  1847,  from  the  agricultural  and  manu- 
facturing sections  were  increased  in  consequence  of  the 
failure  of  the  crops  in  Europe,  and  those  from  the  cotton- 
growing  section  were  diminished  in  consequence  of  the 
limited  demand  in  the  English  market,  it  is  evident  that 
the  Government  was  saved  from  a  large  deterioration  of 
the  revenue  by  the  commerce  furnished  by  the  agricul- 
tural sections  —  or,  in  other  words,  by  the  prosperity  of 
those  sections  in  which,  by  Government  protection,  the 
agricultural  and  manufacturing  industries  had  improved 
by  being  brought  into  harmony.  The  increasing  pros- 
perity of  these  last  jiamed  sections  had,  by  the  year  1847, 
given  great  impetus  to  railroad  enterprises.  In  every 
direction,  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  them,  railroads 
were  projected,  and  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  thousand 
miles  of  track  had  been  laid  that  year.  This,  of  course, 
caused  a  very  considerable  increase  in  the  importation  of 
iron  rails  and  machinery,  and  a  consequent  increase  of 
revenue.  The  fact,  therefore,  is  perfectly  evident  that, 
whatsoever  increase  of  revenue  there  was  in  1847 — the 


404  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

first  year  of  the  tariff  of  1846 — is  attributable  to  a  cause 
which,  at  the  time  of  its  passage,  was  not  and  could  not 
have  been  foreseen  or  anticipated.  Consequently,  the  con- 
clusion is  unavoidable  that,  considered  as  a  mere  revenue 
measure,  it  was  unwise  and  purely  experimental  legisla- 
tion —  such  legislation  as  ought  to  be  studiously  avoided 
in  all  matters  where  the  public  welfare  is  so  largely  in- 
volved. 

And  the  same  may  properly  be  said  of  all  the  other  ten 
years  of  the  operations  of  this  act.  The  railroad  system 
had  received,  during  these  years,  wonderful  additional 
impetus,  and  the  importation  of  iron  rails  and  machinery 
was  correspondingly  increased.  From  1847  to  1857  the 
number  of  miles  of  railroads  in  the  United  States  had 
increased  from  a  little  over  500  to  about  25,000  miles.  Of 
these  less  than  4,000  miles  were  within  the  limits  of  the 
cotton-growing  section,  while  the  remainder,  over  20,000 
miles,  were  within  the  limits  of  the  agricultural  and  manu- 
facturing sections.  The  increased  business  in  the  latter 
sections,  occasioned  by  the  construction  and  operation  of 
these  railroads,  caused,  necessarily,  very  great  increase  of 
importations  and  revenue  during  the  entire  eleven  years  of 
the  tariff  of  1846.  But  for  this,  the  new  system  inaugurated 
s  by  that  act  would  have  collapsed  at  the  expiration  of  the 
first  year.  It  was,  consequently,  the  prosperity  of  the 
agricultural  and  manufacturing  sections  that  saved  the 
Treasury  from  bankruptcy. 

It  is  improper  to  infer  from  these,  or  from  any  other 
state  of  facts,  that  the  interests  of  the  agricultural  and 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  405 

manufacturing  sections  and  those  of  the  cotton-growing 
section,  are,  in  any  proper  sense,  hostile  to  each  other. 
On  the  contrary,  they  show  conclusively — and  are  referred 
to  for  that  purpose  only — that  the  cotton-growing  section 
acted  injudiciously  and  unwisely  in  not  maintaining  the 
principle  of  protection,  after  having  conspicuously  aided  in 
its  establishment.  A  different  course  would  have  secured 
to  it  the  same  degree  of  commercial  prosperity  and  the 
same  material  progress  as  are  now  enjoyed  by  the  other 
sections.  It  was  a  great  mistake — a  positive  blunder — 
for  the  cotton-growers  to  suppose,  at  the  dictation  of 
impassioned  advisers,  that  they  could  rely  more  safely  upon 
the  manufacturers  of  England  for  the  sale  of  their  cotton 
than  upon  those  of  their  own  country — upon  foreign  in 
preference  to  home  markets.  An  intelligent  observation 
of  the  facts  herein  stated,  if  placed  fully  before  them,  would 
enable  them  to  see  this  ;  especially  when  they  realize,  as 
they  could  not  fail  to  do,  that  the  country  was  indebted  for 
the  increase  of  imports  and  the  consequent  increase  of 
revenue,  under  the  tariff  of  1846,  not  to  the  reduction  of 
duties,  but  to  the  increased  commercial  and  material  pros- 
perity of  the  agricultural  and  manufacturing  sections  over 
theirs.  There  is  no  natural  rivalry  between  these  sections, 
and  the  creation  of  it  is  injurious  to  all.  It  should  never 
have  existed,  and  the  authors  of  it  were  bad  advisers,  no 
matter  who  they  were,  or  to  what  degree  of  admiration 
they  were  entitled  on  account  of  their  eminent  abilities  or 
excellence  of  character. 

It  was  urged  by  these  advisers,  when  the  Tariff  Act  of 


406  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

1842  was  under  discussion  in  Congress  —  in  opposition  to 
the  principle  of  protection  and  in  favor  of  free  trade — that 
the  duties  then  proposed  would  operate  injuriously  upon 
the  cotton-growing  interests,  because  they  would  become  a 
tax  upon  them,  which  would  be  paid  by  increasing  the 
prices  of  manufactured  articles  to  the  extent  of  the  duties. 
To  establish  this  proposition  it  was  alleged  that  the  duties 
upon  cotton -bagging,  rope  and  twine,  were  of  this  char- 
acter, and  would  increase  the  cost  of  these  articles  two  and 
a  half  per  cent,  which  would  fall  heavily  upon  the  producers 
of  cotton.  The  answer  to  this  was  the  general  argument 
that  the  prices  of  manufactured  goods  are  regulated  by 
competition  and  not  by  duties  —  that  by  the  increase  of 
manufactures  competition  is  increased  also,  and  tends  to 
lower  their  prices — and  that  they  are,  by  these  means,  not 
infrequently  brought  down  almost  as  low  as  the  duties. 
But  this  argument  was  not  sufficient.  When  the  same 
subject  was  again  under  discussion  in  Congress,  a  gentle- 
man of  high  distinction  —  himself  an  extensive  cotton- 
planter — demonstrated  that,  instead  of  the  prices  of  cotton- 
bagging,  rope  and  twine,  being  increased  in  consequence 
of  the  protective  duties  imposed  by  the  tariff  of  1842,  as 
urged  by  the  advocates  of  free  trade,  they  had  actually 
fallen.  His  answer  to  the  assertion  that  the  price  is  neces- 
sarily increased  to  the  extent  of  the  duty,  was  complete. 
He  showed  that,  instead  of  a  loss  of  two  and  a  half  bales 
of  every  hundred  of  cotton,  to  cover  the  duties,  the  Ken- 
tucky manufacturers — in  consequence  of  American  and 
home  competition,  and  "by  the  workings  of  the  inevitable 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  407 

laws  of  trade" — were  enabled  to  sell  bagging,  rope  and 
twine,  cheaper  than  they  were  before  the  duties  were  imposed. 
This  gentleman,  having  just  been  a  purchaser  himself, 
stated  the  fact  to  be  that  bagging  was  then  selling,  under 
the  protective  tariff  of  1842,  for  within  two  and  a  half  cents 
of  the  estimate  of  the  duty  as  made  by  the  advocates  of 
free  trade,  and  that  rope  was  selling  for  but  little  more  than 
half  their  estimate  of  the  duty  upon  it.  The  actual  fact  was 
that,  after  the  tariff  of  1842  was  passed,  cotton-bagging 
could  be  bought  in  the  United  States  for  less  than  the  same 
article  had  previously  cost  in  Dundee,  Scotland,  from 
whence  it  had  been  imported.  He  demonstrated  the  unre- 
liability of  the  free  trade  predictions,  and  disposed  of  the 
whole  question  in  these  words  : 

"A  comparison  of  the  present  prices  of  domestic  bagging  in  this 
country,  at  the  factories,  with  these  Scotch  prices,  shows  that  we  now 
make  bagging  in  Kentucky  more  than  five  cents  per  yard  less  than  it 
cost  in  Dundee  in  1842,  and  for  three  or  four  cents  per  yard  less  than 
the  present  price  [in  1846,  before  the  act  of  that  year  took  effect],  in 
Scotland,  ascertaining  the  price  according  to  Mr.  Walker's  [Secretary 
of  the  Treasury]  estimate  of  it  for  fixing  the  ad  valorem  duties.  It  is 
now  generally  sold  in  the  larger  markets  for  distribution  at  less  than  the 
Scotch  price  in  1842,  when  the  tariff  bill  was  passed.  It  is  also  a  well- 
known  fact,  to  every  cotton-planter,  that,  notwithstanding  the  duty,  and 
the  cheapness  of  its  production,  the  gunny-bag  has  continued  to  fall  in 
almost  exact  proportion  with  other  descriptions  of  bagging,  showing 
how  little  influence  the  cost  of  production  may  have  over  the  market 
price  of  a  commodity  in  a  country  remote  from  the  place  of  its  produc- 
tion." 

Notwithstanding  this  clear  and  thorough  exposure  of 
the  fallacious  arguments  made  in  defense  of  the  tariff  of 
1 846,  that  measure  was  passed  in  the  face  of  these  demon- 
strations, and  became  a  law  mainly  by  the  support  of  those 


4C>8  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

who  had  misled  themselves  and  others  by  their  false  pre- 
dictions with  regard  to  the  act  of  1842.  There  must, 
therefore,  have  been  something  unrevealed,  more  potent 
than  the  reasons  assigned,  which  contributed  to  the  result. 
He  who  shall  search  the  history  of  that  time  with  the 
patience  necessary  to  discover  this,  will  find  it  centering  in 
the  purpose  of  creating  additional  antagonisms  between  the 
sections  of  the  Union,  with  the  view  of  destroying  the 
principle  of  protection,  establishing  free  trade,  and  subor- 
dinating all  national  interests  to  those  of  the  cotton-growing 
section.  Men  do  not  often  act  without  motive  ;  and  there 
could  have  been  no  other  motive  than  this  to  prompt  a 
policy  so  violative  of  all  past  experience,  so  indefensible  by 
truthful  arguments,  and  so  ruinous  to  the  best  interests  of 
those  who  cherished  it. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

PUBLIC  DEBT  INCREASED  STEADILY  UNDER  A  TARIFF  FOR 
REVENUE  ONLY— EXPENDITURES  EXCEEDED  RECEIPTS— TAR- 
IFF OF  1857  PASSED  UNDER  PIERCE  — SAME  SYSTEM  CON- 
TINUED AND  SAME  CONSEQUENCES  FOLLOWED  —  GOVERNMENT 
HAD  TO  BORROW  MONEY— THE  TWO  SYSTEMS  COMPARED. 

HTHE  tariff  of  1846  underwent  no  change  until  1857.  It 
*  continued  during  the  last  half  of  Mr.  Folk's  administra- 
tion, the  whole  of  Mr.  Fillmore's  and  General  Pierce's,  and 
until  the  first  year  of  Mr.  Buchanan's —making,  as  already 
stated,  eleven  years.  We  have  seen  how  the  receipts  and 
expenditures  compared  during  these  years,  and  have 
noticed  the  fact  that,  at  their  close  in  1857,  the  public  debt 
amounted  to  $28,699,831 — having  been  increased  after  1846 
from  $15,550,202  to  that  sum,  under  the  operations  of  that 
act ;  an  increase  of  nearly  one  hundred  per  cent.  But  little 
financiering  ability  is  requisite  to  decide  that,  whatsoever 
other  consequences  may  follow  such  a  law,  it  cannot  be 
considered  a  success  as  a  revenue  measure.  Manifestly, 
the  tariff  of  1842,  which  reduced  the  public  debt  and,  at  the 
same  time,  protected  domestic  industry,  is  preferable  to  one 
like  that  of  1846,  which  caused  the  public  debt  to  increase, 
although  passed  professedly  for  revenue  alone,  without 
protection.  A  tariff  for  revenue  alone  should,  undoubtedly, 

raise  money  enough  to  pay  the  Government  expenses,  or 

409 


410  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

it  fails  to  answer  the  purpose  designed  by  it.  If  it  does 
not,  it  is  a  sham  and  a  deception.  The  tariff  of  1846  did 
not  do  it,  and  to  call  it  a  revenue  tariff,  when  the  public 
debt  increased,  during  the  eleven  years  of  its  existence, 
from  $15,550,202  to  $28,699,831,  is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  a 
misnomer,  and  indicates  a  low  estimate  of  the  popular 
intelligence  and  a  high  estimate  of  the  popular  credulity. 

It  is  well  to  observe  the  state  of  the  public  debt  during 
all  the  years  this  act  was  in  force,  that  its  entire  effect  upon 
the  Government  finances  may  be  fully  comprehended. 
The  fact  has  just  been  stated  that  the  debt  in  1846 — the 
year  the  act  was  passed — was  $15,550,202.  For  the 
remaining  years,  from  that  time  to  1857,  it  was  as  follows : 

1847 $38,826,534 

1848 47,044,862 

1849 63,061,858 

1850 63,452,773 

1851 68,304,796 

1852 66,199,341 

1853 59.803,117 

1854 42,242,222 

1855 35.586,858 

1856 3!.972-537 

1857 28,699,831 

A  portion  of  this  debt  was  created  on  account  of  the 
expenses  of  the  Mexican  war.  Nevertheless,  the  necessity 
for  raising  revenue  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  these 
was  as  great  as  that  which  required  the  ordinary  expenses 
to  be  paid.  When  extraordinary  expenses  are  actually 
incurred,  they  are  as  much  a  charge  upon  the  Treasury  as 
if  they  were  not  so.  The  Mexican  war  only  created  the 
obligation  to  raise  more  revenue;  and  if  it  was  foreseen  — 


HISTORY   OF   TI1E   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 


411 


as  it  ought  to  have  been — that  the  act  of  1846  did  not 
produce  revenue  enough  to  pay  all  the  legitimate  expenses, 
ordinary  and  extraordinary,  it  should  have  been  changed 
and  the  duties  increased.  This  was  not  done.  To  have 
done  so  would  have  amounted  to  a  concession  that  all  the 
eloquent  dissertations  upon  the  advantages  of  a  tariff  for 
revenue  only,  were  false  and  misleading.  Instead  of  this, 
however,  the  law  was  left  unchanged,  and  the  public  debt 
continued  to  increase.  The  following  table  explains  itself: 


RECEIPTS. 

EXPENDITURES. 

EXPENDITURES 
OVER  RECEIPTS. 

RECEIPTS  OVER 
EXPENDITURES. 

184.7 

$23.74.7.864. 

Ss  3.801.  <\  60 

$30,01;  3,  701 

1848           .... 

3  1.  7  C  7,  07O 

4<C,  227,4  "»4 

13.470,384 

184.0 

28.146.738 

30,033,242 

11,586,804 

igco 

39,668,686 

37,l6c,ooo 

2,502,696 

*"jw  
1851  .  . 

40oi7,6<;7 

44,054,7  1  7 

4,962,850 

*"j   

I852.  . 

47,320.326 

40,  380,0  54 

6,940,372 

181:7 

eg  031  86s 

4A.O78.I  ^6 

14.  8<I1,7OQ 

18^4. 

64.  224.  IQO 

CI«o67«C28 

12,256,662 

iStji; 

C3,O2[;,7Q4 

<;6.7i6,io7 

3,200,403 

i8«;6 

61,022,863 

66,772,  <;27 

2,740,664 

l8C7    . 

63,87«5,Q(X 

66,041,143 

2,165,238 

£523,957,868 

£545,748,777 

#63,316,198 

$41,525,289 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  for  six  years  out  of  the  eleven 
of  the  tariff  of  1846,  the  expenditures  exceeded  the  re- 
ceipts, in  the  aggregate  $63,316,198.  For  the  remaining 
five  years  the  receipts  exceeded  the  expenditures  by  the 
aggregate  sum  of  $41,525,289.  Therefore,  taking  the 
whole  eleven  years  together,  the  excess  of  the  expenditures 
over  the  receipts  amounted  to  $21,790,909;  that  is,  the 
revenues  fell  that  much  short.  This  accounts  for  the  in- 
crease of  the  public  debt,  under  a  tariff  for  revenue  only. 
The  result  is  shown  by  a  simple  method  of  calculation. 


412  HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

For  example,  the  aggregate  receipts  from  customs  for  the 
eleven  years  was  $523,957,868,  and  the  aggregate  ex- 
penditures $545,748,777  ;  the  expenditures,  consequently, 
exceeded  the  receipts  $21,790,909,  as  stated  above.  Con- 
sequently, it  must  be  accepted  as  a  fact  that  the  tariff  of 
1846  failed  to  produce  revenue  enough  to  meet  the  wants 
of  the  Government  —  that  is,  that  the  deficiency  in  the 
revenue  was  the  sum  just  named.  Whatsoever  else  it 
may  have  been,  therefore,  it  was  not  a  successful  revenue 
measure. 

The  foregoing  table  has  been  made  up  with  reference 
to  the  whole  period  of  eleven  years,  during  which  the  tariff 
of  1846  was  in  operation,  for  the  reason  that  this  is  believed 
to  be  the  fairest  and  best  mode  of  testing  the  effects  of  that 
measure  upon  the  revenue.  Plain  as  it  is  in  this  regard, 
however,  it  may  require  some  explanation,  or,  otherwise, 
those  in  the  habit  of  accepting  results  without  inquiring 
into  their  causes,  might  be  misled  by  it.  It  will  be  observed 
that  for  the  five  years  — 1850,  '51,  '52,  '53  and  '54 — the 
aggregate  excess  of  the  receipts  over  the  expenditures  was 
$41,525,289;  whereas,  for  the  first  three  years  of  the  law 
— 1847,  '48  and  '49 — the  aggregate  excess  of  the  expendi- 
tures over  the  receipts  was  $55,110,893,  and  for  the  last 
three — 1855,  '56  and  '57,  it  was  $8,205,305 — showing  the 
result  stated  above  ;  that  is,  an  excess  of  the  expenditures 
over  the  receipts,  for  the  whole  eleven  years,  of  $21,790,- 
909.  If,  therefore,  the  foregoing  five  years  should  be  de- 
tached from  the  whole  period  of  eleven,  and  considered 
without  comparision  with  the  other  six,  it  might  be  argued, 


HISTORY  OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  413 

with  some  apparent  plausibility,  that,  as  a  revenue  measure, 
the  act  of  1 846  was  a  success.  It  is  not  difficult  to  show 
that  this  argument,  if  made,  would  be  merely  plausible  and 
could  not  be  maintained,  for  the  reason  that  the  excess  of 
revenue  for  those  five  years  was  attributable  to  causes— 
alluded  to  in  the  last  chapter — with  which  the  tariff  neither 
had  nor  could  have  any  immediate  connection ;  that  is,  to 
the  general  activity  in  all  the  departments  of  business 
throughout  the  country. 

The  Mexican  war,  which  commenced  in  1846 — the  year 
the  law  was  passed — resulted  in  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe 
Hidalgo,  in  1848,  by  which  the  United  States  acquired 
New  Mexico  and  California.  It  had  been  long  known  that 
the  mountainous  regions  of  the  latter  contained  large  min- 
eral deposits,  only  awaiting  the  presence  of  an  active  and 
enterprising  population  to  assure  their  development.  Such 
a  population  was  speedily  furnished  by  immigration  from 
all  parts  of  the  country  and,  within  a  brief  period,  the 
discoveries  of  gold  changed  the  entire  aspect  of  business 
affairs,  by  stimulating  every  branch  of  domestic  industry. 
These  influences  were  universally  felt,  and  excited  a  pas- 
sion for  over-trading,  not  only  among  capitalists,  but  among 
manufacturers  and  business  men  generally.  A  large  in- 
crease of  importations  resulted,  as  a  necessary  consequence. 
The  goid  of  California  was  the  inciting  cause.  In  1849  its 
product  was  $40,000,000,  but  its  increase  was  steady  from 
that  time  on,  through  the  five  years  named,  as  the  following 
table  will  show : 


41 4  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

1850 $50,000,000 

1851 55,000,000 

1852 60,000,000 

1853 65,000,000 

1854 60,000,000 

Total  in  five  years $290,000,000 

One  of  the  most  palpable  evidences  of  business  stimu- 
lation was  furnished  by  the  rapid  growth  of  the  railroad 
system  —  to  which  reference  was  made  also  in  the  last 
chapter  —  made  necessary  by  the  additional  demand  for 
the  transportation  of  all  kinds  of  commercial  commodities. 
Agricultural  products  sought  markets  upon  the  seaboard 
and  manufactured  fabrics  sought  them  in  the  interior. 
Water  transportation  was  too  slow,  and  the  building  of 
railroads  began  in  all  directions.  The  spirit  of  the  times 
required  steam  as  a  motive  power  in  almost  every  kind 
of  machinery,  and  this  demand  incited  the  inventive 
genius  of  the  whole  country.  In  1849 — the  first  year  of 
the  gold  discoveries — there  were  7,365  miles  of  railroad 
in  the  United  States,  which  it  had  required  more  than 
twenty  years  to  construct,  dating  from  the  beginning  of 
construction  operations  upon  the  New  York  Central  and 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio ;  but,  in  consequence  of  the 
rapidly  increasing  business,  the  number  of  miles  were 
doubled  in  five  years  from  that  time,  as  the  following 
table  will  show: 

In  1849,  the  number  of  miles  were 7.36$ 


1850,  " 

1851,  " 

1852,  " 

1853,  " 

1854,  « 


9,021 

10,982 
12,908 
15,360 

16,720 


HISTORY  OF  THE  PROTECTIVE  TARIFF  415 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  within  the  five  years 
during  which  the  receipts  exceeded  the  expenditures,  the 
railroads  in  the  United  States  had  increased  7,699  miles;  a 
fact  quite  sufficient,  of  itself,  to  show  the  great  increase  of 
business  within  that  period.  The  contemporaneous  discov- 
eries of  gold  in  Australia  had  produced  a  like  effect  in 
England,  and  the  two  discoveries  combined — that  is,  in 
California  and  in  Australia — gave  a  wonderful  impetus  to 
the  commerce  of  the  world.  Of  course,  the  universal 
activity  of  business  had  its  effect  in  the  United  States ;  but 
the  causes  which  operated  most  effectively  here  were 
mainly  domestic.  Whatsoever  they  were,  however,  the 
results  are  sufficient  to  show  that  the  stimulus  given  to 
commerce  in  this  country,  which  produced  the  increase  of 
importations  and  revenue,  was  wholly  independent  of  the 
tariff. 

The  rapid  building  of  railroads  made  it  necessary  to 
import  iron  rails,  locomotives,  and  other  kinds  of  machin- 
ery, which  could  only  be  partially  supplied  in  the  United 
States.  Such  was  also  the  case  with  many  other  kinds  of 
improved  machinery,  in  the  production  of  which  England 
was,  at  that  time,  in  advance  of  this  country.  Besides,  the 
general  activity  of  business  increased  the  demand  for  im- 
ported articles.  This  condition  of  things  underwent  no 
material  change  until  1855,  when  our  home  demand  for 
rails,  machinery,  etc.,  became  so  supplied  by  American 
manufactures  that,  although  1,654  miles  of  railroads  were 
built  that  year,  the  revenue  fell  off  $11,198,396;  and 
notwithstanding  it  gained  during  each  of  the  next  two 


41 6  HISTORY   OF   THE    VROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

years,  1856  and  '57,  by  means  of  the  continued  prosperity 
of  business  and  the  increase  of  railroads,  it  still  fell  short 
of  the  expenditures,  as  the  above  table  will  show,  and  con- 
tinued to  do  so  as  long  as  the  law  existed. 

Notwithstanding  the  condition  into  which  the  Treasury 
was  reduced — with  an  increasing  public  debt  and  the  re- 
ceipts falling  below  the  expenditures  —  those  in  charge  of 
public  affairs  passed  another  tariff  law,  at  the  close  of 
General  Pierce's  administration,  which  made  a  still  nearer 
approach  to  free  trade  than  that  of  1846.  They  seemed 
not  inclined  to  profit  by  experience,  but  rather  to  persist 
in  the  accomplishment  of  some  unavowed  purpose,  without 
any  regard  whatsoever  to  the  condition  of  the  Treasury. 
One  thing  is  certain,  whatsoever  else  may  have  been 
obscure,  that  the  same  influences  which  caused  the  passage 
of  one  of  these  laws  caused  also  the  passage  of  the 
other — having  in  the  meantime  become  more  concen- 
trated and  powerful.  Mr.  James  Guthrie,  of  Kentucky, 
was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis, 
of  Mississippi,  was  Secretary  of  War.  Both  these  gentle- 
men were  friends  of  free  trade,  and  both  were  able  and 
alike  imperious  in  their  natures — quite  powerful  enough 
to  shape  the  policy  of  an  administration  under  so  kind- 
hearted  and  amiable  a  President  as  General  Pierce. 
Whether  they  did  so  or  not  is  of  no  special  consequence, 
as  it  was  well  understood  at  the  time,  and  has  not  since 
been  denied,  that  the  Tariff  Act  of  1857  was  supported  and 
passed  as  an  administration  measure.  There  is  no  diffi- 
culty, therefore,  in  deciding  who  its  sponsors  were,  and 


HISTORY  OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  417 

that  they  were  controlled  by  the  same  motives  and  influ- 
ences which  dictated  the  passage  of  the  act  of  1846.  In 
fact,  the  act  of  1857  was  a  continuation  of  the  policy  em- 
bodied in  that  of  1 846,  and  differed  from  it  only  in  the  fact 
that  it  was  an  additional  step  towards  free  trade.  It  was 
produced  by  free-trade  influences.  That  it  was  an  ill-fated 
and  unnecessary  measure  —  absolutely  forbidden  by  the 
condition  of  the  Treasury,  and  the  necessities  of  the  public 
service — cannot  be  doubted  by  any  intelligent  man  who 
will  take  the  pains  to  investigate  its  operations.  The  pre- 
tence that  it  also  was  a  revenue  measure  must  have  been 
insincere,  for  it  was  already  demonstrated — or  susceptible 
of  easy  demonstration — that,  under  the  decreased  duties 
fixed  by  the  law  of  1846,  the  expenditures  had  exceeded 
the  receipts  from  customs,  notwithstanding  the  general 
activity  of  business  which  followed  the  discoveries  of  golcl; 
and  that  the  public  debt  was  $  13, 149, 629  more  in  1857 
than  it  was  in  1846.  Yet,  directly  in  the  face  of  these 
facts,  the  tariff  of  1857  continued  in  force  the  principles  of 
that  of  1 846,  and  reduced  the  duties  upon  all  the  articled : 
that  involved  the  principle  of  protection.  It  reduced  the 
duties  on  such  articles  of  luxury  as  brandies  and  other 
spirits  distilled  from  grain,  etc.,  from  one  hundred  to  thirty 
per  cent,  and  upon  other  articles  assessed  at  forty  also  to 
thirty  per  cent.  Articles  assessed  at  thirty  were  reduced 
to  twenty-four  per  cent ;  those  assessed  at  twenty-five  to 
nineteen,  those  assessed  at  twenty  to  fifteen,  those  assessed 
at  fifteen  to  twelve,  those  assessed  at  ten  to  eight,  and 

those  assessed  at  five  to  four.     All  articles  not  enumerated 
27 


41 8  HISTORY  OF  THE  PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

in  the  schedules  of  1846  were  reduced  from  twenty  to 
fifteen  per  cent,  thus  reducing  what  was  most  inaptly  called 
the  revenue  standard  about  five  per  cent.  These  reduc- 
tions were  not  made  without  a  purpose ;  but,  whatsoever 
that  purpose  was,  the  immediate  effect  was  a  reduction  of 
the  revenue — a  consequence  which,  at  the  time,  was  fore- 
told by  the  opponents  of  the  measure,  but  denied,  with 
apparent  indignation,  by  its  friends. 

The  act  was  approved  by  General  Pierce  on  the  last 
night  of  his  administration  —  March  3,  1857 — and  only 
one  day  before  the  administration  of  Mr.  Buchanan  began. 
Possibly,  those  who  directed  the  free-trade  influences  which 
caused  its  passage  were  somewhat  suspicious  of  Mr. 
Buchanan,  and  not  quite  willing  to  trust  his  administration 
upon  such  a  question.  He  had  voted  in  Congress  for  pro- 
tection, and  was  supposed  to  agree  with  the  opinions  which 
had  always  prevailed  in  Pennsylvania  with  regard  to  it. 
He  had  never  given  his  assent  to  free-trade  principles.  In 
order,  therefore,  to  hold  his  administration  in  the  line  of 
policy  which  pointed  to  the  ultimate  triumph  of  those  prin- 
ciples, he  was  compelled,  nolens  volens,  to  submit  to  having 
his  hands  tied,  and  to  give  indorsement  to  a  measure 
which  his  judgment,  if  it  had  been  invoked,  might  have 
condemned.  Howsoever  this  may  have  been,  the  act,  being 
prospective,  took  effect  July  i,  1857  —  the  beginning  of  a 
new  fiscal  year.  Its  effects  may  be  traced  as  easily  as 
those  of  the  act  immediately  preceding  it. 

For  the  previous  year,  ending  June  30,  1857,  the  reve- 
nue from  customs  was  $63,875,905  ;  whereas,  for  the  next 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  419 

year,  1858,  it  was  only  $41,789,620  —  showing  a  decrease 
of  $22,086,225,  during  the  first  year  of  its  operations.  It 
was  increased  during  the  next  year,  1859,  to  $49,565,824, 
and  also  in  1860  to  $53,187,511.  The  decrease,  compared 
with  1857,  continued,  however,  during  both  years.  In  1861 

—  including  that  part  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  from 
March  4  to  June  30  —  and  when  the  Government  needed 
money  more  than  it  had  ever  done  before,  the  revenue  from 
customs  ran  down,  under  this  act,  to  $39,582,125,  or  to 
$23,293,780  less  than  it  was  in  1857  —  the  year  the  act  was 
passed.     The  public  debt  increased,  of  course,  every  year  ; 
but  those  who  were  responsible  for  the  condition  of  affairs 
then  existing,  seem  not  to  have  regarded  that  as  of  conse- 
quence. enough  to  arrest  their  injudicious  tampering  with 
the  interests  and  welfare  of  the  Nation.     While  they  were 
not  willing  openly  to  admit  that  "  a  public  debt  is  a  public 
blessing,"  they  indicated  by  their  conduct  that  they  did  not 
shrink  from  it  as  a  misfortune.     The  public  debt  created 
by  somebody  besides  themselves,  was  horrifying  to  them 

—  -one  of  their  own  contracting  was  not  in  the  least  degree 
alarming.     The  following  table  shows  its  condition,  under 
the  act  of  1857,  up  to  1861,  within  the  period  including 
the  breaking  out  of  the  war  : 


$44,911,881 

58*496,837 
1860  ............................................  64,842,287 

18*1  ............................................    90,580,873 

The  increase  each  year  was  as  steadily  progressive  as 
vegetable  growth.     Any  competent   financial  man  could 


420 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARI^r 


easily  have  foreseen  it,  by  but  little  investigation.  The 
failure  of  the  tariff  of  1846  to  produce  the  necessary 
amount  of  revenue  was  a  fact  so  pa'ipable  that  it  could 
not  be  disguised.  Therefore,  the  re^tition  of  the  same 
folly,  by  passing  the  act  of  1857,  is  %-nly  to  be  accounted 
for  in  one  of  two  ways  ;  it  was  eithev  the  result  of  a  belief 
that  the  bad  consequences  which  had  followed  the  tariff  of 
1846  would  be  removed  by  a  nearer  approach  to  free 
trade,  or  the  increased  embarrassment  of  the  Treasury 
was  premeditated.  No  matter,  however,  what  the  motive 
was,  the  experience  of  the  eleven  years  immediately  pre- 
ceding had  clearly  demonstrated  the  truth  of  the  proposi- 
tion that  a  further  decrease  of  duties  would  result  in  a 
further  decline  of  the  revenue,  and  an  increase  of  the 
public  debt.  But  all  predictions  to  this  effect,  although 
repeatedly  made,  were  of  no  avail.  The  public  interests 
weighed  but  little  in  the  scale  against  the  object  it  was 
designed  to  consummate,  whatever  it  was. 

We  have  just  seen  that  the  public  debt  increased  $45,- 
668,992  from  1858  to  1861.  The  following  table  shows  the 
receipts  from  customs  and  the  expenditures  for  each  of  the 
same  four  years,  together  with  the  relation  they  bore  to 
each  other  at  the  close  of  every  year  : 


RECEIPTS. 

EXPENDITURES. 

EXPENDITURES  OVER 
RECEIPTS. 

18158  . 

541,780,820 

$72,3  3O,437 

$30,540,817 

l8<;q  .  .                     .... 

49,565,824 

66,355,950 

16,790,126 

1860  

53.187,511 

60,056,754 

6,869,243 

1861        

70,582,121; 

62,616.055 

23,033,930 

Totals  

$184,125,080 

4261,350,106 

$77,234,116 

HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  42! 

In  order  to  test  the  merits  or  demerits  of  any  system  of 
tariff  measures,  it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  operations 
of  any  single  year.  If  this  were  not  done,  favorable  or 
unfavorable  years  might  be  selected,  and  thus  false  impres- 
sions might  be  created.  For  example,  a  single  year  when 
importations  were  large  would,  necessarily,  show  a  large 
revenue  ;  whereas,  one  when  they  were  small  would  show 
a  decrease.  Neither  would  furnish  an  accurate  test. 
Therefore,  the  necessity  for  taking  the  whole  series  of  years 
included  in  any  particular  system,  so  that,  by  fixing  a  gen- 
eral average  for  each  year,  the  merits  or  demerits  of  the 
system  will  appear.  We  have  seen  that,  during  the  eleven 
years  of  the  tariff  of  1846,  the  expenditures  exceeded  the 
receipts  $21,790,909.  Of  this  excess  $8,205,305  occurred 
during  the  years  1855,  1856  and  1857  ;  so  that,  when  the 
act  of  1857  was  passed  ;  it  was  perfectly  apparent  that  while 
the  expenditures  were  necessarily  increasing  the  revenue 
was  steadily  diminishing  ;  and  this  must  be  accepted  as  a 
fact,  whether  we  take  these  three  years  or  the  entire  eleven^ 
under  the  operations  of  the  tariff  of  1846.  By  this  method 
of  computation  we  see,  from  the  last  table,  that  for  the  four 
years  of  the  tariff  of  1857,  the  aggregate  receipts  were 
$184,125,080,  and  the  aggregate  expenditures  $261,- 
359,196.  The  expenditures,  consequently,  exceeded  the 
receipts  $77,234,116.  The  tariff  of  1857,  therefore — like 
that  of  1846 — failed  to  produce  revenue  enough  to  meet 
the  wants  of  the  Government,  during  the  four  years  of  its 
operations.  As  a  revenue  measure  it  was  a  greater  and 
more  palpable  failure  than  the  tariff  of  1846.  Taken 


422  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

together  they  constitute  a  system  injurious  alike  to  the 
public  revenue  and  the  country.  No  ingenuity  is  sufficient 
to  invent  a  reasonable  apology  for  it.  The  years  of  its 
existence  stand  alone  in  our  history,  condemned  by  all 
experience. 

As  these  two  acts  were  passed  professedly  for  revenue 
only — which  purpose  was  exultingly  announced — it  is  fair 
to  test  their  merits  by  observing  the  effects  they  pro- 
duced within  the  period  of  their  existence.  Together, 
they  were  in  operation  fifteen  years,  from  1847  to  1861. 
During  that  time  the  aggregate  receipts  from  customs 
amounted  to  $708,082,948,  and  the  aggregate  expendi- 
tures to  $807,107,973;  consequently,  the  expenditures 
exceeded  the  receipts  $99,025,025.  The  annual  average 
expenditure,  during  these  fifteen  years,  was  a  little  over 
$53,000,000;  so  that  the  excess  of  expenditures  over  re- 
ceipts was  nearly  as  much  as  two  entire  years  of  ex- 
penses. Such  financiering  as  this  had  one  effect  if  no 
other — that  was,  to  leave  the  Treasury  in  a  totally  unfit 
condition  for  a  state  of  war.  How  different  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  would  have  been  if  these  laws  had  not 
been  passed!  If  the  duties  had  remained  as  they  were 
fixed  by  the  tariff  of  1842,  there  would  have  been  an 
abundance  of  revenue,  the  public  debt  would  have  all 
been  extinguished,  and  the  Treasury  abundantly  able 
to  furnish  the  means  accessary  to  defend  the  Nation's 
life.  As  we  look  back  upon  these  things,  it  is  impos- 
sible not  to  see  how  the  country  was  misled  by  the  pre- 
tenses of  the  advocates  of  free  trade  and  low  duties. 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  423 

Instead  of  raising  money  enough  to  support  the  Govern- 
ment, even  during  the  period  of  peace,  a  system  of  duties 
was  contrived  which  diminished  the  revenue,  while,  at  the 
same  time,  the  expenditures  were  made  to  exceed  it — 
thereby  increasing  the  public  debt  from  $15,550,202  in 
1846  to  $90,580,873  in  1861. 

If  advantages  are  conferred  upon  the  country  by  reck- 
lessly plunging  the  Government  into  debt,  then  the  bene- 
fits resulting  from  this  system  are  perfectly  apparent. 
But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  best  interests  of  the  Nation 
demand  that  the  Government  shall  be  well  and  pru- 
dently managed,  its  credit  preserved  and  its  honor  un- 
tarnished, its  commerce  kept  in  a  healthy  condition  and 
its  immense  natural  resources  developed,  then  these 
measures  of  policy  stand  without  excuse,  and  display 
not  the  wisdom  of  statesmanship,  but  the  quackery  of 
scheming  politicians.  If  this  is  the  only  banquet  to 
which  the  advocates  of  free  trade  propose  to  invite  us, 
the  best  interests  of  every  section  of  the  Union  require 
that  we  shall  respectfully  decline  their  invitation. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

TREASURY  ALMOST  BANKRUPT  UNDER  BUCHANAN— LOANS  ABSO- 
LUTELY NECESSARY— PUBLIC  CREDIT  SERIOUSLY  IMPAIRED— 
DIFFICULTY  OF  BORROWING— LARGE  INTEREST  PAID  — RE- 
CEIPTS—DUTIABLE  ARTICLES— IMPROVED  CONDITION  OF 
TREASURY  BY  REPEAL  OF  TARIFFS  OF  1846  AND  1857— THAT 
REPEAL  AND  THE  TARIFF  OF  1861  A  NECESSITY  —  FURTHER 
COMPARISON  OF  THE  TWO  SYSTEMS. 

HPHE  embarrassed  condition  of  the  Treasury,  occasioned 
by  injudicious  tampering  with  the  long-sanctioned  and 
settled  policy  of  the  Government,  compelled  the  adminis- 
tration of  Mr.  Buchanan  to  admit  the  necessity  of  borrow- 
ing money  in  order  to  save  the  public  credit,  which  the 
measures  established  and  persistently  adhered  to  by  the 
supporters  of  free  trade  had  seriously  imperiled.  Ac- 
cordingly, in  June,  1860,  Congress  authorized  a  loan  of 
$20,000,000 — that  is,  the  Government  was  compelled  to 
borrow  that  much  money,  to  be  added  to  the  public  debt, 
in  order  to  supply  the  deficiency  in  the  Treasury  occa- 
sioned by  the  low  duties  of  the  tariff  of  1846  and  the  still 
lower  duties  of  that  of  1857.  It  having  been  demon- 
strated, by  the  experience  of  a  few  years,  how  incompetent 
they  were  to  produce  a  sufficiency  of  revenue  to  supply 
the  wants  of  the  Treasury — even  under  administrations 
controlled  by  their  friends — it  became  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  bridge  over  the  difficulty  by  supplying  the  deficiency 

424 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  425 

with  borrowed  money.  An  individual  debtor  may  some- 
times save  himself  from  bankruptcy  by  this  means  ;  but  it 
is  necessarily  injurious  to  a  Government  to  be  compelled 
to  do  so  in  time  of  peace.  In  this  particular  instance,  it 
could  not  have  been  avoided,  at  the  time,  but  the  condition 
of  affairs,  which  created  the  necessity  for  it,  was  brought 
about  in  the  face  of  past  experience,  and  of  the  well-estab- 
lished fact  that  properly  graduated  and  discriminating 
duties,  laid  with  reference  to  national  and  not  sectional 
interests,  could  be  always  relied  on  for  a  certain  and 
steady  supply  of  the  necessary  amount  of  revenue.  To 
disregard  and  defy  such  experience  as  this,  and  to  trifle 
with  a  nation's  welfare  by  crude  and  ill-timed  experiments 
with  its  credit  and  interests,  although  not  criminal  by  any 
statute,  ought  to  be  condemned  by  the  whole  country. 
There  have  been  very  few  times  in  our  history  when  the 
necessity  for  prudent  financial  management  was  greater 
than  at  the  end  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Presidential  term,  yet 
he  was  compelled  by  these  ruinous  experiments,  to  turn 
the  Government  over  to  his  successor  with  its  credit  almost 
entirely  destroyed — the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  policy 
which  had  caused  its  revenues  to  fall  below  its  expendi- 
tures, and  at  the  time  when  one  of  the  most  terrible  civil 
wars  of  modern  times  was  about  to  break  out.  No  matter 
whether  this  condition  of  the  Treasury  was  foreseen  or 
not,  or  whether  the  existing  measures  were  designed  for 
that  purpose  or  not,  the  consequences  produced  by  them 
were  such  that  the  credit  of  the  Government  was  seriously 
threatened  with  ruin.  Nor  is  there  any  satisfaction  in 


426  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

knowing,  as  we  now  do,  that,  among  these  consequences, 
there  has  fallen  upon  those  who  mainly  planned  and  plot- 
ted the  policy  which  produced  them,  a  series  of  desolations 
which  make  the  heart  sick.  Patriotism  does  not  require 
any  exultation  because  of  this,  but  imperiously  demands 
that,  in  the  future,  there  shall  be  such  union  of  sentiment 
and  action,  among  the  people  of  all  the  sections,  as  shall 
render  the  repetition  of  such  policy  impossible. 

In  October,  1860,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury — Mr. 
Howell  Cobb,  of  Georgia,  who  had  largely  contributed  to 
the  results  then  existing  —  offered  for  sale  $10,000,000  of 
five  per  cent  Government  stocks,  half  of  the  $20,000,000 
authorized  by  Congress.  Bids  were  made  for  this  at  a 
small  premium,  but  only  a  portion  of  it  was  realized,  on 
account  of  some  of  the  bidders  having  withdrawn  their 
offers.  Congress  was,  consequently,  compelled  to  pass  a 
law  in  December,  1860,  authorizing  the  issue  of  $10,000,- 
ooo  of  Treasury  notes,  as  another  expedient  for  borrowing 
money.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  at  once  offered 
$5,000,000  of  these  notes  for  sale,  which  had  the  effect  of 
demonstrating  the  humiliating  fact  that  the  credit  of  the 
Government  was  lower  than  that  of  many  individual  citi- 
zens. Bids  were  made  for  only  $500,000  of  the  $5,000,000, 
and  these  at  varying  rates  of  discount — some  thirty-six, 
some  twenty-four,  and  the  lowest  twelve  per  cent  discount. 
As  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  raise  money  to  pay  the 
interest  upon  the  public  debt  due  January  i,  1861,  the 
Secretary  closed  the  $500,000  loan  at  twelve  per  cent. 
This,  however,  fell  short  of  the  necessary  amount,  and  to 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  427 

prevent  the  Government  from  failing  in  the  payment  of 
the  interest,  a  loan  of  $1,500,000  was  made  of  a  syndicate 
of  banks  and  bankers  at  twelve  per  cent.  In  a  short  time 
the  remainder  of  the  Treasury  notes  were  disposed  of,  at 
the  same  rate  and  to  the  same  syndicate.  And  by  these 
means  only  was  the  Government  enabled  to  obtain  relief 
from  the  financial  pressure.  It  had  to  be  done  by  borrow- 
ing money  upon  such  terms,  and  such  a  rate  of  discount 
as  would  drive  almost  any  business  man  into  insolvency. 
But  even  this  relief  was,  at  most,  a  mere  temporary 
expedient.  And  not  the  least  humiliating  feature  of  it  was 
the  fact  that,  at  the  same  time,  the  State  of  New  York 
sold  $1,200,000  of  her  State  bonds  for  premiums  varying 
from  one  and  a  half  to  two  and  a  half  per  cent. 

In  January  the  Secretary  offered  another  loan  of  $5,000,- 
ooo,  and  received  bids  varying  from  eight  and  three-fourths 
to  eleven  per  cent  discount.  The  credit  of  the  National 
Government  being  thus  reduced  below  that  of  the  States, 
it  became  apparent  that  the  only  thing  that  would  put  it  in 
a  condition  to  preserve  itself  and  defend  its  life  in  case  of 
attack,  would  be  an  increase  of  tariff  duties  and  the 
restoration  of  the  old  system  of  raising  revenue,  by  laws 
providing  for  both  revenue  and  protection.  Accordingly, 
the  Tariff  Act  of  March  2,  1861,  was  passed  and  approved 
by  Mr.  Buchanan  ;  and,  on  account  of  the  increasing 
expenditures  made  necessary  by  the  war,  another  was 
passed  in  August,  1861,  which  was  approved  by  Mr. 
Lincoln.  These  acts  not  only  increased  the  duties  but  dis- 
criminated for  protection,  in  accordance  with  the  methods 


428  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

and  principles  which  had  prevailed  under  the  act  of  1842, 
and  all  previous  tariff  laws,  and  which  had  never  been 
disturbed  from  the  beginning  of  the  Government,  until  the 
passage  of  the  Compromise  Act  of  1833. 

To  trace  in  detail  the  effects  of  these  last  named  acts, 
upon  the  National  Treasury  and  the  credit  of  the  Govern- 
ment, would  involve  inquiries  not  at  all  necessary,  inas- 
much as  we  are  now  so  immediately  in  their  presence,  that 
those  who  do  not  see  them  must  intentionally  shut  their 
eyes.  It  is  sufficient  for  all  present  purposes,  to  say  that 
the  Government  never  had  better  credit  than  it  now  has, 
under  their  operations,  and  that,  in  this  respect,  it  is  not 
surpassed  by  any  government  in  the  world.  It  has  reduced 
the  rate  of  interest  upon  its  bonds  to  three  per  cent  only, 
and  is  enabled  to  sell  them  without  difficulty  in  any  of  the 
commercial  centers  in  the  world.  It  has  extinguished  an 
enormous  amount  of  its  war  debt.  And  yet  the  Treasury 
has  been  filled  to  such  overflowing  with  gold  and  silver  that 
additional  vaults  have  been  required  for  its  safe-keeping, 
while  more  than  a  hundred  clerks  are  kept  at  work  to 
count  and  arrange  the  greenbacks  and  national  bank  notes 
that  are  constantly  flowing  in  and  out  of  the  Treasury. 

It  is  not  practicable  to  apply  the  same  test  to  the  tariff 
of  1 86 1  and  the  amendment  since  made,  that  has  been  ap- 
plied to  the  acts  of  1846  and  1857  —  that  is,  a  mere  com- 
parison of  the  receipts  and  expenditures — for  the  reason 
that  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  latter  have  been  occa- 
sioned by  the  war,  and  it  is  impossible  to  make  even  an  ap- 
proximate estimate  of  what  they  would  have  been  without 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 


429 


it.  However,  the  beneficial  operations  of  the  system  now 
in  existence  may  be  seen  in  the  general  effect  upon  the 
revenue  for  a  series  of  years,  ending  with  1880,  as  a  period 
most  suitable  to  a  comparison  based  upon  the  value  of  the 
dutiable  articles.  The  following  table  shows  how  much  has 
been  received  from  customs  from  1861  to  1880,  including 
the  period  of  the  war  when  the  importations  to  the  States 
at  war  with  the  Union  had  ceased,  in  so  far  as  they  bore 
any  relation  to  the  national  revenue.  It  also  shows  the 
value  of  the  dutiable  articles  upon  which  this  revenue  was 
assessed : 


RECEIPTS  FROM 
CUSTOMS. 

VALUE  OF  DUTIABLE 
ARTICLES. 

1862    

$40,056,707 

$2O5,77I,72Q 

1867. 

60,050,642 

2^2.QIO.O2O 

1864. 

102,316,152 

3dQ.c62.8oC 

1865  

84,928,260 

24&.CC.5.6C2 

1866                              

1  70,04.6,6  5  i 

44.ce  1  2,  1  58 

1867  

176,417,810 

417,831,571 

1868  

1  64,464,  5QQ 

37  1,  624,808 

1869... 

180,048,426 

437,314,255 

1870. 

104,538,374 

462,354,651 

1871.. 

206,270,408 

541,403,708 

1872. 

216,370,286 

640,338,766 

1873..                                       

188,089,522 

663,617,147 

1874  

163,103,833 

595.685,754 

l8?5. 

1  57,  167,722 

547,O5O,Il8 

1876.  ,                            

148,071,984 

476,677,871 

1877.. 

I3O,g56,4Q3 

480,517,489 

1878  

I3O,I7O,68O 

466,872,846 

1870... 

I37,25O,O47 

466,073,775 

1880  

I86,q22,o64 

667,954,746 

Total  

$2,863,840,370 

$8,667,030,850 

This  table  shows  that,  in  the  foregoing  nineteen  years, 
notwithstanding  the  war,  the  Government  received  revenue 
from  customs  alone,  amounting  in  the  aggregate  to  $2,863,- 
849,370,  which  is  $122,994,620  more  than  the  public  debt 


430  HISTORY  OF  THE  PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

in  October,  1865,  after  the  close  of  the  war.  The  annual 
average  receipts  exceeded  $150,700,000.  It  also  shows 
that  this  large  amount  of  revenue  was  paid  upon  dutiable 
articles  of  the  value  of  $8,667,939,859,  under  the  opera- 
tions of  the  protective  tariff  of  1861,  and  its  amendments, 
—  thus  furnishing  positive  contradiction  to  the  pretense, 
so  frequently  proclaimed  by  the  friends  of  free  trade,  that 
protection  decreases  the  revenue  by  prohibiting  or  lessen- 
ing importations. 

But  this  table  serves  another  purpose.  It  furnishes 
additional  means  of  comparing  the  effects  of  the  two 
systems  upon  the  revenue ;  that  is,  the  protective  system 
under  the  act  of  1861,  with  its  amendments,  and  that  pro- 
fessedly for  revenue  alone,  under  the  provisions,  and  at 
the  rates  of  duties,  prescribed  by  the  acts  of  1846  and 
1857.  Thus  : — If  the  tariff  of  1846  had  continued  in  force 
during  these  nineteen  years,  and  the  same  amount  of 
dutiable  articles  had  been  assessed  under  it  —  taking  the 
average  rate  of  duty  at  twenty-four  per  cent — the  amount 
produced  would  have  been  $2,080,305,566,  or  $783,543,- 
804  less  than  has  actually  been  paid  into  the  Treasury, 
which  would  have  made  the  public  debt  in  1880  that  much 
greater  than  it  really  was.  Or,  if  the  tariff  of  1857  had 
continued  in  force,  and  the  duties  had  been  assessed  under 
it  —  taking  the  average  at  what  has  been  called  the  reve- 
nue standard  of  twenty  per  cent — the  amount  produced 
would  have  been  only  $1,733,587,971,  or  $1,130,261,399 
less  than  was  received,  which  would  have  made  the  public 
debt  in  1880  that  much  greater  than  it  was.  If  the 


HISTORY   OF  THE  PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  43! 

question  of  revenue  were  alone  to  be  considered,  this 
comparison  is  conclusive  in  favor  of  the  protective  system. 
The  amount  of  importations  and,  consequently,  the 
receipts  from  customs  must  depend  upon  the  value  of  the 
commerce  carried  on  —  being  more  or  less  as  that  shall 
increase  or  diminish.  When  the  revenue  is  cut  short  by  a 
declining  commerce,  it  indicates  that  trade  and  labor  are 
not  in  a  healthy  condition  —  not  properly  protected.  Fluc- 
tuations, of  course,  constantly  occur,  and  these  render  the 
prospective  amount  of  revenue  always  uncertain,  so  that 
it  cannot  be  estimated  with  entire  accuracy  in  advance. 
Upon  any  given  amount  of  actual  importations  it  is  per- 
fectly certain  that  high  duties  will  produce  more  revenue 
than  low  ones.  It  is  a  very  simple  proposition,  that  if  we 
had  a  fixed  amount  of  importations  upon  which  to  raise 
revenue,  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  deciding  the  rate 
of  duties  necessary  to  raise  any  given  sum  for  the  support 
of  the  Government  It  would  be  like  calculating  the 
income  upon  an  investment  at  a  fixed  interest.  But  as 
importations  increase  or  decrease  according  to  the  condi- 
tion of  commerce,  it  must  be  evident  that  in  the  regulation 
of  duties,  the  question  is  not  simply  whether  they  shall  be 
high  or  low,  but  how  they  will  contribute  to  the  increase  or 
decrease  of  commerce.  In  1871  the  dutiable  articles 
amounted  to  $541,493,708,  upon  which  $206,270,408  of 
revenue  were  collected — whereas,  in  1880,  the  dutiable 
articles  amounted  to  $667,954,746,  and  the  amount  of 
revenue  collected  was  only  $186,522,064.  This  shows  the 
varying  operation  of  duties,  accordingly  as  they  are  high 


43?  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

or  low,  upon  any  given  amount  of  importations.  And  it 
furnishes  the  means  also  of  comparing  discriminating  and 
specific  duties  with  those  fixed  at  a  horizontal  standard,  a*s 
regards  their  relative  effect  upon  revenue.  If,  during  the 
years  above  named,  a  horizontal  standard  had  been  estab- 
lished —  say  twenty  per  cent,  as  contemplated  by  the  acts 
of  1833,  1846  and  1857,  for  the  revenue  standard — the 
revenue  for  1871  would  have  been  only  $108,298,741,  and 
for  1880  only  $133,590,949.  It  would  then  have  fallen 
short  of  the  expenditures  for  each  year  —  in  1871, 
$56,122,766,  and  in  1880,  $38,294,433.  And  the  same 
process  of  comparison  may  be  applied  to  each  of  the  years 
since  the  war — showing,  in  addition  to  what  has  already 
been  made  to  appear,  how  the  Government  would  have 
been  embarrassed  if  the  acts  of  1846  and  1857  had  not 
been  superseded  by  that  of  1861  with  its  amendments. 

Notwithstanding  the  large  importations  during  the 
years  from  1846  to  1860 — occasioned  mainly  by  the  con- 
struction of  railroads  and  the  commerce  created  by  them 
— the  revenue  reached  its  lowest  point  of  decline  in  the 
latter  year,  when  the  credit  of  the  Government  was  seri- 
ously impaired.  In  every  point  of  view,  therefore,  in 
which  the  matter  can  be  rightfully  considered,  it  is  per- 
fectly apparent  that,  if  the  acts  of  1846  and  1857  had 
remained  unchanged,  and  that  of  1861  had  not  been 
passed,  the  Government  credit  would  have  been  entirely 
destroyed  and  it  could  not  have  carried  on  the  war  for 
the  defense  of  its  life.  Or,  if  the  patriotism  of  the 
country  had  been  ardent  enough  to  carry  it  on  notwith- 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  433 

standing  a  bankrupt  Treasury,  its  close  would  have  been 
reached  with  a  public  debt  far  greater  than  it  was.  The 
conclusion,  therefore,  is  fully  justified,  that  the  tariff  legis- 
lation, at  the  beginning  of  and  since  the  war,  has  been 
the  result  of  absolute  necessity.  The  fruits  of  it  are  stiH 
seen  in  the  unexampled  decrease  of  the  public  debt,  the 
abundance  of  revenue  for  all  Government  expenditures, 
and  the  large  accumulation  of  gold  and  silver  in  the 
vaults  of  the  Treasury. 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

ADVANTAGES  OF  A  PROTECTIVE  OVER  A  REVENUE  TARIFF  - 
OPERATIONS  FOR  A  SERIES  OF  YEARS— COMMERCE— CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL OBLIGATION  TO  REGULATE  IT— REGULATED  BY 
PROTECTION  — THIS  INCREASES  OUR  ABILITY  TO  CARRY  IT 
ON  — CONSTITUTIONAL  POWER  TO  TAX  GIVES  NO  AUTHORITY 
TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE— THE  LATTER  AN  EXPRESS  POWER 
—  NOT  INCIDENTAL— RULE  OF  INTERPRETATION  — EXAMPLE 
FROM  THE  "CONFEDERATE  STATES'"  CONSTITUTION. 

"\  X  7"E  must  not  fail  to  give  due  consideration  to  the 
question  of  revenue,  when  deciding  upon  the  prin- 
ciples to  be  embodied  in  our  tariff  legislation.  Money 
being  absolutely  necessary  to  the  support  of  the  Govern- 
ment, the  obligation  to  raise  it  for  that  purpose  is  not 
only  imperative,  but  primary.  Without  it  the  Govern- 
ment must  necessarily  come  to  an  end.  Hence,  it  has 
been  deemed  necessary,  in  the  prosecution  of  these  in- 
quiries, to  compare  the  two  systems,  protective  and  non- 
protective,  in  their  effects  upon  the  revenue  alone.  This 
could  only  be  done  by  showing,  for  a  series  of  years, 
the  operations  of  each,  in  order  to  demonstrate,  as  has 
been  done,  that  the  former  system  may  be  relied  upon 
to  furnish  a  sufficiency  of  revenue,  while  the  latter  can 
not  On  this  account  the  conclusion  has  been  reached 
that  the  system  in  operation  under  the  existing  tariff 
laws  was  established  from  necessity.  And  if  this  con- 

434 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  435 

elusion  is  justified,  it  logically  follows  that  the  system 
should  be  preserved  until  the  entire  removal  of  the 
necessity  which  brought  it  into  existence.  A  partial  re- 
moval of  it  may  warrant  some  modification  of  the  rates 
of  duties,  so  as  to  prevent  an  undue  accumulation  of 
revenue  in  the  Treasury,  either  for  distribution,  the  en- 
couragement of  reckless  expenditures,  or  to  be  quar- 
reled over.  But,  manifestly,  in  view  of  the  past  experi- 
ence of  the  Government,  it  would  be  unwise  and  greatly 
injurious  to  the  public  interests,  either  to  abandon  or 
endanger  the  principle  of  protection.  Besides  the  gen- 
eral reasoning  already  employed  to  prove  the  necessity 
of  that  principle,  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  that  it  is  the 
imperative  duty  of  the  Government  to  maintain  it.  If  it 
be  true  that  it  gives  assurance  of  a  sufficiency  of  revenue, 
by  means  of  the  increase  of  domestic  commerce,  then  what- 
soever shall  so  develop  our  internal  resources  as  to  pro- 
duce this  increase,  is  as  much  obligatory  upon  the  Govern- 
ment as  it  is  to  raise  revenue  for  its  own  support.  Not 
only  has  this  been  frequently  asserted  by  the  early  Presi- 
dents and  leading  statesmen  of  the  country,  but  no  in- 
genuity has  yet  been  great  enough  to  successfully  assail 
the  proposition. 

We  cannot  safely  or  wisely  overlook  our  domestic  com- 
merce, or  fail  to  realize  the  obligation  to  increase  it  by 
proper  encouragement  to  all  the  sources  of  its  develop- 
ment. Upon  it  alone  does  our  strength  as  a  nation  depend ; 
for  history  establishes  no  proposition  more  clearly  than  that 
nations  are  short  lived  wheresoever  they  have  allowed  their 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

populations  to  sink  into  imbecility,  for  the  want  ot  proper 
industrial  development.  By  means  of  it  we  are  enabled  to 
carry  on  commerce  with  other  nations  ;  and  he  must  have  a 
very  obtuse  mind  who  does  not  know  that,  in  order  to  keep 
pace  with  those  nations,  we  must  take  care  so  to  reward 
our  home  industry  as  to  derive  from  our  domestic  com- 
merce the  ability  to  hold  intercourse  with  them  upon  equal 
terms.  We  do  not  do  this  when,  in  fixing  the  rates  of  tariff 
duties,  we  look  to  the  question  of  revenue  alone  ;  for  that 
confines  us  exclusively  to  a  consideration  of  the  purchase 
of  imported  articles,  and  omits  any  view  of  our  ability  to 
pay  for  them.  A  man  who,  in  conducting  his  individual 
affairs,  buys  more  than  he  is  able  to  pay  for,  will  assuredly 
reach  insolvency  in  the  end,  no  matter  what  his  wealth. 
The  rule  applies  equally  to  the  aggregate  communities  who 
constitute  nations,  with  regard  to  their  commercial  inter- 
course with  other  countries.  If  we  follow  the  advice  of 
those  who  desire  that  duties  shall  be  laid  for  revenue  alone, 
and  neglect  to  consider  our  ability  to  purchase  and  pay  for 
the  imported  articles  we  buy  from  abroad,  our  policy  is 
necessarily  short-sighted  in  this :  that  we  omit  any  con- 
sideration of  the  question  whether  the  balance  of  trade  is 
for  or  against  us  —  in  other  words,  whether  we  are  or  are 
not  able  to  pay  for  what  we  buy  from  abroad.  Whensoever, 
in  our  past  experience,  we  have  found  ourselves  in  debt 
beyond  our  ability  to  pay,  we  have  been  confronted  by  the 
impairment  of  our  national  credit ;  and  the  Government, 
in  consequence  of  diminished  importations,  in  some  cases, 
and  unnecessarily  low  duties  in  others,  has  been  left  without 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  437 

revenue  enough  for  its  support.     Our  experience  under 
the  revenue  tariffs  of  1846  and  1857  attests  this. 

The  policy  of  protection  does  not  look  to  prohibition, 
as  is  often  argued  by  its  adversaries,  for  that,  by  cutting  off 
importations,  would  destroy  revenue.  Nor  does  it  look  to 
the  question  of  revenue  alone,  for  that  would  put  out  of 
view  our  ability  to  pay  for  what  we  buy  of  foreign  countries. 
But  it  involves  both  the  necessities  of  the  Government  for 
revenue,  as  a  primary  duty,  and  the  condition  and  develop- 
ment of  our  domestic  industry  and  commerce ;  in  other 
words,  the  proper  reward  of  labor,  as  the  basis  of  our 
internal  prosperity.  It  is  in  this  way  that  protection 
develops  our  natural  resources,  encourages  all  the  depart- 
ments of  industry — agricultural,  manufacturing,  mechanical 
and  commercial — and  enables  us,  not  only  to  buy  from 
abroad,  but  to  sell  also,  and,  by  that  means,  to  pay  for 
what  we  buy  with  the  products  of  our  own  industry,  and 
thus  keep  our  importations  at  a  healthy  point.  If  we  buy 
beyond  our  means  to  pay  we  get  poorer ;  if  we  sell  more 
than  we  buy  we  get  richer.  Consequently,  our  prosperity 
is  not  determined  merely  by  the  amount  of  our  importa- 
tions, but  by  our  ability  to  pay  for  them.  If  they  exceed  our 
means  of  payment,  we  become  in  debt  to  foreign  countries, 
and  the  balance  of  trade  is  that  much  against  us.  If  what 
we  export  and  sell  abroad  exceeds  our  importations,  then 
foreign  countries  become  indebted  to  us  to  the  amount  of 
that  excess,  and  the  balance  of  trade  is  that  much  in  our 
favor.  Large  importations,  when  they  exceed  our  exports, 
show  an  unhealthy  condition  of  domestic  trade,  although 


438  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

they  may,  at  the  same  time,  produce  a  large  amount  of 
revenue.  In  this  case,  the  Government  is  assured,  for  the 
time  being,  of  the  means  of  support,  but  the  country  is 
getting  poorer.  When,  however,  our  exports  exceed  our 
imports,  our  domestic  trade  is  healthy,  no  matter  what  the 
extent  of  the  importations,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  Gov- 
ernment is  supplied  with  an  abundant  revenue.  Not  only 
is  the  Government  supported,  but  the  country  is  getting 
richer. 

In  regulating  tariff  duties  it  should  always  be  remem- 
bered that  the  protective  policy  was  established  by  the 
framers  of  the  Government,  with  the  special  view  of  pro- 
ducing these  results.  It  has  had  that  effect,  and  has,  conse- 
quently, made  us  a  great  nation.  We  could  not  have 
been  so  without  it ;  and  if,  by  any  possibility  in  the  future, 
it  shall  be  abandoned,  our  rapid  decline  may  be  dated  from 
that  period.  The  Government  was  not  made  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  raising  revenue,  in  order  that  an  oligarchy  of 
office-holders,  with  interests  foreign  from  those  of  the 
people,  shall  be  established.  It  was  created  for  other  and 
far  higher  purposes,  which  are  expressed  in  the  preamble 
to  the  Constitution  in  words  full  of  meaning — a  part  of  the 
Constitution  too  frequently  disregarded  in  the  search  after 
special  rules  of  interpretation.  When  we  come  to  compre- 
hend these  purposes,  in  their  full  length  and  breadth,  we 
shall  realize  the  extent  of  the  obligation  which  imposes 
upon  Congress  the  duty  of  protection. 

The  powers  are  given  to  Congress,  "  to  lay  and  collect 
taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts  and 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  439 

provide  for  the  common  defense  and  general  welfare  of 
the  United  States."  Here  the  words  "common  defense" 
and  "  general  welfare "  are  repeated  from  the  preamble, 
showing  that  these  objects  were  the  central  ideas  of  the 
constitutional  system  of  Government,  as  distinguished  from 
that  previously  existing.  They  were  never  to  be  lost  sight 
of,  but  provided  for  by  laying  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and 
excises,  and  by  such  other  enumerated  means  as  were  nec- 
essary to  these  purposes,  whensoever  required.  But  the 
strict  construction  theory,  which  is  employed  in  opposition 
to  protection,  goes  to  the  extent  of  denying  to  Congress 
the  power  to  lay  taxes,  duties,  etc.,  except  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  paying  the  debts.  And  thus  the  conclusion  is 
reached  that,  under  no  circumstances,  can  any  tariff  law  be 
constitutionally  passed,  unless  its  object  shall  be  revenue 
exclusively.  This  imposes  undue  and  injurious  limitation 
upon  the  powers  of  the  Government,  and  leaves  it  without 
the  means  of  giving  patronage  and  protection  to  the  indus- 
trial interests  of  the  country. 

Undoubtedly,  the  Constitution  must  mean  that  Con- 
gress may  lay  duties  under  one  distinct  grant  of  power — 
pay  the  debts  under  aroother — and  employ  these  and  such 
other  powers  as  shall  be  required  to  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defense  and  general  welfare.  These  last  words  do 
not  grant  any  special  and  independent  power,  but  rather 
express  the  purpose  for  which  the  powers  are  granted. 
By  their  natural  meaning  they  involve  comprehensiveness, 
and  must  be  interpreted  as  expressing  the  results  which 
were  expected  to  follow  the  exercise  of  the  collective 


440  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

powers  granted  to  Congress.  Congress  may  "  borrow 
money,"  "  establish  postoffices,"  "  raise  and  support 
armies,"  "  provide  and  maintain  a  navy,"  etc.  When  and 
under  what  circumstances  may  any  or  all  of  these  things 
be  done  by  Congress,  under  these  special  grants  of 
power?  The  answer  is  plain:  When  "the  common  de- 
fense and  general  welfare "  shall  require  it ;  and  thus  a 
nation;  with  powers  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  provide 
for  the  wants  of  the  Union  and  for  the  public  good,  was 
substituted  for  the  old  Confederation,  which  did  not  possess 
these  powers.  Consequently,  whensoever  it  becomes  nec- 
essary so  to  employ  the  express  power  "to  regulate  com- 
merce with  foreign  nations"  as  to  protect  our  own  industry 
from  ruinous  or  injurious  foreign  competition,  then  it 
becomes  one  of  the  means  of  providing  for  the  common 
defense  and  general  welfare.  This  power  being  granted, 
along  with  others,  for  a  common  purpose,  its  exercise 
is  obligatory  when  the  condition  of  the  country  shall  re- 
quire it. 

Commerce  with  foreign  nations  is  both  traffic  and  inter- 
course. Buying  their  productions  from  them,  and  selling 
ours  to  them  constitute  its  essence.  It  embraces  ships  as 
the  means  of  transportation,  as  well  as  the  cargoes  they 
contain,  and  the  seamen  who  navigate  them.  It  includes 
all  the  means  by  which  intercourse  is  carried  on.  It  is  reg- 
ulated by  prescribing  the  rules,  terms  and  conditions  under 
which  it  shall  be  conducted.  All  our  embargo  laws,  under 
each  of  the  administrations  of  Washington,  Jefferson,  and 
Madison  — whereby  our  own  vessels  were  not  allowed  to 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  44! 

depart  from  our  own  ports — were  enacted  by  the  exercise 
of  the  power  to  regulate  commerce.  And  it  is  equally 
within  this  power  to  say  upon  what  terms  and  conditions 
foreign  vessels  shall  enter  our  ports  and  discharge  their 
cargoes,  brought  from  foreign  countries,  for  sale  in  our 
markets.  If,  in  deciding  this  question,  we  allow  them  to  do 
so  free  and  without  the  payment  of  any  duty,'  we  must  then 
raise  the  necessary  revenue  for  the  support  of  the  Govern- 
ment by  direct  internal  taxation.  If  we  look  alone  to 
revenue,  and  regulate  foreign  commerce  accordingly,  we 
abandon  our  domestic  commerce  by  either  putting  foreign 
commerce  upon  a  precise  equality  with  it,  or  give  it  pref- 
erence in  our  own  markets.  But  if,  in  addition  to  revenue 
duties,  we  also  impose  such  others  as  will  give  domestic 
commerce  preference  over  foreign,  then  we  have  not  only 
secured  the  necessary  amount  of  revenue  to  support  the 
Government,  but  have  obeyed  the  obligation  imposed  by 
the  Constitution,  which  requires  that  we  shall  "  provide  for 
the  common  defense  and  general  welfare"  —  not  inde- 
pendently, as  if  that  were  an  express  grant  of  power  for 
that  purpose,  but  as  a  necessary  incident  to  the  express 
and  specifically  granted  power  "to  regulate  commerce  with 
foreign  nations."  This  is  what  Mr.  Madison  meant  when, 
in  the  debate  in  the  first  Congress,  he  defended  protection 
to  manufactures  upon  the  ground  that  the  power  to  regu- 
late commerce  had  been  taken  from  the  States  and  given 
to  Congress  for  that  express  purpose.  And  we  have  here- 
tofore seen  that  General  Jackson  meant  the  same  thing 
when  he  adopted  and  substantially  repeated  Mr.  Madison's 


442  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

argument  in  his  message  of  1830,  in  these  words,  which 
deserve  to  be  repeated  here : 

"  The  power  to  impose  duties  on  imports  originally  belonged  to  the 
States.  The  right  to  adjust  those  duties  with  a  view  to  the  encourage- 
ment of  domestic  branches  of  industry p,  is  so  completely  identical  with  that 
power,  that  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  the  existence  of  the  one  without  the 
other.  The  States  have  delegated  their  whole  authority  over  imports  to 
the  general  Government,  without  limitation  or  restriction,  saving  the  very 
inconsiderable  reservation  relating  to  the  inspection  laws.  This  authority 
having  thus  entirely  passed  from  the  States,  the  right  to  exercise  it  for 
the  purpose  of  protection  does  not  exist  in  them;  and  consequently,  if  it  be 
not  possessed  by  the  general  Government,  it  must  be  extinct.  Our  political 
system  would  thus  present  the  anomaly  of  a  people  stripped  of  the  right 
to  foster  their  own  industry,  and  to  counteract  the  most  selfish  and 
destructive  policy  which  might  be  adopted  by  foreign  nations.  This 
surely  cannot  be  the  case  ;  this  indispensable  power,  thus  surrendered  by 
the  States,  must  be  within  the  scope  of  the  authority  on  the  subject  expressly 
delegated  to  Congress. ' ' 

The  powers  of  Congress  are  both  express  and  implied. 
Before  the  late  civil  war  there  were  some  who  controverted 
this  to  the  extent  of  denying  entirely  the  existence  of 
implied  powers,  but  since  then,  the  number  of  these  has 
been  so  reduced  as  to  leave  the  general  proposition  here 
stated  almost  entirely  acknowledged.  The  supporters  of 
a  tariff  for  revenue  only  claim  to  be  strict  constructionists, 
and  there  ought  to  be  no  disposition  to  impeach  their  sin- 
cerity in  this.  Nevertheless,  as  the  bulk  of  them  do  not 
deny  that  there  are  some  implied  powers  —  but  insist 
merely  that  they  are  not  substantial  and  independent  — 
their  arguments  do  not  weaken  the  proposition  that  implied 
powers,  when  they  do  exist,  may  be  rightfully  exercised  by 
Congress  to  such  extent  as  the  " general  welfare"  shall 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  443 

demand.  If  this  were  not  so,  the  Constitution  has  been 
violated  in  innumerable  instances  and  under  every  admin- 
istration. 

The  power  to  lay  import  duties  is  expressly  granted ; 
but  according  to  the  strict-construction  theory  of  some  who 
advocate  a  tariff  for  revenue  merely — as  we  have  seen  — 
this  is  an  essential  part  of  the  taxing  power,  and  can  only 
be  exercised  for  revenue  purposes.  Others  of  them,  while 
thus  limiting  the  object  of  the  duties,  agree  that  if  incidental 
protection  can  be  derived  from  them,  there  is  no  constitu- 
tional inhibition  of  it.  But  these  methods  of  reasoning  are 
both  fallacious.  The  revenue  power  involves,  from  its  very 
nature,  only  the  employment  of  the  means  necessary  to 
support  the  Government  and  pay  the  public  debts.  The 
only  legitimate  incidents  to  that  power  are  such  as  pertain 
to  these  objects  ;  to  make  them  otherwise  would  violate  the 
first  principles  of  the  strict  construction  theory.  If  the 
Constitution  did  not  contain  additional  grants  of  power, 
there  would  not  be  even  plausibility  in  the  argument  that, 
by  virtue  of  the  revenue  power  alone,  Congress  could, 
either  directly  or  incidentally,  regulate  commerce  with  for- 
eign nations.  Both  Mr.  Madison  and  General  Jackson 
have  said  that  this  particular  power  belonged  to  the  several 
States  before  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  this  is 
not  denied — nor  can  it  be.  If,  according  to  them,  it  does 
not  now  exist  in  the  general  Government,  it  has  been  ex- 
tinguished. If  it  does  not  exist,  it  will  not  do  to  say  that 
Congress  may  exercise  it  by  implication  merely.  But  ex- 
isting, as  it  must,  it  is  the  result  of  an  express  grant,  and, 


444  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

therefore,  from  necessity,  a  substantial  and  independent 
power,  conferred  directly  and  not  incidentally.  If  this 
were  not  intended,  the  revenue  power  alone  would  have 
been  granted,  as  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  include  the 
power  to  regulate  commerce  incidentally.  But  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution  were  wiser  than  this,  and  did  not  intend 
to  leave  this  latter  and  most  important  power  as  a  mere 
incident  to  any  other  power.  They  granted  the  revenue 
power  in  one  clause  of  the  Constitution,  and  that  to  regu 
late  commerce  in  another  clause,  each  distinct  from  and 
independent  of  the  other.  This  was  emphatically  stated, 
in  substance,  by  Mr.  Madison,  in  the  first  Congress,  when 
debating  the  proposition  of  Mr.  Fitzimons'  to  amend  the 
revenue  bill  by  engrafting  upon  it  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion. And  General  Jackson,  in  the  extract  from  his  mes- 
sage just  quoted,  manifestly  intended  that  the  question 
should  not  be  left  open  for  further  controversy  during  his 
administration,  by  declaring  that  the  power  to  protect 
domestic  industry,  by  means  of  authority  over  imports,  was 
"expressly  delegated  to  Congress''  meaning  thereby  that  it 
could  not  be  considered  a  mere  incident  to  the  revenue 
power.  This  argument,  effectively  employed  by  Mr.  Madi- 
son, in  the  first  Congress,  settled  the  question  of  constitu- 
tional power  so  satisfactorily,  that  it  was  not  again  agitated 
for  many  years.  And  it  is  not  probable  that  it  would  ever 
afterwards  have  become  a  prominent  factor  in  American 
politics,  but  for  the  sectional  agitation  which  followed  the 
tariffs  of  1828  and  1832,  and  culminated  in  an  attempt  at 
nullification  under  General  Jackson's  administration.  It 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  445 

has  borne  such  fruits  since  then  as  should  admonish  us  all 
how  hazardous  it  is  to  get  away  from  the  old  landmarks 
prescribed  when  the  Government  was  formed. 

There  is  an  important  fact  in  recent  history  which  has 
some  bearing  upon  this  question,  and  is  worthy  of  being 
stated  on  that  account.  When  the  attempt  was  made  to 
form  a  new  government  for  the  "  Confederate  States"  Art.  i, 
Sec.  8,  of  the  Constitution  adopted  was  substantially  the 
same  as  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  which  authorizes  Congress  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
etc.  But  it  provided,  in  addition,  that  "  no  duties  or  taxes 
on  importations  from  foreign  nations  [shall]  be  laid  to  pro- 
mote or  foster  any  branch  of  industry."  Why  the  neces 
sity  of  this  emphatic  inhibition,  if,  in  the  opinion  of  those 
advocates  of  free  trade  who  assisted  in  making  it,  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  was  sufficiently  plain  and 
inhibitory  upon  the  subject  ?  The  fact  that  they  considered 
it  necessary  to  introduce  it  into  the  "  Confederate"  Consti- 
tution, justifies  the  belief  that  they  considered  the  power  to 
protect  and  foster  industry  as  fully  conferred  upon  Con- 
gress by  the  Constitution.  This  argument  is  not  conclu- 
sive upon  the  point  of  constitutional  interpretation,  but  is 
entitled  to  some  weight  as  against  the  most  earnest  and 
formidable  enemies  of  protection.  Upon  another  point, 
however,  it  is  conclusive  ;  which  is,  that  the  "  Confederate 
States  "  Government  was  constructed  upon  the  basis  of 
free  trade.  Whether  its  advocates  committed  themselves 
to  that  theory  from  a  conviction  of  its  positive  advantages, 
or  merely  to  induce  the  purchase  of  their  bonds  by  English 


446  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

manufacturers,  is  of  no  present  consequence.  Viewed  in 
^either  aspect  it  furnishes  some  ground  for  the  suspicion 
that  the  preference  they  continue  to  give  to  free  trade  over 
protection,  is  based  upon  their  preference  for  English  over 
American  manufactures — an  error  which  has  inflicted  incal- 
culable ills  upon  themselves  as  well  as  others.  What 
glorious  results  would  follow,  to  the  entire  Nation,  if  they 
should  cast  off  this  error  and  thereby  render  future  discord 
between  the  sections  impossible  ! 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

DUTIES  SHOULD  BE  LAID  FOR  BOTH  REVENUE  AND  PROTECTION 
—  VOLUNTARILY  PAID— FREE  AND  DUTIABLE  LISTS— IN- 
CREASE OF  FREE  LIST  MAKES  REVENUE  DUTIES  HIGHER- 
DUTIES  DO  NOT  NECESSARILY  INCREASE  PRICES  —  PRICES 
REGULATED  BY  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND  AND  COMPETITION— 
HOME  MARKETS  BEST  — ENGLISH  DEMAND  FOR  WHEAT— EN- 
GLAND PREFERS  THE  PRODUCTS  OF  HER  COLONIES— IF  THEY 
COULD  SUPPLY  HER  SHE  WOULD  NOT  BUY  OF  US. 

"\  X  fHILE  it  would  not  be  just  to  say  that  all  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  present  system  of  duties  are  in  favor  of 
free  trade,  yet  the  leading  arguments  employed  in  favor  of 
a  tariff  for  revenue  only  terminate  in  that  theory.  They 
are  designed  to  excite  odium  against  the  system  upon  the 
ground  that  it  imposes  obnoxious  taxes  which  the  people 
ought  not  to  pay.  If  they  were  only  intended  to  show  that 
some  change  or  modification  were  necessary,  they  would 
be  more  availing  ;  for  when  it  is  considered  that  the  effect 
of  a  particular  duty  can  only  be  ascertained  by  the  test  of 
experience,  and  that'not  one  out  of  ten  thousand  is  famil- 
iar with  the  process  by  which  its  effect  is  produced,  it  is 
not  to  be  wondered  at  that  duties  should  be  sometimes 
changed  more  than  once  before  they  are  brought  either 
to  the  proper  revenue  or  protective  standard.  When 
protective  duties  are  laid  they  may  appear  to  be  at  the 
proper  rate,  but  subsequent  practical  experience  may  show 

447 


448  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

them  to  be  so  low  as  not  to  protect  in  the  degree  desired, 
or  so  high  as  to  be  prohibitory,  and,  consequently,  injuri- 
ous to  the  revenue.  In  either  case,  the  proper  course  of 
duty  is  plain  ;  they  should  be  changed  to  the  proper  rate, 
either  higher  or  lower.  Some  duties  are  placed  upon  arti- 
cles which  do  not  enter  into  manufactures  and  in  no  way 
affect  industry ;  these  are  for  revenue  alone.  Others  are 
placed  upon  articles  which  enter  into  manufactures  and 
affect  industry  ;  these  should  be  laid  with  reference  to  both 
revenue  and  protection.  And  thus,  by  adhering  to  these 
principles,  our  tariff  system  should  be  constructed,  not  for 
revenue  alone  or  for  protection  alone,  but  for  revenue  and 
protection — in  precise  accordance  with  the  plan  adopted 
by  the  first  Congress  and  persevered  in  under  all  the  early 
administrations.  No  true  friend  of  protection  will  be 
likely  to  object  to  any  alteration  in  the  present  duties,  not 
calculated  to  imperil  that  important  principle.  When  men 
talk  eloquently  about  the  necessity  of  reform,  without  intel- 
ligent specifications  of  the  manner  of  accomplishing  it,  they 
are  mere  declaimers.  Such  men,  even  if  they  had  their 
way,  would  not  only  impede  practical  legislation  but  seri- 
ously interfere  with  the  rightful  operations  of  the  Govern- 
ment ;  and  yet  their  utter  impracticability  does  not  deprive 
them  of  the  right  to  have  their  theories  respectfully  consid- 
ered, nor  are  others  released  from  the  obligation  to  point 
out  their  errors,  especially  the  capital  one  of  attempting  to 
bring  the  whole  system  of  national  taxation  into  popular 
disrepute,  upon  the  assumption  that  the  burden  is  too 
heavy  to  be  endured. 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  449 

It  is  true  that  the  duties  upon  imports  are  in  the  nature 
of  taxes,  but  it  is  also  true  that  they  are  without  the  odious 
element  which  makes  taxes  seem  oppressive.  If  they  fall 
upon  the  consumer  at  all,  they  are  paid  voluntarily  and 
without  compulsion.  They  are  levied  upon  foreign  and 
not  upon  domestic  goods  and  merchandises,  and,  there- 
fore, do  not  directly  and  primarily  bear  upon  individuals, 
as  do  the  taxes  assessed  for  the  local  government  of  States, 
counties,  and  cities.  The  Government,  in  collecting  them, 
deals  with  the  importer,  who  pays  the  duties  for  the  privi- 
lege of  landing  them  in  our  ports  and  selling  them  in  our 
markets.  Hence,  even  if  the  price  paid  by  the  consumer 
were  always  increased  to  the  extent  of  the  duty,  the  pay- 
ment of  it  is  his  own  voluntary  act.  He  who  does  not 
purchase  and  consume  imported  and  dutiable  goods  does 
not  contribute  anything  to  the  revenue  derived  from  cus- 
toms. 

There  will  always  be,  as  there  has  always  been,  more 
or  less  difficulty  in  selecting  the  articles  to  be  made  exempt 
from  duty  by  being  placed  upon  the  free  list.  The  theory 
with  regard  to  these  is,  that  as  the  whole  community  con- 
sume what  are  considered  necessaries,  therefore,  when 
imported,  they  should  be  exempt  from  duty.  As  it  regards, 
however,  the  leading  articles  of  this  class  —  teas,  coffee, 
etc.  —  this  question  involves  revenue  and  not.  protection. 
Such  of  these  as  are  not  produced  in  the  United  States  and 
do  not  enter  into  the  products  of  any  of  our  domestic  indus- 
tries, have  always  been  made  free  or  otherwise  according 
to  the  necessities  of  the  Treasury.  The  more  this  list  is 
29 


450  HISTORY  OP  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

increased  the  greater  the  necessity  of  increasing  the  duties 
upon  dutiable  articles  becomes,  in  order  to  raise  the  revenue 
required  by  the  Government.  Therefore,  the  advocates 
for  increasing  the  free  list  and  those  in  favor  of  high  duties 
find  this  common  ground  upon  which  they  can  stand  to- 
gether. Those  who  insist  upon  protection  for  its  own  sake, 
without  regard  to  revenue  —  and  there  are  very  few,  if  any, 
who  do  —  readily  act  in  harmony,  at  this  point,  with  the 
friends  of  free  trade.  Their  purposes,  however,  are  radi- 
cally different.  The  former  seek  to  raise  revenue  without 
reference  to  the  wants  of  the  Treasury —  the  latter  to  break 
down  the  system  of  duties  entirely  and  thus  cut  off  all  reve- 
nue from  customs.  They  represent  the  two  extremes - 
one  willing  to  fill  the  Treasury  to  overflowing  with  surplus 
revenue,  and  thus  invite  the  most  extravagant  expendi- 
tures ;  the  other  striving  to  prevent  any  revenue  from 
customs  at  all.  Neither  has  practical  wisdom  enough  to 
manage  the  affairs  of  Government,  and  in  the  hands  of 
either  the  public  interests  will  suffer.  As  is  commonly  the 
case  in  dealing  with  extremes,  we  are  apt  to  find  safety 
only  at  some  intermediate  point  between  them.  And  that 
point,  in  the  matter  we  are  considering,  is  a  tariff  for 
revenue  and  protection  both,  and  not  one  for  revenue 
alone,  or  for  protection  alone. 

But  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  even  the  articles 
placed  from  time  to  time  upon  the  free  list  are  always 
decreased  in  price  to  the  extent  of  the  duty  taken  off. 
Whatever  the  fluctuations  in  their  prices  are,  they  have 
been  and  will  always  be  regulated  by  supply  and  demand. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  451 

Take  coffee  by  way  of  illustration  :  —  if  the  crop  is  large 
in  the  countries  where  it  is  produced,  the  importations 
increase  and  the  price  is  reduced,  because  of  the  increased 
supply  in  the  market  and  the  greater  facility  of  answering 
the  demand.  If  the  crop  is  short,  the  importations  are 
reduced  and  the  price  increased,  because  of  the  difficulty 
in  supplying  the  demand.  This  law  of  trade  has  always 
existed,  and  operates  invariably  upon  all  articles  that  find 
their  way  to  market.  Practical  agriculturists  understand 
it  as  well  as  merchants.  When  the  grain  crdp  is  so  large 
as  to  exceed  the  demand,  prices  go  down  ;  when  it  is 
below  the  demand,  they  go  up.  The  farmer  waits  for  an 
increased  demand  to  put  up  prices,  before  he  sells,  and  the 
merchant  does  the  same,  unless  their  necessities  force  them 
to  sell  without  discretion.  If  the  farmer,  in  any  given  year, 
can  raise  corn  at  thirty  cents  per  bushel  and  wheat  at 
eighty,  on  account  of  the  price  of  labor  for  that  year,  he 
does  not  offer  his  produce  upon  the  market  at  any  given 
percentage  of  profit  upon  these  values.  But  he  sells  at  the 
market  price,  which  is  regulated  by  the  supply  and  demand, 
and  the  profit,  whatsoever  it  is,  constitutes  his  profit  for 
that  year.  If  the  merchant  has  on  hand  a  stock  of  goods 
which  he  cannot  sell  because  the  market  is  overstocked,  he 
is  necessarily  subject  to  loss,  inasmuch  as  his  capital  is 
unproductive.  If  he  buys  when  prices  are  low  and  they 
become  high  before  he  sells,  he,  like  the  farmer,  makes  his 
sales  at  the  high  prices,  and  thus  increases  his  profits.  If 
the  prices  of  goods  go  down  and  he  is  compelled  to  sell, 
in  order  to  meet  his  liabilities,  his  failure  is  inevitable 


452  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

unless  he  has  some  other  means  of  adding  to  his  capital. 
In  the  case  of  the  farmer,  land  and  labor  constitute  his 
capital,  but  the  capital  of  the  merchant  is  composed  of 
money  and  credit.  Their  avocations  are  wholly  unlike,  and 
involve  the  employment  of  different  agencies.  But  when 
they  meet  in  the  market  —  the  farmer  seeking  to  convert 
the  products  of  his  land  and  labor,  and  the  merchant  his 
goods,  into  money, —  they  are  both  governed  by  precisely 
the  same  laws  of  trade ;  that  is,  by  supply  and  demand.  In 
the  absence  of  all  competition,  either  could,  in  an  essential 
degree,  regulate  his  own  prices  ;  in  the  presence  of  com- 
petition, they  are  regulated  by  circumstances  over  which 
neither  of  them  has  any  individual  control.  The  general 
laws  of  trade  cannot  be  changed  by  either  the  one  or  the 
other.  This  is  illustrated  by  a  recent  telegram  from  Lon- 
don, as  follows :  —  "  Flour  is  in  poor  demand.  Fine  barleys 
retain  their  prices  on  account  of  their  scarcity.  There  is  a 
large  amount  of  wheat  in  sight.  The  United  States  is 
regarded  as  the  reservoir  which  may  burst  at  any  time  with 
disastrous  effect.  The  1883  crop  of  Northern  Europe 
being  untouched  tends  to  depress  trade." 

It  may  be  true,  in  the  abstract,  that  the  price  of  an 
article  would,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  be  increased  to 
the  extent  of  the  import  duty,  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact 
that,  when  offered  for  sale,  the  price  is  regulated  by  the 
condition  of  the  market.  Every  man  who  is  competent  to 
transact  business  understands  this.  And  this  rule  applies, 
not  merely  to  all  our  home  products,  but  to  the  articles 
upon  the  free  list,  and  those  upon  which  protective  duties 


HISTORY   OF    THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  453 

are  laid.  The  latter  are  equally  with  the  former  suoject  to 
the  laws  of  trade — to  supply,  demand,  and  competition. 
No  matter  what  the  article  is,  where  it  comes  from,  or 
what  the  duty  upon  it,  if  the  market  is  overstocked 
the  price  must  decline.  Those  who  sell,  as  well  as  those 
who  buy,  recognize  this.  In  such  event  as  this,  the  pur- 
chaser, if  he  be  a  consumer,  is  benefited,  while  the  seller 
suffers  the  loss  of  either  all  or  part  of  his  profits.  The 
wheat  market  furnishes  another  illustration.  The  price  of 
it  is  regulated  more  by  the  English  than  the  American 
demand — more  by  the  demand  in  Liverpool  than  in  New 
York.  If  the  crops  in  Europe  and -Asia  are  abundant*and 
the  supply  from  that  quarter  equals  the  demand,  the  prices 
become  so  reduced  that  American  wheat  cannot  be 
exported  at  a  profit,  and  our  surplus  must  either  be  kept 
on  hand,  stored  in  granaries  and  warehouses,  or  sold  at  a 
loss.  The  same  rule  governs  imported  merchandise — 
whether  dutiable  or  not.  If  the  demand  shall  exceed  the 
supply  the  prices  are  increased  ;  if  the  supply  shall  exceed 
the  demand  the  prices  decline.  These  rules  seem  plain 
and  simple,  and  are  attested  by  universal  experience. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  keep  them  in  remem- 
brance, that  we  may  not  be  misled  by  the  free  trade 
assumption — assented  to  by  those  who  advocate  a  tariff 
for  revenue  only — that  necessarily  and  in  all  cases  the 
consumer  of  imported  articles  is  taxed  to  the  extent  of  the 
duty  upon  them ;  and  that  the  price  of  the  same  kind  of 
articles  manufactured  or  produced  in  this  country  is  corre- 
spondingly increased.  It  is  not  a  little  surprising  that  these 


454  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

assertions  should  be  so  frequently  made,  and  with  apparent 
candor,  when  the  experience  of  almost  every  man  who 
buys  or  sells  in  the  market,  whether  farmer,  mechanic,  or 
merchant,  teaches  the  contrary  to  be  true.  But  if  it  were 
true  instead  of  being  false,  it  is  worthy  of  most  serious 
inquiry  whether  that  would  not  be  more  advantageous  than 
to  put  a  stop  to  our  progress,  by  leaving  our  domestic 
industry  without  protection,  and  the  sale  of  our  surplus 
products  dependent  alone  upon  the  uncertain  contingency 
of  foreign  demand.  Between  these  two  alternatives  there 
is  not  much  ground  for  hesitation. 

Everybody  understands  that  our  surplus  is,  in  a  large 
degree,  valueless,  unless  it  can  find  a  market  —  whether  it 
be  composed  of  the  products  of  manufactories  or  farms. 
If  there  were  no  markets  for  what  we  produce  by  agri- 
culture and  are  unable  to  consume,  the  surplus  would 
necessarily  go  to  waste.  Besides  the  grain  our  farmers 
would  be  compelled  to  see  rotting  in  their  barns,  they 
would  be  surrounded  with  vast  quantities  of  other  do- 
mestic productions,  entirely  without  any  money  value. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  secure  proper  reward  for  the  labor 
of  the  agriculturist,  whatsoever  surplus  of  products  he  has 
must  be  sold  either  in  a  home  or  in  a  foreign  market. 
And  hence  it  becomes  of  the  utmost  importance  to  every 
farmer  and  to  all  who  contribute  to  the  production  of  this 
surplus,  that  they  shall  understand  upon  which  of  these 
markets  they  can  most  safely  rely,  and  from  which  of  them 
labor  will  be  most  likely  to  receive  proper  reward. 

There  is  nothing  better  known  than  that  the  policy  of 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  455 

all  foreign  countries  is  to  sell  as  much  and  buy  as  little 
from  abroad  as  possible.  This  has  always  been  especially 
the  case  with  England,  where  the  protective  system,  as 
involved  in  tariff  and  navigation  laws,  has  been  built  up  and 
persistently  maintained  until  recently,  with  this  end  con- 
stantly in  view.  It  has  been  her  boast,  for  many  years,  that 
her  exports  find  sale  in  all  the  markets  of  the  world,  and 
that  her  ships,  conveying  them  from  her  ports,  navigate 
evrery  sea.  Consequently,  it  is  to  be  accepted  as  true  that 
none  of  the  foreign  countries — England  included — will 
buy  anything  from  us  which  they  can  produce  themselves. 
They  are  not  to  be  complained  of  for  this,  because  it  is 
entirely  natural  and  commendable.  Nevertheless,  the  uni- 
versality of  the  rule  renders  it  necessary  that  we  shall 
profit  by  the  example,  and  take  care  th^t  we  shall  not 
become  the  first  to  violate  it,  by  giving  to  foreign  markets 
preference  over  our  own — as  we  should  undoubtedly  do 
by  an  abandonment  of  the  principle  of  protection.  Free 
trade  means  that,  as  plainly  as  protection  means  the 
reverse. 

Let  the  article  of  wheat  serve  for  further  illustration— 
that  being  one  of  our  largest  staples.  The  annual  product 
of  wheat  in  England,  with  all  the  improved  methods  of 
cultivation,  is  only  about  one-half  of  what  is  consumed 
there.  This  deficiency  can  only  be  supplied  at  home  in 
one  of  two  ways,  either  by  doubling  the  acreage  of  wheat 
lands,  or  the  yield  per  acre  of  those  now  under  cultivation. 
Neither  of  these  results  can  be  expected.  The  first  is 
impossible  in  consequence  of  the  geographical  limits  of 


456  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  country.  The  second  is  improbable,  as  the  lands  ai  -_ 
now  cultivated  with  the  greatest  possible  scientific  skilU- 
not  surpassed,  if  equaled,  in  any  other  country.  England, 
consequently,  must  buy,  every  year,  about  one  half  the 
wheat  she  consumes.  She  must  furnish  an  annual  demand 
for  that  much.  From  what  source  is  the  supply  necessary 
to  meet  this  demand  to  be  derived?  Nothing  concerns 
our  interests  more  than  that  we  should  have  an  intelligent 
answer  to  this  question,  in  order  to  decide  what  claim  this 
important  branch  of  domestic  industry  has  upon  the  Gov- 
ernment for  protection,  and  the  manner  of  it. 

The  wheat-growing  regions  of  Europe  and  Asia  have 
sometimes  a  surplus,  and  when  this  occurs,  it  finds  its  way 
chiefly  to  the  English  market,  to  be  exchanged  for  English 
manufactures.  Their  necessities  make  these  manufactures 
indispensable  to  them  as  they  are  not  supplied  at  home, 
and  so  long  as  this  condition  of  things  exists,  this  trade 
with  England  will  continue.  It  may  be  expected,  with 
certainty,  to  continue  to  the  extent  of  supplying  the 
demand  for  wheat  in  England  whensoever  the  surplus  is 
large  enough  for  that  purpose,  or  to  the  extent  of  consum- 
ing the  entire  surplus  when  it  is  not.  Besides  looking  to 
these  European  and  Asiatic  regions  for  the  supply  of  her 
demand  for  wheat,  England  relies  also  upon  her  colonies 
—  especially  upon  the  Dominion  of  Canada.  With  this 
view  she  takes  extraordinary  pains  to  stimulate  and  encour- 
age the  Dominion  farmers  in  the  cultivation  of  their  wheat 
lands.  This  has  already  been  carried  so  far  that  the  En- 
glish advocates  of  free  trade  address  to  them  the  argument 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  457 

that  England  will  buy  their  surplus  wheat  in  preference  to 
ours,  if  the  Dominion  Parliament  will  adopt  free  trade  with 
England,  in  order  thereby  to  retaliate  against  us  so  long 
as  we  maintain  our  protective  duties.  The  demand  in 
Canada  for  English  manufactures  to  be  exchanged  for 
wheat,  constitutes  a  controlling  reason  also  why  England 
is  so  desirous  that  the  annual  surplus  there  shall  be  as 
large  as  possible.  She  knows  that  the  more  she  buys  from 
Canada  the  less  she  will  be  compelled  to  buy  from  us — in 
other  words,  if  her  whole  demand  could  be  supplied  by  the 
Canadian  wheat-growers,  she  would  not  buy  a  bushel  from 
those  of  the  United  States. 

We  are  obliged,  therefore,  to  act  with  reference  to  the 
incontestable  fact  that  England  will  buy  wheat  from  the 
United  States  only  when  she  cannot  obtain  her  necessary 
supply  from  European  and  Asiatic  countries  and  from 
Canada.  If  the  surplus  derived  from  these  sources  is  not 
sufficient  to  supply  her  demand,  she  will  buy  from  us  just 
what  is  necessary  to  supply  the  deficiency,  and  no  more. 
When  it  is  sufficient  for  that  purpose  she  will  not  buy  any 
from  us.  Hence,  we  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion  that,  as 
regards  the  important  article  of  wheat — which  is  taken 
for  illustration  —  England  will  continue  to  give  those  coun- 
tries preference  over  the  United  States,  and  will  buy  from 
the  latter  only  when  she  is  compelled  to  do  so.  There  is 
not  an  intelligent  wheat-grower  in  this  country  who  does 
not  know  that  when  a  demand  for  American  wheat  exists 
in  England,  it  is  occasioned  by  a  deficiency  in  the  supplies 
from  the  countries  named,  and  that  the  price  is  regulated 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

accordingly,  going  up  or  down  as  the  case  may  be,  accord- 
ing to  the  demand.  Nor  is  there  one  who  does  not  know 
that,  if  we  had  no  other  than  the  English  market  for  the 
sale  of  our  surplus  wheat,  the  demand  would  be  fluctuating 
and  uncertain,  such  as  could  not  be  relied  on  with  the  least 
degree  of  confidence.  We  saw  this  very  plainly  in  our 
exportation  of  wheat  for  the  year  1883.  Compared  with 
1882,  our  exports  to  England  greatly  declined  that  year, 
the  aggregate  decline  being  estimated  by  the  most  com- 
petent judges  at  30,000,000  bushels.  The  cause  of  this 
was  found  in  the  fact  that  the  other  wheat-producing 
countries  drove  our  wheat  out  of  the  market  to  that 
extent ,  and  as  their  labor  was  less  valuable  than  ours, 
they  were  enabled  to  sell  at  less  prices  than  we  could 
afford  to  take;  and  thus,  by  bringing  their  low  wages  in 
competition  with  the  just  value  of  our  agricultural  labor, 
they  reduced  the  price  of  wheat  in  the  English  market 
about  25  cents  per  bushel  less  than  it  was  during  the 
years  immediately  preceding. 

These  propositions  are  so  plain  and  simple,  and  will 
be  so  generally  acquiesced  in,  that  it  scarcely  seems  neces- 
sary to  repeat  them.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this,  they  are 
of  so  much  magnitude  that  any  measures  of  public  policy 
constructed  without  reference  to  them,  would  undoubtedly 
be  unwise  and  injudicious.  That  the  establishment  of  free 
trade  would  require  them  to  be  disregarded,  we  shall  see, 
in  the  course  of  our  inquiries,  when  considering  the  prin- 
ciples upon  which  that  theory  is  based,  and  the  sacrifices 
its  supporters  in  this  country  ask  us  to  make,  in  order  to 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  459 

secure  its  establishment.  We  shall  thus  learn  what  free 
trade  really  is,  when  stripped  of  the  disguises  thrown 
around  it  by  ingenious  and  talented  advocates,  who  openly 
avow  their  purpose  not  to  cease  agitation  until  they  shall 
convince  us  that  English  statesmen  are  more  competent 
to  dictate  American  policy  than  the  pure,  and  wise,  and 
unselfish  men  who  laid  the  foundations  of  our  national 
prosperity  and  greatness. 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

HOME  MARKETS  — FREE  TRADE  GIVES  PREFERENCE  TO  FOREIGN 
—  WHEAT  PRODUCTIONS  — COULD  BE  INCREASED  BY  HOME 
MARKETS— IF  INCREASED  WITHOUT  THEM  PRICES  WOULD 
DECLINE— THIS  WOULD  INJURE  US  AND  BENEFIT  ENGLAND  — 
PRODUCER  AND  CONSUMER  CLOSE  TOGETHER  —  MANUFACT- 
URES NECESSARY  TO  THIS— DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  DE- 
MAND COMPARED  — GROWTH  OF  MANUFACTURES— PROTECTION 
SOCIETY  IN  NEW  YORK— JEFFERSON,  MADISON,  MONROE,  AND 
ADAMS,  ALL  MEMBERS  OF  IT. 

HPHOSE  who  venture  to  deny  that  a  permanent  and 
reliable  home  market  is  preferable  to  a  fluctuating  and 
uncertain  foreign  market,  may  well  be  suspected  of  labor- 
ing under  some  sort  of  strange  hallucination.  They  are 
like  "the  dreamers  of  unprofitable  dreams."  No  business 
man  could  safely  be  guided  by  their  advice,  in  the  conduct 
of  his  private  affairs.  But,  howsoever  desirable  and  neces- 
sary a  home  market  is,  the  practical  question  which  com- 
mands our  consideration  is — how  is  a  home  market  to  be 
secured  and  maintained  ? 

We  have  heretofore  seen  that,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Government,  it  was  argued  by  the  opponents  of  protection 
that  we  should  not  engage  in  manufactures  until  all  our 
wild  lands  should  be  brought  under  cultivation,  because 
agriculture  was  the  most  profitable  pursuit.  We  have  seen 

also  that  the  policy  of  Mr.  Folk's  administration  —  in  sym- 

46o 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  461 

% 

pathy  with  this  idea  —  was  that  the  prices  of  our  agricul- 
tural products  should  be  reduced  by  being  deprived  of  a 
home  market,  in  order  that  English  manufacturers  might 
thereby  be  enabled  to  procure  cheaper  labor  and  pay 
higher  prices  for  cotton.  Both  these  propositions  mean  the 
same  thing — that  is,  that  the  country  would  be  in  better 
condition  if  all  our  labor  were  applied  to  farming  —  if  we 
were  all  producers  of  wheat,  corn,  oats,  barley,  etc.,  and 
none  of  us  consumers  of  the  surplus  of  these  and  other 
farm  products.  The  arguments  in  favor  of  these  proposi- 
tions were  fully  answered  and  overthrown  by  the  defenders 
of  the  policy  of  protection  at  the  time  of  Washington's 
administration,  and  have  since  then  been  declared  false 
and  misleading  by  all  the  Presidents  up  to  Mr.  Polk,  and 
have  been  especially  condemned  by  the  clear  and  conclusive 
reasoning  of  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  and  Jackson. 

The  culture  of  wheat  can  never  lose  its  importance  in 
this  country,  and  therefore  it  is  well  to  preserve  its  promi- 
nence in  our  methods  of  illustration,  inasmuch  as  no  other 
article  which  contributes  to  our  wealth  is  in  greater  need 
*./  a  home  market 

The  number  of  men  directly  and  indirectly  engaged  in 
producing  wheat  in  the  United  States  cannot  be  ascertained 
with  anything  like  reasonable  accuracy.  But  by  an  ap- 
proximate estimate  it  is  shown  that,  in  1883,  they  pro- 
duced 425,000,000  bushels.  The  area  of  land  necessary 
to  produce  this  could  be  doubled,  or  trebled,  or  possibly 
quadrupled,  if  necessary — for,  besides  the  large  unoccu- 
pied territory  we  possess,  there  are  very  few  wheat-growing 


462  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

sections  in  any  part  of  the  country  where  the  acreage  may 
not  be  increased.  In  the  Western  and  Northwestern 
States  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  doing  this,  to  the 
extent  of  from  one  to  two  hundred  per  cent,  and  leave  a 
sufficiency  of  tillable  land  for  other  crops  and  grazing  pur- 
poses. The  introduction  of  labor-saving  machines,  such 
as  buggy-plows,  self-binding  reapers,  etc.,  would  render 
this  comparatively  easy,  with  but  little  increase  of  manual 
labor  If  from  continued  gradual  development,  or  from 
any  other  cause,  this  should  occur  to  the  extent  of  fifty  per 
cent  —  not  an  extravagant  estimate — the  wheat  crop  of 
the  United  States,  in  an  ordinary  and  average  season, 
would  be  over  600,000,000  bushels.  In  this  event  our 
surplus  would  be  greatly  increased.  And,  consequently, 
every  producer  of  wheat  is  directly  interested  in  knowing 
how  this  surplus  is  to  be  disposed  of — where  it  will  find  a 
market. 

England  desires — naturally,  as,  under  like  conditions, 
any  nation  would  —  that  this  surplus  shall  be  made  as  large 
as  possible.  She  knows  that,  when  the  surplus  exceeds 
the  demand,  the  price  declines.  Hence,  she  recommends 
to  us  the  policy  of  free  trade,  so  that,  by  destroying  our 
manufactures,  the  large  number  of  operative  laborers  they 
now  engage  would  be  compelled  to  become  cultivators  of 
the  soil,  and  thus  cause  our  annual  wheat  surplus  to  become 
so  increased  that  she  can  buy  what  she  needs  at  reduced 
prices,  fixed  in  her  own  markets.  She  is,  in  no  sense, 
interested  in  knowing  what  shall  become  of  the  remainder, 
after  her  own  wants  are  supplied.  It  makes  no  difference 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  463 

to  her  how  many  millions  of  bushels  are  rotted  in  our 
barns  and  warehouses.  Her  chief  concern  is  that  we  shall 
withdraw  as  much  labor  as  possible  from  our  manufactories, 
so  that  when  they  shall  cease  to  furnish  a  home  market  for 
our  surplus,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  look  to  hers  for  such 
manufactured  fabrics  as  we  may  require,  and  thus  make  us 
dependent  upon  and  tributary  to  her.  Can  any  man  doubt, 
therefore,  that  it  would  be  far  better  for  us  to  have  home 
markets  for  our  surplus  wheat,  than  to  rely  upon  such  a 
customer  as  England  ?  This  question  applies  to  the  sur- 
plus of  any  other  of  our  productions,  and  the  answer  is 
the  same  with  regard  to  all  of  them. 

Every  manufacturing  establishment  in  the  United  States, 
no  matter  where  located,  helps  to  build  up  a  home  market 
in  its  own  vicinity.  Such  establishments,  considered  as  a 
whole,  furnish  employment  to  many  thousands  of  laborers, 
who  have  to  subsist  themselves  and  their  families  out  of 
our  surplus  agricultural  products.  Let  the  iron  manufact- 
urers be  taken  as  an  example.  They  require  the  services 
of  the  diggers  of  ore  and  coal,  of  teamsters,  carriers,  black- 
smiths, and  of  an  immense  number  of  employes  of  other 
kinds,  who  are  required  to  carry  the  ore  through  the 
smelting  process,  and  convert  it  into  the  many  shapes 
required  to  fit  it  for  domestic  and  other  uses.  All  these 
aggregate  a  multitude  of  men,  women  and  children,  who 
are  supported  by  this  branch  of  industry  alone.  If  to 
these  there  be  added  the  other  thousands  who  are  fur- 
nished with  employment  by  other  manufacturing  establish- 
ments in  the  various  sections  of  the  country,  the  whole 


464  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

constitutes  an  immense  army,  all  of  whom  have  to  be  sub- 
sisted out  of  the  products  of  agriculture.  They  do  not 
make  the  whole  of  the  home  consumers  of  these  products, 
for  the  non-producing  classes  of  the  cities  and  towns  —  mer- 
chants, mechanics,  professional  men,  and  their  families  — 
have  also  to  be  subsisted.  But  if  all  these  laborers  and 
employes  should  be  thrown  out  of  employment  —  as  they 
would  be  by  the  destruction  of  our  manufactures  —  the 
number  who  are  to  be  subsisted  out  of  the  surplus  of  our 
agricultural  products  would  be  correspondingly  decreased. 
This  would,  necessarily,  decrease  the  demand.  And  not 
only  would  the  demand  for  the  surplus  be  decrease^,  but, 
inasmuch  as  -  all  these  discharged  laborers  and  employes 
would  be  compelled  to  become  agriculturists  and  make 
the  area  of  cultivated  land  much  greater,  the  surplus  would 
be  increased  and  the  prices  reduced,  and  thus  the  home 
market  would,  in  the  end,  be  destroyed. 

The  farmer  is  interested  in  cheap  transportation.  Short 
hauls  are  cheaper  than  long  ones.  Therefore,  the  nearer 
the  producer  is  to  the  home  market,  the  greater  is  the 
profit  to  him.  The  consumer  is  also  similarly  interested, 
and,  therefore,  the  nearer  he  is  to  the  producer  the  greater 
is  his  saving ;  consequently,  the  producer  and  the  con- 
sumer should  be  as  near  together  as  possible.  Hence,  in 
every  neighborhood  where  manufactures  exist,  the  farmer 
has  a  reliable  and  steady  home  demand  for  his  surplus,  to 
the  extent  necessary  to  supply  the  wants  of  those  thus 
engaged,  and  the  manufacturers  have  also  a  reliable  and 
steady  market  for  a  portion  of  their  fabrics.  And  thus  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  465 

two  classes  are  mutually  advantageous  to  each  other. 
Both  increase  under  the  influence  of  home  agencies,  and 
the  labor  of  each  is  properly  rewarded.  Free  trade  would 
destroy  this  mutuality  of  interest,  and  that  is  the  chief 
reason  why  England  so  earnestly  and  persistently  recom- 
mends it  to  us.  Why  any  considerable  number  of  our 
own  citizens  should  desire  it,  is  "  past  finding  out." 

The  surplus  of  our  agricultural  products  represents 
wealth  only  to  the  extent  that  it  can  find  markets.  It  must 
be  either  sold  or  lost;  and,  if  lost,  the  expense  of  the 
labor  necessary  to  produce  it  cannot  be  replaced.  The 
rent  of  the  land  upon  which  it  grew  is  lost  with  it.  The 
larger  the  unconsumed  surplus  becomes  the  greater  is  the 
deterioration  of  the  aggregate  wealth  ;  while  the  aggregate 
wealth  is  increased  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  the 
surplus,  provided  a  market  is  found  for  it.  These  are 
simple  truisms,  which  no  one  can  deny.  Simple  as  they 
are,  however,  they  serve  to  show  the  absolute  necessity  for 
home  markets.  No  government  is  properly*  conducted 
which  does  not  do  all  legitimately  within  its  power  to  fur- 
nish such  markets.  The  English  Government  has  never 
failed  in  this  respect,  and  it  has  been  so  successful  that  it 
has  the  best  and  most  firmly  established  home  markets  in 
the  world.  All  the  free  trade  efforts  of  English  statesmen 
and  manufacturers  are,  therefore,  directed  to  the  end  of 
keeping  their  own  markets  in  this  condition,  and  of  con- 
trolling ours  also ;  consequently,  whatsoever  we  do  to 
weaken  our  home  markets  is  beneficial  to  them  and  injuri- 
ous to  ourselves. 
30 


466  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

A  foreign  demand  is  only  necessary  to  us  because  it 
enables  us  to  dispose  of  our  surplus.  But  this  foreign 
demand  is  inconsiderable  compared  with  our  domestic 
demand — that  is,  we  sell  abroad  a  very  small  percentage 
of  what  we  consume  at  home.  It  is  estimated  at  less  than 
ten  per  cent.  And  if  our  home  markets  were  so  increased 
as  to  become  sufficient  for  the  consumption  of  this  small 
percentage  of  surplus,  we  should  be  entirely  independent 
of  foreign  markets,  and  the  prices  of  our  products  would 
not  be  subject  to  the  fluctuations  which  grow  out  of  the 
necessities  of  other  countries — that  is,  they  would  be  regu- 
lated by  home  and  not  by  foreign  demand.  To  leave  them 
subject  to  the  latter  makes  our  increase  of  wealth,  to  the 
extent  of  the  value  of  our  surplus,  to  depend  on  external 
causes  beyond  our  control  —  so  that,  whether  all  or  part  of 
our  surplus  should  be  sold  would  depend  upon  whether  it 
was  needed  by  foreign  countries  or  not.  What  they  did 
not  need  we  should  be  compelled  to  keep,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  a  home  market,  it  would  be  lost  entirely.  And 
thus  the  inducements  for  the  employment  of  the  industry 
necessary  to  produce  a  surplus,  would  be,  in  a  most  import- 
ant degree,  removed,  and  the  rewards  of  our  industry 
lessened. 

Since  our  Government  was  established  we  have  had 
but  a  short  period  of  non -intercourse  with  England — that 
is,  during  the  war  between  the  two  countries  in  1812-15. 
When  that  war  commenced,  our  national  existence  under 
the  Constitution  had  continued  only  about  the  length  of 
time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  breaking  out  of  our  late 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  467 

civil  war  —  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  century.  Within  those 
years  the  development  of  our  natural  resources  had  hardly 
begun.  Ohio — the  only  Northwestern  State  then  formed 
-had  a  population  of  less  than  300,000,  and  there  were 
no  artificial  facilities  of  intercourse  between  the  old  States 
and  the  Valley  of  the  Ohio  river.  The  Territory  of  Indi- 
ana had  been  formed  only  a  few  years,  and  that  of  Illinois 
was  not  in  existence.  Our  manufactures  had  begun  to 
increase  under  the  encouragement  of  the  Government,  but 
were  compelled  to  rely  mainly  upon  foreign  markets  for 
the  sale  of  such  fabrics  as  were  not  consumed  at  home. 
The  foreign  demand  was  necessarily  limited,  because  the 
manufactures  of  England  had  the  advantages  of  strong 
and  unrelaxed  government  protection  and  skilled  labor; 
and  as  we  had,  comparatively,  no  home  markets,  our 
national  wealth  was  of  slow  growth.  Our  domestic  ex- 
ports fell  from  $45,294,043  in  1811  — the  year  before  the 
war  —  to  $6,782,272  in  1814 — during  the  war;  a  decline 
of  $38,511,771.  It  was,  therefore,  satisfactorily  demon- 
strated, that  a  more  rapid  development  of  our  resources 
was  essential  to  our  independence  as  a  nation.  This  senti- 
ment had  a  stimulating  effect  upon  our  manufactures  ;  so 
that  they  increased  in  value  from  about  $172,000,000,  in 
1810,  to  over  $220,000,000  in  1813 — an  increase  of  about 
$48,000,000  in  three  years.  But  for  this  we  would  have 
been  compelled  to  import  from  abroad  many  articles  indis- 
pensable to  our  national  defense,  and  of  which  England, 
by  means  of  the  war,  deprived  us.  We  had  to  confront 
the  fact  that  no  country  can  afford  to  rely  upon  foreign 


468  HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

importations  to  sustain  itself  in  time  of  war,  for  the  reason 
that  if  war  should  be  carried  on  with  the  nation  from  which 
importations  necessary  for  defense  are  obtained,  the  with- 
holding them  would  prove  a  most  successful  method  of 
attack.  Such  would  have  been  the  case  during  our  last 
war  with  England,  if  our  people  had  not  proved  them- 
selves competent  and  energetic  enough  to  extend  their 
own  manufactures,  and  provide  themselves  with  the  means 
of  successful  defense.  And  it  requires  very  little  intelli- 
gence to  see  that  we  might  be  placed  in  that  condition 
of  helplessness,  in  the  event  of  another  war  with  England 
—  if  it  were  possible  —  provided  our  manufactures  should 
be  abandoned  by  the  adoption  of  free  trade. 

We1  have  seen,  heretofore,  that  the  necessities  which 
grew  out  of  the  war  with  England  led,  immediately  after 
its  close,  to  the  re-discussion  of  the  question  of  protection 
and  its  relation  to  domestic  manufactures  and  industry.  It 
was  an  appropriate  time  for  such  a  discussion,  inasmuch  as 
the  patriotic  sentiment  of  nationality  was  as  strong  then  as 
it  had  ever  been  after  our  independence.  This  is  indicated 
by  the  fact  that  no  sectional  spirit  was  exhibited  during  the 
administrations  of  Mr.  Madison  and  Mr.  Monroe,  in  so  far 
as  the  question  of  protection  was  concerned.  That  ques- 
tion was  considered  in  its  national  aspects  alone,  and  by 
general  consent  it  was  determined  that  home  markets  were 
absolutely  demanded  by  our  national  necessities,  and  that 
the  building  up  of  domestic  manufactures  by  proper  protec- 
tion was  the  only  possible  means  of  securing  them.  It  was 
then  and  under  these  circumstances  that  Mr.  Jefferson 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  469 

wrote  his  letter  to  Mr.  Austin,  wherein  he  asserted  the 
indispensable  duty  of  placing  "  the  manufacturer  by  the 
side  of  the  agriculturist,"  so  that  each  could  have  a  home 
market  and  each  contribute  to  the  prosperity  of  the  other.* 
He  expressed  in  this  the  almost  universal  public  sentiment 
of  the  country,  which  was  then  most  earnestly  proclaimed, 
on  account  of  the  experience  we  had  gained  in  the  war 
with  England.  Although  there  were  many  evidences  of 
this  exhibited  in  various  parts  of  the  country,  that  now  to 
be  stated  furnishes  an  instance  too  marked  and  prominent 
to  be  overlooked. 

An  association  was  organized  in  New  York,  called 
"The  American  Society  for  the  Encouragement  of  Do- 
mestic Manufactures."  Its  President  was  Governor  Daniel 
D.  Tompkins,  who  was  elected  Vice-President  with  Mr. 
Monroe,  in  1816.  This  society,  in  an  address,  dated 
December  31,  1816 — wherein  the  policy  of  protection  was 
discussed — made  this  appeal  in  its  behalf  to  the  agricultur- 
ists of  the  United  States,  called  by  them,  most  truth- 
fully, "the  standing  pillars  of  the  Nation's  independence"  : 

"Who  can  have  so  much  interest  as  you  in  the  opening  of  canals 
and  roads,  the  increase  of  national  industry  and  capital,  with  all  its 
ramifications,  which  must  reach  you  like  irrigating  streams  of  living 
waters,  and  enhance  the  value  of  your  possessions  ?  The  great  improve- 
ments that  must  follow  in  the  train  of  national  industry  are  too  far 
beyond  ordinary  calculation  to  be  readily  conceived.  You  will  have, 
not  one,  but  a  choice  of  markets  for  your  produce,  of  which  wars,  block- 
ades, or  the  casualties  of  foreign  nations  cannot  deprive  you.  You  will 
have  speedy  returns  of  whatever  you  may  want,  and  your  approximation 

*See  Ante.  Chap,  xiv,  p.  137. 


47°  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

to  the  mart  of  exchange  will  put  it  in  your  power  to  be  the  comptrollers  of 
your  own  fortunes,  and  the  arbiters  of  your  own  concerns." 

A  portion  of  this  address  was  specially  directed  to 
"our  Southern  agricultural  brethren,  in  particular,"  to 
whom  it  pointed  out  the  important  fact  that  England 
would  not  buy  their  cotton  if  she  could  supply  herself 
from  her  own  colonies  and  from  India,  Africa  or  Brazil; 
and  urged  them  to  consider  that,  in  the  event  of  her 
being  supplied  elsewhere,  the  English  market  would  be 
closed  to  them.  It  addressed  them  in  these  explicit 
words :  "  You  will  be  destitute  of  a  vent  for  your  cot- 
ton, unless  a  market  can  be  found  in  our  own  country,  by 
the  establishment  of  domestic  manufactures" 

Not  only  is  the  importance  of  this  society  shown  by 
the  conclusive  arguments  it  employed  in  favor  of  domestic 
manufactures,  as  the  indispensable  means  of  creating  home 
markets  for  the  benefit  of  the  cultivators  of  the  soil,  but  it 
is  strikingly  manifested  by  the  important  fact  that,  with  full 
knowledge  of  its  objects  and  methods  of  reasoning,  Mr. 
Monroe,  while  President,  Mr.  Jefferson,  Mr.  Madison,  and 
Mr.  John  Adams  —  three  ex-Presidents  —  all  became  mem- 
bers of  it,  and  lent  their  great  influence  to  the  advance- 
ment of  its  views  and  opinions.  Mr.  Monroe,  during  his 
Presidency,  attended  one  of  its  meetings,  held  in  the  city 
of  New  York,  June  13,  1817,  was  admitted  to  membership 
in  the  society,  and  addressed  it  with  "  eloquence  and 
force,"  declaring  that  he  considered  it  as  "being  intimately 
connected  with  the  real  independence  of  our  country";  and 
promising  to  use  his  efforts  to  promote  its  "patriotic  and 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  471 

laudable  objects."  Mr.  Jefferson,  Mr.  Madison,  and  Mr. 
Adams,  were  "  proposed  as  members  and  admitted  unani- 
mously/* at  the  same  meeting,  and  were  subsequently 
notified  to  that  effect.  Their  answers,  accepting  member- 
ship, prove  how  earnestly  each  of  them  sympathized  with 
the  purposes  and  sentiments  of  the  society.  Mr.  Adams' 
letter  was  dated  June  23,  1817,  and  contained  this  senti- 
ment, that  "with  agriculture,  manufactures  and  navigation, 
all  the  commerce  which  can  be  useful  to  mankind  will  be 
secured."  Mr.  Jefferson  replied,  June  26,  1817,  thanking 
the  society  for  his  election  as  a  member,  and  expressly 
approving  its  "patriotic  objects,"  said  : 

"  The  history  of  the  last  twenty  years  has  been  a  sufficient  lesson  for 
us  all  to  depend  for  necessaries  on  ourselves  alone,  and  I  hope  that  twenty 
years  more  will  place  the  American  hemisphere  under  a  system  of  its  own 
essentially  peaceable  and  industrious,  and  not  needing  to  extract  its  com- 
forts out  of  the  eternal  fires  raging  in  the  Old  World." 

The  answer  of  Mr.  Madison  is  dated  June  27,  1817. 
He  also  accepted  membership  and  thanked  the  society. 
Speaking  of  domestic  manufactures,  he  said: 

"All  must  be  sensible,  that  it  is  politic  and  patriotic,  to  encourage 
a  preference  of  them  as  affording  a  more  certain  source  of  supply  for 
every  class,  and  a  more  certain  market  for  the  surplus  products  of  the 
agricultural  class. ' ' 

These  illustrious  men  were  not  suspected  of  undue 
ambition,  and  if  they  ever  had  been,  each  one  of  them  had 
lived  beyond  that  period  of  life  when  he  could  be  longer 
influenced  by  it.  Whatsoever  may  have  been  said  of  them, 
under  the  dictation  of  party  animosities,  every  fair-minded 


47 2  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

man  will  agree  that  they  were  all  moved  by  the  patriotic 
desire  to  see  this  become  one  of  the  leading  and  most 
prosperous  countries  in  the  world  ;  and  it  is  a  most  signifi- 
cant fact  that,  unitedly  influenced  by  this  desire,  they  all 
regarded  protection  to  domestic  manufactures  and  industry 
as  the  chief  instrumentality  in  effecting  this  great  result. 
Yet,  notwithstanding  the  earnestness  and  energy  with 
which  they  so  frequently,  and,  in  so  many  ways,  expressed 
themselves  upon  this  subject,  there  are  some,  in  our  day, 
who  assume  wisdom  superior  to  theirs,  and  who  flippantly 
declare  that  those  who  repeat  their  advice  and  insist  on  its 
adoption,  are  either  "bloated  capitalists"  or  the  tools  of 
manufacturers  or  monopolists  !  Shall  the  appeals  of  these 
great  "  fathers  of  the  republic"  go  unheeded,  as  if  they 
were  empirics  and  imposters  ?  The  world  has  always  been 
made  up  of  the  wise  and  the  unwise  ;  and  society  is  kept 
upon  its  progress  and  improvement  only  by  subordinating 
the  follies  of  the  latter  to  the  wisdom  of  the  former.  We 
shall  see,  in  the  next  chapter,  what  assiduity  is  employed 
to  inspire  our  minds  with  foreign  and  alien  sentiments,  in 
preference  to  those  of  the  wise  statesmen  to  whom  refer- 
ence has  just  been  made,  and  their  many  distinguished 
compatriots  who  cordially  concurred  with  them. 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

THE  "  COBDEN  CLUB"— FREE  TRADE  THEORIES  OF  COBDEN  — 
HIS  OBJECT  TO  REDUCE  PRICES  OF  OUR  BREADSTUFFS  TO 
BENEFIT  ENGLAND  — HIS  PLAN  — REPEAL  OF  ENGLISH  CORN 
LAWS  — HE  DESIRED  TO  DESTROY  AMERICAN  MANUFACTURES 
—THAT  THE  OBJECT  OF  FREE  TRADE  — POLK' S  ADMINISTRA- 
TION AGREED  WITH  COBDEN  — MUTUALITY  BETWEEN  LABOR 
AND  CAPITAL— IF  ALL  WERE  FARMERS  SURPLUS  WOULD  BE 
WASTED. 

A  POLITICAL  organization  known  as  "  The  Cobden 
^*  Club"  has  become  very  formidable  in  this  country  by 
the  character  and  intelligence  of  its  members.  It  has  the 

o 

center  of  its  operations  in  New  York  City,  where  it  is 
mainly  —  as  is  believed — supported  by  the  large  body  of 
importing  merchants  who  there  represent  foreign  capital 
and  manufactures.  It  has  been  able,  however,  by  means 
of  branches  in  other  cities,  and  the  aid  of  a  few  able  and 
reputable  newspapers,  to  disseminate  its  doctrines  over 
large  sections  of  the  United  States,  and  to  enlist  some 
thoughtful  people  among  their  advocates.  As  may  be 
inferred  from  its  name,  it  openly  defends  free  trade,  and, 
in  recommending  it,  does  not  hesitate  to  employ  arguments 
furnished  by  British  statesmen  and  philosophers,  in  prefer- 
ence to  those  of  the  eminent  men  who  not  only  founded 
our  institutions,  but  molded  the  policy  upon  which  our 
prosperity  has  hitherto  rested.  Nor  does  it  hesitate  to 

473 


474  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

insist  that  the  American  Congress  shall  take  the  British 
Parliament  as  its  pattern,  and  blindly  follow  its  dictation  in 
making  exterminating  war  upon  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion. The  fallacies  employed  to  sustain  its  speculative 
theories  are  numerous,  but  not  always  easy  of  detection, 
because  of  the  ingenious  sophistry  in  the  use  of  which  their 
advocates  have  become  adepts.  Its  members,  however, 
recognize  Mr.  Richard  Cobden  as  their  great  prototype, 
and  borrow  their  proposed  policy  from  his  teachings. 
An  inquiry  into  those  teachings,  consequently,  becomes 
essential  to  a  proper  understanding  of  what  they  pro- 
pose to  accomplish  by  success. 

Mr.  Cobclen  was  a  philanthropist  as  well  as  a  states- 
man. He  was  also  a  manufacturer  ;  and  it  is  no  impeach- 
ment of  his  integrity  to  say  that  he  sympathized  with  the 
class  to  which  he  belonged  in  England.  His  broad  humani- 
tarian views  must  have,  in  some  degree,  influenced  his 
opinions  upon  public  questions,  and  caused  him  to  desire 
that  the  condition  of  manufacturing  operatives  should  be 
improved.  When  he  began  the  work  of  reform  as  an 
active  agitator,  the  commercial  supremacy  of  England, 
which  had  been  successfully  maintained  for  many  years, 
was  seriously  threatened.  Her  manufacturers  were  suffer- 
ing from  great  financial  depression,  and  the  mass  of  her 
laboring  population  were  reduced  to  a  condition  bordering 
upon  pauperism.  Referring  to  this  in  one  of  his  speeches, 
he  said : 

"When  I  go  down  to  the  manufacturing  districts,  I  know  that  I 
shall  be  returning  to  a  gloomy  scene.  I  know  that  starvation  is  stalking 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  475 

through  the  land,  and  that  men  are  perishing  for  want  of  the  merest 
necessaries  of  life." 

All  this  he  attributed  to  the  principle  of  protection  and 
the  absence  of  free  trade  ;  and,  therefore,  with  the  express 
object  of  causing  the  latter  to  be  adopted,  he  inaugurated 
an  active'  war  upon  Parliament,  because  it  had,  for  a  long 
series  of  years,  maintained  the  former.  To  him  it  seemed 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  Parliament,  not  only  to  secure  fair 
wages  for  labor,  but  to  reduce  the  cost  of  subsistence  to 
English  laborers  by  cheapening  the  prices  of  food.  He 
considered  cheap  food  as  necessarily  leading  to  fair  wages, 
and,  consequently,  never  lost  sight  of  that  idea.  It  consti- 
tutes, indeed,  the  key  that  unlocks  his  entire  policy.  Find- 
ing the  laboring  population  of  England  rapidly  increasing, 
and  rejecting  the  Malthusian  theory  of  reduction — and  her 
manufactures  encountering,  everywhere,  formidable  rivalry 
from  those  of  the  United  States  and  Germany — he  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  existing  evils  could  only  be  removed 
by  putting  an  end  to  this  rivalry — that  is,  by  lessening  the 
products  of  American  and  German  manufactures  and  in- 
creasing those  of  England.  His  perceptions  were  so  keen, 
and  his  mind  so  intelligent  that  he  could  not  fail  to 
know  that,  in  this  way  and  no  other,  could  the  manufact- 
urers of  England  maintain  that  control  over  the  markets 
of  the  world,  by  means  of  which  they  had  acquired  their 
great  wealth.  Consequently,  his  first  effective  movement 
was  the  formation  of  the  "  Anti- Corn- Law  League"  which 
was  designed  as  an  arraignment  of  Parliament  for  having 
fostered  this  "  rivalry  of  foreign  competition."  He,  and 


476  HISTORY  OF   THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

those  who  co-operated  with  him,  insisted  that  protective 
duties  in  England  had  produced  the  effect  of  inviting 
"  America  and  Germany  to  divert  their  resources  from  the 
production  of  food,  in  order  to  satisfy  their  natural  demand 
for  manufactures  "  ;  and  that  something  should  be  done  to 
counteract  these  threatening  influences.  It  was  entirely 
manifest  to  him  that,  if  fabrics  manufactured  in  the  United 
States  and  Germany  continued  to  increase  in  quantity,  and 
to  take  the  place  of  those  manufactured  in  England,  the 
laborers  of  that  country  would  be  thrown  out  of  employ- 
ment, their  distresses  increased,  English  manufacturers 
compelled  to  divert  their  capital  to  some  less  profitable 
enterprise,  English  commercial  supremacy  be  brought  to 
an  end,  and  the  United  States  and  Germany  become  great 
manufacturing  and  commercial  nations. 

One  of  the  first  speeches  made  in  Parliament  by 
Mr.  Cobden  was  intended  to  show  that  the  repeal  of  the 
English  Corn  Laws  would  lead  immediately  to  "  the  inter 
change  of  food  and  manufactures  between  England  and 
the  United  States — that  is,  that  it  would  enable  England 
to  exchange  her  manufactures  for  our  surplus  breadstuffs. 
Of  course,  it  did  not  concern  him  to  inquire  what  amount 
of  our  own  manufactured  fabrics  would  remain  uncon- 
sumed,  or  would  have  to  find  new  markets.  That  was  a 
matter  in  which  Parliament  had  no  interest,  and  in  which 
he  had  none.  His  proposition  was  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
Parliament  to  open,  in  some  way,  an  American  market  for 
English  goods.  He  had  no  thought  of  having  anything 
done  to  open  an  English  market  for  American  goods  ;  for, 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  477 

in  subsequent  explanation  of  his  theory,  he  showed  his 
meaning  to  be  that,  in  the  event  of  free  trade  between 
England  and  the  United  States,  there  would  be  no  Ameri- 
can manufactures,  and,  therefore,  no  American  goods  to 
seek  markets  anywhere.  He  viewed  the  matter  exclusively 
from  the  standpoint  of  an  English  statesman  and  manufact- 
urer. Possibly  it  may  not  have  occurred  to  him  that  the 
United  States  would  be  likely  to  remember  the  illiberal  and 
oppressive  measures  by  which  England  had,  for  many 
years,  endeavored  to  keep  us  in  a  condition  of  inferiority 
by  destroying  our  trade  and  commerce.  The  benevolence 
of  his  own  motives  may  have  induced  him  to  suppose  that 
we  would  be  ready,  at  the  invitation  of  Parliament,  to 
exhibit  such  a  spirit  of  brotherly  kindness  and  generosity  as 
to  impoverish  our  own  manufacturers  in  order  that  those 
of  England,  including  himself,  might  augment  their  trade 
and  wealth  at  our  expense  !  Undoubtedly  he  was  incited, 
by  the  philanthropic  tendency  of  his  mind,  to  consider  the 
opportunity  a  favorable  one  for  urging,  not  upon  England 
alone  but  the  United  States  also,  the  necessity  of  consider- 
ing the  two  countries  as  reunited  in  the  bonds  of  reciprocal 
friendship — as  again  allied  by  the  kindly  spirit  of  brother- 
hood— as  having  no  motives  for  commercial  rivalry  —  or 
any  other  interests  than  those  common  to  both.  This,  con- 
sidered alone  in  a  humanitarian  point  of  view,  was  credita- 
ble enough  to  the  heart  of  Mr.  Cobden,  as  a  philanthropist; 
but  he  fell  into  the  error  of  supposing  that  the  time  had 
arrived,  or  was  rapidly  approaching,  when  nations,  stricken 
upon  one  cheek,  would  turn  the  other.  And  he  was  in  error 


47 8  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

also  in  supposing  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
would  not  be  likely  to  see  and  accurately  measure,  in  all  its 
dimensions,  the  ingenious  plan  he  was  contriving  for  turn- 
ing them  back  in  the  march  of  material  development,  by 
shutting  up  their  manufactures,  and  diverting  the  labor 
they  had  employed  so  profitably,  to  the  cultivation  of  the 
soil,  in  order  to  increase  their  agricultural  surplus,  and 
lessen  the  value  of  their  agricultural  labor  thereby,  so  that 
the  price  of  food  in  England  would  be  cheapened,  to 
enable  English  manufacturers  to  subsist  their  laborers  at 
less  cost,  and,  by  that  means,  make  larger  profits. 

By  way  of  enforcing  these  ideas  Mr.  Cobden  suggested 
that,  by  the  reduction  of  the  English  duties,  so  as  to  make 
a  beginning  in  the  direction  of  free  trade — which  was  the 
ulterior  point  of  his  policy — the  process  of  exchanging 
American  wheat  for  British  manufactured  goods  would  at 
once  begin.  He  said : 

"Suppose,  now,  that  it  were  but  the  Thames  instead  of  the  At- 
lantic which  separates  the  two  countries  —  suppose  that  the  people  on 
one  side  were  mechanics  and  artisans,  capable  by  their  industry  of  pro- 
ducing a  vast  supply  of  manufactures ;  and  that  the  people  on  the  other 
side  were  agriculturists,  producing  infinitely  more  than  they  could  them- 
selves consume  of  corn,  pork  and  beef — fancy  these  two  separate  peoples 
anxious  and  willing  to  exchange  with  each  other  the  produce  of  their 
common  industries,  and  fancy  a  demon  rising  from  the  middle  of  the 
river — for  I  cannot  imagine  anything  human  in  such  a  position  and 
performing  such  an  office  —  fancy  a  demon  rising  from  the  river  and 
holding  in  his  hand  an  act  of  Parliament,  and  saying,  'You  shall  not 
supply  each  others'  wants';  and  then,  in  addition  to  that,  let  it  be  sup- 
posed that  this  demon  said  to  his  victim,  with  an  affected  smile,  'This 
is  for  your  benefit ;  I  do  it  entirely  for  your  protection ! '  Where  was 
the  difference  between  the  Thames  and  the  Atlantic  ?" 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  479 

The  picture  here  drawn  is  somewhat  fanciful,  especially 
in  those  portions  where  the  Atlantic  is  dwarfed  to  the  size 
of  the  Thames,  and  the  principle  of  protection  is  com- 
pared to  a  demon.  Nevertheless,  its  most  conspicuous  and 
prominent  feature  is  plainly  exhibited,  in  this,  that  he 
manifestly  considered  the  English  people  as  more  compe- 
tent than  the  American  to  become  skilled  mechanics  and 
artisans ;  and  the  latter  as  better  suited  than  the  former 
for  cultivating  the  soil  and  raising  corn,  pork  and  beef! 
These  he  supposed  to  be  the  separate  vocations  for  which 
the  two  peoples  were  naturally  adapted  ;  and,  therefore,  in 
order  that  each  should  remain  in  its  proper  sphere,  his 
imagination  suggested  that  the  Atlantic  should  be  reduced 
to  the  dimensions  of  the  Thames,  by  the  simple  process  of 
free  trade,  so  as  to  remove  entirely  that  spirit  of  rivalry 
which  had  stimulated  the  American  manufacturers  to  such 
competition  with  those  of  England  as  had  seriously  inter- 
fered with  the  business  and  lessened  the  profits  of  the 
latter.  Deploring  the  consequences  produced  by  this 
rivalry,  not  only  as  an  Englishman  but  as  a  manufacturer, 
he  regarded  his  duty  as  two-fold — first,  to  see  that  the 
commercial  supremacy  of  England  was  re-established  and 
maintained ;  and,  second,  that  the  legislation  of  Parliament 
should  give  preference  to  British  over  American  manu- 
factures. He  should  not  be  complained  of,  nor  should  his 
motives  be  assailed  for  this,  because,  as  a  member  of 
Parliament  and  a  thorough  Englishman,  he  represented 
English  interests  exclusively.  As  between  England  and 
the  United  States  it  was  his  duty,  and  as  an  English  manu- 


480  HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

facturer  it  was  his  interest,  to  bring  about  such  legislation 
as  would  tend  to  strengthen  the  former  and  weaken  the 
latter — such  as  would  drive  American  manufactures  out 
of  the  markets  of  the  world  to  make  room  for  English. 
And  it  was  no  less  his  duty  and  interest  to  influence,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  price  of  food  in  England,  so  that  by 
reducing  it  to  a  low  standard  the  profits  of  English  man- 
ufacturers would  be  increased.  These  objects,  in  fact, 
constituted  the  chief  aim  of  his  ambition.  They  influenced 
him  to  enter  Parliament,  where  he  concentrated  all  his 
energies — which  were  eminently  great  —  to  accomplish 
them.  His  perseverance  was  untiring,  and  the  success 
he  won — which  was  marked  and  distinguished  —  consti- 
tutes the  basis  of  his  fame. 

Mr.  Cobden's  opinions  have  a  most  important  bearing 
upon  our  interests,  which  may  easily  be  seen  by  those  in 
this  country  who  have  leisure  and  opportunity  to  investi- 
gate these  matters.  It  does  not  require  much  reflection  to 
observe  that  the  very  arguments  employed  by  him  in  favor 
of  free  trade,  prove  conclusively  that  in  precisely  the  same 
degree  that  free  trade,  as  he  understood  it,  would  benefit 
England  it  would  injure  the  United  States.  Nothing  would 
more  assuredly  arrest  our  prosperity  than  to  divert  the 
large  amount  of  labor  engaged  in  manufactures  in  the 
United  States  to  the  cultivation  of  the  soil.  Such  an  in- 
crease in  the  number  of  agriculturists  would,  necessarily, 
increase  also  the  surplus  of  wheat,  corn,  cattle,  hogs,  etc., 
and  cause  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  price  of  these 
articles,  as  well  as  in  the  value  of  lands.  These  conse- 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  481 

quences — that  is,  the  destruction  of  manufactures,  the  de- 
creased value  of  labor,  and  of  farm  products,  and  of  lands- 
would  cause  the  United  States  to  become  many  millions  of 
dollars  poorer ;  and,  as  we  should  have  to  buy  all  our 
manufactured  fabrics  from  England,  they  would  cause  that 
country  to  become  many  millions  of  dollars  richer.  Why 
Mr.  Cobden  should  have  desired  this,  and  labored  so  hard 
to  bring  it  about  —  when  it  is  considered  that  he  was  an 
Englishman  and  a  manufacturer — is  easy  enough  to  under- 
stand. But  why  any  considerable  number  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States  should  desire  it,  is  exceedingly  hard 
to  comprehend. 

No  injustice  is  done  to  the  memory  of  Mr.  Cobden  by 
this  method  of  stating  his  opinions.  According  to  Mr, 
John  Bright — his  most  distinguished  coadjutor — the  dis- 
cussion in  and  out  of  Parliament,  for  seven  years,  involved 
one  question  —  "  whether  it  was  good  for  a  man  to  have 
half  a  loaf  or  a  whole  loaf."  The  idea  suggested  by  this 
was  not  whether  a  whole  loaf  was  better  than  half  a  loaf — 
for  such  a  proposition  could  not  give  rise  to  any  difference 
of  opinion  or  debate  —  but  whether  a  whole  loaf  should 
be  purchased  for  the  price  then  paid  for  half  a  loaf- —  in 
other  words,  whether  the  price  of  subsistence  in  England 
should  be  reduced  one  half.  Of  course,  such  a  question 
was  important  to  the  laborer,  as  a  consumer,  and  thus  Mr. 
Cobden  and  Mr.  Bright  were  enabled  to  enlist  all  the 
manufacturing  operatives  in  England  on  the  side  of  the 
" Anti- Corn- Law  League"  and,  by  this  means,  to  bring 
about,  in  the  end,  the  repeal  of  the  corn  laws.  Their  zeal 
31 


482  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

in  the  service  of  this  large  class  was,  in  all  respects,  com- 
mendable. But  it  would  have  been  more  disinterested  if 
England  had  been  the  producer  of  all  the  means  of  sub- 
sistence of  her  own  laborers.  In  that  case,  she  would  have 
shown  something  like  magnanimity  by  reducing  the  value  of 
her  own  farm  products,  for  the  relief  of  her  own  suffering 
laborers.  Mr.  Cobden  and  Mr.  Bright  would,  possibly, 
have  consented  to  this,  for  they  were  both  urged  forward 
by  humanitarian  motives.  But  the  land-owners  of  England 
would  not  consent  to  it,  and,  as  the  governing  class,  they 
possessed  the  power  to  influence  the  decisions  of  Parlia- 
ment. No  such  case  as  that,  however,  existed  or  could 
exist,  for  the  reason  that  the  lands  of  England,  however 
highly  cultivated,*  were  insufficient  to  produce  the  amount 
of  subsistence  required  by  her  laboring  population.  They 
had  to  be  fed  by  the  products  of  other  countries,  includ- 
ing the  United  States.  Nobody  understood  this  better  than 
Mr.  Cobden,  and,  consequently,  he  kept  that  fact  so  con- 
stantly prominent  before  Parliament  that  he  finally  brought 
the  land-owners  to  see  that  to  reduce  the  cost  of  subsist- 
ence would  tend  to  reduce  the  value  of  breadstuffs  in  the 
United  States  and  other  exporting  countries.  And  by  this 
means  he  succeeded  in  getting  the  Corn  Laws  repealed  — 
manifestly  realizing,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  full  benefits 
he  had  promised,  as  the  result  of  the  repeal,  would  not. 
follow  unless  the  United  States  could  be  persuaded  to 
adopt  the  policy  of  free  trade.  That,  in  his  opinion,  would 
lead  directly  to  the  reduction  in  the  price  of  food,  which  he 
so  earnestly  desired,  and  which  was  the  great  object  of  all 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  483 

his  exertions.  In  one  of  his  speeches  he  quoted  approv- 
ingly an  English  workman,  to  the  effect  "  that  high  pro- 
visions make  low  wages,  and  cheap  provisions  make  high 
wages";  —  showing  that,  in  his  opinion,  high  provisions 
in  England  assure  high  prices  there  for  the  agricultural 
products  of  the  United  States,  and  that  low  provisions 
diminish  them.  It  did  not,  of  course,  require  any  extra- 
ordinary reasoning  powers  to  enforce  this  proposition, 
for  there  was  no  difficulty  in  seeing  that  as  the  prices  of 
breadstuffs  in  England  were  regulated  by  the  ability  of 
the  consumers  to  pay  for  them,  they  would  necessarily 
decline  with  the  decline  of  their  ability. 

So  long  as  Mr.  Cobden  was  content  to  confine  his  argu- 
ments in  favor  of  repealing  the  corn  laws,  to  the  proposi- 
tion that  the  price  of  subsistence  would  be  reduced  to  the 
extent  of  the  duty  taken  off,  what  he  said  would  furnish 
no  ground  for  criticism  in  this  country.  He,  however, 
went  beyond  this,  by  undertaking  to  show  that  he  desired 
a  still  greater  reduction,  which,  as  he  argued,  could  only  be 
produced  by  destroying  American  manufactures  and  divert- 
ing the  labor  employed  by  them  to  agricultural  pursuits,  so 
as  to  increase  the  surplus  of  their  products,  and  thereby 
reduce  the  prices  still  greater  than  would  follow  the 
removal  of  the  duties.  As  this,  in  point  of  fact,  consti- 
tutes the  most  prominent  feature  of  all  his  arguments,  it 
is  necessary  to  understand  his  views  fully,  inasmuch  as  the 
"  Cobden  Club "  has  undertaken  to  disseminate  in  the 
United  States  his  peculiar  doctrines  with  reference  to  free 


484  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

trade.  To  aid  in  doing  this  intelligently,  the  foregoing 
analysis  of  them  has  been  made 

There  are  three  classes  of  people  in  the  United  States 
who  are  interested  in  thoroughly  comprehending  these 
teachings  of  Mr.  Cobden,  in  order  that  they  may  realize 
what  will  be  the  effect  of  free  trade  upon  their  prosperity, 
if  his  followers  in  this  country  should  accomplish  the  object 
for  which  they  are  so  earnestly  laboring.  These  are 
farmers,  manufacturers  and  manufacturing  laborers.  They 
represent  a  very  large  percentage  of  our  population,  and, 
together,  contribute,  in  a  far  greater  degree  than  all  other 
classes  combined,  to  the  wealth  and  material  advancement 
of  the  country.  Their  importance  is  recognized  and 
admitted  by  all.  They  can  easily  see,  with  but  little  reflec- 
tion, how  their  interests  would  be  imperiled  by  free  trade, 
as  explained  by  Mr.  Cobden,  its  most  zealous  and  greatest 
defender.  The  farmer  would  find  the  profits  of  his  labor 
seriously  reduced,  if  not  wholly  destroyed.  The  manufact- 
urer's capital  would  be  lost  and  his  business  broken  up. 
The  manufacturing  laborer  would  be  thrown  out  of  em- 
ployment, and  forced,  in  order  to  secure  a  bare  subsistence 
for  himself  and  family,  to  find  some  new  occupation  un- 
suited  to  his  habits,  and  at  far  less  wages  than  he  had  been 
accustomed  to  receive.  And  the  amount  of  injury  inflicted 
upon  these  three  classes  would  be  so  great  as  to  affect 
injuriously  all  the  business  of  the  country,  and  thus  para- 
lyze every  department  of  industry. 

It  has,  in  previous  chapters,  been  explained  why  the 
Protective  Tariff  Act  of  1 842  was  repealed,  and  why  that  of 


HISTORY  OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  485 

1846  was  passed,  and  its  principles  continued  in  that  of 
1857.  And  if  the  three  classes  of  people  above  named, 
will  take  the  pains  to  inquire  into  the  arguments  made  by 
Mr.  Cobden,  in  favor  of  free  trade,  they  will  find  that  the 
same  arguments  substantially  influenced  the  passage  of 
the  two  last  acts.  When  Mr.  Walker,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  under  Mr.  Polk,  undertook  to  show  that  the 
interests  of  the  cotton-growers  would  be  promoted  by  re- 
ducing the  prices  of  our  agricultural  products,  so  thafc 
English  manufacturers  would  thereby  be  enabled  to  pay 
higher  prices  for  cotton,  he  — whether  consciously  or  not,  is 
now  of  no  consequence — made  himself  the  voluntary 
indorser  of  Mr.  Cobden's  opinions.  He  endeavored  to 
Americanize  English  ideas  ;  and  he  succeeded  to  the  ex- 
tent of  misleading  the  country  by  assigning  the  temporary 
increase  of  revenue  to  other  than  the  true  causes,  and  by 
seriously  embarrassing  the  national  Treasury.  The  reason- 
ing of  Mr.  Cobden  may  have  been  logically  true  from  the 
standpoint  of  an  English  statesman  and  manufacturer ; 
but  the  same  argument  made  by  Mr.  Walker  was  logically 
false  from  the  standpoint  of  an  American  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury.  The  plain  and  simple  fact  is,  that  the  chief 
object  to  be  produced  by  free  trade,  in  Mr.  Cobden's  view, 
was  to  reduce  the  price  of  the  agricultural  products  of  the 
United  States,  for  the  benefit  of  English  manufacturers, 
and  the  chief  object  of  American  free  trade,  in  Mr. 
Walker's  view,  was  to  accomplish  the  same  result,  for  the 
benefit  of  both  English  manufacturers  and  American  cot- 
ton-growers. The  mutual  interests  of  these  two  classes 


486  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

— one  English,  the  other  American  —  centered,  accord- 
ing to  the  free-trade  theories  of  both  Mr.  Cobden  and  Mr. 
Walker,  in  opposition  to  agricultural  and  manufacturing 
industry  in  this  country. 

This  contemplated  injury  could  not  be  inflicted  upon 
our  vast  agricultural  and  manufacturing  industries  with- 
out seriously  deranging  all  the  business  of  the  country; 
nor  could  it  be  inflicted  upon  one  of  these  industries 
without  prejudice  to  all  others  —  especially  to  the  labor 
they  employ.  It  is  capital  that  furnishes  the  means  of 
rewarding  labor,  and  the  wages  of  labor,  in  any  occupa- 
tion, are  always  and  necessarily  regulated  by  the  amount 
of  capital  employed.  He  who  erects  manufacturing  estab- 
lishments, determines  their  extent  by  the  amount  of  his 
capital.  If  this  enables  him  to  operate  extensively,  he 
will  require  a  larger  amount  of  labor  and,  therefore,  a 
larger  number  of  laborers,  than  he  will  if  compelled, 
on  account  of  limited  capital,  to  carry  on  business  upon 
a  small  scale.  Upon  the  same  principle  the  farmer  will 
cultivate  more  or  less  land,  or  raise  more  or  less  grain, 
stock,  etc.,  accordingly  as  the  prices  paid  for  his  surplus 
are  high  or  low;  and  as  these  prices  depend  upon  the 
demand  for  his  surplus,  and  as  this  is  always  greater  or 
lesser  accordingly  as  there  are  a  greater  or  lesser  num- 
ber engaged  in  manufactures,  therefore,  each  should  have 
a  fair  compensation  assured — the  farmer,  that  he  may  be 
remunerated  for  producing  the  surplus,  and  the  laborer, 
that  he  may  have  the  means  of  purchasing  it  for  his 
subsistence.  If  anything  should  occur  to  withhold  just 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  487 

compensation  from  the  farmer,  he  would  have  no  induce- 
ment to  create  a  surplus;  and  if  just  compensation  were 
withheld  from  the  laborer  he  could  not  provide  for  his 
subsistence  by  purchasing  the  surplus.  And  thus  each 
would  be  injured  if  the  free  trade  theories  of  Mr.  Cob- 
den  and  Mr.  Walker  should  prevail  in  this  country. 

The  interest  of  the  laborer  requires  that  a  large 
amount  of  capital  shall  be  engaged  in  manufactures, 
so  that  he  may  obtain  high  wages;  and  the  interest  of 
the  farmer  requires  that  the  laborer  shall  receive  high 
wages,  so  that  he  may  be  able  to  purchase  his  surplus 
products.  Consequently,  the  mutuality  of  interest  between 
the  agriculturist,  the  capitalist  and  the  manufacturing 
laborer,  is  as  necessary  to  material  development  as  air 
and  moisture  are  to  vegetable  growth.  It  is  alone  by 
protection  to  the  various  forms  of  industry  that  the 
Government  provides  for  the  regulation  of  these  mutual 
relations.  If  capital  is  protected  it  will  seek  investment 
in  manufactures.  If  manufactures  are  protected  they  will 
create  a  demand  for  labor;  and  the  protection  thus  given 
is  beneficial  to  the  farmer  and  the  laborer  —  to  the 
farmer,  because  it  creates  a  market  for  his  surplus,  and 
to  the  laborer,  because  it  assures  him  good  and  steady 
wages;  and  thus  the  capitalist  gets  a  fair  profit  for  his 
capital,  the  farmer  fair  rent  for  his  land,  and  the  laborer 
a  fair  rate  of  wages. 

But  free  trade  disregards  these  relations  ;  and,  instead 
of  encouraging  them  to  harmony  and  mutuality,  it  incites 
them  to  rivalry.  If  adopted  in  this  country  it  would  force 


HISTORY    OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

capitalists  to  withdraw  their  capital  from  manufactures  and 
put  a  stop  to  the  demand  for  labor  in  that  direction. 
Labor,  being  thus  left  without  reward,  would  be  unable  to 
contribute  towards  the  creation  of  a  market  for  the  con- 
sumption of  the  agricultural  surplus.  The  necessary 
decline  in  the  price  of  the  surplus,  in  consequence  of  this 
withdrawal  of  the  demand,  would  impoverish  the  farmers. 
And  as  everybody  knows  that  agriculture  is  the  basis  of  all 
our  prosperity,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  the  impover- 
ishment of  our  farmers  would  send  a  shock  through  all  the 
avenues  of  business. 

England  could  never  have  been  content  at  the  infliction 
upon  her  interests  of  the  injury  which  free  trade  would 
produce  in  this  country,  upon  all  these  classes  of  people, 
and,  through  them,  upon  the  whole  body  of  the  people. 
She  is  far  too  sagacious  to  submit  to  any  condition  of  affairs 
which  tends,  in  any  degree,  to  reduce^  her  to  inferiority. 
When  she  adopted  free  trade  it  was  intended  to  counteract 
the  influence  of  protection  in  the  United  States,  where  it 
had  produced  the  same  effect  as  in  that  country.  A  con- 
sciousness of  this  stimulated  Mr.  Cobden  and  suggested  to 
his  fertile  mind  that  the  only  remedy  would  be  free  trade 
in  both  England  and  the  United  States — because  as  pro- 
tection had  built  up  our  manufacturing  industries,  free 
trade  would  destroy  them.  Therefore,  when  England  saw 
herself  entering  upon  a  commercial  decline  in  consequence 
of  the  rivalry  occasioned  by  the  progress  of  American  and 
German  manufactures,  she  was  in  a  condition  to  be 
impressed  by  Mr.  Cobden's  ideas  of  free  trade,  for  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  489 

plain  reason  that  he  proposed  to  put  an  end  to  this  rivalry 
by  removing  the  cause  of  it — that  is,  by  breaking  up 
American  manufactures.  The  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws 
was  the  first  step  towards  this  ;  which  was,  manifestly, 
adopted  with  the  view  of  having  the  United  States  do  the 
same  thing,  so  that  when  the  death  wound  should  be 
inflicted  upon  American  manufactures  it  should  at  least 
have  the  appearance  of  being  received  in  the  house  of  their 
friends.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  Mr.  Cobden's  scheme 
would  not  have  proved  a  success,  and  free  trade  would  not 
have  been  adopted  in  England,  but  for  the  belief  that  the 
United  States  would,  in  the  near  future,  do  the  same  thing. 
Our  advances  towards  that  end — the  evil  effects  of  which 
have  been  pointed  out — had  already  created  this  impres- 
sion. The  passage  of  our  tariff  of  1846,  under  the  lead  of 
Mr.  Walker,  was  almost  contemporaneous  with  the  repeal 
of  the  English  Corn  Laws,  under  the  lead  of  Mr.  Cobden  ; 
as  if  the  two  nations  were  holding  out  their  arms  to  embrace 
each  other  in  the  genuine  spirit  of  brotherhood !  Mr. 
Cobden  hoped  to  see  the  Atlantic  reduced  to  the  dimen- 
sions of  the  Thames,  but  he  expected  to  see  the  rich  treas- 
ures of  commerce  which  were  borne  upon  its  waters 
poured  into  the  laps  of  his  own  countrymen.  Mr.  Walker 
was  partially  deluded  with  the  same  idea,  and  was  .quite 
willing  to  see  that  end  consummated,  even  at  the  expense 
of  all  the  other  sections  of  the  Union,  provided  only  that 
the  cotton-growing  section  should  be  benefited  by  the 
increased  prices  of  its  cotton.  Therefore,  the  beneficial 
effects  of  free  trade,  promised  to  England  by  Mr.  Cobden 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

and  his  allies,  were  expected  to  be  derived  more  from  our 
free  trade  than  theirs.  While  the  laborers  of  England 
were  not  more  numerous  than  she  could  subsist  by  the 
products  of  her  own  soil  and  that  of  her  dependent  Col- 
onies, she  persevered  in  protection  as  the  only  means  dis- 
covered by  her  ablest  statesmen  of  developing  her 
resources  and  extending  her  commerce.  But  when  she 
realized  the  painful  and  unwelcome  fact  that  her  products 
were  no  longer  sufficient  for  that  purpose,  and  that  she 
was  compelled  to  import  food  for  her  laborers  from  the 
United  States,  to  keep  them  from  starving,  then  Mr.  Cob- 
den  and  the  "  Anti- Corn-Law  League "  prescribed  the 
panacea  of  free  trade  in  both  countries,  as  the  only 
effective  remedy,  because  it  would  cheapen  food,  first  in 
England  and  then  in  the  United  States,  and  lead,  with 
unerring  certainty,  to  lower  the  price  of  labor,  ruin  Ameri- 
can manufactures  and  continue  the  commercial  supremacy 
of  England  throughout  the  world. 

If  the  condition  of  this  country  were  like  that  of  En- 
gland— if  we  had  to  subsist  our  laborers  by  the  importation 
of  food  from  foreign  countries,  as  England  is  compelled  to 
do,  then  some  plausible  reason  might  be  found  why  we 
should  desire  to  cheapen  the  prices  of  agricultural  products 
in  the  countries  from  which  our  importations  would  come. 
In  that  event  the  "  Cob  den  Club"  would  have  opened 
before  it  the  same  field  of  operations  as  that  in  which  Mr. 
Cobden  won  his  fame.  But  our  condition  is  the  very 
reverse  of  this  —  a  fact  which  deserves  to  be  repeated  a 
thousand  times.  It  is  by  the  exportation  of  our  surplus 


HISTORY   OF  THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  49! 

that  we  furnish  subsistence  for  other  countries  —  especially 
England  ;  and,  consequently,  our  interest  demands  that 
the  prices  of  our  surplus  shall  be  increased,  not  diminished. 
What  we  need  for  our  surplus  wheat,  corn,  beef,  pork, 
etc.,  is  high  prices,  not  low.  What  England  desires  and 
needs  for  her  interests,  is  that  the  prices  of  all  these  shall 
be  low,  not  high.  And  thus  the  issue  between  protection 
and  free  trade,  in  the  United  States,  becomes  so  simple 
and  palpable  that  no  sophistry  is  ingenious  enough  to  dis- 
guise it,  when  subjected  to  the  scrutiny  of  thoughtful  and 
practical  minds.  Protection  assures  high  prices  for  labor  — 
therefore,  it  should  be  preserved  in  the  United  States  for 
the  benefits  it  confers.  Free  trade  assures  low  prices  for 
produce  and  low  wages  for  labor, —  therefore,  it  would 
inflict  serious  and  irreparable  injury  upon  this  country  and 
confer  important  advantages  upon  England.  In  deciding 
which  of  these  consequences  to  prefer  —  the  advantage  of 
the  United  States  or  of  England — it  would  puzzle  even  the 
"  Cobden  Club"  with  all  the  recognized  ability  of  its  mem- 
bers, to  contrive  a  logical  and  valid  argument  by  which 
preference  of  the  latter  over  the  former  can  be  maintained 
—  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  our  own  interests. 

If  this  country  should  be  persuaded  to  follow  the  advice 
of  Mr.  Cobden,  and  of  the  "  Cobden  Club"  and  submit  to 
being  made  entirely  agricultural,  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  free  trade  and  the  destruction  of  our  manufactures, 
we  should  always  possess  the  ordinary  means  of  comfort 
and  quiet  enjoyment,  because,  by  the  cultivation  of  the 
soil,  we  should  be  supplied  with  the  chief  necessaries  of 


4Q2  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

life.  That  is  the  condition  for  which  Mr.  Cobden  seemed 
to  think  nature  designed  us,  inasmuch  as  it  has  withheld 
from  our  people  the  genius  and  talents  necessary  to  rival 
those  of  England  in  skill  !  Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that 
countries  where  agriculture  and  manufactures  both  exist, 
side  by  side,  are  found  to  possess  greater  means  of  mate- 
rial advancement  than  those  entirely  agricultural.  Agri- 
culture depends  upon  soil  and  climate,  and  neither  of 
these  is  sufficiently  diversified  to  allow  very  much  departure 
from  the  ordinary  methods  of  cultivation  and  production. 
There  is  room  only  for  limited  experiments  and  improve- 
ment. It  is  otherwise  with  manufactures.  They  open 
more  and  broader  fields  for  the  display  of  ingenuity,  and 
give  greater  stimulus  to  the  genius  of  invention.  And  as 
each  new  invention  leads  to  others,  all  the  wants  and 
demands  of  society  are  supplied  by  every  variety  of  ma- 
chinery. Such  has  been  our  experience  hitherto ;  and  if,  in 
the  face  of  this,  we  shall  now  be  prevailed  upon  to  depart 
from  the  settled  policy  which  has  produced  such  prosperous 
and  satisfactory  results,  we  might  well  be  compared  to  the 
man  who,  weary  of  life,  puts  an  end  to  it  by  suicide. 


CHAPTER  XLV. 

TAXATION  INEVITABLE  —  DIRECT  AND  INDIRECT  TAXES— FREE 
TRADE  LEADS  TO  FORMER— VALUE  OF  REAL  AND  PERSONAL 
PROPERTY— DIRECT  TAXES  FALL  HEAVILY  UPON  THE  FORMER 
—THEY  ARE  COMPULSORY  —  TAXES  UPON  NECESSARIES  AND 
LUXURIES— DIRECT  TAXES  OPPRESSIVE  TO  LABOR— CLASS  SO- 
CIETY IN  ENGLAND  — EFFECT  UPON  LABOR— LABORERS  KEPT 
IX  INFERIOR  CLASS— FREE  TRADE  DERIVED  FROM  POLITICAL 
ECONOMY -HOW  THAT  BECAME  A  SCIENCE  — ENGLISH  LABOR- 
ERS NOT  RELIEVED  — WOULD  REDUCE  AMERICAN  LABORERS 
TO  SAME  CONDITION. 

DY  the  introduction  of  free  trade  in  England,  the 
*"^  government  has  been  compelled  to  persevere  in  an 
oppressive  system  of  direct  taxation,  to  obtain  the  means 
of  support.  That  a  like  result  would  follow  its  introduc- 
tion in  the  United  States  is  perfectly  evident,  unless  some 
method  of  carrying  on  the  Government  without  taxation  is 
discovered — which  nobody  proposes  or  anticipates.  There 
is  nothing  more  certain  than  taxation.  In  some  form  or 
other  we  must  all  bear  its  burden,  because  society  needs 
the  protection  of  governments,  and  governments  can  only 
be  maintained  by  means  of  it.  The  periodical  return  of  the 
tax-gatherer  is  as  regular  as  the  return  of  the  seasons,  but 
far  more  unwelcome.  Under  our  form  of  government  uni- 
versal suffrage  has  been  adopted  in  order  to  preserve  the 
principle  that  taxes  shall  not  be  assessed  without  the  "  con- 
sent of  the  governed,"  it  being  designed  thereby  to  lighten 

493 


494  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  burden  as  much  as  possible.  Hence,  there  is  no  ques- 
tion connected  with  the  administration  of  public  affairs,  of 
greater  concern  to  the  people,  than  that  involving  the 
mode  of  raising  the  public  revenue.  The  proposition  that 
taxes  for  this  purpose  shall  be  in  the  least  possible  degree 
oppressive  upon  labor  and  industry,  is  universally  ac- 
cepted, because  these  are  the  real  sources  of  our  material 
prosperity.  But  how  to  make  them  so  is  not  only  the 
great  problem  of  the  present,  but  will  be  of  the  future  also. 
The  burden  may  be  lessened,  but  cannot  be  entirely 
removed. 

There  are  but  two  modes  of  taxation — direct  and  indi- 
rect— and  the  power  of  Congress  is  the  same  over  each. 
The  only  measure  of  indirect  taxation  hitherto  employed 
by  the  National  Government,  is  by  laying  duties  upon  im- 
ports. The  payment  of  these  is  made  at  the  custom 
houses,  by  the  importer  of  foreign  goods  ;  and,  in  so  far  as 
they  enter  into  the  prices  of  imported  articles,  they  are 
voluntarily  paid  by  the  consumers  of  those  articles — for  it 
should  not  be  forgotten  it  is  entirely  discretionary  with 
each  individual  whether  he  will  or  will  not  purchase  and 
consume  foreign  goods.  If  he  does  not,  he  will  not  repay 
to  the  importer  any  part  of  the  duties  paid  by  him  to  the 
Government.  If,  however,  this  system  were  abolished, 
direct  taxation  would  necessarily  follow,  and  all  taxes 
would  then  be  paid  by  compulsion,  as  they  now  are  for 
State,  county,  and  municipal  purposes,  in  all  the  States. 
By  this  system  a  percentage  of  tax  would  be  levied  upon 
every  dollar's  worth  of  property  in  the  country,  in  order  to 


HISTORY  OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  495 

raise  the  amount  required  by  the  wants  of  the  Government. 
The  largest  part  of  the  burden  would  then  fall  upon  the 
wealthy  classes,  yet  it  would  fall  proportionately  upon  all 
who  own  property  of  any  description,  and  more  heavily 
and  oppressively  upon  the  poor  than  the  rich.  He  who 
receives  a  large  income  from  accumulated  property  and 
capital,  always  pays  his  taxes  more  easily — but  not  always 
more  willingly — than  the  man  whose  labor  is  his  only  capi- 
tal, and  who  has  no  income  beyond  what  it  produces. 
Whatsoever  is  accumulated  by  the  former  without  labor, 
and  by  the  latter  by  means  of  labor,  enters  into  the  mass 
of  property  subject  to  taxation ;  and  the  method  of  reach- 
ing this  mass  for  purposes  of  taxation  is  simple,  because  it 
is  direct. 

The  estimated  value  of  property  in  the  United  States 
in  1870  was  $30,068,518,507,  and  the  assessed  value  for 
taxation,  was  $14,178,986,732 — less  than  one  half.  In 
1880  the  estimated  value  was  $43,642,000,000,  and  the 
assessed  value  $16,902,993,543  — an  increase,  during  the 
decade,  of  only  $2,724,006,811,  or  about  nineteen  per 
cent.  It  may  be  safely  assumed  that  by  the  time  any 
system  of  direct  taxation  could,  if  established,  be  carried 
into  effect,  the  ordinary  expenses  of  the  Government 
would  border  very  closely  upon  $250,000,000  per  year.  If 
to  this  shall  be  added  the  amount  necessary  to  be  paid 
annually  for  interest  on  the  public  debt,  until  our  bonds 
have  matured,  the  sum  to  be  raised  each  year  will  be  over 
$300,000,000.  This  would,  of  course,  require  a  large  per- 
centage of  direct  taxes  upon  every  species  of  property  in 


496  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

the  United  States  at  its  assessed  value.  It  requires  but  a 
glance,  however,  to  see  that  it  would  fall  most  heavily  upon 
real  estate,  inasmuch  as  its  real  and  assessed  value  greatly 
exceeds  the  real  and  assessed  value  of  personal  property. 
To  illustrate:  The  assessed  value  of  real  estate  in  1880 
was  $13,036,766,925,  and  the  assessed  value  of  personal 
property  was  $3,866,226,618 — a  difference  of  about  three 
and  a  half  to  one.  The  fact  would  be,  therefore,  that  by  a 
system  of  direct  taxation,  the  amount  levied  and  collected 
from  real  estate  would  be  more  than  three  times  as  much 
as  would  be  levied  and  collected  from  personal  property. 
It  is  scarcely  to  be  supposed  that  the  great  body  of  the 
American  farmers  would  desire  to  see  the  present  system, 
by  which  all  they  pay  into  the  National  Treasury  is  volun- 
tarily paid,  changed  for  one  by  which  they  would  be 
required  to  pay,  by  compulsion,  so  large  a  proportion  of 
the  public  revenue. 

This  mode  of  statement,  however,  assumes  that  the 
assessed  value  of  the  property  to  be  reached  by  direct 
taxation  would  be  arrived  at  by  the  same  methods  of  ap- 
praisement that  now  prevail  in  the  States,  and  by  which 
property  is  invariably  appraised,  for  purposes  of  taxation, 
at  much  less  than  its  actual  value.  The  value  of  both  real 
and  personal  property  would  undoubtedly  be  increased ; 
but  the  great  bulk  of  the  assessment  would  continue  to 
fall  upon  real  estate.  The  proportions  would  probably 
remain  about  what  they  now  are  under  the  systems  pre- 
vailing in  the  States — that  is,  for  every  $i  of  tax  assessed 
upon  personal  property  there  would  be  at  least  $3  assessed 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  497 

upon  real  estate.  Can  anyone  imagine  why  such  a  state 
of  things  as  this  should  exist?  why  the  owners  of  real 
estate  should  pay  three  times  as  much  for  the  support  of 
government  as  the  owners  of  personal  property  ?  Such  an 
arrangement  would  be  beneficial  to  bankers,  brokers, 
stock-operators,  corporations,  and  all  engaged  in  specu- 
lations ;  but  would  be  seriously  oppressive  to  that  large 
class  who  are  owners  of  their  own  homes,  and  who  con- 
stitute the  most  substantial  of  our  population.  And  when 
it  is  considered  that  the  national  taxes,  thus  to  be  assessed 
and  collected  under  a  system  of  free  trade,  would  be  in 
addition  to  what  must  also  be  paid  for  State,  county,  town- 
ship and  municipal  purposes,  the  burden  of  taxation  would 
soon  become  so  great  that  it  would  be  exceedingly  difficult, 
if  not  impossible,  to  bear.  And  if  there  should  be  any 
failure  or  refusal  to  pay,  the  assessed  property  would  be 
distrained  and  sold  —  usually  at  a  ruinous  sacrifice,  as 
generally  happens  in  such  cases.  But  in  any  view  the 
burden  would  be  more  oppressive  upon  those  in  moderate 
circumstances  than  upon  such  as  have  abundance,  because 
it  would  take  from  the  generality  of  that  class  the  pittances 
which  constitute  the  surplus  profits  of  their  labor,  which,  in 
innumerable  cases,  is  indispensably  necessary  for  their 
own  support  and  that  of  their  families. 

The  fact  that  the  payment  of  direct  taxes  to  the  Gov- 
ernment would  be  compulsory,  instead  of  voluntary,  as  it 
now  is,  deserves  serious  consideration,  in  determining 
whether  direct  or  indirect  taxation  shall  prevail.  No  owner 
of  property  could  escape  them  without  fraud,  for  which  he 
32 


498  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE    TARIFF. 

would  be  made  liable  to  punishment  — perhaps  criminally 
—  if  detected.  Their  collection  would  require  the  appoint- 
ment of  many  thousands  of  assessors,  collectors,  clerks 
and  other  agents  —  a  number  sufficiently  large  to  reach 
every  home  and  every  individual  in  the  country.  To  say 
nothing  of  the  additional  expense  required  to  compensate 
such  an  army  of  employes,  they  would  constitute  a  body 
of  most  unwelcome  visitors  to  every  neighborhood,  and 
would  often,  by  extortions  in  the  name  and  by  the  author- 
ity of  the  Government,  rob  labor  of  a  large  portion  of  its 
reward. 

The  number  of  those  who  openly  avow  themselves  the 
advocates  of  a  system  of  direct  taxation,  has  not  yet  be- 
come very  large.  But  all  the  supporters  of  free  trade, 
like  those  of  the  "  Cobden  Club" — whether  they  acknowl- 
edge it  or  not — must  be  put  down  as  preferring  it  to  the 
indirect  taxation  which  is  part  of  the  protective  system. 
Not  only  do  all  their  arguments  lead  to  this,  but  there  is, 
in  point  of  fact,  no  middle  ground  for  them  to  occupy. 
Some  of  them,  who  are  entitled  to  credit  for  sincerity,  seek 
to  escape  the  result  behind  the  plea  of  duties  for  revenue 
only  —  that  is,  duties  too  low  to  discriminate  for  protection 
—without  seeming  conscious  that  there  is  but  a  single  step 
from  an  exclusively  revenue  tariff  to  free  trade,  and  that 
free  trade  leads,  unavoidably,  to  direct  taxation. 

No  system  of  taxation  has  yet  been  discovered  that 
does  not  bear,  in  some  degree,  upon  both  necessaries  and 
luxuries;  and,  it  is  one  of  the  most  important  problems 
in  the  economy  of  government  so  to  apportion  the  burden 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  499 

between  them  that  it  shall  fall  most  heavily  upon  the  latter. 
It  is  not  always  easy  to  decide,  in  an  abstract  sense,  what 
are  and  what  are  not  necessaries,  and  what  are  and  what 
are  not  luxuries;  inasmuch  as  each  individual  must  decide 
such  matters  for  himself,  and  enjoy  the  one  or  the  other 
according  to  his  ability.  The  tastes  of  those  who  subsist 
by  labor  do  not  incite  to  an  indulgence  in  luxuries,  to 
the  same  extent  as  they  do  among  such  as  do  not  labor. 
Nevertheless,  the  former  are  more  entitled  than  the  latter 
to  such  protection  and  encouragement  from  the  Govern- 
ment as  shall  enable  them  to  obtain  luxuries  whensoever 
they  shall  desire  to  procure  them,  because  of  the  larger 
contributions  they  make  to  the  development  and  perma- 
nent welfare  of  the  country.  This  protection  and  encour- 
agement can  only  come  from  such  public  measures  as  are 
calculated  to  influence  the  wages  of  labor  and  the  prices 
of  its  products,  for  by  these  alone  are  the  means  furnished 
for  the  purchase  of  either  necessaries  or  luxuries.  Abso- 
lute necessaries  are  enjoyed  in  common  by  all,  and,  there- 
fore, should  be  exempt  from  the  burden  of  taxation  in  as 
great  a  degree  as  possible,  in  order  that  the  laborer  may 
be  relieved  to  the  extent  of  the  exemption,  whensoever  the 
price  would  be  increased  by  taxation.  Now,  it  is  one  of 
the  chief  merits  of  the  system  of  indirect  taxation  which 
has  hitherto  prevailed  in  this  country,  that,  unless  the 
wants  of  the  Government  shall  require  it,  necessaries 
shall  be  exempt  from  taxation  and  the  burden  rest  upon 
luxuries.  By  this  means  labor  is  left  in  possession  of  a 
larger  portion  of  its  wages,  for  the  uses  of  life,  and  is 


500  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

thus  protected  and  encouraged;  while  the  consumers  of 
luxuries  voluntarily  contribute  to  the  increase  of  the  public 
revenues.  No  such  merit  can  be  attached  to  a  system 
of  direct  taxation,  because,  from  its  nature,  it  involves 
the  abandonment  of  this  discrimination  in  favor  of  labor, 
and  throws  the  burden  equally  upon  every  dollar's  worth 
of  property,  no  matter  whether  possessed  by  those  who 
consume  necessaries  alone,  or  by  those  who  consume 
both  necessaries  and  luxuries.  Between  two  systems  so 
unlike  in  all  matters  of  the  most  essential  importance, 
it  is  not  a  little  surprising  that  there  should  be  the 
slightest  hesitation,  in  a  country  like  ours,  where  society 
recognizes  no  upper  and  lower  orders,  and  where  the 
great  principle  of  equality  must  continue  to  be  the 
assurance  of  our  future  progress. 

In  England  it  is  otherwise.  There  the  existing  ranks 
in  society  —  founded  upon  the  idea  of  the  superiority  of 
one  portion  of  the  population  over  all  others  —  constitute 
the  foundation  upon  which  the  government  has  always 
rested.  By  this  means  it  acquires  its  aristocratic  feature, 
which  could  not  exist  without  social  distinctions  arising  out 
of  the  supposed  purity  of  blood  in  one  rank  and  impurity 
in  others.  The  foregoing  argument  would  be  of  no  avail, 
in  that  country,  with  the  governing  class,  which,  although 
in  the  minority,  maintains  its  supremacy  by  keeping  the 
laboring  masses  of  population  in  their  inferior  condition  - 
fearing  that  their  elevation  would  lead  to  a  radical  change 
in  the  form  and  structure  of  the  government.  Hence,  all 
efforts  in  that  country  having  reference  to  the  wages  of 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  50! 

labor  and  the  condition  of  laborers,  look  only  to  such 
measures  as  afford  a  bare  subsistence  —  leaving  nothing 
for  profit  or  accumulation.  English  policy  makes  the  labor- 
ing man  much  like  a  machine,  and  holds  him  in  that 
condition  —  caring  for  him  only  to  the  extent  of  his 
indispensable  wants.  Therefore,  it  is  of  but  little  concern 
to  English  statesmen  how  much  labor  is  oppressed,  or  how 
low  wages  are  reduced,  or  how  limited  are  the  means  of 
the  laborer  for  educating  his  children,  or  how  nearly  he  and 
they  approach  to  pauperism,  provided  the  dependent  class 
is  kept  in  a  condition  of  inferiority.  Any  exertion  to 
remove  this  inferiority  is  resisted  by  them,  with  their 
invariable  tenacity  of  purpose,  to  maintain  the  aristocratic 
feature  of  the  government,  which  assigns  to  them  the 
upper  and  to  laborers  the  lower  rank  in  society. 

In  a  state  of  society  molded  by  such  sentiments  and 
influences  as  these  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  policy 
of  the  government,  whatsoever  it  is,  has  any  special 
reference  to  the  interests  of  the  laboring  population,  as 
such.  The  influences  which  reach  them  are  only  incidental 
to  such  as  have  been  created  for  the  benefit  of  the  govern- 
ing class.  Even  the  repeal  of  the  corn  laws,  on  the 
ground  assumed  by  Mr.  Cobden,  constituted  no  exception 
to  this.  The  relief  proposed  to  be  extended  to  laborers 
by  that  measure  was  not  primary,  on  their  own  account ; 
but  secondary,  because  it  was  designed  to  benefit  the 
manufacturers.  Those  laws  would  have  remained  unre- 
pealed,  if  no  other  interests  than  those  of  English  laborers 
had  been  involved.  The  necessity  which  called  for  their 


5O2  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

abrogation  has  been  explained  —  that  is,  it  was  the  first 
step  in  the  direction  of  free  trade,  which  did  not  promise 
increased  wages  to  labor,  but  increased  profits  to  manu- 
factures. If  laborers  were  benefited  by  it  in  any  degree, 
they  were  only  raised  up  above  the  starvation  point,  and 
left  to  struggle  on  in  their  inferior  condition,  without  any 
additional  rays  of  hope  for  the  future.  Even  when  free 
trade  was  actually  reached,  the  motives  of  the  governing 
class  were  the  same,  that  is,  merely  to  furnish  employment 
to  English  laborers  without  any  increase  of  wages,  so  that 
English  capital  should  be  assured  of  larger  profits  and  En- 
glish manufacturers  of  the  supremacy  they  claimed  on 
account  of  their  supposed  superiority.  That  free  trade 
was  intended  to  leave  the  laborer  in  the  condition  to  which 
he  had  been  reduced  by  low  wages,  so  as  to  cut  off  all 
reasonable  prospect  of  his  social  elevation,  will  be  seen  by 
a  brief  reference  to  its  origin,  and  the  meaning  attached  to 
it  by  some  of  its  ablest  English  expounders. 

It  had  its  source,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in  the  teach- 
ings of  David  Hume  and  Adam  Smith.  Both  of  these 
men  were  eminent  for  learning  and  ability,  but  neither 
participated  actively  in  business  affairs.  Each  endeavored, 
in  the  seclusion  of  his  closet,  to  construct  a  system  of  rules 
for  the  direction  of  matters  of  which  he  had  little  or  no 
practical  knowledge.  This  being  generally  understood, 
the  doctrines  and  theories  they  announced  failed  to  obtain 
favor  even  in  England,  until  many  years  had  elapsed. 
They  were  looked  upon  by  almost  the  entire  public  as  the 
crude  speculations  of  ingenious  and  learned  men,  both  of 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  503 

ivhom  were,  in  some  measure,  shunned  by  the  general 
public  in  consequence  of  their  defense  of  the  infidel  senti- 
ments of  France.  Smith's  "  Wealth  of  Nations'  for  a 
long  time  interested  scholars  only.  No  English  statesman 
considered  it  as  furnishing  rules  for  the  practice  of  govern- 
ment, until  it  was  discovered  that  it  could  be  appealed  to  as 
supplying  arguments  in  favor  of  free  trade.  Even  then  it 
was  not  easy  to  bring  its  doctrines  into  popular  favor.  It 
had  to  be  done  gradually  and  somewhat  by  indirection.  The 
essential  step,  most  relied  on,  was  the  conversion  of  the 
theories  of  political  economy  into  such  a  system  as  would 
be  entitled  to  recognition  as  a  science,  to  be  taught  in  col- 
leges and  schools,  so  as  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the  ulti- 
mate adoption  of  its  principles  by  the  government.  This 
required  the  concentration  of  a  large  amount  of  influence 
outside  of  Parliament,  and  chiefly  among  the  literary  men 
of  the  country.  Magazine  literature  was  largely  employed, 
especially  that  which  emanated  from  the  Edinburgh  Re- 
view, which,  for  a  number  of  years,  stood  at  the  head  of 
all  such  publications  in  the  world.  At  last,  after  years  of 
•Active  exertion,  success  was  so  far  achieved  that  political 
economy  was  placed  among  the  sciences,  to  be  taught  to 
the  young,  so  that  the  public  mind  might  be  inoculated  by 
degrees.  In  considering  the  claims  this  new  science  has 
upon  our  favor,  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  it  would  not,  in 
all  probability,  have  acquired  the  designation  of  a  science 
at  all,  if  it  had  not  been  found  that  its  free-trade  principles 
were  necessary  to  the  commercial  interests  of  England. 
As  it  is,  it  is  crowded  with  speculations  and  abstractions 


504  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

about  wealth,  labor,  wages,  rents,  and  many  other  kindred 
matters,  which  no  government  in  the  world  has  ever  yet 
recognized  in  practice,  and  about  which  scarcely  any  two 
of  its  defenders  agree.  England  employs  it  to  persuade 
the  United  States  to  adopt  the  policy  of  free  trade  —  her 
elevation  of  it  to  the  condition  of  a  science  was  for  that 
purpose.  One  of  its  most  distinguished  disciples,  David 
Ricardo — who  was  rewarded  by  a  seat  in  the  Parliament 
of  England,  and  whose  work  in  defense  of  it  is  now  used 
in  American  as  well  as  English  colleges  —  took  special 
pains  to  point  out,  as  part  of  this  new  science,  the  par- 
ticular uses  for  which  some  of  the  leading  nations  were 
fitted,  and  to  show  that  if  they  attempted  others  they 
would  violate  some  of  its  essential  principles.  According 
to  him  it  teaches,  as  a  scientific  principle,  that  all  the 
nations  must  conform  to  the  rule  which  requires  that  each 
shall  follow  the  pursuits  for  which  it  is  adapted,  so  that  they 
may  build  up  a  "  universal  society  of  nations  throughout 
the  civilized  world."  In  giving  special  illustration  to  this 
idea,  he  defines  the  pursuits  for  which  some  of  the  nations 
are  adapted,  and  to  which,  according  to  the  science  of 
political  economy,  they  are  obliged  to  confine  themselves, 
in  these  words  : 

"It  is  this  principle  which  determines  that  wine  shall  be  made  in 
France  and  Portugal,  that  corn  shall  be  groivn  in  America  and  Poland 
and  that  hardware  and  other  goods  shall  be  manufactured  in  England. ' ' 

We  see,  in  these  opinions  of  Mr.  Ricardo,  a  precise 
conformity  to  those  expressed  by  Mr.  Cobden,  by  Mr. 
Walker,  and  by  all  who  have  maintained  that  we  should 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  505 

not  engage  in  any  other  pursuit  but  agriculture  until  all  our 
vast  body  of  land  is  in  cultivation.  It  shows  how  admir- 
ably the  new  science  of  political  economy  has  been  con- 
structed—  to  promote  English  interests  at  the  expense  of 
the  United  States  !  Basing  free  trade  upon  its  teachings, 
all  the  enemies  of  protection  who  follow  the  "  Cobden  Club  " 
and  the  political  economists,  insist  that  we  shall  tamely 
submit  to  our  destiny  by  confining  ourselves  to  the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  soil,  while  England  shall  be  left  to  fill  the  higher 
and  more  profitable  sphere  of  manufacturing  for  the  whole 
world  !  They  fix  the  occupations  of  the  nations  according 
to  the  grades  of  their  capacity,  and,  with  the  help  of  college 
lecturers,  present  us  with  a  chart  of  our  national  character- 
istics, whereby  we  learn  that  our  inferiority  to  England  is 
only  the  result  of  manifest  destiny  !  And  why  should  we 
murmur  at  such  a  fate  ?  Is  it  not  scientifically  demonstra- 
ble that  we  are  fitted  only  to  become  the  producers  of  such 
articles  of  food  as  English  necessities  shall  require  ?  No 
matter  if  it  does  exhaust  all  our  wealth  to  buy  manufact- 
ured fabrics  from  England — we  are  thereby  promoting 
the  great  and  laudable  object  of  creating  a  "  universal 
society  of  nations  throughout  the  civilized  world  "  ;  which 
conduces  far  more  to  the  happiness  of  mankind  in  general 
than  it  would  for  us  to  build  up  a  great  and  powerful 
nation  of  our  own  ! 

During  the  time  that  South  Carolina  was  attempting  to 
establish  free  trade  with  the  bayonet — by  nullifying  our 
tariff  laws — the  political  economists  came  to  their  assist- 
ance by  an  active  dissemination  of  their  principles.  The 


506  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

treatise  uf  Jean  Baptiste  Say  was  published  in  Philadelphia 
at  that  time,  and,  undoubtedly,  with  the  purpose  of 
impressing  the  people  of  the  United  States  with  the  views 
expressed  by  Mr.  Ricardo  with  regard  to  their  destiny  and 
duty,  so  that  when  some  such  man  as  Mr.  Cobden  should 
appear  in  England,  and  such  a  one  as  Mr.  Walker  in  the 
United  States,  to  enlighten  the  public  mind,  we  should  be 
able  to  furnish  our  contribution,  with  becoming  humility,  to 
that  great  "universal  society  of  nations,"  when  "  the  wolf 
shall  dwell  with  the  lamb,  and  the  leopard  shall  lie  down 
with  the  kid  ;  and  the  calf  and  the  young  lion  and  the 
fading  together;  and  a  little  child  shall  lead  them!" 
Although  this  condition  of  the  world  has  never  existed,  and 
will  never  exist  until  the  millennium,  yet  the  political  econ- 
omists, and  the  politicians  who  advocate  free  trade,  and  the 
11  Cobden  Club"  and  all  whose  enthusiasm  incites  belief  in 
the  universal  brotherhood  of  man,  join  in  strenuous  efforts 
to  lead  us  away  from  the  paths  marked  out  by  our  fathers, 
into  those  which  lead  through  interminable  forests  where 
the  ways  are  not  blazed  out  and  where  bogs  and  morasses 
and  quicksands  abound.  Which  class  of  advisers  shall  we 
follow  ? 

It  was  very  easy  to  persuade  the  English  Government 
that  it  was  best  for  English  manufacturers  that  they  should 
have  no  competition  in  the  United  States,  and  that  we 
should  confine  ourselves  to  raising  cheap  subsistence  for 
their  laborers.  It  was  easy  also  to  make  the  writings  of 
Hume,  Smith,  Ricardo,  Say,  and  other  political  economists, 
text-books  in  the  colleges  and  schools  of  England,  because 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  507 

they  taught  this  doctrine  as  a  scientific  truth.  There  was  a 
great  deal  of  human  nature  in  all  this ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  England  had  a  more  difficult  problem  to  solve  in 
dealing  with  the  multitude  of  her  starving  population.  In 
the  first  place,  it  was  necessary  to  anticipate  what  would  be 
the  possible  or  probable  effect  upon  the  masses  of  her 
people  if  anything  should  occur  so  to  improve  their  condi- 
tion as  to  put  them  upon  a  course  of  advancement.  The 
aristocracy,  having  control  of  the  government,  entertained 
the  well-grounded  fear  that,  if  the  price  of  labor  should  be 
so  increased  that  the  laboring  population  would  be  able  to 
become  the  owners  of  their  own  homes,  and  acquire  the 
means  of  educating  their  children,  there  might  grow  up  a 
political  power  sufficiently  strong  to  popularize  the  govern- 
ment and  take  it  out  of  their  hands.  This  fear  led  an 
eminent  English  authority  to  deny  the  proposition  "that 
tradesmen  and  traders  should  be  left  to  follow  their  own 
interests  in  their  own  way,"  because  it  invited  the  exercise 
of  too  large  a  degree  of  personal  liberty,  and  furnished 
ground  for  the  future  elevation  of  the  masses  of  the  people 
— which  was  greatly  dreaded.  The  very  opposite  of  this 
proposition  was  maintained  by  the  leaders  of  the  govern- 
ing class,  and  centered  in  the  idea  that  the  inferior  classes 
should  not  be  permitted  to  rise  high  enough  to  become 
competitors  of  those  who,  as  their  superiors,  governed  the 
country.  In  commenting  upon  "  the  rapid  and  remarkable 
progress  which  the  lower  orders  are  making  "  in  knowl- 
edge, the  Edinburgh  Review  —  the  greatest  organ  the  free 
trade  party  ever  had — employed  this  language  : 


508  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

"Of  all  derangements  that  can  well  take  place  in  a  civilized  com- 
munity, one  of  the  most  embarrassing  and  discreditable  would  be  that 
which  arose  from  the  working  classes  becoming  more  intelligent  than 
their  employers." 

Finding  in  this  "discreditable"  condition  of  affairs 
only  that  which  was  to  be  deplored,  the  Review  pro- 
ceeded to  demonstrate  that  by  free  trade  alone  could 
the  transfer  of  property  and  political  power  from  the  rich 
to  the  poor,  be  prevented.  With  professors  of  the  new 
science  of  political  economy  placed  by  the  side  of  those 
of  moral  philosophy,  medicine,  law,  languages,  etc.,  in 
the  colleges  and  schools,  it  saw,  or  thought  it  saw,  such 
a  brotherhood  among  the  nations  as  would  induce  each 
one  to  rank  the  interests  of  all  others  by  the  side  of 
its  own,  and  so  to  act,  even  in  regard  to  its  domestic 
affairs,  as  if  the  whole  world  were  tied  together  by  com- 
mon sympathy  and  affection  in  a  "universal  society  of 
nations."  Such  a  picture  is  admirable  in  contemplation, 
but  it  exists  only  in  the  imagination.  We  are  as  far 
removed  from  its  reality  as  we  are  from  the  model  re- 
public of  Plato.  It  was  the  fancy  portraiture  of  English 
grandeur  and  greatness  —  of  the  triumph  of  England 
over  all  her  rivals.  Neither  the  Edinburgh  Review, 
nor  any  other  English  free -trade  authority,  had  higher 
conceptions  of  the  value  of  political  economy  than  those 
expressed  by  Mr.  Ricardo — that  England  should  be  con- 
tinued as  the  great  manufacturing  country  for  all  the 
world,  with  her  laborers  held  down  by  the  combined 
power  and  capital  of  her  aristocracy  and  her  manufact- 
urers; while  the  United  States  and  other  countries  should 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  509 

furnish  her  cheap  subsistence,  at  the  expense  of  their 
own  laboring  populations.  The  English  free- trade  idea 
then  was,  and  yet  is,  that  if  the  working  people  of  both 
England  and  the  United  States  can  be  placed  in  the 
same  low  condition,  and  permanently  kept  there,  self- 
government  will  prove  a  failure,  and  the  aristocratic  form 
of  government  become  perpetual.  In  one  respect  the 
laboring  man  is  the  same  in  both  countries ;  he  cannot 
improve  his  condition  or  take  care  of  his  family  without 
high  wages.  As  he  does  not  get  these  in  England  under 
free  trade,  and  can  get  them  here  under  proper  protec- 
tion, it  is  manifestly  to  his  interest  that  free  trade  should 
not,  but  that  protection  should  prevail.  One  is,  in  every 
view,  doubtful  and  precarious — the  other  positively  cer- 
tain and  permanent.  Abundant  evidence  of  this  is  found 
in  the  condition  of  the  two  countries,  under  the  operations 
of  these  opposing  methods  of  raising  revenue. 

We  have  seen  that  the  ruling  class  in  England  do  not 
desire  that  the  laboring  population  shall  possess  such 
advantages  as  would  lead  to  their  improvement  and  eleva 
tion.  Hence  it  is  that  the  policy  of  that  country  has  been 
so  framed  as  to  accomplish  this  general  purpose  by  leaving 
labor  without  proper  reward.  It  was  promised  that  one 
of  the  necessary  fruits  of  free  trade  would  be  the  increase 
of  wages,  and  that  this  would  create  a  new  order  of  affairs. 
But  it  has  not  had  that  effect.  Wages  remain  as  before, 
almost  at  starvation  rates,  and  the  laborer  finds  subsistence 
as  hard  as  ever  to  procure.  His  condition  is  not  bettered 
in  the  least.  The  same  impassable  gulf  which  separates 


510  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

the  classes  still  yawns  before  him,  and,  struggle  as  he  may, 
he  continues  to  look  forward  to  a  gloomy  and  disheart- 
ening future.  Among  the  most  intelligent  thinkers  in 
England  this  problem  of  the  future  becomes  more  and 
more  complicated  and  difficult  every  year.  The  palpable 
and  acknowledged  fact  which  lies  at  the  bottom  is  the 
dissatisfied  condition  of  the  working  classes — arising,  in  a 
large  degree,  out  of  the  organization  of  the  government 
and  the  consequent  structure  of  society.  Until  this  is 
changed,  in  some  way,  disturbances  of  every  kind  may  be 
expected,  and  there  is  danger  of  their  being  carried  to 
dangerous  extremities.  The  seeds  of  dissatisfaction  are 
undoubtedly  scattered  broadcast,  but  what  harvest  they 
may  produce  is  given  to  none  to  foresee.  We,  in  this 
country,  have  no  just  right  to  interfere  with  English  do- 
mestic questions,  and  yet  cannot  refrain  from  entertaining 
a  desire  to  see  all  English-speaking  peoples  kept  stead- 
fastly in  the  march  of  development,  so  that,  in  the  contest 
between  the  new  and  the  old  forms  of  civilization,  they 
may  continue  to  maintain  their  position  at  the  head  of  the 
nations.  In  order  to  assure  this  it  may  become  necessary, 
in  the  course  of  time,  for  England  to  remove  from  her 
government  the  aristocratic  feature  which  now  mars  so 
much  the  beauty  of  her  institutions.  If  this  is  ever  accom- 
plished, it  must  be  done  at  h~r  own  time  and  in  her  own 
way.  But  whether  accomplished  or  not,  she  cannot  fail  to 
see,  in  the  present  condition  of  her  laboring  masses,  that 
free  trade  has  not  contributed,  in  any  material  degree,  to 
improve  their  condition.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  in  a 


HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  5  I  I 

more  unsettled  and  precarious  state  than  they  were  under 
the  system  of  protection — a  fact  which  is  becoming  so 
much  more  and  more  apparent  every  day,  that  a  consid- 
erable number  of  the  most  intelligent  citizens  of  the 
country  are  now  advocating  a  return  to  that  system. 

England  would,  undoubtedly,  re-introduce  the  principle 
of  protection  in  her  tariff  laws,  if  the  support  given  to 
free  trade  in  the  United  States  did  not  encourage  the  hope 
that  this  country  would  follow  her  example.  Free  trade 
originated  in  that  hope,  in  the  first  instance,  for  reasons 
already  explained,  and  the  authorities  of  the  government 
are  reluctant  to  abandon  it  so  long  as  the  war  upon  our 
manufactures  shall  continue  among  our  own  people.  She 
does  everything  in  her  power  to  incite  and  encourage  that 
war,  and  finds  employment  for  some  of  her  best  intellects 
in  the  effort  to  persuade  us  that  she  is  unselfish — while,  at 
the  same  time,  the  vail  that  is  intended  to  conceal  her  real 
motives  is  perfectly  transparent.  With  either  nation  the 
question  is  only  one  of  domestic  economy.  It  does  not 
involve  those  broad  humanitarian  views  upon  which  the 
idea  of  a  universal  brotherhood  of  nations  is  founded. 
Nothing  of  that  sort  exists,  or  will  be  likely  ever  to  exist. 
Even  where  the  nations  are  crowded  so  closely  together  as 
they  are  in  Europe,  each  pursues  those  lines  of  policy 
which  best  promote  its  own  distinct  and  separate  interests. 
Commercial  rivalry  exists  between  all  of  them  —  England 
being  the  only  nation  that  has  ever  adopted  free  trade. 
Separated  as  we  are,  from  Asia  upon  one  side,  and  Europe 
upon  the  other,  by  the  two  great  oceans,  and  possessing 


512  HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

unlimited  elements  of  material  wealth  and  power-- suffi- 
cient to  make  us  the  rivals  of  any  other  people  in 
commerce  and  manufactures — it  is  the  encouragement 
of  a  false  hope  to  suppose  that  we  can  be  duped  into  a 
policy,  dictated  by  English  interests  adverse  to  our  own, 
upon  the  ground  of  international  brotherhood,  which  other 
nations  do  not  recognize  or  adopt.  England  would  not 
have  adopted  the  policy  of  free  trade  if  she  had  not  been 
forced  to  realize  that  the  rivalry  of  the  United  States  had 
become  so  formidable  as  to  threaten  her  commercial  su- 
premacy. It  would  be  a  strange  form  of  delusion  for 
the  United  States  to  surrender,  voluntarily  and  without 
resistance,  the  innumerable  advantages  of  their  position. 


CHAPTER  XLVI. 

ENGLISH  OPINIONS  OF  OUR  POLICY—  BY  FREE  TRADE  WE  ARE 
EXPECTED  TO  UNITE  IN  EUROPEAN  AFFAIRS—  JOIN  A  BROTH- 
ERHOOD OF  NATIONS—  THIS  FORBIDDEN  BY  OUR  INTERESTS 
—  SUCH  A  BROTHERHOOD  IMPOSSIBLE  —  NATIONS  ACT  AS  THEY 
ALWAYS  HAVE  DONE  —  EACH  TAKES  CARE  OF  ITSELF—  OUR 
DUTY  TO  TAKE  CARE  OF  OURSELVES  —  ENGLAND  HAS  ALWAYS 
DONE  SO  —  GAVE  NO  SIGNS  OF  CHANGE  UNTIL  SHE  FEARED 
OUR  RIVALRY—  WANTS  TO  REDUCE  US  TO  INFERIORITY—  OUR 
DUTY  TO  REJECT  FREE  TRADE  AND  PERSIST  IN  THE  POLICY 
THAT  HAS  MADE  US  GREAT. 


T^HE  London  Post  —  a  paper  of  acknowledged  influence 
*  in  England  —  not  long  ago  pointed  out  the  recent 
intercourse,  of  the  United  States  with  Chili,  Peru  and 
Corea,  as  indicating  an  intention  of  inaugurating  "a  for- 
eign policy"  —  such  as  shall  cause  our  influence  to  be 
felt  in  the  movements  and  affairs  of  the  European  nations. 
It  has  gone  to  the  extent  of  saying  that,  in  its  opinion, 
"the  adoption  of  free  trade  would  mean  incipeased  inter- 
course with  the  world  at  large,  and  would  compel  America 
to  admit  the  existence  of  a  regular  foreign  policy  and  to 
defend  her  interests  in  Asia,  and  Africa  against  European 
attacks." 

The   Pall  Mall  Gazette  —  another   influential   English 

journal  —  indulges   in  the  anticipation  of  the  time  when 

the  two  countries  —  England  and  the  United  States  —  will 

form    such    an    alliance    among    the    "English-speaking 

33  513 


514  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

peoples"  as  that  existing  "between  Austria  and  Ger- 
many." It  says:  "After  the  federation  of  the  British 
Empire  there  will  remain  for  British  statesmen  no  task 
comparable  in  importance  to  that  of  the  conclusion  of  an 
alliance  between  Great  Britain  and  the  great  Republic 
which  has  sprung  from  England's  loins." 

And  a  telegram  from  London,  about  the  same  date, 
announced  the  expectation  existing  there  that  the  United 
States  will,  before  long,  "claim  admittance  into  the  Euro- 
pean areopagus" — that  is,  sit  in  council  with  European 
nations  to  decide  political  questions — basing  this  conclu- 
sion upon  the  alleged  facts  that  "blood  is  thicker  than 
water,"  and  that  "the  United  States  is  England's  natural 
ally." 

These  opinions  are  undoubtedly  entertained  by  some, 
and,  perhaps,  a  considerable  portion  of  the  English  people. 
And  when  it  is  openly  avowed  that  the  contemplated  results 
are  expected  to  follow  the  adoption  of  free  trade  by  the 
United  States,  they  deserve  our  most  careful  consideration. 
In  public,  as  in  private  affairs,  it  is  well  to  know  all  our 
surroundings,  so  that,  being  forewarned,  we  may  not 
unconsciously  drift  into  danger. 

One  of  the  first  lessons  this  country  learned,  in  its 
earliest  history,  was  the  necessity  of  avoiding  "entangling 
alliances"  with  other  nations  —  especially  those  of  Europe. 
Apart  from  the  peculiar  circumstances  which  contributed 
to  our  independence,  our  position  rendered  it  impossible 
that  foreign  influences  could  contribute  to  our  prosperity 
and  happiness.  Our  Government  was  framed,  therefore, 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  515 

with  special  reference  to  its  own  advancement,  and  not 
that  of  others.  We  hold  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  world,  as  other  peoples  do,  under  the  protection  of 
international  laws,  and  beyond  this  exercise  only  that  in- 
fluence which  springs  from  our  example  of  self-govern- 
ment. Hence,  the  people  of  the  United  States  should  be 
studiously  careful  never  to  forget  that  they  owe  their 
first  and  chiefest  duty  to  themselves.  If  this  were  for- 
gotten it  does  not  require  a  prophet  to  foretell  that  we 
should  no  longer  advance,  but  retrograde — go  backward 
and  not  forward.  It  is  our  primary  duty  to  attend  to 
the  promotion  of  our  own  "general  welfare,"  and  leave 
other  peoples  to  do  the  same  thing.  This  is  a  special 
constitutional  obligation  imposed  alike  upon  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  people. 

There  may  be  something  for  the  philanthropist  and  the 
humanitarian  to  admire  in  the  idea  of  a  united  brotherhood 
of  nations  —  such  a  molding  into  perfect  unity  of  the  sym- 
pathies and  interests  of  all  peoples  as  shall  suppress  every 
selfish  desire  and  inaugurate  the  reign  of  perfect  disinter- 
estedness. More  than  a  thousand  years  ago  there  were 
some  who  cherished  the  belief  that  not  many  centuries 
would  elapse  before  mankind  would  be  peacefully  and 
quietly  brought  into  this  condition.  Others  looked  for- 
ward to  a  universal  and  harmonious  empire,  to  be 
governed  only  in  the  spirit  of  generous  and  kindly  emula- 
tion. But  these  were  mere  "visions  of  the  brain/' which 
have  filled  history  with  myths  that  are  merely  confusing 
and  misleading,  because  they  are  unreal.  The  nations 


HISTORY   OF   THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

continue  to  move  on  in  the  same  old  way  —  each  devoting 
its  energies  to  its  own  peculiar  welfare.  They  jostle  each 
other  as  they  have  always  done,  since  before  the  birth  of 
history.  Instead  of  emulation  prevailing  among  them, 
there  is  rivalry.  Envy  and  jealousy  are  potent  factors 
in  all  their  intercourse.  War  continues  to  be,  as  it  always 
was,  the  only  remedy  for  real  or  imaginary  wrongs.  Prep- 
arations for  it  are  in  perpetual  activity  in  every  direction, 
and  the  inventions  of  new  instruments  of  destruction 
keep  pace  with  improvements  in  the  useful  arts.  And  even 
he  who,  prompted  by  the  love  of  peace,  suggests  the  settle- 
ment of  international  disputes  by  arbitration,  is  pronounced 
a  visionary  enthusiast. 

If  there  are  any  signs  that  this  condition  of  the  world 
is  undergoing  a  change,  they  are  not  visible.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  evidences  are  constantly  multiplying  to  show 
that,  among  all  the  foremost  nations,  there  is  no  more 
palpable  fact  than  that  of  their  rivalry  with  each  other.  It 
is  useless  to  deny  this,  and  it  would  be  folly  for  us  to  ignore 
it.  Men  do  not  reach  eminence  without  proper  self-, 
respect;  so  nations  do  not  become  great  and  powerful) 
without  regarding  their  own  interests  and  welfare  as  para-| 
mount  to  those  of  others.  Philanthropists  may  call  this 
selfishness,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing;  nevertheless,  as 
it  regards  any  single  nation,  it  is  patriotism.  And  so  long 
as  this  sentiment  of  patriotism  exists,  the  preference  of 
one's  own  country  over  all  others  will  continue  to  be  a 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  statesmanship  among  all 
peoples. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  517 

The  relations  which  England  has  always  borne  to  the 
United  States,  have  not,  at  any  time,  justified  the  belief 
that  she  would  act  toward  us  otherwise  than  as  her  own 
interests  required.  This  has  been  made  sufficiently  to 
appear  by  facts  already  stated,  which  admonish  us  to 
employ  the  utmost  vigilance  in  guarding  our  own  interests, 
as  she  has  always  done  hers.  She  oppressed  the  Colonies 
and  drove  them  to  revolution,  when  conciliatory  measures 
might  have  avoided  that  event.  Her  restrictions  upon  our 
commerce  were  intended  to  be  so  severe  as  to  prevent  our 
growth  and  development  as  a  nation.  She  made  continu- 
ous and  extraordinary  exertions  to  absorb  our  wealth,  and 
her  cupidity  in  this  respect  was  remorseless  and  unabating. 
Aided  by  contributions  obtained  from  us,  in  various  ways, 
she  became  able  to  build  up  the  most  extensive  system  of 
manufactures  in  the  world,  and  to  exact  commercial  tribute 
from  all  other  countries,  by  means  of  protective  and  pro- 
hibitory tariffs,  which  she  perseveringly  maintained  because 
they  were  vital  to  her  domestic  welfare.  And  she  indicated 
no  desire  to  relax  her  severity  toward  us  until  she  realized 
that  our  growth  could  not  be  arrested  —  that  our  develop- 
ment would  continue  in  spite  of  her — and  that  our  manu- 
factures, under  a  judicious  system  of  protection,  like  her 
own,  were  rapidly  driving  hers  from  the  markets  of  the 
world.  As  if  aroused  by  the  fact  of  having  to  contend 
against  so  formidable  an  adversary  in  the  encounters  of 
commercial  enterprise,  she  suddenly  startled  us  by 
announcing  her  policy  of  free  trade,  accompanied  by  the 
discovery  that  the  two  peoples  —  because  they  speak  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

same  language  and  have  a  common  origin  —  ought  to 
govern  their  intercourse  in  the  kindly  spirit  of  brotherhood 
and  without  any  commercial  rivalry.  Seemingly,  suppos- 
ing us  incapable  of  penetrating  her  motives,  she  has 
endeavored  to  impress  us  with  the  idea  that,  although  our 
governments  are  distinct,  they  should  adopt  such  recipro- 
cal measures  of  commercial  policy  as  would  unite  them  in 
the  common  purpose  of  controlling  the  trade  of  the  world. 
The  product  of  her  apparent  disinterestedness  is  free  trade, 
which  she  presents  to  us  with  one  hand  inviting  the  grasp 
of  friendship,  while  the  palm  of  the  other  is  itching  to 
clutch  the  profits  expected  to  result  to  her  manufacturers 
from  the  cheapened  prices  of  our  agricultural  productions. 
This  being  her  controlling  motive,  she  converted  the 
speculations  of  her  philosophers  into  the  new  science  of 
political  economy,  to  persuade  us  that  her  example  would 
induce  all  the  nations  to  exist  together  in  universal  har- 
mony and  concord.  She  felt  the  approach  of  weakness, 
while  we  were  rapidly  gaining  strength,  and  desired  to 
reverse  this  order  of  things,  so  that  our  strength  should 
be  diminished  and  hers  increased.  Like  an  individual  who 
seeks  to  circumvent  an  adversary  by  open  professions  of 
friendship,  she  hoped  to  draw  us  within  the  circle  of  her 
influence,  in  order  to  regain  the  commercial  supremacy 
which  she  plainly  saw  passing  from  herself  to  us.  Her 
course  was  characterized  by  that  profound  sagacity  which 
has  distinguished  her  in  every  stage  of  her  history.  But 
as  she  has  been,  in  all  this,  acting  in  her  own  behalf, 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  519 

not  ours,  we  can  have  no  ground  of  national  complaint 
against  her. 

But  while  we  may  not  find  fault  with  England  for  any 
exhibition  of  her  sagacity  as  a  nation,  or  envy  her  on 
account  of  her  power  and  greatness,  we,  nevertheless,  can- 
not evade  the  responsibility  of  deciding  for  ourselves,  and 
on  our  own  account,  how  far  we  may  venture  to  acquiesce 
in  measures  of  her  dictation,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they 
had  their  birth  in  her  desire  to  destroy  our  power  as  a 
commercial  rival.  Whatsoever  shall  be  our  decision  it 
should  be  reached  with  the  calm  deliberation  which 
becomes  a  nation  like  ours  ;  and  with  due  consideration  of 
the  fact  that  our  own  best  interests  and,  in  some  measure, 
the  welfare  of  mankind,  depend  upon  our  continued 
advancement  and  the  successful  administration  of  our 
affairs.  We  owe  nothing  to  other  peoples,  except  in  that 
reciprocal  good-feeling  and  fellowship  which  should  mark 
our  intercourse  with  them.  None  of  them  can  do  us  harm 
so  long  as  we  remain  true  to  ourselves.  We  are  in  no 
danger  from  any  probable  combination  of  adversary 
powers.  But  we  represent  that  form  of  civil  institutions 
for  which  the  world  had  long  struggled  before  our  inde- 
pendence was  achieved,  and  we  cannot  take  a  single  step 
backward  without  marring  their  beauty  and  impairing  their 
strength.  If  we  shall  allow  ourselves  to  be  inveigled  by 
foreign  powers  to  the  extent  of  permitting  them  to 
influence  our  domestic  policy,  or ,  of  becoming  mixed  up 
with  their  affairs,  under  the  pretext  of  a  community  of 
interests  between  them  and  us,  our  example,  which  has 


520  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

thus  far  been  beneficial  to  the  world,  would  be  likely  to 
prove  no  longer  worthy  of  imitation. 

Besides  the  foregoing  extracts  froei  two  of  the  leading 
newspapers  in  England,  there  is  abundant  other  evidence 
to  show  that  the  people  of  that  country  know  but  little  of 
us  or  of  our  institutions.  Even  the  most  intelligent  among 
them  are  ignorant  of  the  prominent  facts  and  incidents  in 
our  history,  and  nothing  excites  their  surprise  more  than 
our  growth  and  development  within  the  present  century7. 
It  is  not  very  surprising,  therefore,  that  an  impression 
should  exist  there  that  our  relations  with  Chili,  Peru  and 
Corea,  indicate  an  intention  of  inaugurating  a  foreign 
policy,  in  the  European  sense  ;  and  more  especially  is  it 
not  so  when  it  is  interpreted  to  mean  that  we  are  prepar- 
ing to  do  what  England  so  much  desires — that  is,  to  sec- 
ond her  effort  to  establish  a  brotherhood  of  nations  by 
adopting  the  policy  of  free  trade.  They  misunderstand  us. 
We  are  too  far  removed  from  other  nations  to  be  envious 
or  jealous  of  them.  We  have  no  desire  to  interfere  with 
their  affairs.  Our  relations  with  all  of  them  are  peaceful, 
and  are  not  likely  to  be  disturbed  by  anything  that  we  shall 
do.  England  is  differently  situated,  and  is  not  familiar 
with  our  wants  or  competent  to  pass  judgment  upon  our 
policy.  She  is  surrounded  by  antagonisms.  Her  compli- 
cations are  innumerable,  because  they  spring  from  the 
jealousies  of  other  strong  powers,  who  watch  her  with 
ceaseless  vigilance.  When  her  foreign  relations  are 
involved  her  first  thought  is  of  war.  Her  "jingo"  policy 
is  the  outgrowth  of  her  surroundings.  And,  therefore,  it 


HISTORY  OF  THE  PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  521 

is  hard  for  her  to  understand  why  other  countries  are  not 
influenced  by  like  motives  with  herself.  Hence,  her  mis- 
take in  supposing  that  we  are  likely  to  fall  into  her 
embrace,  either  through  free  trade  or  any  other  instru- 
mentality she  may  employ. 

During  the  war  between  Chili  and  Peru  our  Govern- 
ment endeavored  to  act  the  part  of  a  friendly  mediator, 
with  a  view  to  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  their  affairs. 
Both  of  these  countries  are  American  republics,  professedly 
desiring  to  perpetuate  the  principle  of  self-government.  A 
war  between  them  which  should  result  in  the  destruction  of 
either  might  weaken  this  sentiment  upon  the  American 
continent  —  possibly  to  the  extent  of  inviting  the  revival 
of  the  "  Holy  Alliance"  among  the  monarchical  nations  of 
Europe,  for  the  final  subjugation  of  the  Spanish-American 
States.  And  it  was  impossible,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  the  United  States  could  contemplate  the  happening  of 
such  an  event,  even  by  possibility,  without  the  deepest 
concern.  Hence,  without  any  purpose  to  interfere  with 
the  affairs  of  either  State,  but  merely  to  counsel  the 
peaceful  adjustment  of  all  disagreements,  the  United  States 
ventured  upon  a  friendly  intervention  between  them- 
nothing  more.  Nor  could  any  other  meaning  be  rightfully 
assigned  to  our  intercourse  and  negotiations  with  Corea 
than  a  simple  desire,  on  our  part,  to  convince  her  of  the 
advantages  to  be  derived  by  herself  and  other  nations  from 
opening  her  ports  to  the  commercial  world.  European 
peoples  are  not  fully  able  to  understand  how  a  nation  can 
become  so  isolated  as  to  avoid  foreign  complications.  With 


522  HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

England,  interference  with  the  affairs  of  a  foreign  nation 
and  its  conquest,  are  very  nearly  of  equivalent  meaning;— 
and  whether  that  interference  shall  be  brought  about  by 
war  or  through  the  instrumentalities  which  are  expected  to 
be  created  by  free  trade,  it  means  almost  the  same  thing. 
Wheresoever  she  plants  her  feet,  as  in  India — or  desires 
to  enlarge  her  commerce,  as  in  China,  or  transports  her 
flag,  as  in  Egypt  —  she  is  impelled  by  the  unchanging 
purpose  to  recognize  no  limit  to  her  dominion  than  what 
her  own  ambition  assigns.  It  is  not  wonderful,  then,  that 
leading  English  minds  should  see  in  the  peaceful  means  we 
employ  to  extend  our  commercial  intercourse,  the  signs  of 
an  aggressive  foreign  policy,  and  that  they  should,  in  con- 
sequence, flatter  themselves  with  the  hope  that,  through  the 
instrumentality  of  free  trade,  we  may  be  inveigled  into  the 
net  so  cunningly  woven  for  us,  and  allow  the  stream  of  our 
prosperity  to  flow  towards  them  and  away  from  ourselves. 
They  are  encouraged  in  this  by  such  organizations  as  the 
" Cobden  Club"  which,  on  account  of  the  ability  and 
respectability  of  its  members,  is  supposed  to  reflect  the 
public  sentiment,  whereas,  in  point  of  fact,  all  the  opinions 
promulgated  by  it  are  English,  not  American. 

National  brotherhood,  as  the  result  of  free  trade  or 
from  any  other  cause,  is  a  delusion.  What  have  we  to  do 
with  other  nations,  or  they  with  us,  beyond  those  relations 
which  arise  out  of  friendly  commercial  intercourse?  We 
sell  them  our  products  and  buy  theirs — that  is  all.  This 
intercourse  is  carried  on  by  individuals,  not  by  govern- 
ments. We  regulate  foreign  commerce — nothing  more. 


HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF.  523 

If  we  export  our  products  and  sell  them  to  the  Patagonians 
of  South  America,  or  to  the  negroes  of  Africa,  or  to  the 
Afghans  in  Asia,  it  is  commerce  in  precisely  the  same 
sense  as  when  we  sell  to  or  buy  from  England.  It  is  this 
intercourse  alone  which  the  nations  regulate  between  their 
individual  citizens,  each  according  to  the  demands  and  exi- 
gencies of  its  own  affairs.  Whensoever  anything  beyond 
this  has  been  attempted  by  the  strong  nations,  it  has  led  to 
war ;  and  when  between  strong  and  weak  nations,  to  the 
overthrow  and  absorption  of  the  latter.  England  and 
France,  representing  a  combination  of  nations,  undertook 
to  superintend  the  financial  affairs  of  Egypt,  to  secure  the 
payment  of  money  to  their  citizens.  But  when  France 
wisely  declined  to  proceed  to  extremities  and  left  England 
to  herself,  she  demonstrated  her  great  power  by  bombard- 
ing an  almost  defenseless  city,  as  well  as  the  weakness  of 
misdirected  ambition  by  inciting  vast  hordes  of  fanatical 
Arabs  to  revolt,  at  the  sacrifice  of  many  millions  of  dollars 
and  the  lives  of  some  of  her  best  and  bravest  soldiers. 
Instances  akin  to  this  have  been  of  frequent  occurrence  in 
the  checkered  history  of  European  affairs — affording  to 
the  strong  powers  opportunities  to  oppress  the  weak — of 
which  they  have  availed  themselves  without  any  evidence 
of  remorse.  But  a  little  while  ago,  Russia,  after  stealthily 
seizing  upon  Turkestan,  advanced  upon  Herat,  on  the  road 
to  India.  France  and  Germany  are  confronting  each  other 
with  large  armies.  Every  few  days  we  hear  of  the  pos- 
sible breaking  out  of  war.  Open  hostilities  have  but 
recently  transpired  between  Bulgaria  and  Servia,  and  the 


524  HISTORY  OF  THE   PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. 

great  nations  are  looking  on  with  greedy  expectation  of 
benefit  to  themselves  —  armed  to  the  teeth  and  calmly 
awaiting  the  day  when  all  Europe  will  tremble  beneath  the 
tread  of  their  vast  armies.  Is  this  a  time  for  the  people  of 
the  United  States  to  agitate  themselves  about  a  "  universal 
society  of  nations  "  which  is  promised  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  free  trade  ?  The  duty  of  attending  to  their 
own  affairs  is  sufficient  to  tax  all  their  energies*;  and  if  they 
shall  so  employ  them  as  to  protect  their  various  industries 
and  thus  cause  additional  development  to  the  natural 
resources  they  possess,  they  will  assure  to  themselves  a 
destiny  far  preferable  to  any  that  could  possibly  arise  out 
of  "  entangling  alliances  "  with  foreign  peoples. 

Washington  conjured  us  to  keep  "  constantly  awake  " 
our  jealousy  "against  the  insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influ- 
ence/' realizing,  as  he  did,  that  "history  and  experience 
prove  that  foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most  baneful  foes 
of  republican  government."  He  considered  "our  detached 
and  distant  situation  "  as  inviting  us  into  fields  of  domestic 
enterprise  and  industry  peculiarly  our  own ;  and,  picturing 
us  in  his  mind  as  possessing,  within  ourselves,  the  means 
of  becoming  one  of  the  leading  and  powerful  nations  of 
the  earth,  he  asked  these  pertinent  and  suggestive  ques- 
tions :  "Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a 
position?  Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  on  foreign  soil? 
Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of 
Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of 
European  ambition,  rivalship,  interest,  humor,  or  cap  rice?" 
The  lapse  of  time  has  not  caused  these  questions  to  lose 


HISTORY   OF  THE   PROTECTIVE   TARIFF.  525 

any  of  their  significance  or  force.  As  it  was  apparent  to 
his  clear  and  thoughtful  mind  "that  it  is  folly  in  one  nation 
to  look  for  disinterested  favors  from  another,"  and  that 
"  there  can  be  no  greater  error  than  to  expect  or  calculate 
upon  real  favors  from  nation  to  nation,"  so  it  should  be 
alike  apparent  to  us  now,  as  we  observe  the  jealousies  and 
struggles  among  the  nations  of  the  present  day,  that  there 
is  not  one  of  them  with  whom  we  could  form  alliance 
without  placing  our  best  interests  at  fearful  hazard.  We 
could  no  more  mix  ourselves  up  with  European  affairs  and 
escape  unharmed,  than  a  man  can  plunge  his  hand  into  a 
heated  furnace  without  burning. 

We  must  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  England 
did  not  relax  the  severity  of  her  measures  toward  us  until 
she  witnessed  our  marvelous  growth  and  became  assured 
of  our  increasing  greatness.  And  now,  when  some  of  her 
leading  minds  seem  fascinated  with  the  idea  that,  by  free 
trade,  we  should  be  led  into  such  foreign  policy  as  would 
end  in  some  sort  of  alliance  with  her,  we  cannot  avoid 
realizing  that  we  are  brought  directly  in  the  presence  of  the 
dangers  to  which  Washington  admonished  us  we  should  be 
"  constantly  awake."  Free  trade  means  the  erection  of 
commercial  barriers  which,  with  all  our  energies  and  vast 
resources,  we  cannot  overleap.  Hitherto,  under  the  prin- 
ciple of  protection,  we  have  progressed  in  the  march  of 
material  wealth  and  prosperity,  until  new  fields  of  enter- 
prise are  opened  almost  every  day,  and  new  inventions  and 
forms  of  machinery  are  constantly  required  to  keep  pace 
with  our  progressive  development.  But  if,  from  any  false 


526  HISTORY   OF   THE    PROTECTIVE   TARIFF. 

conceptions  of  duty  towards  ourselves  or  others,  we  should 
be  persuaded  to  abandon  this  great  principle  and  leave  our 
natural  resources  to  waste  before  our  eyes,  we  should  not 
long  escape  the  humiliating  condition  of  seeing  our  barns 
crowded  with  surplus  productions,  rotting  for  the  want  of 
markets ;  our  manufacturing  establishments  sinking  into 
decay;  our  laboring  population  without  employment;  our 
commerce  reduced  to  comparatively  nothing ;  and  a  nation 
which  has  thus  far  attracted  the  admiration  and  excited  the 
wonder  of  the  world,  slowly,  perhaps,  but  surely  sinking 
into  inferiority.  And,  to  add  to  our  humiliation,  we  should 
then  see  England,  from  whom  we  have  hitherto  received 
nothing  but  hostility,  reaping  rewards  produced  by  our  own 
folly  ;  replenishing  her  coffers  with  our  wealth  ;  increasing 
her  commerce  at  our  expense;  and  removing,  with  our 
assistance,  every  impediment  now  standing  in  the  way  of 
her  commercial  supremacy. 


APPENDIX. 


Taxes  and  Duties — The  Tariff  and  Internal  Revenue.* 


THE  RATES  OF  DUTY  FIXED  BY  THE  TARIFF  ACT  OF  1883. 


A  tax  is  the  assessment  of  a  sum  of  money  on  persons  or  property  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  government.  Taxation  on  property  is  either 
"  direct  "  or  "  indirect."  A  direct  tax  is  one  which  is  levied  from  the 
very  persons  who  it  is  intended  should  pay  it.  An  indirect  tax  is  one 
which  is  demanded  from  one  person  in  the  expectation  that  he  will 
indemnify  himself  at  the  expense  of  another — as  customs  duties,  for 
instance.  In  some  States  all  citizens  above  21  years  of  age  are  required 
to  pay  a  personal  tax,  known  as  capitation  or  poll  tax.  The  expenses  of 
towns,  cities,  counties  and  States  are  paid  by  a  direct  tax  upon  the 
property  or  polls  of  the  same,  the  methods  of  assessment  differing  in  the 
several  States.  In  some  States  the  whole  tax  is  paid  by  the  owners  of 
property;  in  others  a  certain  percentage  of  the  whole  tax  is  assessed 
upon  the  polls,  while  in  some  the  poll  tax  is  a  fixed  amount  for  each 
citizen. 

The  expenses  of  the  United'  States  Federal  Government  are  paid  by 
the  internal  revenue  and  the  duties  on  imports.  The  internal  revenue  is 
the  tax  on  tobacco,  cigars,  etc.,  and  distilled  spirits  and  fermented 
liquors. 

Fixed  property,  such  as  land,  houses,  etc.,  is  called  real  estate. 
Movable  property,  such  as  merchandise,  furniture,  money,  stocks,  bonds, 
mortgages,  etc.,  is  called  personal  property. 

For  the  support  of  the  government,  and  in  order  to  protect  home 
industries,  certain  taxes  are  imposed  on  imported  merchandise,  and  these 
taxes  are  called  duties  or  customs. 

The  waters  and  shores  of  the  United  States  are  divided  into  collection 
districts,  in  each  of  which  there  is  one  port  of  entry  and  one  or  more 
ports  of  delivery.  All  ports  of  entry  are  also  ports  of  delivery. 


*  Copyright,  1887,  by  R.  S.  Peale. 

527 


528  APPENDIX. 

All  cargoes  chargeable  with  duties  must  be  entered  and  the  duties 
paid,  or  secured  to  be  paid,  at  the  port  of  entry,  before  permission  is 
given  to  discharge  the  same  at  the  port  of  delivery. 

The  principal  officer  of  every  district  is  the  collector,  who  is  assisted 
by  deputy  collectors,  surveyors,  appraisers,  weighers,  gaugers,  inspectors, 
etc.  The  duties  of  the  above  vary  in  the  several  collection  districts  and 
ports.  There  is  also  in  the  leading  ports  of  entry  a  "  naval  officer," 
whose  department  is  a  check  upon  that  of  the  collector. 

An  importer  desiring  a  permit  to  land  merchandise  presents  his 
invoice,  with  the  consular  certificate,  bill  of  lading,  and  a  formal  entry 
attached,  to  the  entry  clerk  at  the  custom  house,  and  makes  the  necessary 
oath  before  the  collector  or  his  deputy.  The  duties,  if  any,  are  estimated 
in  the  departments  of  the  collector  and  the  naval  officer.  The  amount 
of  the  estimated  duties  having  been  paid,  or  secured  by  a  bond,  the 
collector,  together  with  the  naval  officer,  where  there  is  one,  grants  a 
permit  to  land  the  merchandise.  It  is  the  custom  of  custom-house 
brokers  and  many  merchants  to  calculate  the  duties  and  enter  the  same 
on  the  entry.  The.  permit  is  presented  to  the  inspector  in  charge  of  the 
vessel,  who  allows  the  merchandise  to  be  landed.  The  collector  indicates 
on  the  permit  by  numbers  what  packages  shall  be  sent  to  the  public  store 
for  examination.  When  the  merchandise  is  examined  by  the  appraiser, 
he  enters  on  the  invoice  or  manifest  the  rate  of  duty  to  be  collected. 
The  invoice  and  the  accompanying  papers  are  then  sent  to  liquidators  in 
both  the  collector's  and  naval  officer's  departments  for  adjustment.  The 
liquidators  check  the  calculations  on  the  entry,  or  again  calculate  the 
duty  if  the  appraiser  has  changed  the  rate  or  the  dutiable  value,  or  if  the 
returns  of  the  weigher  or  gauger  differ  from  the  weight  or  measurement 
in  the  invoice.  The  amount  of  duty  to  be  refunded  or  collected  is 
marked  on  the  entry.  If  the  difference  between  the  duty  as  estimated 
and  as  liquidated  is  less  than  $i,  it  is  disregarded,  and  the  liquidator 
approves  the  original  estimate. 

A  custom-house  broker  is  a  person  who  makes  entries,  secures  permits, 
and  transacts  other  business  at  custom  houses  for  merchants.  The 
greater  part  of  the  business  at  the  New  York  Custom  House  is  done 
through  brokers. 

DUTIES. 

Duties  are  of  three  kinds,  ad  valorem,  specific  and  combined. 

An  ad  valorem  duty  is  a  tax  assessed  at  a  certain  per  cent  on  the 
dutiable  value  of  the  merchandise.  The  dutiable  value  of  merchandise  is 
its  market  value  at  the  port  of  export,  but  not  less  than  its  invoiced  cost, 


APPENDIX.  529 

commission  added,  whether  paid  or  not.  It  is  usually  the  original  cost 
plus  all  charges,  excepting  the  consul's  fee,  to  the  vessel  on  which  the 
shipment  is  made.  There  is  no  duty  on  the  freight  or  transportation 
from  the  port  of  export. 

A  specific  duty  is  a  tax  assessed  at  a  certain  sum  per  ton,  pound,  foot, 
yard,  gallon,  or  other  weight  or  measure,  without  reference  to  the  value. 
Before  specific  duties  are  calculated,  allowances  are  made  for  tare,  leakage 
and  breakage. 

In  reducing  foreign  money  to  United  States  money  for  the  purpose  of 
calculating  duties,  if  the  cents  of  the  result  are  less  than  50,  they  are 
rejected;  if  more  than  50,  $i  is  added  to  the  dollars. 

The  United  States  custom-house  ton  contains  2,240  pounds,  and  the 
hundredweight  112  pounds. 

Combined  duty. — On  certain  goods  there  is  both  a  specific  and  an  ad 
valorem  duty,  and  this  is  termed  a  "  combined  duty." 

BONDED  WAREHOUSES— DRAWBACK— FREE  LIST. 

A  bonded  warehouse  is  a  place  for  the  storage  of  merchandise  on  which 
the  duties  or  taxes  have  not  been  paid.  If  an  importer  does  not  desire 
to  place  his  goods  at  once  in  the  market,  or  anticipates  exporting  the 
same,  by  giving  a  bond  for  the  payment  of  the  duties  and  making  the 
entry  in  the  proper  form,  he  may  have  the  merchandise  stored  at  his  own 
risk  in  a  bonded  warehouse,  and  thus  defer  the  payment  of  the  duties. 

Merchandise  may  be  withdrawn  from  a  bonded  warehouse  for 
exportation  to  Canada,  or  other  foreign  country,  without  the  payment  of 
the  duty  on  the  same. 

Drawback. — When  distilled  spirits,  fermented  liquors,  medicines  and 
perfumery,  upon  which  an  internal  revenue  tax  has  been  paid,  and 
foreign  merchandise  upon  which  an  import  duty  has  been  paid,  are 
exported,  the  tax  or  duty  upon  the  same  is  Refunded.  Such  return  of  the 
tax  or  duty  is  called  a  drawback. 

The  free  list  is  a  list  of  articles  which  are  exempt  from  duty.  In 
making  entries  of  free  goods,  the  value  as  given  in  foreign  money  must 
be  reduced  to  United  States  money,  permits  must  be  obtained  to  land 
the  goods,  and  certain  packages  are  sent  to  the  public  store  for 
examination. 


530 


APPENDIX. 


THE    TARIFF. 

THE  TARIFF— RATES  OF  DUTY  FIXED  BY  THE  TARIFF  ACT  OF  1883 


Schedule  A-Chemlcal  Products. 

Glue 20  p.  c. 

Beeswax 20  p.  c. 

Gelatine  and  all  similar  prepa'tions.  30  p.  c. 
Glycerine,  crude,  brown  or  yellow, 

of  i  and  25-iooths 2C.  Ib. 

Glycerine,  refined 5  c.  Ib. 

Fish-glue  or  isinglass 25  p.  c. 

Phosphorous 10  c.  Ib. 

Soap,  hard  and  soft,  and  castile  soap.  20  p.  c. 

Fancy  perfumed  and  toitet  soap 15  c.  Ib. 

Sponges   20  p.  c. 

Sumac,  ground 1  3-10  c.  Ib. 

Sumac,  extract J  20  p.  c. 

Acid,  acetic,  acetous  or  pyroligne- )  2  c.  Ib. 

ous  acid,  according  to  gravity j  10  c.  Ib. 

Acid,  citric 10  c.  Ib. 

Acid,  tartaric 10  c.  Ib. 

Camphor,  refined 5  c.  Ib. 

Castor  beans,  or  seeds 50  c.  bu. 

Castor  oil 80  c.  gal. 

Cream  of  tartar 6  c.  Ib. 

Dextrine,  burnt  starch,  or  Brit.  gum.  x  c.  Ib. 

Extract  of  hemlock 20  p.  c. 

Glucose,  or  grape  sugar 20  p.  c. 

Indigo,  extracts  of,  and  carmined. ..  10  p.  c. 

Iodine,  resublimed 40  c.  Ib. 

Licorice,  paste  or  roll 7^£  c.  Ib. 

Licorice,  juice 3  c.  Ib. 

Oil  of  bay-leaves,  essential $2.50  Ib. 

Oil,  croton 50  c.  Ib. 

Oil,  flaxseed  or  linseed,  &  cot'nseed.  25  c.  gal. 

Hempseed  oil,  and  rapeseed  oil 10  c.  gal. 

Soda,  potassa,  tart'rate  or  roch.  salt.  3  c.  Ib. 

Strychnia  and  salts  of  it 50  c.  oz. 

Tartars,  partly  refined 4  c.  Ib. 

Alumina,  alum,  patent  alum,  etc....  60  c.  100  Ibs. 

Ammonia,  anhydrous 20  p.  c. 

Ammonia,  aqua 20  p.  c. 

Ammonia,  muriate  of 10  p.  c. 

Ammonia,  carbonate  of 20  p.  c. 

Ammonia,  sulphate  of 20  p.  c. 

All    imitations    of    natural    mineral 

waters,  and  artificial  min'l  waters.  30  p.  c. 

Asbestos,  manufactured 25  p.  c. 

Baryta,  sulphate  of,  unmanufactured  10  p.  c. 

Baryta,  sulphate  of,  manufactured..  %  c.  Ib. 

Refined  borax 5  c.  Ib. 

Pure  boracic  acid 5  c.  Ib. 

Commercial 4  c.  Ib. 

Borate  of  lime,  and  crude  borax 3  c.  Ib. 

Cement 20  p.  c. 

Whiting  and  Paris  white,  dry %  c.  Ib. 

Ground  in  oil,  or  putty i  c.  Ib. 

Prep'd  chalk,  precipt'd  chalk,  etc...  20 p.  c. 

Chromic  acid 15  p.  c. 

Chromate  of  potash 3  c.  Ib. 

Bi-chromate  of  potash 3  c.  Ib. 

Cobalt,  oxide  of 20  p.  c. 

Copper,  sulph'te  of,  or  blue  vitriol  . .  30.  Ib. 

Iron,  sulphate  of,  or  copperas 0.3  c.  Ib. 

Acetate  of  lead,  brown 4  c.  Ib. 

Acetate  of  lead,  white 6  c.  Ib. 

White  lead,  dry  or  in  pulp 3  c.  Ib. 

When  ground  or  mixed  in  oil 3  c.  Ib. 

Litharge 3  c.  Ib. 

Orange  mineral  and  red  lead 3  c.  Ib. 

Nitrate  of  lead 3  c.  Ib. 

Magnesia,  medicinal,  carbonate  of..  50.  Ib. 


Magnesia,  calcined 10  c.  Ib. 

Magnesia,  sulphate  of %  c.  Ib. 


Crude,  carbonate,  etc 

Chlorate  of 

Hydriodate,  iodide  and  iodate  of — 

Prussiate  of.  red 

Prussiate  of1,  yellow , 

Nitrate  of,  or  saltpeter,  crude 

Nitrate  of,  or  refined  saltpeter 

Sulphate  of 


SODA. 

Soda-ash 

Soda,  sal  or  soda  crystals 

Bi-carbonate  of  or  sup.-carb  of,  etc. . 

Hydrate  or  caustic 

Sulphate,  known  as  salt  cake,  etc. . , 
Soda,  silicate  of,  etc 


Refined,  in  rolls 

Sublimed  or  flowers  of 

Wood-tar 

Coal-tar,  crude 

Coal-tar,  products  of 

Coal-tar  colors  or  dyes 

Prep's  of  coal-tar,  not  colors  or  dye. 

Logwood  and  other  dye  woods 

Ultramarine 

Turpentine,  spirits  of 

Colors  and  paints 

Bone  black,  etc Y. . . 

Ocher,  umber,  sienna,  dry 

When  ground  in  oil 

Zinc,  oxide  of,  when  dry 

Zinc,  oxide  of,  when  ground  in  oil  .. 
Essential  oils,  expressed  oils,  etc. . .. 

PREPARATIONS. 

Known  as  cerates,  conserves,  etc. . . . 

Barks,  berries,  balsams,  etc 

Non-dut'e  c'demins.,  a'v'd  in  val  etc. 

Ground  or  powdered  spices 

E'rth  or  clays,  un'r'ght  or  unma'f  d. 
Earths  or  clays,  wrought  or  man'f  d. 
Proprietary  preparations 

ALCOHOLIC   PREPARATIONS. 

Alcoholic  perfumery,  cologne  water, 
etc '. 

Distilled  spirits,  containing  50  p.  c. 
anhydrous  alcohol 

Alcoh.  con'g  94  p.  c.  anhyd.  alcohol. 

Alcoholic  compounds,  other 

Chloroform 

Collod'n  and  all  comp's  of  pyroxy'ne 

Rolled  or  in  sheet 

In  finished  or  partly   finished  ai'ti- 

cles 

Ether,  sulphuric 

Hoffman's  anodyne 

lodoform 

Acid,  tannic  and  tannin 

Ether,  nitrous,  spirits  of 

Santonine 

Amylic  alcohol,  or  fusel  oil 

Oil  of  cognac,  or  oenantic  ether 

Fruit  ethers,  oils  or  essences 


20  p.  C. 

3  c.  Ib. 
50  c.  Ib. 
10  c.  Ib. 
5  c.  Ib. 
i  c.  Ib. 
*%  c.  Ib. 

20  p.  C. 
#  C.  Ib. 

y.  c.  ib. 

ifcc  Ib. 
i  c.  Ib. 

20  p.  C. 

%  c.  Ib. 

$10  p.  ton. 
$20  p.  ton. 
10  p.  c. 
10  p.  c. 

20  p.  C. 

35  P-  c. 

20  p.  C. 
10  p.  C. 

5  c.  Ib. 
20  c.  gal. 
25  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 


c.  Ib. 
c.lb. 
25  p.  c. 


25  p.  c. 
10  p.  c. 

10  p.  c. 
5  c.  Ib. 
$1.50  p.  ton. 
$3  P- ton. 
50  p.  c. 


($2  p.  gal. 
1 50  P-  c. 


I 


p  ga  • 

p.  gal. 
$2  p.  gal. 
V25p.c. 
50  c.  Ib. 
50  c.  Ib. 
60  c.  Ib. 
f6oc.  Ib 
1  =5  p.  c. 
50  c.  Ib. 
30  c.  Ib. 
$2  p.  Ib. 
$ip  Ib. 
30  c. Ib. 
$3  p.  Ib. 
10  p.  c. 

*4  P-  OZ; 

$2.50  p. Ib. 


APPENDIX. 


531 


Oil  or  essence  of  rum 50  c.  or. 

Ethers  of  all  kinds $i  p.  Ib. 

Coloring  for  brandy 50  p.  c. 

Prep's  of  which  alcoh.  is  comp't  part.  50  c.  Ib. 

Varnishes  of  all  kinds  ...  . .       °  p<  c> 

Spirit  varni.bc, 

Opium,    crude,    containing  9    p.  c. 

and  over  of  morphia $i  p.  Ib. 

Opium  cont'ng less 9  p.  c.  morphia.,  prohb'td. 
Prep,  for  smok'g  and  all  other  prep,  jio  p.  Ib. 
Aqueous  ext.  of,  for  medicinal  uses. .  40  p.  c. 
Morp'a  or  morp'ne  &  all  salts  the'of.  $i  p.  or. 

Schedule  B— Earthenware  and 
Glassware. 

Brown  earth'ware,  not  ornamented..  25  p.  c. 

Chi'a,  p'rcel'n,  par' an,  bisq'e,  e'th'n, 
stone  and  crockeryware,  painted, 
print'd,  gild'd,  otherwise  decor'd.  60  p.  c. 

China,  porcelain,  parian  and  bisque- 
ware,  white,  not  decorated 55  p.  c. 

Other  earth.,  stone,  cro'k'ware,  etc.  55  p.  c. 

Stoneware,  above  capac'y  of  10  gal.  20  p.  c. 

Encaustic  tiles 35  p.  c. 

Brick,  fire-brick,  ro'ing,  pa'ing,  tile.  20  p.  c. 

Slates,  slate-pencils,  etc 30  p.  c. 

Roofing-slates 25  p.  c. 

Green  and  colored  glass  bottles, 
etc.,  not  cut,  engrav  d  or  painted,  i  c.  Ib. 

If  filled... 


^Sop.c.in 
,  Vad.  to  duty 
j  on  c'nt'nts. 


Flint  and  lime  glass  bot's,  vials,  etc.  40  p.  c. 

)  40  p.  c.  inad. 

If  filled Vto    duty    on 

)  c'nt'nts. 

Articles  of  glass,  cut,  engraved,  etc.  45  p.  c. 
Cylinder  and  crown  glass,  polished, 

not  exceeding  10x15  in.  sq 2}^  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  16x24  in.  sq 4  c.  sq.ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x30  in.  sq 6  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x60  in .  sq 20  c.  sq.  ft. 

Above  that 40  c.  sq.  ft. 

Unpol.  cyl'der,  crown  and  com.  win- 

d'w  glass,  not  exc'd'g  10x15  in.  sq.  i^i  c.  Ib. 

Not  exceeding  16x24  in.  sq i%  c.  Ib. 

Not  exceeding  24x30  in.  sq 2^i  c.  Ib. 

Above  that 1%  c.  Ib. 

Fluted,  rolled  or  rough  plate-glass  )  75  c.  ico  sq. 

not  exceeding  10x15  in.  sq j  ft. 

Not  exceeding  16x24  in.  sq i  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x30  in.  sq i%c.  sq.  ft. 

Above  that 2  c.  sq.  ft. 

Cast  polished  plate-glass,  unsilvered 

not  exceeding  10x15  in.  sq 3  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  16x24  in.  sq 50.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x30  in.  sq 8  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x60  in.  sq 25  c.  sq.  ft. 

Above  that 50  c.  sq.  ft. 

Cast  pol'd  plate-glass,  silv.  or  look'g 

glass  pl't  s,not  exc'g  10x15  in.  sq.  4  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  16x24  in.  sq 6  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x30  in.  sq 10  c.  sq.  ft. 

Not  exceeding  24x60  in.  sq. .......  35  <:.  sq.  ft. 

Above  that 60  c.  sq.  ft. 

Looking-glass  plates  or  plate-glass,  )  30  p.  c.  in 

silvered,  when  framed J  addition. 

Porcelain  and  Bohemian  glass,  etc..  45  p.  c. 

Schedule  C- Metals. 

Iron  ore,  including  manganiferous  )  . 

iron  ore J  75 

Sulphur  ore,  as  pyrites,  containing 

not  more  than  3)4  p.  c.  of  copper. .   75  c.  ton. 

Ore  cont'g  more  than  2.  p.  c.  copper.  •<  Jj"  j     2/^c< 
Iron  r'way  bars,  over  25  Ibs.  to  yd,.  0.7  c.  Ib. 


Iron  in  pigs,  iron  kentledge,  spie- 
geleisen.  wrought  and  cast  scrap- 
iron  and  scrap-steel 0.3  c.  Ib. 

Steel  railway  bars,  and  railway-bars 
made  in  part  of  steel,  over  25  Ibs..  $17  per  ton. 

Bar-iron,  rolled  or  hammered,  com- 
prising flats  not  less  than  x  inch 
wide,  nor  less  than  ->i  in.  thick...  0.8 c.  Ib. 

Round  iron  not  less  than  y±  in.  in 
diameter,  and  square  iron  not  less 
than  ^4.  inch  square  i  c.  Ib. 

Flats  less  than  i  inch  wide  or  less 
than  %  inch  thick ;  round  iron  less 
than  %  inch  and  not  less  than  7-16 
inch  in  diam.,  and  square  iron  less 
than  %  of  an  inch  square no  c.  Ib. 

All  iron  slabs,  etc 35  p.  c. 

Provided  further,  iron  bars,  blooms, 
billets,  or  sizes  or  shapes  of  any 
kind,  in  the  man'f.  of  which  char- 
coal is  used  as  fuel $22  p.  ton. 

Iron  or  steel  tee  rails,  weighing  not 
over  25  Ibs.  to  the  yard 0.9  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  flat  rails,  punched  .    ...  0.8  c.  Ib. 

Round  iron?  in  coils  or  rods,  less 
than  7-16  inch  in  diam.,  and  bars 
or  shapes  of  rolled  iron  not  spec- 
ially provided 1.2  c.  Ib. 

Boiler  or  plate  iron,  sheared  or  un- 
sheared,  skelp-iron,  sheared  or 
rolled  in  grooves i#  c.  Ib. 

Sheet  iron,  com.  or  black,  thinner 
than  \%  inch  and  not  thinner  than 
No.  20  wire  gauge i  1-16  c.  Ib. 

Thinner  than  No.  20  wire  gauge  and 
not  thinner  than  No.  25 1.2  c.  Ib. 

Thinner  than  No.  25  wire  gauge  and 
not  thinner  than  No.  29 1.5  c.  Ib. 

Thinner  than  No.  29  wire  gauge,  and 
all  iron  commercially  known  as 
common  or  black  taggers'  iron 
whether  put  up  in  b'x's,  b'dles,  etc.  30  p.  c. 

On  all  such  iron  and  steel  sheets  or 
plates,  excepting  what  are  known 
commercially  as  tin  plates,  terne- 
plates  and  taggers'  tin,  when  gal- 
v'z'd  or  co't'd  with  zinc,  spelter  or 
other  metals,  or  any  alloy  of  them  %c.  Ib.  in  ad. 

Polished,  plan's'ed,  or  glanc'd  sheet- 
iron  or  sheet-steel 2j£  c.  Ib. 

Plate,  sheet  or  taggers'  iron  other 
than  the  polished,  planished  or 
glanc'd  herein  provided  for,  which 
has  been  pickled  or  cleaned  by 
acid  or  by  any  other  material  or 
process,  and  which  is  cold  rolled. .  %  c.  Ib.  ad. 

Iron  or  steel  sheets,  plates,  taggers* 
iron,  coated  with  tin  or  lead,  or  a 
mixture  of  which  these  metals  is  a 
component  part,  by  the  dripping 
or  other  process,  commercially 
known  as  tin  plates,  terne  plates, 
and  taggers' tin i  c.  Ib. 

Cor'ga'd  orcr'ped  sheet  iron  or  steel  1.4  c.  Ib. 

Hoop  band,  scroll  or  other  iron,  8 
inches  or  less  in  width,  and  not 
thinner  than  No.  10  wire  gauge. . .  i  c.  Ib. 

Thinner  than  No.  10  wire  gauge  and 

not  thinner  than  No.  20 1.2  c.  Ib. 

Thinner  than  No.  20  wire  gauge....  1.4  c.  Ib. 

Articles  not  specially  provided  for, 
whether  wholly  or  partly  manufac- 
tured, made  from  sheet,  plate, 
hoop,  band  or  scroll-iron  herein 
provided  for,  or  of  which  such 
sheet,  plate,  hoop,  band  or  scroll- 
iron  shall  be  material  of  chief 
value ^c.  Ib.  ad. 


532 


APPENDIX. 


Iron  and  steel  COtton-ties  or  hoops 
for  bailing  purposes  not  thinner 
than  No.  20  wire  gauge 35  p.  c. 

Cast-iron  pipe  of  every  description.,  i  c.  Ib. 

Cast-iron  ves'L,  etc.,  not  sp'c'lyprov.  i^  c.  Ib. 

Cut  nails  of  iron  or  steel 1%  c.  Ib. 

Cut  tacks  or  brads,  not  exceeding  16 
oz.  to  the  1,000 1%  c.  p.  M. 

Exceeding  16  oz.  to  the  1,000 3  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  railway  fish-plates i^  c.  Ib. 

MaJ'ble  iron  cast'g,  not  spec,  en'm'd  2  c.  Ib. 

AVr't  iron  or  steel  sp'h's  &  horse  sh's  2  c.  Ib. 

Anvil,  etc.,  w'gh'g  ea.  25  Ib.  or  more  a  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  rivets,  bolts,  etc 1%  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  blacks'hs'  ham's,  etc. . .  1%  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  axles,  p'r'ts  thereof,  etc.  2^  c.  Ib. 

Forgings  of  iron  and  steel 2 }&  c.  Ib. 

Horseshoe-nails,  etc.,  wrought-iron 
or  steel 4  c.  Ib. 

Boiler  tubes,  wroughi-iron  or  steel  . .  3  c.  Ib. 

Other  wrought-iron  or  steel  tubes  . . .  a#  c.  Ib. 

Chains,  iron  or  steel,  not  less  than  ^ 
of  an  inch  in  diamater ij£  c.lb. 

Less  than  y^  and  not  less  than  %  in.  a  c.  Ib. 

Less  than  $  of  an  inch 2 %  c.  Ib. 

Cross-cut  saws 8  c.  lin.  ft. 

Mill,  pit  and  drag  saws,  9  in.  or  less. .  10  c.  lin.  ft. 

Over  p  inches 15  c.  lin.  ft. 

Circular  saws 30  p.  c. 

Hand,  back  and  other  saws 40  p.  c. 

Files,  rasps,  floats  4  in.  long  &  under.  35  c.  p.  doz. 

Over  4  in.  and  under  9  in 75  c.  p.  doz. 

Nine  in.  and  under  14  in fa-S0  doz. 

Fourteen  in.  and  over $2.50  doz. 

Steel  and  cogged  ingots,  blooms, 
slabs,  not  spcc'ly  prov'd,  valicdat 
4  c.  per  Ib.  or  less 45  p.  c. 

Above  4  c.  Ib.  and  not  above  7  c.  Ib.  2  c.  Ib. 

Above  7  c.  and  not  above  10  c.  Ib . . .  2^  c.  Ib. 

Above  loc.  per  Ib 3^  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  bars,   rods,  strips,  or 
steel  sheets,  etc.,  cold-rolled,  cold- 
ham'd,or  pol'd  in  any  way  in  ad-  (  steel  r't's 
dition   to   the  ordinary  process  of-<  &  %  c.  Ib. 
hot  rolling  or  hammering (  additional. 

On  steel  circular  saw  plates i  c.  Ib.  ad. 

Iron  or  steel  beams,  girders,  joists  . .  i}£  c.  Ib. 

Steel  wheels  and  steel-tired  wheels 
for  railway  purp'es,  wh'ly  or  p'rtly 
fin'd,  and  iron  or  steel  loc'tive,  car 
and  other  railway  tires,  or  parts 
thereof,  wholly  or  partly  manufd.  aj£  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  ingots,  etc.,  for  same. . .  2  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  wire  rods,  not  lighter 
than  No.  5  wire  gauge,  valued  at 
3}-£  c.  or  less  per  Ib o.6c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel,  flat  with  longitudinal 

ribs  for  fencing 0.6  c.  Ib. 

Screws  2  inches  long  or  over 6  c.  Ib. 

One  inch  and  under  2  inches f  8  c.  Ib. 

Over  %  inch  and  under  i  inch •<  10  c.  Ib. 

Half  an  inch  long  and  less (12  c.  Ib. 

Iron  and  steel  wire,  under  No.  5  and 

not  under  No.  10  wire  gauge i  %  c.  Ib. 

Under  No.  10  and  not  under  No.  16.  2  c.  Ib. 

Under  No.  16  and  not  under  No.  26.  2%  c.  Ib. 

Under  No.  26 3  c.  Ib. 

Iron  or  steel  wire  covered  with  cot-  (  4  c.lb.  ad. 
ton,  silk  or  other  mat'al,  and  wire*!  to  forego- 
k'wn  as  c'n'ine,  co's'tand  hat  wire  (ing  rates. 
'2  c.lb.  ad. 


Iron  or  steel  wire  cloths  and  net'gs, 

made  in  meshes  of  any  form  . . . .  i . 

gauge. 
Galvanized  iron  or  steel  wire  (except 

fence  wire) %  c.  Ib.  ad. 

Iron  rope  and  wire  strand x  c.  Ib.  ad. 


to  ir'n  or 
steel  wire 
of  same 


Steel  wir*  rope  and  wire  strand  ..... 
Steel,  not  specially  provided  for.... 
Arg'tine,  al'ata  or  Ger.  silv.  unmFd 

Copper,  imported  in  ores  ........... 

Coarse  copper  and  copper  cement.. 
Old  copper  ........................ 

Copper  in  plates,  bars,  ingots,  etc..  . 
In  rolled  plates,  sheets,  rods,  etc., 

not  specially  provided  for  ........ 

Brass,  in  bars  or  pig,  old  brass,  etc.. 
Lead  ore  and  lead  dross  ............ 

Lead  in  pigs,  bars,  etc  ............. 

Lead  in  sheets,  pipes  or  shot  ........ 

Nickel  in  ore  or  matte  ............. 

Nickel,  nickel  oxide  ............... 

Zinc,  spelter  or  tutenegue,  in  blocks 

or  pigs  .......................... 

Zinc,  spelter  or  tutenegue,  in  sheets 
Sheathing  or  yellow  metal  .......... 

Antimony,  as  regulus  or  metal  ...... 

Bronze  powder  .................... 

Cutlery,  not  specially  provided  for.. 
Dutch  or  bronze  metal,  in  leaf  ...... 

St'el  pl't's,  engv'd,  stereo,  pl't's,  etc. 


Hollow-ware,  coated,  glaz'd  or  tin'd 
Muskets,  rifles  and  other  fire-arms, 

not  specially  provided  for  ........ 

All  sporting,  breech-loading  shot- 

guns and  pistols  ................. 

Forg'd  shot-gun  barrels,  rough-bor'd 
Needles  for  knitting  or  sewing  ma- 

chines ......................... 

Needles,  sewing,  darning,  knitting, 

and  all  not  provided  for  .......... 

Pen-knives,  pocket-knives  of  all 

kinds,  and  razors  ................ 

Swords,  sword-blades  and  side-arms 
Pens,  metallic  ..................... 

Pen-holder  tips  and  pen-holders.... 

Pins,  solid-headed  or  other  ......... 

Britannia-ware  and  plated  arrd  gilt 

articles  and  wares  ................ 

Quicksilver  ........................ 


2  c.  Ib.  ad. 

45  P-  c. 
25  p.  c. 

1  aj$  c.  Ib.  < 
(  line  coppej 

3%  c.  ib: 

3  c.  Ib. 

4  c.  Ib. 

Stob. 

i^c.lb. 

2  c.  Ib. 

3  c.  Ib. 
15  c.  Ib. 
15  c.  Ib. 

i  %  c.lb. 
2%  c.  Ib. 
35  P-  c. 
10  p.  c. 
15  p.  c. 
35  P-  c. 
10  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 


3  c.  Ib. 
25  p.  c. 

35  p.  c. 
10  p.  c. 

35  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 

50  p.  c. 
35  p.  c. 
12  c.  gross. 
30  p.  c. 
30  p.  c. 


35  p.  c. 
10  p.  c. 


Type  metal  .......................  20  p.  c. 

Chromate  of  iron  or  chromic  ore  ----  15  p.  c. 
Miner'l  substances  in  a  crude  state 

and  met'ls  unwr'g't,  not  pr'v'd  for  ao  p.  c. 
Manuf  res,  not  pr'vd  for,  composed 

wholly  or  in  part  of  iron,  steel, 

copper,  lead,  nickel,  pewter,  tin, 

zinc,  gold,  silver,  platinum,  or  any 

other  metal,  and  whether  partly  or 

wholly  manufactured  .............  45  p.  C. 

Schedule  D—  Wood  and  Wooden 

Wares. 
Timber,  hewn  and  sawed  ......  .....  20  p.  c. 

Timb'r.  sq'ed  or  sided,  not  pr'v'd  for  i  c.  cb.  ft. 
Saw'd  b'rds,  etc.,  of  he'lock,  white- 

wood,  sycamore  and  basswood  ....  $i  p.  M.  ft. 

All  other  sawed  lumber  ............  $2p.M.ft. 

Lumber  of  any  sort,  planed  or  fin'd..   soc.M.ft.ad. 
Pl'n'd  on  one  side,  tong'd  and  gr'v'd  $i  p.  M.  ft. 
Planed  on  two  sides,  tongued  and 

grooved  .........................  £z.$»lf.  ft. 

Hubs  for  wheels,  etc.,  rough-hewn 

or  sawed  only  ....................  20  p.  c. 

Staves  of  wood  of  all  kinds  .........  10  p.  c. 

Pickets  and  palings  ................  20  p.  c. 

Laths  .......   .....................  15  c.  M.pcs. 

Shingles  ..........................  35  c.  p.  M. 

Pine  clapboards  ...................  $2  p.  M. 

Spruce  clapboards  .................  £1.50  p.  M. 


APPENDIX. 


533 


House  or  cabinet  furniture,  in  piece 

or  rough  and  not  finished 30  p.  C. 

Cabinet  ware  and  house  furniture, 

finished 35  P-  C. 

Casks  and  barrels,  etc.,  empty,  not 

provided  lor 30  p.  c. 

Man'f's  of  c'd'rw'd,  grand'la,  ebn'y, 

mahogany,  rose  and  satin  woods  .  35  p.  c. 
Man'f  s  of  wood  not  provided  for  . .  35  p.  c. 
Wood,  unman'f'd,  not  provided  for  .  20  p.  c. 

Schedule  E— Sugar. 
Sugars,  not  above  No.  13  D.  S.  in 
color,  tank,  bot'ms,  syrups  of  cane, 
or  beet  juice,  melada,  conc'trated 
mclada,  concrete  and  conc'trated 
molasses,  testing  by  the  polari- 

scope  not  above  75° 1.40.  Ib. 

For  every  addi'al  °  or  fract'n  of  a  °  .04  c.  Ib.  for 
shown  by  the  polariscopic  test. . . .  ev'ry  ad'l  °. 
Sugar  above  No.  13  and  not  above 

Mo.  i6D.  S 2.75  c.  Ib. 

Sugar  above  No.  16  and  not  above 

No.2oD.S ' 3  c.  Ib. 

Sugars  above  No.  20  D.  S 3.50  c.  Ib. 

Molasses  testing  not  above  56  °  by 

the  poiariscope 4  c.  gal. 

Molasses  above  56  ° 8  c.  gal. 

Sugar  candy,  not  colored 5  c.  Ib. 

All  other  confect'ry  not  provided  for, 

valued  at  30  c.  p.  Ib.  or  less 10  c.  Ib. 

Coiifect'ery  val'd.above  30  c.  p.  Ib.  or 

sold  by  box  or  package 50  p.  c. 

Schedule  F— Tobacco. 
Cigars,   cigarettes  and    cheroots    off$2.5olb. 

all  kinds (25  p.  c. 

Leaf  tobacco,  of  which  85  p.  c.  is  of 
the  reqvi'te  size  and  of  the  neces- 
sary fineness  of  texture  for  wrap- 
pers and  of  which  more  than  100 
leaves  are  required  to  weigh  a 

pound,  if  not  stemmed 75  c.  Ib. 

If  stemmed ji  Ib. 

Other  tobacco  in  leaf,  unmanufac- 
tured and  not  stemmed 35  c.  Ib. 

Tobacco  stems 15  c.  Ib. 

Tobacco,  manuf'd,  of  all  descript's, 

and  stemmed,  not  provided  for 40  c.  Ib. 

Snuff  and  snuff-flour 50  c.  Ib. 

Tobacco,  unman'f,  not  provi'd  for.  30  p.  c. 
Schedule  G— Provisions. 

Animals,  live 20  p.  c. 

Beef  and  pork i  c.  Ib. 

Hams  and  bacon 2  c.  Ib. 

Meat,  extract  of 20  p.  c 

Cheese 4  C.  Ib. 

Butter  and  substitutes  thereof 4  c.  Ib. 

Lard 2  c.  Ib. 

Wheat 20  c.  bush. 

Rye  and  barley 10  c.  bush. 

Barley,  pearled,  patent  or  hulled %  c.  Ib. 

Barley  malt,  per  bush.,  34  Ibs 20  c.  bush. 

Indvan  corn  or  maize 10  c.  bush. 

Oats 10  c.  bush. 

Corn-meal 10  c.  bush. 

Oat-meal %  c.  Ib. 

Rye-flour %  c.  Ib. 

Wheat-flour 20  p.  c. 

Potato  or  corn  starch 2  c.  Ib. 

Rice  starch 2%  c.  Ib. 

Other  starch 2%  c.  Ib. 

Rice,  cleaned 2#  c.  Ib. 

Ur-cleaned i%  c.  Ib. 

Paddy i#  c.  Ib. 

Rice-flour  and  rice-meal 20  p.  c. 

Hay $2  p.  ton. 

Honey 20  c.  gal. 


Hops  ..............................  Sc.lb. 

Milk,  preserved  or  condensed  .......  20  p.  c. 

FISH. 

Mackerel  .........................  x  c.  Ib. 

Herrings,  pickled  or  salted  .........  %  c  Ib. 

Salmon,  pickjed  ...................  i  c.  Ib. 

Other  fish,  pickled,  in  barrels  ......  i  c.  Ib. 

Foreign-caught  fish,  imp'ted,  other- 
wise than  in  bar'ls  or  half  bar'ls, 
not  provided  for  ................. 

Anchovies  and  sardines,  packed  in 
oil  or  oth'wise  in  tin  bxs.,  p.  size.  . 

In  1A  bxs.,  meas'ring  not  more  than 
5  in.  long,  4  wide  and  if£  deep  ---- 

In  y±  boxes,  meas'ng  not  more  than 
4%  in.  long,  3#  wide  and  i#  deep 

In  any  other  form  .................. 

Fish  preserved  in  oil  ............... 

Salmon  and  all  other  fish,  prep'd  or 
pres'ved,  and  prep'd  meats  of  all 
kinds,  not  provided  for  ......  ..... 

Pickles  and  sauces,  not  prov'd  for  .  . 

Potatoes  .......................... 

Vegetables  in  natural  state  or  in  salt 
or  brine  not  provided  for  ......... 

Vegetables,  not  oth'wise  prov'd  for  .  . 

Chicory  root  ....................... 

Vinegar  ........................... 

Acorns  and  dandelion  root,  and  all 
other  articles  intended  to  be  used 
as  coffee  or  as  substitutes  thereof, 
not  provided  for  ................. 

Chocolate  ......................... 

Cocoa,  prepared  or  manufactured.  .  . 
FRUITS. 

Currants,  Zante  or  other  ........... 

Dates,  plums  and  prunes  ........... 

Figs  .................  ,  ............. 


50  c.  100  Ib. 
10  c.  p.  box. 
5  C.  deep. 

2%  c.  each. 
40  p.  c. 
30  p.  c. 

25  p.  c. 
35  p.  c. 
15  c.  bush. 

10  p.  c. 
30  p.  c. 
2  c.  Ib. 
1%  c.  gal. 


2  c.  Ib. 
2  c.  Ib. 
2  c.  Ib. 

i  c.  Ib. 
i  c.  Ib. 

2C'lbu 
25  c.  box. 


Orates,  per  ri. 

sc.bbl. 
(30  c.  box. 
Lemons,  per  size  ...................  <  i6c.  ^  box, 

($2  p.  M. 
Lemons  and  oranges,  in  packages, 

not  provided  for  ..................  20  p.  c. 

Limes  and  grapes  ..................  20  p  c. 

Raisins  ............................  2  c.  Ib. 

Fruits  preserved  in  their  own  juices 

and  fruit  juice  ...................  20  p.  c. 

Comfits,  sweetmeats  or  fruits   pre- 

served in  sugar,  spirits,  sirup  or 

morses,  not  prov'd  for,  and  jellies  .  35  p.  c. 

NUTS. 
Almonds  ..........................  5  c.  Ib. 

Shelled  ............................  7^c.  Ib. 

Filberts  and  walnuts  ................  3  c.  Ib. 

Peanuts  or  ground  beans  ...........  i  c.  Ib. 

Shelled  ............................  ilA  c.  Ib. 

Nuts,  not  provided  for  .............  2  c.  Ib. 

Mustard,  ground  or  preserved  ......   10  c.  Ib. 


Schedule  H— Liquors. 
Champagne  and  all  other  sparkling 


$7  doz.  qt. 
bottles. 
$3.50  doz. 
pt.  bottles. 
$1.75  doz. 
Upt  bot. 

Bottles  of  more  than  one  quart  each.  (  on'gx  ofqt. 
Still  wines,  in  casks  ................  50  c.  gal. 


On  any  excess  of  these  quantities  ....  sc.  pt.  on  ex. 
Vermuth  ..........................  50  c.  gal. 


534 


APPENDIX. 


Wines,  brandy,  and  other  spirituous 
liquors,  imp.  in  bots.,  shall  be  in 


pkgs.  of  not  less  than  i  doz.  bots. .  30.  on  ea.bt. 
randy  and    other  spirits    manuf'd 
CT  distilled    from  grain  or    other 


Bran 


materials  and  not  provided  for. ...  %i  p.  gal. 
On  all  comp'ds  or  prep'ns  of  which 

dist.  spirits  are  compo'nt  part  of 

chief  value,  not  spec,  provi'd  for..  £2  p.  gal. 
Cordial  and  liquors  not  provi'd  for. .  $2  p.  gal. 

Bay  rum  or  bay  water $i  p.  gal. 

Ale,  porter  and  beer  in  bottles  or  jugs 

of  glass,  stone  or  earthenware 35  c.  gal. 

Otherwise  than  in  bottles ao  c.  gal. 

Ginger  ale  or  ginger  beer 20  p.  c. 

Schedule  l-Cotton  and  Cotton 

Goods. 

Cot'n  thread,  yarn,  warps,  or  warp- 
yarn,  whether  single  or  advanced 

beyond  the  cond'n  of  single   by 

twist'g  two  or  more  single  yarns 

tog'her,  value  not  cxc'd'g  25  c  Ib  . .   10  c.  Ib. 

Over  25  and  less  than  40  c 15  c.  Ib. 

Over  40  and  not  exceeding  50  c ao  c.  Ib. 

Over  50  and  not  exceeding  60  c 25  c.  Ib. 

Over  60  and  not  exceeding  70  c 33  c.  Ib. 

Over  70  and  not  exceeding  80  c 38  c.  Ib. 

Over  So  c.  and  not  exceeding  $i 48  c.  Ib. 

Overji Sop.  c. 

On  all  cotton  cloth  not  ble'ed,  dyed, 

colored,  stain'd,  paint'dorprint'd, 

and  exceeding  100  threads  to  the 

«.q.  in.,  counting  w'rp  and  filling  ..  a*4c.  sq.  yd. 

If  bleached 3#c.  sq.  yd. 

If  dyed,  colored,  stained,  painted,  or 

printed 4^c.  sq.  yd. 

On  all  cotton  cloth,  not  ble'ed,  dyed, 

colored,  stain'd,  paint'd  or  print'd, 

and  not  exc'di'g  200  threads  to  the 

sq.  in.,  counting  warp  and  filling. .  3  c.  sq.  yd. 

If  bleached 4  c.  sq.  yd. 

If  dyed,  colored,  stained,  painted  or 

printed 5  C.  sq.  yd. 

On  all  cotton  cloth  not  exceeding  200 

threads  to  the  square  inch,  counting 

the  warp  and  filling,  not  bleached, 

dyed,  colored,  siained,  painted  or 

printed,  valued  at  over  8  c.  p.  sq. 

yd.;  bleached,  valued  at  over  10  c. 

p.  sq.  yd.,  dyed,  colored,  stained, 

painted  or  printed,  valued  at  over 

13  c.  p.  sq.yd 40  p.  c. 

On  all  cotton  cloth,  exceeding  200 

threads  to  the  square  inch,  counting 

the  warp  and  filling,  not  bleached, 

dyed,  colored,  stained,  painted  or 

primed 4  c.  sq.  yd. 

If  bleached 50.  sq.  yd. 

If  dyod,  colored,  stained,  painted,  or 

printed 6  c .  sq.  yd. 

On  all  such  cot'n  cloths  not  bleached, 

dyed,  colored,  stained,  painted  or 

printed  ,  valued  at  over  10  c.  p.  sq. 

yd.;  bleached,  valued  at  over  12  c. 

p.    sq.    yd.,   and    dyed,    colored. 

stained,  painted  or  printed,  valued 

at  over  15  c.  p.  sq.  yd 40  p.  c. 

On  stockings,  hose,  half-hose,  etc., 

made    on   knitting    machines    or 

frames,  composed  wholly  of  cotton 

and  not  otherwise  provided  for. ...  35  p.  c. 
On  stockings,  hose,  half-hose,  etc., 

fashioned,    narrowed,    or    shaped 

wholly  or  in  part  by  knitting  ma- 
chines or  frames,  or  knit  by  hand 

and  composed  wholly  of  cotton  ...  40  p.  c. 
Cotton  cords,  braids  and  corsets  ....  35  p.  c. 


Cot'n  lace,  emb'd'ies,  insert  gs,  etc  .  40  p.  c. 
Spool  thread  of  cotton,  not  over  zoo 
yds.  on  spool 7  c.  doz. 

(  7  c.  doz.  ea. 
Exceeding  100  yds •<  ad.  100  yds. 

(of  cotton. 

Schedule  J— Hemp,  Jute  and  Flax 
Goods. 

Flax  straw £5  p.  ton. 

Flax  not  hackled  or  dressed $20  p.  ton. 

Flax,  hackled,  known  as  "  dressed 
line" #40  p.  ton. 

Tow,  of  flax  or  hemp £10  p.  ton. 

Hemp,  manilla  and  other  like  substi- 
tutes for  hemp  not  provided  for. . .  $25  p.  ton. 

Jute  butts $5  p.  ton. 

lute 20  p.  c. 

sunn,  sisal,  grass  and  other  vegetable 
substances,  not  provided  for $15  p.  ton. 

Brown  and  bleached  linens,  etc.,  not 
provided  for 35  p.  c. 

Flax,  hemp  and  jute  yarns 35  p.  c. 

Flax  or  linen  thread,  twine,  etc 40  p.  c. 

Flax  or  linen  laces,  insertings,  etc. . .  30  p.  c. 

Burlaps,  not  exc'd'g  60  in.  in  width.  30  p.  c. 

Oil-cloth  foundations,  etc 40  p.  c. 

Oil-cloths  for  floors,  stamped,  paint- 
ed, etc 40  p.  c. 

Gunny  cloth,  not  bagging,  zoc.  or 
less  per  square  yard. . .  30.  yd. 

Over  loc 40.  yd. 

Bags  and  bagging  and  manufactures 
not  enumerated 40  p.  c. 

Bagging  for  cotton,  7  c.  or  less  sq.  yd.  iftc.  Ib. 

Over  7  c 2  c.  Ib. 

Tarred  cables  or  cordage 3  c.  Ib. 

Untarred  manilla  cordage zj£c.  Ib. 

All  other  untarred  cordage 3}£c.  N>. 

Seins  and  sein  and  gilling  twine 25  p.  c. 

Sail  duck  or  canvas  for  sails 30  p.  c. 

Russia  and  other  sheetings 35  p.  c. 

All  other  man'f  s  of  hemp  or  manilla.  35  p.  c. 

Grass-cloth 35  P-  c. 

Schedule  K-Wool  and  Woolens. 

Wools  of  the  ist  class,  valued  at  the 
last  port  whence  exported  to  the 
U.  S.,  excluding  the  charges  in 
such  port,  at  30  c.  or  less  per  Ib. . .  10  c.  Ib. 

Over  30  c.  per  Ib 12  c.  Ib. 

Wools  of  the  2d  class,  valued  at  the 
last  port  whence  exported  to  the 
U.  S.,  excluding  charges  in  such 
port,  at  30  c.  or  less  per  Ib 10  c.  Ib. 

Valued  at  over  30  c.  per  Ib 12  c.  Ib. 

Wools  of  the  3d  class,  valued  at  the 
last  port  whence  exported  to  the 
U.  S..  excluding  charges  in  such 
port,  at  12  c.  or  less  per  Ib 2 %  c.  Ib. 

Valued  at  over  12  c.  per  Ib 5  c.  Ib. 

Woolen  rags,  shoddy  m'ngo  &  waste  10  c.  Ib. 

Woolen   cloths,  woolen  shawls  and 
all  manuf  r^s  of  wool,  not  speci- 
ally provided  for,  valued  at   not  35  c.  Ib 
exceeding  80  c.  per  Ib 35  P-  c. 

Valued  at  above  80  c.  per  Ib  ,. 


Flan'ls,  blankets,  hats  of  wool,  knit 
goods  and  all  goods  m'de  on  knit'g 
fr'm's,  balm'ls,  wo'l'n  and  worst'd 
yarns  and  all  manufac's  of  every 
desc'pti'n,  composed  wholly  or  in 
part  of  worsted,  the  hair  of  the 
alpaca  goat  or  other  animals  (ex- 
cept such  as  are  co'p'sed  in  part  of 
wool)  not  specially  provided  for, 

Valued  at  not  exceed'g  30  c,  per  Ib. . 


40  p.  c. 


10  c.  Ib. 


APPENDIX. 


535 


Valued  at  above  30  c.  per  Ib.  and  not  xa  c.  Ib. 

exceeding  40  c.  per  ID  ............  35  p.  c. 

Valued  at  above  40  c.  per  Ib.  and  not  18  c.  Ib. 

exceeding  60  c.  per  Ib  ............  and  35  p.  c. 

Valued  at  above  60  c.  per  Ib.  and  not  24  c.  Ib. 

exceeding  80  c.  per  Ib  ............  and  35  p.  c. 

35  c.  Ib. 
Valued  at  above  80  c.  per  Ib  ........  and  40  p.  c. 

zo  c.  sq.  yd. 
Bunting  ...........................  and  35  p.  c. 

Wom'n's  and  chil'r'n's  dress  goods, 

coat  linings,  Italian  cloths  and  like 

goods,  composed  in  part  of  wool, 

•worsted,  the    hair  of  the  alpaca 

goat  or  other  animals,  valued  at  5  c.  sq.  yd. 

not  exceeding  zo  c.  per  sq.  yd  .....  and  35  p.  c. 
7.  c.  sq.  yd. 

Valued  at  above  20  c.  per  sq.  yd  ....  and  40  p.  c. 
If  composed  wholly  of  wool,  worsted, 

the  hair  of  the  alpaca  goat  or  other  9  c.  sq.  yd. 

animals,  or  of  a  mixture  of  them  .  .  and  40  p.  c. 
But  all  such  goods  with  selvedges, 

made  wholly  or  in  part  of  other 

mate'als,  or  with  threads  of  other 

materials  inter'  d'c'd  for  the  p'rp'se  9  c.  sq.  yd. 

of  changing  the  classification  .....  and  40  p.  c. 
All  such  goods  weighing  over  4  oz.  35  c.  Ib. 

per  sq.  yd  .......................  and  40  p.  c. 

Clothing,  ready-made,  and  wearing")  •» 

apparel  of  every  description,  notf*°dl     • 

provided  for  .....................  j  ami  35  p 

Cloaks,    dolmans,  jackets,    talmas,  )  45  c.  Ib. 

ulsters,  etc  .......................  f  and  40  p.  c. 

Webbings,       gorings,      suspenders,  1  30  c.  Ib. 

braces,  beltings,  etc  .............  j  and  50  p.  c. 

Aubusson,    Axminster   and  chenille  j 

carpets,  and  carpets  woven  whole 


,. 


45C.sq.yd. 
and  30  p.  c. 
30  c.  sq.  yd. 
and  30  p.  c. 

25  c.  sq.  yd. 
and  30  p.  c. 

20  c.sq.  yd* 
and  30  p.  c' 
12  c.  sq.  yd. 
and  30  p.  c. 
8  c.  sq.  yd. 
and  30  p.  c. 
15  c.sq.  yd. 
and  30  p.  c. 


for  rooms 
Saxony,  Wilton  and  Tournay  velvet 

carpets    ,~. 

Brussels  carpets 

Patent  velvet  and  tapestry  velvet 
carpets,  printed  on  the  warp  or 
otherwise 

Tapestry  Brussels  carpets,  printed 
on  the  warp  or  otherwise 

Treble  ingrain,  3-ply  and  worsted- 
chain  Venetian  carpets 

Yarn,  Venetian,  and  2-ply  ingrain 
carpets 

Druggets  and  bookings,  printed, 
colored  or  otherwise ^,  r, 

Hemp  or  jute  carpeting 6  c.  sq.  yd. 

Carpets  and  carpetings  of  wool,  flax 
or  cotton 40  p.  c. 

Mats  not  exclusively  of  vegetable  } 
mate's,  scre'ens,  has'cks  and  rugs.  j  *°  "' 

Endless  belts  or  felts  for   paper  or  20  c.  Ib. 
printing  machines 30  p.  c. 

Schedule  L-Silk  and  Silk  Goods. 

Silk,  partly  manufactured 50  c.  Ib. 

Thrown  silk,  in  gum,  not  more  ad- 
vanced than  singles 30  p.  c. 

Lastings,  mohair  cloth,  silk  twist, 
patterns  for  buttons,  exclusively  . .  10  p.  c. 

Silk  goods,  wares  and  merchandise, 
not  provided  for 50  p.  c. 

Schedule  M— Books,  Papers,  Etc. 

Books,  pamphlets,  bound  or  un- 
bound, and  all  printed  matter  not 
provided  for,  engravings,  etchings, 
illustr'd  books,  maps  and  charts  . .  25  p.  c. 

Blank -books,  bound  or  unbound,  and 
blank-books  for  press-copying....  20  p.  c. 

Paper  box's  and  all  oth'r  fancy  boxes  35  p.  c. 


Paper,  sized  or  glued,  suitable  only 
for  printing  paper 20  p.  c. 

Printing  paper,  unsized,  used  for 
books  and  newspapers  exclusively.  15  p.  c. 

Paper,  manufacturers  of,  or  of  which 
paper  is  a  component  material,  not 
provided  for 15  p.  c. 

Sheathing  paper 10  p.  c. 

Paper  envelopes 25  p.  c. 

Paper-hangings  and  paper  for  screens 
or  fire-boards,  etc 25  p.  c. 

Pulp,  dried  for  paper-makers'  use. . .  10  p.  c. 

Schedule  N— Sundries. 

Alabaster  and  spar  statuary,  etc  ....  10  p.  c. 
Articles  comp's  d  of  grass,  osier,  etc.  30  p.  c. 
Be'ds  and  be'd  or'm'ts,  exc'pt  amb'r  50  p.  c. 

Blacking  of  all  kinds 25  p.  c. 

Bladders,  manufactures  of 25  p.  c. 

Bone,  horn,  ivory,  etc 30  p.  c. 

Bonnets,  etc.,  of  chip,  grass,  palm- 
leaf,  etc 30  p.  c. 

Bouillons  or  can'tille,  mstalthread'ds  25  p.  c. 

Bristle* 15  c.  Ib. 

Broom  of  all  kinds 25  p.  c. 

Brushes  of  all  kinds 30  p.  c. 

Bulbs  and  bulbous  roots 20  p.  c. 

Burr-stones 20  p.  c. 

Buttons  and  button-molds 25  p.  c. 

Candles  and  tapers  of  all  kinds 20  p.  c. 

Canes  and  sticks  for  walk'g  finished.  35  p.  c. 

If  unfinished 20  p.  c. 

Card-cases,  pocketbooks,  shell  box's, 

etc 35  p.  c. 

Card-clothing 25  c.  sq.  ft. 

When  manufactured  from  tempered 

steel  wire 45  c.  sq.  ft. 

Carriages,  and  parts  of 35  p.  c. 

Chronometers,  box  or  ship 10  p.  c. 

Clocks  and  parts  of  clocks 30  p.  c. 

Coach  and  harness  furniture  of  all 

kinds,  etc 35  p.  c. 

Coal  slack  or  culm  30  c.  ton. 

Coal,  bituminous  and  shale 75  c.  ton. 

Coke \ 20  p.  c. 

Combs 30  p.  c. 

Composition  of  glass  or  paste,  when 

not  set 10  p.  c. 

Coral,  cut,  manufactured  or  set 25  p.  c. 

Corks  and  cork  bark,  manufactured.  25  p.  c. 

Crayons  of  all  kinds 20  p.  c. 

Dice,  draughts,  chessmen,  etc 50  p.  c. 

Dolls  and  toys 35  p.  c. 

Emery  grains  and  emery  manufact'd  i  c.  Ib. 
Ep'ulets,  gallo'ns,  laces,  knots,  etc. .  25  p.  c. 

Fans 35  P*  c. 

Feathers  of  all  kinds,  crude 25  p.  c. 

When  dressed,  colored  or  manufac'd  50  p.  c. 

Finishing  powder 20  p.  c. 

Fire-crackers  of  all  kinds 100  p.  c. 

Floor-matting  and  floor-mats 20  p.  c. 

Friction  or  lucifer  matches 35  p.  c. 

Fulminates,  fulminating  powders  ...  30  p.  c. 

Fur,  articles  made  of 30  p.  c. 

Gloves,  kid  or  leather 50  p.  c. 

Grease 10  p.  c. 

Grindstones #1.75  ton. 

Gunpo'der  and  all  explo've  sub'ces, 

valued  at  20  c.  or  less  per  Ib 6  c  Ib. 

Valued  above  20  c.  per  Ib 10  c.  Ib. 

Gun-wads  of  all  descriptions 35  p.  c. 

Gutta-percha,  manufactured 35  p.  c. 

Hair,  human,  bracelets,  braids,  etc. .  35  p.  c. 

Curled  hair,  except  of  hogs 25  p.  c. 

Human  hair,  raw,  unclean  .and  not 

drawn 20  p.  c. 

If  clean  or  drawn  but  not  manuf'd  . .  30  p.  c. 
When  manufactured 35  p.c. 


536 


APPENDIX. 


Hair  cloth 

Hair  seating 

Hair  pencils 

Hats,  and  materials  for  braids,  etc.. 

Hat-bodies,  of  cotton 

Hatters'  furs  and  dressed  furs 

Hatters'  plush  of  silk  or  of  silk  and 
cotton 

Hemp  seed  and  rape  seed 

India  rubber  fabrics 

Art'l's  of  India  rub'r  not  prov'd  for. 

India  rubber  boots  and  shoes 

Inks  of  all  kinds  and  ink  powders. . . 

Japanned  ware  of  all  kinds 

Jet,  manufacturers  and  imitations. . . 

J  ewelry  of  all  kinds    

Leather,  bend  or  belting 

Calfskins,  tanned,  and  dressed  upper 
leather 

Skins,  for  morocco,  tanned,  but  un- 
finished   

All  articles  of  leather,  not  prov'd  for 

Lime 

Garden  seeds 

Linseed  or  flaxseed 

Marble,  in  block,  rough  or  squared. . 

Veined  marble,  sawed,  dressed  or 
otherwise 

Manufac't  of  marble  not  prov'd  for. . 

Musical  instruments  

Paintings  in  oil  or  water  colors,  and 
statuary 

Osier  or  wil'w  for  baskkt-mak'rs'  use 

Papier-mache  articles 

Pencils  of  wood  filled  with  lead  or 
other  material  and  pencils  of  lead  . 

Pencil-leads  not  in  wood  .... 


30  p.  c. 

30  c.  sq.  yd. 

3°  P.  c. 

20  p.  C. 

35  P.  c. 

20  p.  C. 


Jfl'fi, 

30  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 
30  p.  c. 
40  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 
15  p.  c. 


10  p.  c. 

30  p.  c. 
10  p.  c. 

20  p.  C. 

20  c.  bush. 
65  c.  cub.  ft. 

$i.  10  cub.  ft. 
50  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 

30  p.  c. 
25  p.  c. 
30  p.  c. 
50  c.  gross  \ 
&  30  p.  c.  J 
10  p.  c. 


Percussion  caps 40  p.  c. 

Philosophical  apparatus  and  instru- 
ments  35P-C. 

Pipes,  pipe-bowls 70  p.  c. 

Common  pipes  of  clay 35  p.  c. 

Plaster  of  Paris 20  p.  c. 

Playing  cards 100  p.  c. 

Polish'g  powd'rs  of  every  desc'p't'n.  20  p.  c. 

Precious  stones  of  all  kinds 10  p.  c. 

Rags 10  p.  c. 

Rattans  and  reeds 10  p.  c. 

Salt,  in  bags,  sacks,  barrels i2c.  100  11 

In  bulk 8c.  100  lb 

Scagliola  and  composition  tops 35  p.  c. 

Sealing-wax 2t>  p.  c. 

Shells,  whole  or  parts  of 25  p.  c. 

Stones,  unmanufac'd  or  undressed, 
freestone,  etc $i  p.  ton. 

Stones,  as  above,  hewn,  dressed  or 
polished 20  p.  c. 

Strings  of  catgut 25  p.  c. 

Tallow i  c.  lb. 

Teeth,  manufactured 20  p.  c. 

Umbrella  and  parasol  ribs,  stretcher- 
frames,  etc 40  p.  c. 

Umbrellas,  parasols,  covered  with 
silk  or  alpaca 50  p.  c. 

Other  umbrellas 40  p.  c. 

Umbrellas,  parasols  and  sunshades, 
frames  and  sticks  for,  not  provided 
for 30  p.  c. 

Waste  , 10  p.  c. 

Watches,  watch-cases,  watch-move- 
ments, parts  of  watches,  and  watch 
materials,  not  provided  for 15  p.  c. 

Webbing 35  P-  c. 


ARTICLES  FREE  OF  DUTY. 


Actors'  costumes  and  effects  intended  for  personal 

use. 

Animals  for  breeding  purposes. 
Antiquities  not  for  sale. 
Articles  and  tools  of  trade. 
Art  works  of  American  artists. 
Bed  feathers. 

Birds,  land  and  water  fowl. 
Books  printed  over  20  years. 
Bullion,  gold  and  silver. 
Coal,  anthracite. 
Cocoa,  crude. 
Coffee. 
Collections  of  antiquities,  etc.,  for  use  in  colleges, 

museums,  incorporated  societies,  etc. 
Diamonds,  rough. 

Drugs,  crude,  used  in  dyeing  or  tanning. 
Effects    of  American    citizens    dying    abroad,   if 

accompanied  by  consular  certificate. 
Engravings  (engraved  over  20  years). 
Farina. 
Fertilizers. 
Fruits  and  nuts,  green,  ripe,  dried. 


Furs,  undressed. 

Hides,  raw. 

Household  effects  in  use  abroad  over  one  year  and 

not  for  sale. 
India  rubber,  crude. 
Macaroni  and  Vermicelli. 
Mineral  waters,  natural. 
Mother  of  pearl,  unmanufactured. 
Natural  history  specimens  (not  for  sale). 
Newspapers. 
Periodicals. 

Personal  effects  when  old  and  in  use  over  one  year. 
Plants,  trees  and  shrubs. 
Rags,  not  wool,  for  paper  stock. 
Sausages,  Bologna,  German,  skins. 
Scientific  instruments  for  colleges. 
Skins,  raw. 
Tapioca. 
Tea. 
United  States  manufactures  forwarded  to  foreign 

countries  and  returned. 
Wax,  vegetable  and  mineral. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Adams,  John,  condition  of  government  when  he  became  president,  84;  his  first  message, 
86;  his  last  message,  1800,  87;  member  of  Protection  Society  of  New 
York,  470. 

John  Quincy,  candidate  for  President,  1824,  181 ;  elected  by  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, 184;  purpose  of  his  administration,  184;  last  message  in  favor  of 
protection,  extracts  from,  207,  208;  Chairman  of  Committee  on  Manufact- 
ures, 248. 

Alexander,  of  Virginia,  member  of  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  247. 

"  American  Society  for  the  Encouragement  of  Domestic  Manufactures,"  469. 

Ames,  of  Massachusetts,  proposes  the  protection  of  manufacture  of  wool  cards,  61. 

"  Act  laying  a  duty  on  goods,  wares  and  merchandises  imported  into  the  United  States," 
introduced  by  Madison  into  Congress,  47 ;  passed,  67  ;  approved  by  Wash- 
ington, 67  ;  settles  the  constitutionality  of  protection,  68. 

Austin,  Benjamin,  Jefferson's  letter  to,  137,  469. 

B. 

Bacon,  of  Massachusetts,  introduces  resolution  into  House  of  Representatives,  1809,  98; 

opposed  by  Gardenier,  of  New  York,  and  John  Randolph,  of  Virginia,  99; 

resolution  passed,  100. 

Baldwin,  of  Georgia,  his  views  upon  the  Constitution,  64. 
Baltimore,  her  people  petition  Congress  to  protect  manufactures,  1789,  38. 
Barbour,  Philip  P.,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 ;  votes  for  tariff  of 

1816,  134;  votes  for  for  Vice- President,  257. 

John  S.,  member  of  Committee  on  Manufactures,  248. 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  supports  Kane's  motion  to  lay  duty  on  lead,  210;  moves  to  impose 

duty  on  indigo,  211 ;  extract  from  his  "  Thirty  Years  in  the  United  States 

Senate,"  353. 

Birney,  J.  G.,  votes  cast  for  him  in  1844,  364. 
Bland,  of  Virginia,  favors  restriction  of  importation  of  coal,  62. 
Boston,  society  formed  in,  1787,  33;  tradesmen  and  manufacturers  petition  Congress, 

1789,40. 

Bright,  John,  481 ;  influences  repeal  of  English  Corn  Laws,  481. 
British  Board  of  Trade  reports  to  Parliament  adverse  to  Colonies,  25. 
British  statesmen  advocate  free  trade  for  United  States,  389. 
Brougham,  Lord,  extract  from  speech  in  Parliament,  127. 

537 


538 


INDEX. 


Buchanan,  James,  remarks  upon  tariff  bill  of  1828,  211 ;  refers  to  duty  on  woolens,  211 ; 
the  vote  for  him,  1844,  352;  borrows  money  to  save  public  credit,  424;  his 
administration  leaves  public  credit  impaired,  425. 


O. 

Calhoun,  John  C,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121  ;  defense  of  tariff  law 
of  1816,  130;  extracts  from  his  speech,  131,  133 ;  votes  for  tariff  law,  1816, 
134;  favors  increase  of  duty  on  cotton,  1816,  163;  elected  Vice-President, 
206  ;  dissatisfied  with  Jackson's  administration,  256. 

California  acquired  by  United  States,  413;  product  of  gold,  1849,  4I3>  table  of  gold 
production,  1850  to  1854,  414. 

Carrol,  of  Maryland,  moves  to  tax  glass,  61. 

Chase,  Lucien  B.,  his  "  History  of  Folk's  Administration,"  359,  394. 

Chipman,  Daniel,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 

Clay,  Henry,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 ;  remarks  upon  tariff  law 
of  1816,  130;  advocates  reduction  of  duty  on  tea,  240;  candidate  for  Presi- 
dent, 1824,  181 ;  opposed  to  Jackson  for  presidency,  1832,  256;  author  of 
Compromise  Act  of  1833,  288 ;  his  defense  against  imputation  of  Webster, 
288;  candidate  for  President  1844,  350;  recognized  as  a  supporter  of  pro- 
tection, 350;  extract  from  his  Raleigh  speech,  351;  vote  cast  for  him  in 
1844,  364;  protective  tariff  votes  cast  for  Polk  would  have  elected  him,  365. 

Clymer,  of  Pennsylvania,  insists  on  protection  to  paper  mills,  61. 

Cobb,  Howell,  Secretary  of  Treasury,  offers  government  stocks  for  sale,  426. 

Cobden  Club,  473,  490,  491,  498,  506,  522 ;  attempts  to  disseminate  free  trade  doctrines 
in  the  United  States,  483. 

Cobden,  Richard,  474;  formed  Anti-Corn  Law  League,  475  ;  speech  in  Parliament,  476 ; 
extract  from  speech,  478;  his  opinions  of  importance,  480;  influences  repeal 
of  Corn  Laws  in  England,  481 ;  desires  the  destruction  of  American  manu- 
factures, 483,  490 ;  three  classes  affected  by  his  teachings,  485 ;  suggests  free 
trade  in  both  England  and  the  United  States,  488,  490. 

Colonies,  dependent  upon  will  of  English  Parliament,  24. 

Colbert,  mentioned,  159. 

Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  1809,  members  and  report  of,  96;  the 
portion  of  Madison's  message  recommending  protection  referred  to  it,  1816, 
122;  states  represented  by  it,  122;  report  of  February,  1816,  122;  extracts 
from  report,  123,  124,  127;  its  sentiments  influenced  by  course  of  English 
statesmen  and  manufacturers,  127. 

Compromise  Act  of  1833,  287;  a  peace  measure,  299;  an  experiment,  289,  328;  not 
inviolable,  307 ;  a  compromise  because  a  concession  to  those  threatening  the 
Union,  307;  did  not  provide  for  immediate  introduction  of  horizontal 
standard  of  duties,  328 ;  its  supporters  of  two  classes,  328 ;  a  failure  as  a 
revenue  measure,  334 ;  it  was  insufficient,  339. 

Condict,  of  New  Jersey,  member  of  Committee  on  Manufactures,  248. 

Confederation,  Articles  of,  not  sufficient  to  encourage  domestic  labor,  22. 

"Confederate  States,"  the  attempt  to  form,  445;  adopted  a  free  trade  constitution,  445. 


INDEX.  539 

Congress,  first  important  lavr  of,  favors  protection,  47;  its  powers,  as  declared  by 
Madison,  51;  its  constitutional  power  to  protect  manufactures  not  denied, 
53;  passes  Madison's  bill,  67;  authorizes  loan,  1860,424,426;  powers  of, 
438-446. 

Constitution,  its  powers  to  regulate  commerce,  collect  taxes,  etc.,  23. 

Corn  Law,  mentioned,  169,  386;  its  repeal  a  step  towards  breaking  up  American 
manufacturers  489,  its  repeal  contemporaneous  with  passage  of  tariff  of 
1846,  489. 

Cotton,  cultivation  of,  created  new  and  important  industry,  162;  amount  produced  in 
1800,  163;  most  valuable  article  of  export  in  1824,  163;  duty  on  foreign, 
increased  in  1816,  163  ;  necessity  for  continuation  of  duty  recognized,  164; 
duty  continued  in  tariff  law  of  1824,  164;  manufacture  of,  1824,  164;  first 
importation  to  Great  Britain  from  U.  S.  unfavorable  to  English  manufacturers, 
165;  uncertainty  of  English  market  produces  anxiety  for  protection,  166; 
becomes  king,  369 ;  a  conspicuous  factor  in  politics,  387 ;  reasons  of  free 
traders  for  giving  it  preference,  389 ;  grower  not  antagonistic  to  manufac- 
turer, 390;  exportation  and  price  decline,  400. 

Gin,  invention  of,  begins  revolution  in  the  cotton  trade,  167. 

Sea  Island,  167  ;  without  a  successful  rival,  168. 

Cotton  States,  oppose  tariff,  229 ;  looked  to  for  relief  by  Van  Buren,  304 ;  adverse  to 
tariff  of  1842,  352. 

Cutt",  of  Massachusetts,  member  of  Committee  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96. 

Crawford,  William  H.,  candidate  for  President,  1824,  181. 

"  Corn  Law  League,  Anti,"  formed  by  Richard  Cobden,  475,  481 ;  advocates  free  trade 
in  both  England  and  America,  490. 


D. 

Dallas,  Alexander  J.,  Secretary  of  Treasury,  113;  his  report  recommending  increase  of 
duties  upon  cotton  and  woolen  goods,  118-120. 

Dallas,  Vice- President,  disclaims  participation  in  the  deception  of  the  campaign  of 
1844,  362;  his  vote  passes  tariff  bill  of  1846,  392. 

Dana,  of  Connecticut,  member  of  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  Secretary  ot  War,  a  friend  of  free  trade,  416. 

Daune,  William  J.,  195. 

Dayan,  of  New  York,  member  of  Committee  on  Manufactures,  248. 

Debt,  Public,  at  commencement  and  close  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  113;  amount  paid 
under  tariff  of  1828,  231;  amount  paid  1831-1832,  279;  extinguished  iii 
1835,  292;  under  tariff  of  1842,  397;  under  tariff  of  1846,  397,  409; 
increased,  397,  409,  410;  table  of,  1847  to  1857,410;  table  of,  1858  to 
1861,  419;  necessary  to  borrow  money  to  pay  interest  upon,  426,  427. 


E. 

Edinburgh  Review,  extract  from,  508. 

Encyclopedia  Brilannicat  free  trade  article  of,  176;  extract  from,  177. 


540  INDEX. 

England,  methods  of,  to  restrict  Colonial  manufactures,  26;  favors  free  trade  in  U.  S., 
156 ;  embarrassment  of  h'er  manufactures,  171 ;  her  markets  uncertain,  401 ; 
will  not  purchase  anything  from  U.  S.  that  she  can  produce  herself,  455 ;  annual 
product  of  wheat  about  one-half  of  that  consumed,  455 ;  looks  to  European 
and  Asiatic  regions  and  Canada  for  wheat  supply,  456;  desires  to  destroy 
American  manufactures,  462  ;  intercourse  with  U.  S.,  466 ;  adopts  free 
trade  to  counteract  influence  of  protection  in  U.  S.,488;  ruling  class  opposed 
to  improvement  of  laboring  class,  509;  free  trade  derived  from  political 
economy,  511. 

Exports  and  imports  for  seven  years  preceding  1791,  85  ;  table  of,  1795  to  1801,  85. 

P. 

Findley,  of  Ohio,  member  of  Committee  on  Manufactures,  248. 

Fitzimons,  of  Pennsylvania,  amendment  of,  to  Madison's  bill,  in  House  of  Representa- 
tives, 52-57;  favors  protection,  58-59. 

Force  bill,  the,  284. 

Forsyth,  John,  of  Georgia,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  1 21. 

Free  trade,  beginning  of  agitation  in  favor  of,  151  ;  views  of  an  English  advocate  con- 
cerning, 169  ;  derived  from  political  economy,  511 ;  horizontal  duties  a  step 
towards,  234. 

G. 

Gaither,  of  Kentucky,  member  of  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  248. 

Gailatin,  Albert,  Secretary  of  Treasury,  report  of,  100. 

Gardenier,  of  New  York,  opposes  Bacon's  resolution  in  House  of  Representatives,  99. 

Germantown,  resolution  adopted  by  inhabitants  of,  1787,  33. 

Giles,  William  B.,  opposition  of,  to  Washington's  administration,  199. 

Gilmore,  of  Pennsylvania,  member  of  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  247. 

Gold,  discovery  of,  stimulates  industry,  413;  table  of  its  product,  1850  to  1854,  414; 

discovered  in  Australia,  415. 
Government,  the,  should  foster  and  encourage  labor,  21 ;  problem  solved  by  founders 

Of,  21. 

Great  Britain,  opposed  to  our  protective  policy,  150;  her  commercial  policy  based  upon 
protective  system,  159;  alarmed  by  progress  of  U.  S.,  160;  suggests  adop- 
tion of  free  trade  by  U.  S.,  163;  adverse  to  importation  of  cotton  from  U.  S., 
165  ;  adheres  to  its  system  of  protective  and  prohibitory  duties,  168. 

Greeley,  Horace,  extract  from  views  on  revenue  tariff,  333,  334. 

Green,  Gen.  Duff,  editor  "  United  States  Telegraph,"  190. 

Guthrie,  James,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  a  friend  of  free  trade,  416. 

H. 

Halifax,  association  formed  in,  1787,  32. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  Secretary  of  Treasury,  report  of,  74-83. 

Harrison,  Gen.,  elected  President,  329;   inaugurated  President,  329;    finds  Treasury 

depleted  and  credit  of  Government  threatened,  329;  convenes  extra  session 

of  Congress,  329 ;  death  of,  330. 


INDEX.  541 

Hartford,  association  of  ladies  organized  in,  1787,  32. 

Hayne,  Robert  Y.,  denounces  revenue  system,  240 ;  refuses  to  support  Jackson,  259. 

Horn,  of  Pennsylvania,  member  of  Committee  on  Manufactures,  248. 

House  of  Representatives  passes  resolution  instructing  Alexander  Hamilton,  Secretary 
of  Treasury,  to  report  a  plan  for  encouragement  of  manufactures,  72  ;  dis- 
tinguished members  of  in  1816,  121 ;  vote  of,  upon  tariff  of  1816,  135. 

Huskisson,  advocates  free  trade  in  England,  173  ;  extract  from  his  speech,  175. 

Hume,  David,  one  of  the  authors  of  political  economy  and  free  trade,  502. 


"  Incidental  protection,"  314;  first  referred  to  by  Jackson,  1832,  314 ;  principle  of,  315  ; 

Jackson's  views  concerning  it,  315-327. 
Indiana,  supporters  of  protection  in,  1828,  201  ;  admitted  into  Union,  1816,  201 ;  Senate 

of,  request  explanation  of  Jackson's  views,  202 ;  Jackson's  letter  to  Governor 

of,  202. 

Ingeisoll,  of  Connecticut,  member  of  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  247. 
Ingham,  Samuel  D.,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 ;  his  views  upon 
tariff  law  of  1816,  130. 

J. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  candidate  for  President,  1824,  181  ;  letter  to  Dr.  Coleman,  182,  196, 
204,  357,  384;  brought  forward  for  President  by  Legislature  of  Tennessee, 
1825,  185;  his  friends  assail  Adams'  administration,  189;  defence  of,  by  his 
supporters,  195-196;  letter  te  Governor  of  Indiana,  202,  357;  receives 
majority  of  popular  vote,  206 ;  his  election  a  triumph  for  protection,  206 ; 
inaugurated  President,  212;  extract  from  inaugural  address,  212;  extract 
from  his  first  message,  213,  220,  221 ;  administration  commences  in  favor  of 
protection,  218;  approves  "American  System,"  221;  extracts  from  message 
vetoing  Maysville  road  bill,  222,  223;  extracts  from  message,  1830,  223,  224, 
226-227,  322,  442;  extracts  from  message  of  1831,  230;  extract  from 
message  calling  attention  of  Congress  to  surplus,  232 ;  his  administration, 
opposed  by  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  defended  by  Committee  on 
Manufactures,  253;  his  administration  sustained,  255;  opposed  to  Clay  for 
Presidency,  1832,  256;  receives  electoral  vote  of  cotton-growing  states, 
except  South  Carolina,  259 ;  opposes  nullification,  265 ;  extracts  from 
message  of,  267,  269,  317;  gives  no  sanction  to  horizontal  duties,  269; 
exhibits  conciliatory  spirit  toward  South  Carolina,  269;  his  argument 
opposed  to  free  trade,  270;  his  proclamation,  273;  extract  from  proclama- 
tion, 274;  special  message,  1833,  276;  extract  from  message,  277;  message 
December  3,  1833,  289;  declines  to  recommend  further  reduction  of  duties, 
290;  changes  opinion  about  surplus,  294;  his  "farewell  address,"  295; 
receipts  of  Treasury  during  last  year  of  his  administration,  308 ;  first  to  refer 
to  "incidental  protection,"  314;  his  views  upon  "incidental  protection," 
3 1 5-327  J  views  upon  powers  of  Congress,  441-444. 


542  INDEX. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  his  first  message  to  Congress,  1801,  89;  extracts  from  message,  1806, 
90,  91  ;  extracts  from  message,  1809,  95  ;  indorses  protection  of  manufact- 
ures to  extent  of  prohibition  when  necessary,  95  ;  message,  1809,  referred  to 
Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96 ;  report  of  committee  upon 
message,  96;  extract  from  letter  to  Benjamin  Austin,  1816,  137;  extract 
from  letter  to  William  Simpson,  1817,  138;  asserts  doctrine  of  protection, 
314;  member  of  protection  society  in  New  York,  470. 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  charges  Polk  with  misleading  voters  in  campaign  of  1844,  362;  his 
reply  to  Dallas,  363. 

Richard  M.,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 ;  votes  for  tariff  of 

1816,  134;  advocates  "American  System,"  and  supports  Kane's  motion, 

210. 

K. 

Kane,  of  Illinois,  motion  of,  to  "lay  duty  on  lead,  etc.,"  209. 

John  K.,  letter  of,  to  Polk,  354 ;  extracts  from  Folk's  reply  to,  355. 


Lands,  Public,  receipts  from,  1832,  243  ;  1833,  291 ;   1835,  292;   1836,  293  ;   1839,  311 ; 

1837  to  1840,  332. 
London  Post,  513. 
Lowndes,  William,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121  ;  remarks  upon  tariff 

law  of  1816,  130  ;  votes  for  tariff  of  1816,  134. 
Lumpkin,  William,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 ;  votes  for  tariff  of 

1816,  134. 

M. 

Macon,  Naftianiel,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 

Madison,  James,  supports  and  votes  for  "  Act  for  laying  duty  on  goods,  etc.,  imported 
into  United  States,"  48  ;  introduces  bill  into  Congress  for  collection  of  import 
duties,  49 ;  explanation  of  his  general  purpose,  50 ;  primary  object  of  bill  wa%. 
revenue,  50 ;  powers  of  Congress  as  declared  by  him,  51,  441,  443,  444  ;  his 
discussion  of  Fitzimon's  amendment,  53;  in  perfect  accord  with  the  con. 
stitutionality  and  necessity  of  protection,  55;  assents  to  Fitzimon's  amend 
ment,  57  ;  remarks  of,  61,  62,  63, 65,  66 ;  mentioned,  72 ;  condition  of  afiain. 
at  commencement  of  his  administration,  103  ;  his  first  annual  message,  104; 
second  message,  106;  third  message,  107;  message  of  1813,  108;  specif 
message,  1815,  III ;  his  views  with  reference  to  best  mode  of  raising  revenue, 
114;  his  recommendation  passes  the  tariff  law  of  1816,  115;  his  views  in 
1828,  116;  portion  of  message  recommending  protection  referred  to  Com 
mittee  of  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  122;  policy  of  his  administratiot, 
influenced  by  course  of  English  statesmen  and  manufacturers,  127 ;  sentiment 
of  protection  increased  during  his  administration,  139;  asserts  doctrine  oi 
protection,  314;  member  of  protective  society  of  New  York,  470. 

Marion,  of  South  Carolina,  member  of  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96. 


INDEX.  543 

McDuffie,  George,  threatens  to  dissolve  the  Union,  198-200;  Chairman  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means,  247;  report  by,  249;  extracts  from  report  of,  251-252; 
refuses  to  support  Jackson,  259;  extracts  from  his  inaugural  address  as 
Governor  of  South  Carolina,  296,  297. 

McKim,  of  Maryland,  member  of  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96. 

McLean.  John,  member  House  oi  Representatives  1816,  121. 

Lewis,  Secretary  of  Treasury,  report  of,  228  ;  recommends  ordinary  expenditures 

be  increased,  243 ;  extract  from  his  report,  244. 

Mexican  War,  413. 

Middleton,  Henry,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 

Mifilin,  Governor,  presides  over  meeting,  35. 

Monroe,  James,  Secretary  of  State,  113;  President,  144;  extract  from  inaugural  address, 
1817,  144;  extract  from  first  annual  message,  1817,  145;  extract  from 
message,  1821,  147;  favors  protection,  148;  recommends  increase  of  pro- 
tective duties  in  response  to  free  trade  speculations,  152 ;  extract  from 
message  of  1823,  152;  recommends  "additional  protection,"  154;  recom- 
mendation not  regarded  as  especially  referring  to  cotton,  164 ;  asserts  doctrine 
of  protection,  314. 

Mumford,  of  New  York,  member  of  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96. 

N. 

Navigation  Laws  limit  shipments  of  exports  and  imports  to  English  ships,  26 

New  Mexico,  acquired  by  United  States,  41 3. 

Newton,  of  Virginia,  Chairman  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96,  122. 

New  York,  mechanics  and  manufacturers  petition  Congress,  1789,  39;  sells  State  bonds, 

427;   society   for   encouragement  of  domestic   manufactures   formed,  469; 

extract  from  address  of  society,  469  ;  importance  of  society,  470;  Jefferson, 

Madison,  and  John  Adams,  members,  470. 
Nullification  ordinance,  passed  in  South  Carolina,  260-264  >  purpose  of,  265 ;  opposed 

by  Jackson,  265. 

O. 

Ohio,  formed,  467. 

P. 

Pall  Mall  Gazette,  513. 

Parliament,  prohibited  exportations  from  Colonies,  1732,25;  permitted  exportation  of 

pig  iron  from  Colonies,  1750,  25  ;  prohibited  erection  of  rolling  mills  and 

making  of  steel,  25. 
Pennsylvania,  society  formed  in,  1787,  33;  object  of  society,  34;  active  and  efficient 

measures  adopted,  35. 

Philadelphia,  committee  of  Jackson's  supporters  organized  in,  195. 
Pickings,  Timothy,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 
Pierce,  Franklin,  President,  416;  approves  tariff  act  of  1857,  418. 

Polk,  James  K.,  candidate  for  President,  1844,  350;  his  position  equivocal,  351 ;  extract 
fc  from  letter  opposed  to  tariff  of  1842,  352  ;  advocates  repeal  of  tariff  of  1842, 

352;    reply  to  John  K.  Kane,  355;   his  circular  letter,  356,  367;    letter 


544  INDEX. 

followed  by  injurious  consequences,  357 ;  history  of  his  administration,  359 ; 
extract  from  the  history,  361,  394;  supported  in  cotton  sections  as  friend  of 
tariff  for  revenue  only,  364  ;  supported  in  manufacturing  sections  as  a  friend 
of  protection,  364;  his  election  procured  by  fraud,  364;  vote  received  by 
him,  364 ;  would  have  been  defeated  if  protection  votes  had  been  withheld 
from  him,  365;  his  election  a  surprise,  366;  not  the  choice  of  a  majority  of 
the  convention,  366;  his  election  made  the  issue  between  protection  and  free 
trade,  367;  his  Cabinet  half  from  North  and  half  from  South,  369;  his  first 
message  a  step  toward  repeal  of  tariff  of  1842,  370;  message  contradicts  the 
Kane  letter,  370;  recommends  a  "revenue  standard,"  371  ;  his  the  first 
sectional  administration,  374;  perfect  accord  between  English  statesmen  and 
his  administration,  386;  his  administration  triumphed  by  passage  of  tariff  act 
of  1846,  392. 
Porter,  of  Pennsylvania,  member  of  Committee  on  Commerce  and  Manufactures,  96. 

Q. 

Quesnay  and  Turgot,  theories  of,  in  France,  mentioned,  159. 


Randolph,  John,  opposes  resolution  of  Mr.  Bacon  in  House  of  Representatives,  99. 
Railroads,  miles  of  increased  in  U.  S.,  404;  growth  of  stimulated  business,  414,  415; 

number  of  miles  in  U.  S.,  1849  to  l854«  414> 
Ricardo,  free  trade  theories  of,  in  Great  Britain,  172,  504,  506. 
Richmond,  association  of  citizens,  1789,  and  their  resolutions,  32. 
Roane,  William  H.,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 
Ruggles,  Nathaniel,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 
Rush,  Richard,  Attorney-General,  opposes  tariff  law  of  1816,  131. 

S. 

Sergeant,  John,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 

Sherman,  of  Connecticut,  proposition  of,  to  levy  duty  on  manufactured  tobacco,  61. 

Smith,  William,  of  South  Carolina,  opposes  proposition  to  levy  tax  on  salt,  59 ;  extract 
from  speech,  60;  mentioned,  71. 

of  Maryland,  opposes  reduction  of  duty  on  teas,  240. 

Smith  and  Hume,  free  trade  theories  of,  no,  159,  172,  502. 

South  Carolina,  casts  vote  for  John  Floyd,  259;  passes  nullification  ordinance,  260-264; 
Governor  issues  counter-proclamation  defying  authority  of  U.  S.,  276;  cotton 
planters  declared  there  was  but  one  basis  of  reconciliation,  280 ;  gives  elec- 
toral vote  to  Van  Buren,  305. 

Stevenson,  Andrew,  elected  Speaker  of  the  House,  247. 

T. 

Tariff,  advantages  of  protective  over  revenue,  434. 

law  of  1816,  118;  discussion  of  in  House  of  Representatives,  129;  passed,  134; 

vote  upon,  135  ;  mainly  supported  by  Middle  and  Western  States,  135;  dis- 
cussion of,  not  confined  to  Congress,  137. 


INDEX.  545 

Tariff  law  of  1824,   162;    followed   by  serious  and    threatening  consequences,   162; 
continues  duty  of  1816  on  cotton,  164. 

of  1828,  209;  revenue  under,  231. 

of  1832,  pnssed,  approved  by  Jackson,  233,  235;  bill  modifying,  reported 

by  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  285 ;  continued  to  act  until  close  of 
Jackson's  administration,  289. 

of  1842,  first  bill  passed  and  vetoed  by  Tyler,  344 ;  passed  over  veto,  344 ; 

was  of  two-fold  character,  347 ;  its  beneficial  effects,  348 ;  political  results 
following,  349;  opposed  by  cotton  States,  352;  receipts  from  customs  under, 
395  ;  expenditures  under,  396;  public  debt  during  its  operation,  397. 

of  1846,  passage  of,  392 ;  intended  to  put  an  end  to  protection,  393 ;  receipts 

from  customs  under,  395,  397 ;  expenditures  under,  396,  397  ;  public  debt 
under  its  operation,  397  ;  in  operation  eleven  years,  397,  409 ;  imports 
increased  because  exports  were  increased,  399;  additional  Imports  for  1847 
attributed  to  increased  prosperity  of  agricultural  and  manufacturing  sections, 
401  ;  the  law  a  mistake,  402  to  405  ;  arguments  of  its  advocates,  405 ;  answer 
to  argument,  406,  407 ;  passage  of  contemporaneous  with  repeal  of  English 
corn  lawj  489. 

of  1857,  an  administration  measure,  416;  additional  step  toward  free  trade, 

417  ;  approved  by  Pierce,  418 ;  effects  produced  by  it  and  tariff  of  1847,  422. 

of  March  2,  1861,  passed  and  approved  by  Buchanan,  427. 

of  August,  1861,  passed  and  approved  by  Lincoln,  427. 


Taxes,  necessary  to  carry  on  government,  493  ;  direct  and  indirect,  494. 

Timkins,  D.,  President  of  "  American  Society  for  Encouragement  of  Domestic  Manufac- 
tures," 469. 

Treasury,  the,  condition  of  in  1830-1831,  238;  balance  reduced,  1832,  279;  balance  at 
close  of  1833,  291 ;  receipts  and  expenditures,  1833,  291  ;  receipts  and 
expenditures,  1835,  292;  receipts  and  expenditures,  1836,  293,  308;  surplus 
in,  293;  available  balance,  receipts  and  expenditures,  1839,  311;  notes 
issued,  1839,  311;  depletion  of,  threatens  credit  of  government,  329 ;  balance 
March  4,  1841,  331;  notes  issued  1841,  331 ;  financial  condition  deplorable, 
331 ;  manner  in  which  condition  was  produced,  331  ;  receipts  from  customs, 
1828  to  1833,  331 ;  receipts  from  customs,  183410  1840,  332;  gross  expendi- 
tures, 1837  to  1840,  332 ;  receipts  from  loans  and  treasury  notes,  1837  to 
1840,  332;  from  public  lands,  1837  to  1840,  332;  from  miscellaneous  sources, 
1837  to  1840,  332;  receipts  from  customs,  1839,332;  receipts  ran  down, 
1840,  333;  receipts  from  customs,  1841,  333  ;  relieved  by  tariff  law  of  1842, 
349;  receipts  from  customs,  1843,  I&44»  J&45>  and  1846,  349;  receipts  from 
customs  under  tariff  of  1842, 395  ;  receipts  from  customs  under  tariff  of  1846, 
395>  397;  expenditures  under  tariff  of  1842,  396;  expenditures  under  tariff 
of  1846,  396,  397;  table  of  receipts  and  expenditures,  1847  to  1857,  411  ; 
receipts  from  customs,  1857,418;  receipts  from  customs,  1858,419;  table, 
receipts  and  expenditures,  1858  to  1861,420;  embarrassed  under  Buchanan, 
424;  compelled  to  borrow  money,  426,  427 ;  its  condition  at  present,  428; 
receipts  from  customs  and  value  of  dutiable  articles,  table,  1862  to  1880,  429. 

"  •  Secretary  of,  suggests  reduction  in  the  revenue,  a8o;  extracts  from  report  of, 

281  ;  report,  1841,  340 ;  offers  government  stocks  for  sale,  426. 


INDEX. 

Tucker,  Henry  St.  George,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121. 

Tyler,  John,  Vice-President,  acts  as  President,  330;  occupies  "  half-way  house  "  between 
protection  and  free  trade,  330;  declares  anticipative  means  of  treasury  inade- 
quate, 331;  met  with  embarrassing  question  of  relieving  treasury,  333; 
approves  "a  system  of  discriminating  duties,"  335;  first  annual  message, 
335;  extract  from  special  message,  March  8,  1842,  337;  embarrassments 
increased,  338;  extract  from  special  message,  March  25,  1842,  338;  advises 
additional  duties  on  imports,  341  ;  his  veto  of  first  tariff  bill  of  1842,  343-344; 
his  second  veto,  344 ;  grounds  of,  344. 


U. 

United  States,  the  advantages  of  the  people,  20 ;  original  extent  of,  28 ;  population  of  in 
1787,  29;  condition  of  shipping  in  1787,  29;  pursuits  of  different  sections 
of,  30;  condition  of  manufactures  and  foreign  trade,  30;  comparison  of 
exports  and  imports,  1787,  31 ;  diversity  of  sentiment  creates  two  classes,  60; 
condition  at  beginning  of  Adams'  administration,  84 ;  state  of  affairs  at  close 
of  Jefferson's  administration,  94;  prosperity  increasing  at  beginning  of 
Monroe's  administration,  145;  general  depression  of  values  in  1819,  146; 
brighter  financial  prospects  in  1821,  146;  condition  during  Monroe's  admin- 
istration, 150;  condition  at  beginning  of  Jackson's  Administration,  219; 
approach  of  sectional  controversy,  229;  gross  expenditures,  1831  and  1832,. 
279 ;  balance  in  Treasury  reduced,  279 ;  revenue  from  customs,  and 
expenditures,  under  tariff  of  1832,  289;  receipts  and  expenditures,  1833, 
291  ;  expenditures  reduced  and  revenue  from  customs  increased,  1835,  292; 
gross  receipts  larger  than  since  war  with  Great  Britain,  292 ;  receipts  and 
expenditures,  1836,  293;  fiscal  affairs  grow  worse,  311;  receipts  and 
expenditures,  1839,  311  5  receipts  and  expenditures  under  tariff  of  1842,  395, 
396;  same  under  tariff  of  1846,  395,  396;  debt  under  tariff  of  1842  and 
1846,  397  ;  credit  of,  threatened,  329;  majority  of  people  in  favor  of  protec- 
tion in  1844,  365;  free  trade  hurtful  to  all  sections  of,  392;  imports 
increased  because  exports  increased,  399 ;  additional  imports,  1847,  caused 
by  increased  prosperity-  of  agricultural  and  manufacturing  sections,  401 ;, 
imports  for  1845,  4O2>  revenue  fell  short,  1847,  402 ;  table  of  receipts  and 
expenditures,  1847  to  J857>  411  >  acquired  New  Mexico  and  California, 
413;  discovery  of  gold  stimulates  industry,  413;  public  credit  impaired 
under  Buchanan,  424,  425 ;  compelled  to  borrow  money,  426,  427 ;  credit 
reduced  below  that  of  States,  427  ;  credit  never  better  than  at  present,  428 ; 
imported  articles  on  free  list,  449,  450;  prices  regulated  by  supply  and 
demand,  450-454 ;  production  of  wheat,  461  ;  intercourse  with  England, 
466;  estimated  value  of  property,  1870  and  1880,  495;  assessed  value  of 
property,  1870  and  1880,  495-496 ;  assessed  value  of  real  estate  and  personal 
property,  1880,  496. 

.  Telegraph  advocates  election  of  Jackson  to  Presidency,  190;  charges 

Adams,  Clay  and  Webster  with  combining  to  "defeat  the  tariff,"  190;  article 
published  in,  191  ;  extracts  from  editorials,  192. 


INDEX.  547 

V. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  supports  tariff  bill  of  1828,  212;  nominated  for  Vice-Presidency, 
256;  receives  electoral  vote  of  all  cotton-growing  States,  except  South 
Carolina,  259;  President,  1837,  301;  convenes  extra  session  of  Congress, 
301 ;  his  object  to  provide  relief  for  financial  embarrassment,  301 ;  his 
special  message,  301 ;  revenue  declining  during  administration,  302 ;  did 
not  fully  comprehend  condition  of  affairs,  303 ;  looked  to  cotton  for  relief, 
304 ;  received  electoral  vote  of  South  Carolina,  New  Hampshire  and  Illinois, 
305  ;  incompetent  to  meet  the  issues,  306 ;  fiscal  affairs  of  government  grow 
worse,  311;  his  policy  tends  to  increase  embarrassment,  311;  quotation 
from  third  message,  311;  his  mistakes  defeated  him  in  1840,  312;  the 
choice  of  a  majority  of  the  nominating  convention  of  1 844,  366. 

Van  Ness,  John  P.,  195. 

Verplank,  of  New  York,  member  of  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  247. 

W. 

Walker,  Robt.  J.,  Secretary  of  Treasury,  an  advocate  of  free  trade,  374,  381  ;  extracts 

from  his  report,  375,  382 ;  reasons  for  supporting  free  trade,  388. 
Washington,  George,  his  first  Presidential  message,  1790,  43;  his  second  message,  44; 

recommends  protection,  45  ;  in  perfect  accord  with  the  constitutionality  and 

necessity  of  protection,  55 ;   approves  protection  —  extracts   from  his  last 

message,  70. 
Webster,  Daniel,  member  of  House  of  Representatives,  1816,  121 ;  advocates  reduction 

of  duty  on  teas,  240;  opposes  compromise  act  of  1833,  288;  charges  Polk 

with  deception  in  campaign  of  1844,  362. 
Wheat,  price  of,  regulated  more  by  English  than  American  demand,  453 ;  necessity  for 

protecting  it,  455-459;  product  of  in  U.  S.,  461. 
Wilde,  of  Georgia,  member  of  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  248. 
Wright,  Silas,  supports  tariff  bill  of  1828,  212. 
Worthington,  of  Maryland,  member  of  Committee  on  Manufactures,  248. 


Return  to  desk  from  which  borrowed. 


REC'D  LI 

DEC  4  - 1959 


REC'D  LD 

MAR  23 19SO 


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